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This is not to say, of course, that individual or collective behaviour is altogether 
irrelevant. It is clear, for example, that consumers and producers’ preferences as 
to present and future output have a direct impact on the economy. Yet, 
individual or collective decisions cannot modify the nature of the laws 
governing our economic systems, since not one of them is based on or 
influenced by economics agents’ behaviour. Macroeconomic laws derive from 
the double-entry book-keeping nature of money and are concerned with the 
logical structure of payments relating to production and exchange. Far from 
being influenced by individual or collective behaviour, these laws set the 
structural framework within which economic agents are free to take their 
decisions and model their society in accordance with a set of ethical, juridical, 
sociological, and political rules that go far beyond the field of economics proper.  
(Cencini 2005: 279
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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
This work examines an existing anomaly within the system of international payments and 
shows how it lies at the core of a duplication occurrence that adversely compounds external 
debt.  
 
It considers the case of the European monetary union.  We explain why it would be in 
Member States’ best economic interest, with respect to tackling their external debt and 
ultimately its sustainability, if efforts were concentrated first and foremost on correcting the 
faulty infrastructure that currently afflicts the process of international payments through lack 
of payment finality.  We evidence how it would enable current member nations to regain their 
respective monetary sovereignties and thus all distinct tools of the trade essential to 
prosperous and sustainable growth, while simultaneously curbing their external debt.  The 
approach advocated in this paper purports an alternative to the present status quo of trying to 
keep afloat a fragile monetary union despite its inherent problems and risks of irreversible 
negative impact.  
 
Our analysis finds strong evidence to support the fact that it is primarily this payment 
anomaly that perversely affects economic growth through external debt duplication, in turn 
responsible for fuelling and escalating a worldwide financial crisis.  
 
Finally, we bring forward the very fundamental chord responsible for undermining the 
European ‘monetary union’ in its current state – the delusion of an authentic single currency.  
We show how this revelation becomes undoubtedly evident when examining the procedural 
steps involved and currently in place at the level of international payments.  Moreover we 
demonstrate how, in the presence of this deficient payment system, external debt duplication 
arises to further exacerbate the financial instability in Member States where the analysis is 
predominantly relevant.  These countries are particularly vulnerable in their powerlessness to 
rectify the situation given the absence of respective monetary sovereignties that forms the 
basis of the Union.  The ultimate implication is the inability of Member States to embark 
upon a path of recovery and sustainable long-term economic growth. 
 
The paradox is that, having seemingly joined the European ‘monetary union’ in their quest for 
curtailing the unfavourable effects of exchange rate volatility, Member States have become 
even greater victims amidst the challenging course and devastating consequences of external 
debt duplication. Our research deliberates the alternative of a viable and positive resolve as 
could be achieved under the aegis of the Schmitt School’s theoretical approach – quantum 
monetary macroeconomics – also known as the theory of money emissions. 
 
1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
In writing this thesis we endeavour to unveil the merits that permeate the fundaments of a 
system of absolute exchange rates. We aim to impart its intrinsic virtue of stability in that it is 
essentially a system of distinct attributes that fosters stable1 exchange rates. Moreover, were it 
adapted in conjunction with a comprehensive system of international payments all 
encompassing of a supranational currency that would carry out the payments through the 
systematic mediation of a supranational institution, this system of absolute exchange rates 
would yield optimal conditions for a propitious financial climate and sound economic 
evolution. 
 
Still in these modern times, a system of relative exchange rates founds the basis of our current 
system of international payments despite its incompatibility with exchange rate stability and 
ultimately with the true nature of bank money, a unit of account emitted by banks – via the 
unique double-entry bookkeeping mechanism – as their acknowledgement of debt. 
 
Unfortunately, it is in a very system of relative exchange rates that a currency is made to 
identify with a net asset and as such becomes the object of final payment, rather than a simple 
means of payment as it ought to be in keeping with the principles of banking money. It thus 
finds its way to the foreign exchange market, falling victim to speculation and consequent 
relentless pressures of erratic fluctuations. In fact, it is this resultant pressing environment that 
became the driving thrust behind countries eventually forsaking the regime of fixed exchange 
rates, given the otherwise necessary costly interventions of their respective governments. It 
even incited some to believe in the benefits of currency unions as a more permanent 
alternative to ensuring exchange rate stability, hence the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that later led 
to the creation of the Euro – the single European currency. Withal, our research undertakes to 
evidence the underlining paradox associated with the claim of having established such a 
currency union. 
 
We expound our reasoning as to why we advocate that a single European currency does not in 
fact exist. Moreover, we explain why restoring monetary sovereignty is crucially more 
important than striving to correct a faulty system of international payments such that it could 
deliver a proper single European currency, which currently it falls short of delivering. We 
demonstrate how European countries (whether Member States of the European ‘monetary 
union’ or non-members) or any other country in the world, would best progress towards 
sustainable economic growth were they to retain their own currencies and consort to rectify 
the anomaly of our current international payment system by adopting a supranational money 
                                                
1 The system inherently prevents currencies from being available for trade on the monetary 
market. Hence, by default, exchange rate fluctuations are reduced (a complete halt would not 
only necessitate a more universal application but as well, a viable plan to re-absorb currencies 
which have already made their way to the foreign exchange market − on account of our 
current non-system of international payments which is based on a regime of relative exchange 
rates) without the need for a monetary authority’s costly intervention to otherwise ‘fix’ the 
exchange rate. 
2 
with which to carry out their international financial transactions, and this, via the intermediary 
of a central counterparty clearing house. We evidence how this undertaking, concurrently 
with enabling them to rein in their respective sovereign debt levels, would curb exchange rate 
instability.  
 
The order with which we unfold the chapters of our subject reflects a dual focus. It attempts to 
parallel the sterling logic that pervades the reasoning of a theory constructed, evolved and 
continually advanced by economists Schmitt, Cencini et al., whilst staying abreast of the 
chaos that fuels an ongoing global financial crisis – within which state of affairs – this theory 
labours to vindicate the tenets of its doctrine. 
 
 
 
Moving onwards and upwards from a current state of affairs… 
 
The system of international payments that we advocate is primarily illustrated through a 
scaled-down application that could easily befit the existing institutional infrastructures at the 
European Union level. Through tailored modifications of its current structural set-up of 
payment processes, the European Central Bank could readily take the lead with a new sound 
and exemplary system of payments at its helm that would serve well participant European 
countries.  
 
The Euro zone – On the horns of a trilemma 
 
But how is the current plight of Euro Member States truly envisioned? Is their state of 
quandary really at an impasse? Not necessarily, it would seem rather more about which of 
three options to choose from, that is, which has the most promise to lead Euro Land to the 
Promised Land. 
 
 
A first option – Feign mellowness and continue to muddle through as though all is sweetness 
and light. 
 
Amid a deteriorating economic and financial environment, to all appearances this is 
surprisingly the course currently navigated – nation leaders desperately struggling to keep 
their respective ideals afloat despite gloomy forebodings that they might actually be riding a 
tsunami. In all fairness, perhaps they are simply affording the situation the benefit of the 
doubt in the absence of full and compelling evidence, that is, being unaware of a crucial and 
fundamental truth – the precarious situation that Member States find themselves in – in 
having seemingly joined a currency union when in point of fact analytical findings point to a 
very different reality. Put in a nutshell, the very fact that Member States – despite they’re 
having adhered to a ‘monetary union’ – do not process the entirety of their international 
payment transactions via the intermediary of the ECB (European Central Bank), means that 
their inter-nations payments do not actually take place within a unique monetary system, the 
latter being devoid of monetary homogeneity. The lack of this homogeneous characteristic 
has serious implications for the servicing of external debt. ‘Monetary homogeneity is what 
allows for a unique payment of debts; monetary heterogeneity, on the contrary, entails their 
double payment, since they require a transfer of income and the purchase of the vehicle 
necessary for the transfer in order to be effective’ (Cencini 1995: 7).  
3 
In this state of affairs, particularly given the absence of a system of international payments 
based on a regime of absolute exchange rates2 which guarantees the vehicular use of bank 
money, the double burden of external debt duplication negatively weighs on Member States’ 
respective economies. Moreover, they find themselves in a tight situation with no individual 
tools3 of retaliation with which to counter their parlous economic state, having waived their 
respective monetary sovereignties. 
 
 
A second option – Embrace the reality that Member States of the Euro zone are not actually 
part of a currency union and aim to modify the existing anomalous payment system such as to 
render the Euro zone a truly homogeneous monetary area.  
 
This course might appeal the most even if beguilingly. European nation leaders may find it 
more viable to their idealistic endeavours and less daring than the immediate challenge of 
ceding monetary sovereignty back to the current Member States.  
Though in the short-term the proposal has some remedial aspects4, in the long-term it is not 
without its consequential reverses5. 
Essentially they would be setting themselves up as a United States of Europe and all 
reciprocal payment transactions amongst Member States of the Euro zone would be processed 
in a same manner as it currently is within any national payment system. This in itself would 
solve their external debt problem and thus greatly improve their long-term prospect for 
economic growth. 
Still, the general state of things would not yield the optimum conditions for nurturing 
sustainable economic progress and sound financial stability that could otherwise be attained if 
Member States were to brave taking over the reins of their respective monetary sovereignties, 
                                                
2 Our current non-system of international payments is based on a regime of relative exchange 
rates in which each national currency is exchanged against another nation’s currency. In this 
regime, bank money is considered to have intrinsic value, of being an asset per se versus 
being a simple means of payment. Specifically, a system of relative exchange rates inherently 
lends itself to a process of duplication that transforms bank money from a mere means of 
payment into an object of payment on account of the fact that this system does not enable a 
vehicular use of bank money. ‘The circular use of money requires international payments to 
be carried out in such a way that no foreign currency is ever entered on the assets side of a net 
exporting country’s balance sheet as the final counterpart of its net commercial exports’ 
(Cencini 2000: 19). 
3 Despite each country’s unique individual make-up, the fact is that Member States have 
given up their respective monetary sovereignties to the central governing of the ECB and 
hence have lost essential monetary tools with which to govern their economic and financial 
policies as per their specific needs, e.g. setting their own interest rates. 
4 If the Eurozone were an authentic homogeneous monetary zone, the entirety of its inter-
nations’ (Member States) payment transactions would be carried out through the systematic 
mediation of the ECB and as such Member States would avoid the double charge of external 
debt servicing. 
5 Securing the Euro by rectifying the anomaly within the current payment system does not 
avoid the detrimental effects that some features inherent to a currency union may have. For 
example, the specific make-up of the union may be conducive to capital movement that may – 
in the long-term – increase the disparity that much more amongst Members States (if we 
recall the negative consequences that capital movement could have on employment) and as 
such fuel an interdependency that may be unwelcomed, if not unsustainable, by some. 
4 
as they once have in the past. The difference with now and then is that they could do so 
simultaneously with adopting a new payment system6 that would utilize the Euro solely to 
process the entirety of the member participants’ reciprocal payment transactions – through the 
mediation of a third counter party institution7 – whilst all of their intra-nation payments would 
be carried out in their respective currencies. 
 
 
A third option – Aim for the sky and go the full nine yards. Restore monetary sovereignty in 
each of the current Member States and, together with any new European member participant, 
embark upon a path of sustainable financial stability and long-term economic growth.  
 
This course has veritable potential for nurturing a viable European bond, more realistically 
than a mere currency union8 could ever hope to accomplish. European nations would 
naturally draw closer together towards a sound and prosperous union of strong commercial 
affiliation with mutually reciprocal economic ties, enabling them to build upon an integrated 
structural framework more conducive to financial and economic stability.  
Moreover, Nations would regain the powers of their respective monetary sovereignties along 
with its associated diversified advantages without the destabilizing effect of fluctuations of 
exchange rates9. 
Of course, the endeavour that we hereby advocate could not be successively achieved without 
an accompanying reform of the current payment system at the European level. The current 
regime of relative exchange rates will have to be replaced with one of absolute exchange rates 
that would assuredly yield monetary homogeneity through the issuance of a common currency 
for member participants’ use in all of and solely for their reciprocal payment transactions10. 
 
In conclusion, the passage from a regime of relative to one of absolute 
exchange rates would mark a radical change for the European monetary system. 
Without depriving EU countries of their national currencies, the new structure 
of payments will gather the different countries together in a common area 
where transactions among them will all be settled by the use of a common 
money: the euro. While protecting themselves from capital flight, EU countries 
will benefit from a mechanism guaranteeing exchange rate stability and will, in 
the meantime, create the sound premises for an increasing economic 
integration. This would be achieved, let us say it once again, through the 
monetary and financial intermediation of the ECB, and would invest the ECB 
                                                
6 The idea would be to base this new system of inter-nations payments, for member 
participants, on a regime of absolute exchange rates. 
7 Ideally, the ECB would assume the role. 
8 Or, any specific compulsory unified set of rules or directive forming the basis of any other 
pertinent future alliances or unions, e.g. fiscal/banking union, which may be even self-
defeating in the long run, for certain nations. 
9 That is, amongst European participating members – ridding our economies, universally, of 
exchange rate erratic fluctuations would warrant a more comprehensive reform of ecumenical 
applicability. Later on in the paper, we will return and elucidate this ultimate ‘sonata’ that 
could potentially be played out in the fullness of time.  
10 Specifically, we intend ‘a system of payments in which money is used only 
‘vehicularly’’(Cencini 2000: 18) and through the intermediation of a third counter party 
institution, a role that the ECB could readily embrace. 
 
5 
with the tasks of creating the euro as a European vehicular money, managing 
the system of inter-European (gross) settlements, and providing extra 
investments to less developed countries. 
(Cencini 2001: 18−19) 
 
In the ensuing sections, we advance the arguments pertinent to the thesis’s mission via a top-
down approach that will deviate intermittently from the intended course such as to reveal the 
essence of key components and principles fundamental to the theory and various concepts. 
 
The first chapter (Part I) focuses on the principle of monetary homogeneity versus 
heterogeneity through which it introduces fundamental concepts pertinent to a monetary 
economy. We evidence the lack of payment finality within the EMU’s current payment 
regime and the resulting payment imbalances, amongst Member States, that fuel an ongoing 
crisis. We emphasize the raison d’être of Central Banks in affording monetary homogeneity at 
the national payment level and demonstrate how, contrarily, this lacks at the international 
level. We show how our current non-system of international payments, being based on a 
regime of relative exchange rates, is unable to solve the problem of monetary heterogeneity at 
the international level of payments. We explain how this leads to serious payment anomalies 
with self-defeating effects. Finally, we expose the current sentiment with respect to the very 
latest state of the alliances be it the EMU or the EU. We advocate a backward step onto a path 
of ‘sustainable retreat’ versus continuing on a quest for the Holy Grail – the ‘sustainable 
development’11 of the EMU. In this regard, we close with an enlightened reflection from 
Lovelock. 
The second chapter (Part II) evokes a macroeconomic approach to our analysis, overall. It 
recalls the ‘template’ of bank-money and explains the appearance of money-income into our 
capitalist systems. The analysis emphasizes the fundaments of double-entry bookkeeping 
from which the macroeconomic laws of logical identities are derived. It stresses the 
importance of recognizing the existence of nations as macroeconomic entities. It elaborates on 
the concept of double-entry bookkeeping such as to distinguish it from that of double double-
entry bookkeeping, which elaboration more clearly evidences the vehicular aspect of bank-
money. Finally, it explains the interrelatedness of the balance-of-payments identity to that of 
double double-entry bookkeeping. In closing we remind of the persistent payment imbalances 
as revealed in the statistical data covering both the global current and, capital and financial 
accounts despite the strict adherence to double-entry recording. We suggest that a thorough 
analysis of international payment flows may help us understand the mystery behind the 
imbalances. 
Chapter three (Part II) revisits Schmitt’s (1975) fundamental macroeconomic law of the 
identity between each economic agent’s sales and purchases and considers how it all plays out 
in an international context by examining the evolvement of international payment flows 
between countries. That is, given the defective infrastructure of our current international 
payment ‘system’. We evidence a pathological malfunction of the monetary flows implicated 
in a nation’s net foreign borrowing, an impairment that leads to a costly net monetary outflow 
for these nations whose gain is more often than not, less than its expenditures, in foreign 
money. 
Chapter four (Part II) provides a brief history on the progress realized to date in understanding 
world accounting discrepancies. It sets out to unveil them whilst exposing its unique source-
cause: external debt servicing. In so doing, it highlights the essence of nations as 
                                                
11 Both expressions ‘sustainable retreat’ and ‘sustainable development’ derive from Lovelock 
2006: 7. 
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macroeconomic entities, reflected in the very macroeconomic element that characterizes 
international payment transactions. The ‘missing surplus’ is ultimately exposed followed by 
the ‘missing capital outflow’. We end with closing remarks regarding the double charge of net 
interest payments. 
In chapter five (Part II) we concentrate on Schmitt’s (2014) double charge claim with regard 
to countries’ external debts. We examine his various, versatile and all in all compatible proofs 
that undeniably demonstrate the pathological formation of a sovereign debt that adds to that of 
an ‘ordinary’ debt, the result being that it duplicates a deficit nation’s external debt. We 
emphasize the importance of net imports’ distinctive payment. We study some of Schmitt’s 
double-loan arguments starting with his demonstration that net imports are paid both in real 
and in money terms. Moreover, we consider the fact that they are paid by an income 
originating from the domestic production of the rest of the world. We observe the additive 
lien that links the two distinct debts: the ‘ordinary’ and sovereign debts. We then consider 
Schmitt’s single-loan argument and conclude this last section with a sub-section dedicated to 
the compatibility of Schmitt’s varied proofs, whether single or double-loan. 
Chapter six (Part III) introduces the reform. In particular, we focus on Schmitt’s (2014) 
single-country reform. The chapter’s first section puts it forward through yet another 
specifically pertinent demonstration of Schmitt’s double charge claim. The second section of 
the chapter gives a thorough overview of this distinctly independent reform. Several sub-
sections ensue, three of which concentrate on the ‘Bureau’, a core internal country department 
to be established by any reforming country: first introducing the idea or, principle behind it; 
secondly, its essential functions; thirdly, a brief summary of its mechanism. A next sub-
section covers the governing rule that underlines the basis of international exchanges, that of 
the necessary reciprocal parity of expenditures between trading countries. Two other relevant 
sub-sections follow: the first lays bare the double charge by unmasking the very method by 
which the parity of reciprocal imports is, today, attained; the second compares today’s method 
with tomorrow’s method of attaining it, that is, as the single-country reform would 
accomplish. Finally, we bring the chapter to a close through a final sub-section that provides 
some correlating evidence and concluding observations. 
In chapter seven (Part III) we put forward a conceptual framework that could form the basis 
of a more elaborate reform − the multi-country reform. We present the fundamental 
mechanics of a partial system of international payments, based on absolute exchange rates and 
operating multilaterally with a real-time gross settlement mechanism. The reform that we 
advocate is illustrated through a scale-down version of a more comprehensive reform that 
could, ultimately, encompass all world countries. Its initial application at the European level 
could, admittedly, easily befit the institutional infrastructure the likes of the ECB, if tailored 
modifications of its current payment system were undertaken. Still, our study-module consists 
rather of a diligently chosen group of seven European countries, non-Euro zone members that 
could potentially more willingly embrace the multi-country reform, as well as realistically 
deliver a successful result from their endeavour. The reform that we elaborate aims at 
achieving the same beneficial results, for participant member countries, as would be obtained 
through Schmitt’s single-country reform. It implies, however, the need for a decisive political 
will to create a world/European intermediary settlement institution that would be 
complemented with its own currency standard with which to mediate the new system’s 
overall payment transactions. 
Finally, in chapter eight (Part III) we conclude our study with a retrospective view on the state 
of affairs and reflect on how countries could choose, or not, to move it along on a more 
progressive and sustainable path. 
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Part I  Anent monetary macroeconomics 
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1   Some specifics on the realities and effects of a 
monetary economy −  a monetary economy of production 
within a nation’s boundary, a monetary economy of 
exchange across it’s borders 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We introduce in generalities and on the whole, fundamental concepts of a monetary economy 
that we will later elaborate more specifically in ensuing chapters. 
 
	  
Fundamentals underlying the mechanics and settlement of intra-national 
economic transactions 
 
Let us consider the underlying principles governing the general scheme of a payment system 
as it currently operates within nations, and as it would likely happen for Member States were 
they to actually form a one-nation Confederacy. 
Starting with bank money we remind of its capacity for providing ‘the objective numerical 
measure of economic transactions’ (Rossi 1997: abstract) and of its distinctive nature as a 
virtual means of transport essential for distributing national output amongst a vast array of 
economic agents (national agents). The modern paradigm of money facilitates a clear and 
logical understanding of the genesis of money’s purchasing power ‘by relating it to the 
production process’ (ibidem) and in doing so, it ‘gets rid of all kinds of subjectivistic 
approaches to monetary economics’ (ibidem). Rossi insightfully explains it in just a few 
words: ‘[b]eing the result of the monetization of total costs of production, money-income is 
the avatar of real output, its factual alter ego’ (ibidem). 
Now money derives its provenance from the banking establishment, hence the contemporary 
reference to it as bank money. But more pointedly it is by observing the distinct manner by 
which banks emit it through double-entry book-keeping, that we can logically perceive that 
the banking system can’t but issue a mere means of payment that acquires its distinguishing 
dimension of real money – money-income – through the wage earning process. It is through 
this unique process of labour remuneration that income is created and takes the form of a bank 
deposit. This brings to the fore the double intermediary role that is carried out by banks, that 
of ‘issuing the vehicular (nominal) money required for the circulation of output, and of 
lending the income (real money) generated by production and entered by them as a bank 
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deposit’ (Cencini 1995: 3).  In fact, it is via this very channel12 that we can conceptualize that 
‘money can simultaneously be a numerical entity and be endowed with positive purchasing 
power’ (ibid.: 3). 
Issued as a mere means of payment (accounting unit), bank money cannot be considered an 
asset or liability per se. Rather it is an asset and a liability at the same time, the single neutral 
emission of which, has the primary13 effect to enumerate current output and render it 
‘homogeneous by providing it with a purely numerical expression’ (ibid.: 21). 
This twofold asset and liability aspect of bank money implies that it is naturally drawn back 
to its point of emission, instantaneously, upon being issued. ‘Fundamentally, bank money is a 
pure unit of account with no axiologic dimension. Moreover, its dual nature of asset and 
liability prevents it from moving except in a circular way. The instantaneous flow of money to 
its point of origin, therefore, is not a condition of equilibrium but a logical imperative’ (ibid.: 
18). This is an important feature of bank money, the fact that it never truly ventures from the 
point it originates from, hence from the very banking establishment that issued it. Understood 
for all is worth, this boomerang effect should help home in on other issues key to the 
arguments that will be advanced throughout our work. 
As indicated earlier, money-income comes into being in the form of a bank deposit − from 
that very instance banks intercept as financial intermediary between initial14 income holders 
and enterprises (firms). From the moment income appears as a bank deposit deposited by 
initial income holders it is immediately lent to the associated production enterprise (the firm). 
Referring to income holders simply as IH and firms as F, Cencini asserts ‘[t]he fact that the 
bank owes IH what F owes the bank is proof that the credit granted by the bank to the firm is 
backed by income holders. The payment of wages does not presuppose the existence of a 
positive income, for the very reason that it gives rise to a new deposit that allows for the 
financial covering of the whole operation’ (ibid.: 23). So through its monetary 
intermediation, banks mould money and output into income that they then transfer from the 
initial income holders to the enterprise in their role as financial intermediaries. The end 
product being ‘that the final object of the firm’s debt is a sum of real money (the income lent 
to it by IH) equivalent to that earned by the owners of the bank deposit’ (ibid.: 24). This 
should drive home the fact that money – bank money – a mere vehicular unit of account, 
operates in a very circular manner never ever deviating or existing from its circular loop. In 
one instant, it is ‘simultaneously created, associated with current output and destroyed, in a 
circular movement that leaves a book-keeping mark defining the value of currently produced 
goods and services’ (ibid.: 21). 
On top of their initial financial intermediation linked to the production15 firm, banks expand 
on their role as financial intermediaries by facilitating the transfer of initial income holders’ 
income to other economic agents who may be in need of a loan and have the ability to 
                                                
12 That is, it is through the co-existing occurrence of this dual role of monetary and financial 
intermediary, as carried out by banks, that we can precisely understand how income is 
introduced to our practical world. 
13 Cencini states it very succinctly. ‘The first intervention of banks, therefore, consists in 
issuing the numerical units required for the monetization of current output. It is only if they 
are monetarily defined that real goods acquire the common characteristic that places them in a 
unique ‘space of measure’’ (ibid.: 21). 
14 Wage earners. 
15 Our reference here is in relation to the credit of workers (initial income holders) lent to 
firms, via banks’ financial intermediation, for the financing of initial production.  
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secure16 their loan request. This enables enterprises to sell their current output and repay their 
initial debt with the bank, even before the initial income holders decide to expend their 
earned17 deposits. 
In sum, on the costs of production, we are reminded by Cencini that it is through the very 
payment of wages that a new income comes into existence. Moreover the remuneration of the 
workforce − thus being able to finance the integral costs of a new production − seals 
manpower as the sole factor of production. Finally, let us ponder the following observation, 
incisively encapsulated by Cencini. 
 
The financing of production takes place through the intermediation of banks, 
but does not have its original source in the banking system. Banks act as 
intermediaries, transferring to the debtor what has been deposited by the 
creditor. The income generated by production is instantaneously deposited and 
lent to firms, whose costs are covered by the credit granted to them by workers 
and by all the other economic agents who take their place as income holders. 
(Ibid.: 24) 
 
 
On the cardinal raison d’être of Central Banks and the distinguishing difference between 
the monetary and the financial facets of payment transactions 
 
After all is said and done, that is, with respect to the genesis of bank money and money-
income and how the latter’s formation begins with production whilst the former has its root 
source in the banking establishment, and having analysed other fundamentals pertinent to 
secondary-level banking, we turn our attention to Central Banks and their key role18 in 
establishing ‘a common ‘space of measure’ for all the secondary currencies issued by the 
commercial banks of a given country’ (Cencini 1995: 4). We observe how this role is what 
takes care – within nations – of what Keynes referred to as the transfer problem19 at the 
international level (Cencini 1995).  At the national level, owing to the existence of a Central 
Banking system that, through its multilateral clearing, conveys monetary homogeneity to the 
currencies of ‘secondary issuing banks’ (Cencini 1995: 4) − currencies thus ‘pertain to the 
same monetary system’ and as such payment transactions20 ‘only require the payer to find the 
necessary amount of real income to transfer to the payee’ (ibid.: 5). That is, the only 
‘problem’ that underlies payment transactions, at a national level, is of a financial aspect 
contrarily to a monetary one. This is because national money is of a same central monetary 
system and the monetary homogeneity that thus pervades it, provides for the proper vehicular 
                                                
16 Meaning that the agents have the necessary solvent profile to back and thus eventually 
repay the credit granted by the bank. 
17 Earned as per the remuneration of their labour through the production process. 
18 As per his explanation, we are reminded that ‘by acting as a multilateral clearing house 
between secondary banks’, a Central Bank, ‘allows for the homogeneity of the currencies 
issued at secondary level’ − that is, it allows for the currencies ‘of secondary issuing banks’ to 
be drawn into ‘a unique mass called national money’ (ibid.: 4). 
19 This transfer problem is one that comes up at the international level whereby payments 
between nations prove more complex than simply securing the necessary financing which is 
owed to international counterparts given the countries have the added problem (still today) to 
find the proper medium with which to convey it to them. (See Cencini 1995:5) 
20 Or said another way, payment finality. 
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medium needed to transfer income from the payer to the payee − hence the transfer problem is 
automatically or put another way, naturally circumvented. 
Cencini explains just how ‘our national banking systems’ (ibid.: 5) effectively solve − at the 
national level − the monetary aspect or ‘monetary problem’ of payment transactions. 
 
The kernel of the analysis is again the distinction between the monetary and the 
financial aspects of every transaction. Being a purely numerical means of 
exchange, money should be made available free of cost to the economic agents 
who need it to convey their payments. And, surprisingly as at first sight it may 
appear to be, this is precisely what happens at the national level. What the 
debtor needs in order to pay for its net real purchases is a positive amount of 
income, the money necessary for its transfer to the creditor being circularly 
issued by the banking system. If we examine the accounting relationships 
involved in the transaction, we can easily verify that the payment amounts to 
the transfer of a bank deposit (income) carried out on behalf of the debtor. The 
vehicular money required for the transfer is instantaneously created by the bank 
of the payer and destroyed by this same bank as it flows back to its point of 
origin.  
(Ibid.: 5) 
 
This ‘monetary problem’ − the transfer problem of payment transactions − takes on a 
particular meaning and importance at the international level. Contrarily to how things 
transpire at a national level to take care of the transfer aspect of payment transactions, at the 
international level, there is no international banking system currently in place to provide the 
international vehicular money or, medium, necessary to properly carry out payment 
transactions21. This fact leads to serious payment anomalies as in the particular case of a 
nation’s payment of net interest on its external debt. We will later explore this in greater 
                                                
21 That is, through a system of absolute versus that of relative exchange. Specifically, an 
international clearing institution is necessarily needed to enable the homogenization of the 
different country currencies by monetizing − through the intermediate vehicular medium of a 
chosen international currency − the international payment transactions. Moreover, this 
monetization should occur through an operation of absolute exchange. In this regard, Cencini 
recalls Schmitt’s reference in what the latter considered an absolute exchange. ‘Having no 
value as such, money leaves its place to real goods, and in its circular flow defines what 
Bernard Schmitt has called an absolute exchange, that is, an exchange whose two terms are 
money itself’ (Cencini 1995: 207). Cencini elaborates on this definition by explaining that 
‘[u]nlike relative exchange, which requires the presence of two distinct objects, absolute 
exchange refers to a unique object’. He adds that  ‘money takes the place of the physical 
product and becomes its numerical form, so that the exchange between money and output 
defines their integration: money and output become the two complementary faces of a unique 
object’ (Cencini 1995: 16). Analogously, at the international level, the key purpose of having 
an international currency would be so that it could provide the necessary homogeneous 
transfer zone (‘the common denominator of domestic currencies’ as referred to by Cencini 
1995, p. 263) through which the national output of relevant trading countries could ultimately 
exchange the shell of their respective vehicular money. Said another way, countries would 
literally exchange the original country-currency representation of their national output with 
that of another country-currency (e.g., a trading partner), through an absolute exchange that 
according to Schmitt implies an ‘exchange whose two terms are money itself’ (Cencini 1995: 
207). 
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detail. For now, let us primarily remember that at the international level, nations become 
involved on behalf of their residents ‘directly from the fact that international payments require 
the conversion of domestic currencies into foreign currencies. A national money is a country’s 
acknowledgement of debt. It is therefore immediately clear that a resident’s foreign payment 
entails, if carried out in domestic money, the external indebtedness of his country. In almost 
every case, however, countries are reciprocally involved in the payments of their residents, so 
that no payment by the countries themselves is actually required on top of that carried out by 
their residents (Cencini and Schmitt, 1991)’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 280−281). That is, 
between nations, ‘no net macroeconomic payment occurs’, rather ‘macroeconomic payments’ 
are ‘reciprocally balanced’ (ibid.: 281): the debtor country pays for its residents’ net 
commercial imports (on their behalf) providing that the creditor country pays for the net 
importing country’s financial exports, as sold by the debtor country’s residents. It is important 
to understand that payment transactions are actually carried out by the trading nations’ 
residents themselves ‘as it is they who import (goods and services) and who export (financial 
assets); their country provides only the institutional framework for their transactions’ (ibid.: 
281). Specifically, it ‘merely plays the role of a simple intermediary’ (ibid.: 281) on behalf of 
its residents. 
There is however, as indicated above, one very transaction that does evidence a net 
macroeconomic payment: a nation’s payment of net interest on its external debt features an 
unilateral transfer which inherently lacks payment reciprocity and this combined with our 
faulty payment regime of relative exchange, causes it (nation) to ultimately suffer an 
unnecessary doubling cost of its external debt servicing. That is, the country’s 
macroeconomic payment on behalf of its residents, actually adds to the latter’s 
microeconomic payment. Cencini and Citraro 2012 explain below. In their stylized case, 
country A represents the developing net commercial importer nation (debtor country) whilst R 
represents the Rest of the World (creditor country). 
 
In fact, as shown by Schmitt (2000, 2004, 2005, and Chapter 9 in this volume), 
there exists a unique case in which the macroeconomic payment of a country 
adds up to the microeconomic payment of its residents: the payment of net 
interest on the country’s external debt. Given that the payment of net interest 
entails a unilateral transfer from the debtor country to the creditor country, the 
lack of reciprocity precludes the balancing of the macroeconomic payment of A 
by an equivalent macroeconomic payment of R. The fact that country A’s net 
interest is paid both by its residents and by the country itself would have no 
consequence in the joint balance of payments of A and R if the macroeconomic 
payment of A were entered both in A’s and in R’s current or capital and 
financial accounts. Yet this is not what happens, as the payment of A benefits 
the whole of R and not any particular resident of R. A’s interest payment 
amounts to a decrease in A’s official reserves caused by the call to restore the 
level of A’s internal resources, now decreased by the payment of net interest 
entered in A’s current account. The macroeconomic payment of A’s net interest 
is entered in A’s balance of payments but goes unreported in R’s balance of 
payments. It is the macroeconomy of country R that benefits from A’s second 
interest payment, but this gain is recorded neither in R’s current account nor in 
R’s capital and financial account. 
(Cencini and Citraro 2012: 281−282) 
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Cencini also provides a good observation of the effect of this net macroeconomic payment 
with respect to the double burden on external debt. 
 
We thus get the impression that external debt servicing takes place through a 
mechanism which reduces it to a self-defeating process. The analysis confirms 
this astonishing result: the servicing of external debt (interest and principal) 
within the key-currencies standard system can only take place through a double 
payment. This double payment is all the more surprising in that it never occurs 
at the national level. The servicing of a debt between residents of different 
regions of the same country requires only a single payment: the transfer of 
positive income from the debtor to the creditor. However, it has to be kept in 
mind that inter-regional payments take place within a single monetary system. 
Monetary homogeneity is what allows for a unique payment of debts; monetary 
heterogeneity, on the contrary, entails their double payment, since they require 
a transfer of income and the purchase of the vehicle necessary for the transfer in 
order to be effective. The point is that international debts have to be serviced, 
cumulatively, by the residents who have incurred them and by their own 
countries. The institution of a supranational Bank acting as a monetary 
intermediary between countries would avoid the double payment, since the 
Bank would prevent the purchase of the vehicular money by the indebted 
countries. Until then, external debts are bound to be serviced twice, the 
payment of the residents having to be backed by an equivalent payment of their 
nation. 
(Cencini 1995: 7) 
 
 
Between the devil and the deep blue sea 
 
By going as far as providing for a ‘single’ currency for some of its Member States, the Treaty 
on European Union (1992 Maastricht Treaty) has put the cart before the horse, causing a 
chicken to be hatched without the egg.  
The reality of facts, twisted as they may be, has it that the Euro zone’s ‘unique’ currency is 
unable to convey ‘internal homogeneity’ (Cencini 1995: 124) to ‘the sets of national goods 
and services’ (ibid.: 124) of its Member States, the Euro lacking the necessary authenticity of 
a currency originating from one specific national economy. Specifically, given the current 
state of the non-national system of payments22 that characterizes its banking infrastructure, 
the zone is neither with a unique national currency nor ‘with a common unit of measure 
capable of collecting national currencies within a unique monetary ‘space’, which would 
simultaneously allow for their sovereignty and their homogeneity’ (ibid.: 124). 
To some who are already grasping the import of our meaning and thence accepting, even in 
the slightest, that the Euro zone is without a unique currency, the situation might feel like 
being faced with two equally undesirable choices: from one standpoint, the lure of the devil23 
                                                
22 Or, if observed as well from yet another perspective, given the current state of the non-
system of international payments… 
23 “Keep the Euro and become a United States of Europe…” a rustling and enticing whisper 
ostensibly reverberates. 
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seemingly selling the easier24 of the two alternatives or, from another standpoint, the choice of 
having to brave the unknown adventures of a deep blue sea.25 Umm… Affaire à suivre. 
 
 
Monetary homogeneity versus heterogeneity 
 
Extra-national payment transactions need a payment system infrastructure26 that operates 
through the mediation of a truly international clearing institution responsible for issuing its 
very own international monetary unit that, via an absolute exchange, would be up to ‘the task 
of making the sets of national goods and services reciprocally homogeneous, their internal 
homogeneity being already provided for by each national currency’ (ibid.: 124). Currencies of 
different countries are intrinsically heterogeneous by the mere fact that they are emitted by 
different central banking systems. ‘The solution to monetary heterogeneity requires the 
intervention of a supranational Bank that is given the task of issuing a currency which, 
through absolute exchange, acts as a catalyst with regard to national currencies’ (ibid.: 185). 
 
Inserted into an exchange economy, international transactions require the 
intervention of money as simple vehicular intermediary between national 
outputs which have already been fully monetised in their countries of origin. 
(Ibid.: 124) 
 
When concerned with monetary systems at the national level we speak of production 
economies but when referring to an international monetary system our meaning relates to an 
economy of exchange. This is so because there does not exist an international production that 
we can say is produced in an international zone, rather production associates – always – with 
the currency that monetises it. ‘Commodities produced in the USA, for example, are 
monetised in dollars, and it is precisely this monetary identity which defines their origin. If 
the same goods and services were monetised in marks27, they would be part of German 
national output despite being materially produced in America’ (ibid.: 123). 
                                                
24 As may appear to some, at least in the short run. 
25 Venture a daring return to their respective sovereignties, whilst simultaneously embracing a 
massive reform of their current ‘non-system’ of international payments. 
26 Based on a regime of absolute exchange rates rather than on a system of relative exchange 
rates as per the current state of affairs. 
27 At the time of author’s writing (Cencini 1995), Germany had not yet abandoned its 
traditional currency for the Euro – the official monetary unit of the European Monetary 
Union. It adopted the Euro as its basic unit of money in 2002.  Although this may seem a par 
for the course fact, it does bring a more important point to the fore: the logical impossibility 
for the Euro to monetize the national production of any one specific country of the Euro zone 
given the underlying foundation that formed and continues to characterize the alliance of 
Member States versus their amalgamation into a one-Nation country. A clear paradox comes 
to light: Member States are in limbo and actually sitting on the fence – not officially united 
into an integral Nation that they can call their own, yet having forfeited their respective 
monetary sovereignties, technically there should not be any national production to speak of 
that the Euro, their ‘unique’ monetary currency, can monetize, according to what it exactly 
means to monetize. Such is the absurdity that characterizes their alliance. It highlights the very 
paradox of the situation – the Euro can’t logically be a unique currency responsible for 
monetizing the national production of a single, non-existent for that matter, Nation of which 
15 
Production is very much an affaire of Nations, that is, in the strict sense of the national money 
which monetises it. Now, the other side of the coin is that a Nation’s currency (national 
money) derives its purchasing power from the production of goods and services it is linked to, 
its very object. Without it, it is a mere unit of account of no value per se. As Cencini reminds 
us ‘[s]ince the science of economics began, money has been defined as a unit of account and 
its main task identified as the measurement of produced goods and services’ (ibid.: 1). The 
picture which can’t but emerge from obscurity here is that of the Euro – what then is it truly, 
this monetary unit of the European Monetary Union (EMU)? It is difficult not to answer: “In 
its current state? It is nothing but a mere currency appellation with no proper object to call its 
own, given the EMU is not a proper nation, per se”. It simply does not fit the bill of a unique 
currency of a unique monetary economy (e.g. as is issued by the Central Bank of a nation)28 
neither does it have the distinguishing quality of a supranational money as would be issued by 
an international clearing institution capable of final29 inter-bank clearing through a system of 
absolute exchange rates, given the manner in which international transactions are currently 
being carried out amongst its Member States. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
none of the Member States actually form an integral whole with. In other words, what is 
currently called the Euro is nothing more than a soubriquet to designate the currency. Take 
heed, it has not a proper output associated with it. That is, as it is currently utilized within the 
Member States themselves, as though it was a genuine national money rendered 
homogeneous via a single Nation’s central banking system ‘capable of gathering the various 
secondary banks in a common area’ (ibid.: 184). Purchasing power originates from a national 
money’s association with current output as is produced within a national system of a specific 
monetary sovereignty – the Euro, in its current state, has no purchasing power or even 
potential for it, it is simply an empty denomination. However, the fact remains that production 
is ‘monetized’ in each country of the Euro zone. But ultimately, first principles will remind us 
that there are only two possibilities for the said Euro: either it exists as the EU unique 
currency, in which case the EU would be a unique and homogeneous monetary area and the 
Euro would monetize the production of this area or, it does not exist, in which case only 
national currencies, national euros, veritably monetize national productions. 
28 Currently the ECB processes only official payments (between Member States, though alas, 
remiss of payment finality), it does not act as clearing-house with respect to the private 
payments between residents of different Member States. As a result, the Euro does not meet 
the necessary condition of a unique and fundamentally homogeneous money characteristic of 
national monies and which characteristic is the end product of inter-bank clearing as – 
comparatively – is enabled in individual nations via their respective Central Banks. This 
means that in each of the Member States what we still have, realistically, is a specific money. 
If you will for simplicity’s sake, here onwards and when fitting, the thesis will refer to them 
as different country euros, e.g. French euro, Italian euro, German euro and so forth. (This 
reference will be further elaborated as the work progresses.)  
29 ‘In fact, Euroland countries still have heterogeneous currencies, although the latter all have 
the same denomination since they were encapsulated in the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). Certainly, EMU is a misnomer, since to date there is no currency union across the 
area, which notably lacks a final-payment mechanism for the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB). It is indeed the lack of payment finality between any two EMU member 
countries that has originated (observed and non-observed) soaring imbalances within the 
EMU, particularly since the bursting in 2009 of the systemic crisis that is devastating the euro 
area at the time of writing’ (Rossi 2012: 221). 
16 
Every national economy has at its disposal a vehicular money, issued by banks, 
and a product associated with it. Purchasing power is thus accounted for as the 
result of this association between numerical form (money) and real content 
(output). Since no specifically international production exists, it is obviously 
impossible to define a purchasing power of extra-national origin. Even if a true 
international money existed (and, thus, also a supranational bank capable of 
issuing it), we would have no product to autonomously fill it with. If we want to 
go on speaking of international income or purchasing power we have to 
remember, therefore, that its existence is related to exchange only, which means 
that it has to be derived from national productions (which are the unique source 
of income at the planetary level). 
(Cencini 1995: 123–24) 
 
If there is one fundamental element that underlines monetary sovereignty it is the economic 
raison d’être that it affords nations. As Cencini explains ‘it is through the workings of Central 
Banks that nations come into economic existence defined by their own monetary systems. A 
country can enjoy its monetary sovereignty only if it benefits from the services of a Central 
Bank which, by acting as a multilateral clearing-house between secondary banks, allows for 
the homogeneity of the currencies issued at secondary level. The banking system adopted by 
our countries develops at two interrelated levels, the first being made up of secondary issuing 
banks, and the second of a Central Bank which takes them under its aegis, allowing for their 
currencies to become part of a unique mass called national money’ (ibid.: 4). This 
homogeneity is precisely the vital element that the ECB, in its current role and workings, is 
unable to secure. Unlike a national Central Bank it does not act as a multilateral clearing 
institution for the entirety of the inter-nations payments transacted amongst Member States. 
Matter-of-factly, much of the ‘clearing’ function is decentralized to the respective Members 
themselves who carry them out through different bilateral payment arrangements. In not 
fulfilling the role of an authentic multilateral clearing-house, the ECB misses out on the 
opportunity to transmit in-house monetary homogeneity to the currencies issued at the 
national level of each of the individual Member States. The Euro is thus not the homogeneous 
end product of the heterogeneous currencies issued by the respective nations, Members of the 
Union. Oddly enough, it is these heterogeneous antiquated currencies that are still at play, 
only, under a nom de plume ‘Euro’ or perhaps more punningly fitting, a nom de guerre, given 
the dolour it has increasingly come to be associated with throughout the escalating financial 
crisis. The Euro is not a unique currency in the true sense of what it means to be unique. The 
ECB fails in the task of metamorphosing it into a homogeneous money, unique to Member 
States. The lack of payment finality, that is witnessed in the ‘Eurosystem’ or as also referred 
to by Rossi ‘European System of Central Banks (ESCB)’ (Rossi 2012: 221), confirms this. 
The evidencing of this missing ‘final-payment mechanism’ (ibid.: 221) – that according to 
Rossi (2012) became more apparent at the onset of the 2009 euro-area financial crisis – 
points, by its very self, to the fact that the Euro is not being processed, as though it was a 
unique currency of a unique monetary system as would be characteristic of a national 
money30. Otherwise, monetary homogeneity would prevail and payment finality would 
naturally ensue. But this is evidently not the case. This then, would thus appear as yet another 
strong piece of evidence supporting our claim that the Euro is not a unique currency. 
Neither is the Euro capable, in its current disposition, of acquiring purchasing power for the 
reasons relating to national output – as outlined earlier, income (purchasing power) can only 
derive from a production originating at the national level and monetized by a unique 
                                                
30 Or, of a true currency union, for that matter. 
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homogeneous national money. As Rossi 2012 reminds in recalling the expression of Padoa-
Schioppa 2004, under its present circumstances the Euro is ‘‘a currency without a state’ 
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2004, p.35)’ (ibid.: 236). It is but a new name replacing now obsolete ones 
such as the once almighty mark. The Euro has not replaced the former currencies of each of 
the Member States: the individual countries, Members of the Union, are still with each of 
their respective ‘ancient’ currencies and this fact will hold true until such time as the Member 
States unite into a United States of Europe, a genuine nation. Then again, Member States 
could choose instead to ‘return’ to or more factually put, to keep their respective original 
currencies31 and simply unite under the aegis of a truly unique monetary zone. Doing so, 
conjunctionally with adopting a newly structured system of international payments32, based 
on a regime of absolute exchange rates, and complemented with a true international clearing-
house and common international money, would not only assure payment finality for member 
participant Nations33 in all of their international transactions, but as well, obviate the 
manifestation of the double burden effect with regard to their respective external debts. 
So if the European unit of account, the Euro – despite the many graceful folds of its current 
draping – is nothing but a soubriquet replacing the name of antiquated currencies34 and not 
actually an authentic currency unique to the EMU, what does this mean in true existence? 
That is, in the final analysis, how does this predicament actually affect Member States of the 
Euro zone? It means that they are no more protected from the double burden effect on 
external debt35 than any other country outside the EMU or any other net borrowing36 country 
in the world for that matter, given the current absence of a truly functional37 system of 
                                                
31 Even if under the new names of different country euros, e.g. French euro, Italian euro, 
German euro et cetera such as to differentiate with the unique Euro of the ‘would be’ true 
Euro zone currency union and which Euro would be issued by a third counter party clearing-
house such as the ECB. 
32 Albeit, on a smaller European level scale. 
33 Nation, in the proper sense of its economic existence – the nation as a whole operating as a 
unit on behalf of the set of its residents, rather than simply as the sum of its residents. 
34 Though alas, itself (Euro), devoid of their respective subsistence.  
35 External debts are pathological to the extent that, in our present non-system of international 
payments, they include sovereign debts, the result being that of an unwarranted double burden 
effect. We will expound the origin of this effect in subsequent chapters. In the interim, let us 
be clear on the following: a country’s external debt should merely define the foreign debt 
incurred by the country’s residents whilst the expression sovereign debt refers to the debt of 
the country as a whole, a debt which anomalously adds to that of the external debt of the said 
country’s residents.  
36 It is perhaps important to point out a differentiation here between non-key currency and 
key-currency countries, the latter whom finance their net imports using their own currency. In 
so doing, their indebtedness is thus not related to the sale abroad of domestic financial claims. 
But still, key-currency countries get indebted and have to pay interests on their debt. 
Moreover, it remains that the analysis concerning the problems affecting both the net payment 
of interests and the very formation of external debts applies also to key-currency countries: in 
our current non-system of international payments the real payment entails another monetary 
payment which is added to it, unjustifiably. 
37 Our meaning: an international multilateral payment framework that would intrinsically (via 
a ‘final-payment mechanism’ as coined by Rossi 2012) facilitate payment finality between 
Member participants and furthermore without inducing a double payment (double burden 
effect on external debt). That is, a payment system that would ensure that international debts 
are paid only once by the net debtor country on behalf of the set of its residents and not 
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international payments and the complementary infrastructure necessary to effectively support 
its networking.   
What we need to ultimately develop at the international level (or, initially on a smaller scale, 
e.g. at the European level) is a shared monetary system between nations that would enable 
them to benefit from keeping their respective monetary sovereignties whilst avoiding having 
‘to settle their commercial deficits both financially and monetarily’ (Cencini 1995: 5). An 
international Central Bank of national Central Banks operating within the framework of an 
absolute system of exchange rates is the indispensable bricks-and-mortar required to facilitate 
the coming into being of a truly homogeneous monetary transfer zone between sovereign 
nations that would solve both the heterogeneous problem of national currencies and their 
respective countries’ consequent transfer problem.  
 
 
Relative exchange rates regime versus that of absolute exchange rates: Delicate distinctions 
 
We should remember that it is at the international level of payment transactions, that a system 
of relative exchange rates strikes its full impetus by transforming currencies into net assets38 
despite their inherent vehicular nature to act as mere conveyors of payment – an operation 
which leads also to a process of duplication very part and parcel of a system of relative 
exchange rates. Combined with the effect of the principle of the double double-entry book-
keeping mechanism39 this regime of relative exchange rates not only facilitates the erratic 
fluctuation of exchange rates40 but is indeed the cause of another calamitous effect: the double 
burden of external debt – a phenomenon which can be understood either by analysing the 
servicing of a country’s external debt (principal and its associated interest) or the payment 
process involved whenever a country is a net foreign borrower. Either analysis will show that 
this is again where a regime of relative exchange rates definitely hails a negative influence. 
As we develop the dissertation our arguments will endeavour to progressively evidence this 
claim. 
In highlighting the differences and consequent implications between the two regimes of 
exchange rates, Cencini reminds that it is only when money is allowed to operate in a circular 
manner that exchange rate stability is enabled. ‘The transition from relative to absolute 
exchange rates is therefore that from a system in which money is an object of payment to one 
in which money is a means of payment; from a system in which money is itself an asset to 
                                                                                                                                                   
additionally to them. Currently ‘international debts have to be serviced, cumulatively, by the 
residents who have incurred them and by their own countries’ (Cencini 1995: 7). Specifically 
then, in order to circumvent this double payment, we require a payment network based on a 
regime of absolute exchange rates operating under the auspices of a third party authentic 
international clearing-house responsible for issuing an international unit of account with the 
ability to transmit monetary homogeneity to Member participants’ respective currencies 
through a catalytic absolute exchange process. The latter would ultimately take care of 
Keynes’s well-known transfer problem having the unparalleled ability to encapsulate the 
individual country currencies under the protective umbrella of a truly homogeneous monetary 
transfer zone.  
38 As positive assets these duplicates − mere acknowledgments of debt or said another way 
simple I.O.U.s − are thus empowered to ‘settle’ payment imbalances. 
39 To be expounded in a later chapter. 
40 The ‘net asset’ duplication is what eventually forms the official reserves of foreign assets 
that potentially find their way to the foreign exchange market, resulting in massive 
fluctuations of exchange rates. 
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one in which real and financial assets are ‘circulated’ by money. It is the circular use of 
money that, as in Keynes’s plan of reform, allows for the stability of exchange rates’ (Cencini 
2000.: 18). He adds the following important particulars. 
 
To reach exchange rate stability and find an effective solution to the external 
debt problem we will have to change radically the way we look at money and 
use it in international trade. It is highly important to understand fully Keynes’s 
message as to the nature of bank money and the logical rules a monetary system 
has to comply with. In particular, the time has come to abandon the ‘materialist’ 
conception of money and to work out a system of payments in which money is 
used only ‘vehicularly’. When this is done, the present regime of relative 
exchange rates will be replaced by a regime of absolute exchange rates in which 
each currency is exchanged against itself. 
(Ibid.: 18) 
 
When it is said that in a system of absolute exchange rates, currencies will be exchanged 
against themselves, and this instantaneously, we mean through the intermediary of a chosen 
international currency and as issued by an international clearing-house. Now if we remember 
that in order for international payment finality (international clearing) to be effective, the 
exporting country must be rid of any remaining future claims on the importing country, we 
will thus also recall the importance that the latter counterbalances its net commercial imports 
with a net sale of financial securities. ‘Hence, instead of entering a sum of foreign currencies 
on the assets side of its banks’ balance sheet − the first step towards duplication − , the 
surplus country spends it immediately to purchase an equivalent amount of foreign securities. 
Whatever currency is chosen as the international means of payment (money A, money R or a 
new international unit like Keynes’s bancor), the circular flow of money is thus guaranteed 
by the necessary equality between the balance of trade and that of financial transactions’ 
(ibid.: 19). To better understand just how the international money would operate, we should 
primarily note an important and distinguishing aspect between our current system of relative 
exchange rates and that of an absolute exchange rates regime. The latter is one ‘in which the 
international monetary flow is kept separate from the flow of national currencies that takes 
place within each country’ (ibid.: 19). While on a national level a country’s currency provides 
its ‘body’ to the mass of goods and services that it then circulates amongst its internal 
economic agents, on an international level we recall that ‘money is also required to transfer 
goods, services and financial claims, although this time the objects to be circulated have 
already been monetised in their countries of production’ (ibid.: 19). So what actually happens 
in a regime of absolute exchange rates is that the chosen international currency ‘lends its 
form to the goods, services and financial claims exchanged between countries’ (ibid.: 19). For 
example, through its intermediary, the exporting country’s real output (the goods and 
services it has exported) is transferred from its own national currency ‘body’ to that of the 
importing country’s currency ‘body’ in exchange for the financial securities it replaces it with 
(as sold to the exporting country by the importing country). Specifically, if we conjecture 
country A to be the net exporter and country R to be the net importer and ICU to mean 
International Clearing Union, the following is what occurs given international payment 
finality intends a reciprocal transfer of some equal value in exchange for its receipt of net 
commercial imports: ‘[t]hrough its absolute exchange, money A gives up its real content to 
the international money (the goods and services exported by country A) and replaces it with 
the financial bonds exported by country R and transferred from money R to the international 
money through the absolute exchange of money R. Thus, because of the exchange between 
the two countries, goods and services exported by A take the form of money R, while the 
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financial bonds sold by R take the form of money A. This substitution takes place through the 
intermediary of the international money with which both currencies are exchanged, and that 
disappears as soon as the reciprocal payment between the two countries has been carried out 
by the ICU’ (ibid.: 20).  
The problem with our current non-system of international payments being based on a regime 
of relative exchange rates is that the latter regime, most importantly, is not conducive to 
recognizing a nation in its proper sense41. Distinguishing between a country’s residents and 
the country itself as the set of its residents is of prime importance particularly when 
considering a nation’s external debt servicing. ‘[T]his is so because the debt problem is 
essentially macroeconomic. In particular, the payment of net interest by a country’s indebted 
residents necessarily involves the country itself, whose payment − in the present system of 
international payments − adds up to that of residents’ (Cencini 2012: 65). Specifically, if we 
consider country A as the debtor country and country R as the creditor country, we can better 
understand why that is, upon recalling the following authors’ elaboration. ‘[T]here exists a 
unique case in which the macroeconomic payment of a country adds up to the microeconomic 
payment of its residents: the payment of net interest on the country’s external debt. Given that 
the payment of net interest entails a unilateral transfer from the debtor country to the creditor 
country, the lack of reciprocity precludes the balancing of the macroeconomic payment of A 
by an equivalent macroeconomic payment of R’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 281). 
In fact, we could obviate the double burden of external debts with respect to the payment of 
interests if we correctly viewed nations from a macroeconomic perspective and considered 
them as true macroeconomic entities. But this not being the case and given that in reality, 
international transactions are not processed in such a way as to properly account for the 
natural circular-flow of bank money42, the end result is the emergence of severe international 
payment disorders − pathologies that the current relative exchange rates based payment 
infrastructure, in its present inadequately fit status, is unable to properly counter. 
In general the overall international payment system, grounded as it is on a regime of relative 
exchange rates, is prone to diverse systemic monetary disorders that erupt in different areas or 
stages e.g. the final settling of international payment transactions between nations43. As 
referenced earlier (see Rossi 2012) if we consider, for example, the case within the euro area 
whereby lack of payment finality has lead to substantial and continually accruing payment 
imbalances between the Member States. Moreover, as Rossi points out, ‘[t]his echoes the 
well-known ‘exorbitant privilege’ that so-called ‘key-currency’ countries have been enjoying 
for about 40 years within the ‘non-system’ for international payments’ (Rossi 2012: 221) and 
which system is based on a regime of relative exchange rates that is very partial to key-
currency countries. 
                                                
41 A nation, properly understood from a macroeconomic perspective, is defined by the set of 
its residents, not the sum of its residents. 
42 As a system of international payments based on a regime of absolute exchange rates would 
properly do. 
43 Clearly, the payment infrastructure has a vital attribute missing – that of a triggering 
procedure that could automatically enable payment finality and this via a monetary 
homogeneity that would be conveyed to the system, as afforded through the intermediary of a 
chosen international money. A ‘final-payment mechanism’ to refer to Rossi’s expression 
(Rossi 2012: 221) upon unveiling the serious implication of this missing attribute, as observed 
at the inter-nations payment level just within the euro region itself. Specifically, he notes that 
it is these consequential payment deficits of Euro nations that have ‘originated (observed and 
non-observed) soaring imbalances within the EMU, particularly since the bursting in 2009 of 
the systemic crisis that is devastating the euro area at the time of writing’ (ibid.: 221). 
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Without considering the naturally circuitous flow of bank money granted by double-entry 
book-keeping proper international clearing (payment finality) is compromised and it is not 
difficult to understand the resulting genesis of monetary duplicates that appear in foreign 
banking systems and their associated disastrous effects (e.g. erratic fluctuations of exchange 
rates). 
Finally, on comparing the two regimes − relative versus absolute − it eventually becomes 
clear that it is only via a comprehensive regime of absolute exchange rates that the true 
macroeconomic existence of nations could properly be accounted for, at the international 
level. Such an absolute regime would enable a nation to properly operate on behalf of the set 
of its residents as opposed to in addition to them. Combined with an infrastructure that would 
include an international multi-lateral clearing-house, itself complemented with its very own 
international money, this would allow for the necessary monetary homogeneity44 that is 
currently lacking at the international payment level and which lacking currently plagues our 
non-system of international payments with a serious income-conveyance problem − as 
Cencini notes ‘what Keynes called ‘the transfer problem’’ (Cencini 1995: 5). 
On this note, let us conclude this section with a fundamental observation with respect to 
monetary homogeneity in relation to a regime of relative exchange rates. By logical analysis, 
it soon becomes obvious that the latter regime cannot logically convey monetary homogeneity 
to the national currencies of an international payment system given relative ‘exchange rates 
vary when (demand for and supply of) currencies vary’ (Cencini 1995: 125). Cencini 
elaborates this argument by eliciting a very important and critical condition that must be met 
by a ‘common standard’45 if monetary homogeneity is to be guaranteed: ‘[a] good unit of 
measurement must be invariable. If the meter varied when the distance it has to measure 
changes, it could not be considered a good standard of length. Analogously, how is it possible 
to claim that national currencies are made homogeneous through exchange rates, given that 
exchange rates vary when (demand for and supply of) currencies vary’ (ibid.: 125)? He sums 
up the analysis of his observations with the following crucial points. 
 
The relative exchange between national currencies does not determine a unique 
standard, and can therefore not solve the problem of their heterogeneity. 
Moreover, the very idea of relative exchange is inconsistent with the vehicular 
nature of bank money. Demand and supply have real goods and services as their 
object, and not a simple numerical vehicle. To subject money to the law of 
supply and demand amounts to considering it as a real good, a net asset 
purchased and sold on the basis of its presumed intrinsic value. Within every 
single country money is used as an instrument or means of payment. That is to 
say that the final object of monetary transactions is not money itself. What the 
                                                
44 Let us recall and take heed of Cencini’s observations. ‘Monetary homogeneity is what 
allows for a unique payment of debts; monetary heterogeneity, on the contrary, entails their 
double payment, since they require a transfer of income and the purchase of the vehicle 
necessary for the transfer in order to be effective’ (Cencini 1995: 7). 
Additionally, if monetary homogeneity prevailed, then payment finality would naturally ensue 
for every international payment transaction without entailing an extra anomalous cost to 
nations in addition to the payment of their residents (as is case e.g. in external debt servicing). 
45 He is referring here to the chosen international currency that would necessarily accompany 
a new international payment system based on a system of absolute exchange rates. ‘The 
solution to the problem of national currencies’ heterogeneity calls for the determination of a 
common standard through which they can be collected in a single numerical ‘space’’ (Cencini 
1995: 125). 
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payee gets from the payer is the content of vehicular money and not the vehicle 
itself, which, as such, has no real value. 
(Cencini 1995: 125-26)  
 
 
Cross-border payments across Euro Land – the current state of affairs 
 
Though it is not our intent to reiterate the precise and thorough work already compiled with 
respect to the mechanics of TARGET246 – Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross-
settlement Express Transfer System (see the skilful analysis of Rossi, 2012) we will attempt 
to highlight (en grandes lignes) some elements of its infrastructure relevant to the issues we 
have been raising. 
In a nut shell the following can be emphasized: its most outstanding systemic flaw is that its 
payment infrastructure consists of a two-tier network with the ECB operating ‘at the same 
hierarchical level as participating NCBs47’ (Rossi 2012: 226). What this means is that under 
such conditions, the ECB is unable to convey monetary homogeneity to the system. In order 
to do so it would need to operate as a third counter party48 Central Bank of Member States’ 
Central Banks. This would enable it to gather the whole of the heterogeneous country 
currencies of Member States under a unique monetary umbrella much like national Central 
Banks convey monetary homogeneity to different intra-nations secondary monies by 
transforming them into ‘central money’49, (Cencini 1995). ‘Currencies issued within a single 
monetary area are perfect substitutes, so that it is always possible to pass from one to the other 
through an operation of ‘absolute’ exchange. As we already know, absolute exchange differs 
from relative exchange in that, unlike the latter, it does not take place between separate 
objects, but between a single object and its monetary form’ (ibid.: 237−238). In fact, if the 
ECB acted as a true Central Bank of Central Banks50 operating within a regime of absolute 
exchange, the first monetary (versus the financial aspect) step towards payment finality51 
would naturally ensue52 within the inter-nations’ payment protocol if we consider, 
                                                
46 The current version of the original Target which ‘provides the payment infrastructure 
within which all payment orders denominated in euros are carried out across the borders of 
the various, pre-existing national payment systems, all of which operate now with the Real-
Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) protocol (see Rossi, 2007a, pp. 69-78 for analytical 
elaboration on this protocol)’ (Rossi 2012: 223). 
47 NCBs defining ‘[t]he national central banks (NCBs) of euro-area member countries’ (Rossi 
2012: 221). 
48 Our meaning: within a three-tier payment system as Central Bank of Member States’ 
Central Banks and thus operating at a higher hierarchical level than the latter. 
49 His reference here is in relation to the national money of the individual Nations. 
50 Given its current mandate with respect to inter-nations’ payment protocol amongst the 
Member States, the ECB does not operate in the true sense of a Central Bank of Central 
Banks. 
51 Rossi clarifies payment finality by referencing Goodhart. ‘As Goodhart (1989, p.26) 
explains, the finality of a payment requires that the ‘seller of a good or service, or another 
asset, receives something of equal value from the purchaser, which leaves the seller with no 
further claim on the buyer’’ (Rossi 2012: 221). In other words, whether within the national or 
international level context, payment transactions ultimately require to be financed. 
52 Via the intermediary of the chosen international currency as issued by an international 
multilateral clearing-house, for example, the ECB. Moreover, the financing of a debtor 
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analogously, that at the national level ‘[i]n practice, an absolute exchange takes place every 
time the Central Bank intervenes to guarantee the equilibrated carrying out of interbank 
clearing’ (Cencini 1995: 238). Cencini also reminds that without a proper Central Bank of 
Central Banks a regime of absolute exchange rates could not be put into practical effect and 
so ‘European currencies would remain substantially heterogeneous and their exchange pertain 
to the category of relative transactions’ (ibid.: 238). Contrarily, at a national level, the system 
of payment is set up in such a way that monetary homogeneity is guaranteed quite simply 
through the existence of a Central Bank given its prime function − in its role as inter-bank 
clearing-house − in establishing a common monetary system within a country. 
 
Let us consider the transactions taking place within a unique monetary zone. No 
one doubts that their results can be aggregated without it being necessary to 
raise the problem of their common unit of account. The very fact that they are 
carried out in national money is sufficient proof of their fundamental 
homogeneity. A payment in dollars carried out in New York can immediately 
be compared with any other payment in dollars carried out in the United States 
for the simple reason that the dollars issued by the American banking system 
are perfectly inter-exchangeable. Yet, it must be kept in mind that this 
characteristic, common to national currencies, is not guaranteed a priori. On the 
contrary, it is the result of interbank clearing carried out by each single 
country’s Central Bank. Monetary homogeneity is made possible by the 
existence of a national banking system, which requires the presence of a Central 
Bank capable of gathering the various secondary banks in a common area. 
Without any such institution, every private bank would issue a currency totally 
heterogeneous with regard to the others, and it would no longer be possible to 
speak either of a national monetary system, or monetary sovereignty. 
           (Cencini 1995: 184) 
 
In an analogous manner ‘at the international level’ monetary homogeneity can only be 
attained if provided the proper medium as next elaborated by Cencini. ‘Likewise, at the 
international level currencies can only be considered homogeneous if they are inserted into a 
structure making them mutually exchangeable. This task should be assigned to a true 
international Bank’ (ibid.: 184). 
                                                                                                                                                   
country’s payment deficit would be facilitated through this multilateral clearing (see our 
Table 1 and associated explanation) in the event that ‘residents in creditor countries (like 
Germany) are unwilling to continue buying those financial assets, like corporate or 
government bonds, that residents within debtor countries (such as Greece) need to sell in 
order to finance their payment deficits’ (Rossi 2012: 230). This would resolve the current 
‘end-of-period’ (ibid.: 230) imbalances whereby ‘trade-surplus countries still have a claim on 
trade-deficit countries’ (ibid.: 230). Now on considering what needs to really happen in order 
for final international clearing to effectively take place, Rossi captures it very pointedly 
‘international transactions (in this case, between Greece and Germany) are cleared once the 
deficit country sells to the surplus country an amount of financial assets that corresponds to 
the debt the former country has encountered in commercial trading with the latter country’ 
(ibid.: 229). We should recall that, in this context, the international multilateral clearing-
house could play, not only an additional, but a key role as financial intermediary by taking on 
an intervening relation between debtor and creditor countries (member participants). That is, 
in the event that a debtor country remains unable to secure the necessary funds with which to 
finance its payment transactions, initially via the system of multilateral clearing itself. 
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In sum, through his examination of ‘cross-border payment orders that are carried out through 
TARGET2’ (Rossi 2012: 227), Rossi highlights how the absence of an underlining logic 
relative to ‘money and payments’ (ibid.: 226−27) has marred this payment infrastructure with 
a two-tier ‘monetary-structural flaw’ (ibid.: 226) of grave consequences. ‘The logic of money 
and payments is indeed one and the same for participants in any payment system: the payer 
and the payee need a settlement institution that intervenes as a monetary intermediary in order 
for the payment to be final for all parties involved, that is, the buyer and the seller of the 
relevant items’ (ibid.: 226−27). Unfortunately, as can be observed, this is not how things 
transpire within the payment infrastructure of TARGET2. 
On further thinking about it, it can be noted that operating within TARGET2’s current make-
up, it is not just that the ECB is not even properly set up to function as a monetary 
intermediary53 but thence, not even as a financial one.54 (See our earlier reference in footnote 
52).  
Were the ECB to accept55 to take on the role of ‘settlement institution for NCBs within the 
Eurosystem’ (ibid.: 231), or whether this function is ultimately assumed by some other 
European establishment, in either case, Member States of the current ‘EMU’ could re-claim 
their respective monetary sovereignties56. What is of essence, to ensure payment finality57 
                                                
53 With a capacity to deliver monetary homogeneity through inter-Nations clearing of 
payment transactions as could be carried out by a true inter-Nations clearing-house within a 
three-tier system. 
54 See our footnote number 58 on the postulation of three case scenarios by which monetary 
payment transactions could be financed between countries. 
55 A situation, according to Rossi ‘rather unlikely to occur in the near future, owing to the 
ECB’s strong reluctance to act as the bank for NCBs within the EMU’ (Rossi 2012: 231). 
Instead, one European settlement institution that could intervene in the place of the ECB, as 
per Rossi’s suggestion, is the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) − whether in a capacity 
of monetary (e.g. bilateral/multilateral case-scenarios) or financial intermediary. In the latter 
scenario, it could be particularly fitted to act ‘as credit provider to those countries that are 
unable to obtain capital otherwise. In this regard, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
could indeed act as an international financial intermediary, carrying out the monetary function 
of a European settlement institution that provides payment finality between any two member 
countries’ (Rossi 2012: 234). 
56 In interpreting Keynes with respect to the importance of limiting the role as assumed by an 
international currency or its international clearing house, Rossi points out how certain policies 
(e.g. interest rate setting) ‘should not be abandoned to some supranational institution like the 
ECB − whose monetary policy cannot do justice to the different needs of different EMU 
member countries’ (Rossi 2012: 235). More comprehensively, here is how he captures the 
meaning of Keynes as elaborated throughout some of the latter’s writings: ‘Indeed, as noted 
by Keynes (1942b/1980, p. 168), the euro is needed as ‘an instrument of international 
currency having general acceptability between nations… that is to say, an instrument of 
currency used by each nation in its transactions with other nations, operating through 
whatever national organ, such as a Treasury or a central bank’. In other words, the euro 
‘should not trespass unnecessarily beyond this field’ (Keynes, 1942a/1980, p. 125). Keynes 
was indeed aware of the fact that ‘private individuals, businesses and banks other than central 
banks’ should be allowed ‘to use their own national currency as heretofore’ (1942b/1980, p. 
168). This amounts to saying that monetary sovereignty, to wit, the possibility of steering the 
interest rates according to the country’s domestic needs (also with regard to foreign exchange 
rates) by a sovereign central bank, should not be abandoned to some supranational institution 
like the ECB − whose monetary policy cannot do justice to the different needs of different 
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between Member States in their inter-Nations’ payment transactions, is that the latter ‘be 
monetized by a European settlement institution in order for the payer country and payee 
country respectively to pay and to be paid finally’ (Rossi 2012: 232). The establishment of a 
genuine international settlement house to primarily issue ‘the means of final payment between 
the two trading countries’ (ibid.: 231) is a first necessary step towards payment finality. Then 
what needs to take effect is the financing of these monetary payment transactions through the 
sale and purchase of government or corporate issued bonds by the relevant interacting trading 
countries via multilateral clearing. If this occurred then the debtor nations would be ‘in a 
position to finance their trade deficits through a sale of financial assets’ (ibid.: 228). If not the 
case, then a truly inter-Nations settlement institution (possibly the same European settlement 
institution responsible for primarily monetizing the payment transactions of the trading 
countries) is necessarily required to intercede, ultimately, as financial intermediary between 
the trading nations in order to secure payment finality. Otherwise, the debtor-country in 
question would simply have to limit its imports accordingly, in keeping with the conditional 
confines of the reform advocated for the future system of payments. 
Now remembering that the avenue that we have been elaborating with respect to Rossi’s 
recommended solution ‘to transforming promises of international payment into final 
payments for the countries involved’ implies an Euro ‘to be issued by some European 
institution for the settlement of trade imbalances’ whilst ‘all EMU member countries recover 
their monetary sovereignty through the issuance of their own national currencies’ (ibid.: 231), 
the primary justification for the existence of an intervening European settlement institution 
becomes clear. It is needed to collect all of the heterogeneous country currencies within a 
common homogeneous monetary area, primarily enabling the monetary aspect of payment 
finality in international payment transactions through the issuance of its own central money, 
the Euro that we refer to above. As Rossi puts it ‘[a] European settlement institution must 
intervene as monetary intermediary issuing the means of final payment’ − the amount of 
central money units − ‘necessary in order for the international payment to be final’ (ibid.: 
231, 232 respectively). But these monetary payment transactions ultimately require to be 
financed; that is to say − taking Greece and Germany as exemplary trading partners (bilateral-
case58 scenario) as per Rossi 2012 − they need to be complemented with a ‘financial 
transaction through which residents in the payer country (Greece) issue and sell either 
corporate or government bonds, and residents within the payee country (Germany) purchase 
foreign bonds’ (ibid.: 232). Let us next examine Rossi’s description of the bilateral-case. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
EMU member countries (see Rochon and Rossi, 2006 for analytical elaboration on this point). 
In this respect, as Keynes (1943/1980, p. 234) wrote in the Preface to the April 1943 Clearing 
Union White Paper issued by the British government, the international monetary system is to 
be reformed in order to make sure that ‘[t]here should be the least possible interference with 
internal national policies’’ (Rossi 2012: 235). 
57 As pointed out earlier, the current two-tier design of TARGET2’s infrastructure – the 
Achilles heel from which payment finality is impeded − is without doubt the source of ‘intra-
euro-area imbalances’ and ‘[t]he solution to this problem implies transforming promises of 
international payment into final payments for the countries involved’ (Rossi 2012: 231). 
58 Three possible case scenarios can be postulated by which monetary payment transactions 
could be financed between countries. The first case consists of bilateral clearing (as described 
above by Rossi 2012). The second and third case involve, respectively, multilateral clearing 
or ultimately, the financial intervention of a chosen international institution that would 
intervene as a financial intermediary. 
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The bilateral case occurs when residents in the trade-surplus country (Germany 
in our stylized example) buy those bonds that are being sold by residents in the 
trade-deficit country (Greece in this case). If so, then the relevant financial-
market transaction involves the European settlement institution as mere 
monetary intermediary, because it issues the number of money units that are 
necessary in order for the international payment to be final as regards the two 
countries involved thereby. 
(Ibid.: 232) 
 
A significant observation worthy of notice with respect to the above account as Rossi points 
out, is that ‘all international transactions are finally paid, because they have been internalized 
and therefore no further foreign claim exists’ (ibid.: 232)59. He adds that this differs 
significantly with balance of payments entries as depicted in Table 8.1 (see Rossi 2012, p. 
228) ‘which show that, to date, payments through TARGET2 are not final for the countries 
concerned by them’ (ibid.: 232).  
Let us distinguish the bilateral-case60 from that of the multilateral-case. Multilateral clearing 
is a payment procedure occurring on an ongoing basis61 and involving more than two 
participant countries interacting all at once through the intermediary of a third counter-party 
international62 institution (above in hierarchy) and this via a system of absolute exchange. In 
order to illustrate its distinguishing features, we provide a basic layout as an exemplary 
scenario (our own simple re-formatting of an original of Cencini whereby he details a 
numerical example63 of the multilateral-case). In following with Cencini’s example, we 
depict (see Table 1.1) the three countries (Italy, Germany, France) interacting in a multilateral 
clearing through the intermediary of a third counter-party institution, e.g. the ECB. 
In examining the payment interactions of Table 1.1 we can observe the advantages of 
multilateral clearing: it facilitates the financing of monetary payment transactions taking place 
amongst the interacting countries such that a trade-deficit country has a wider-range chance to 
raise the necessary funds it requires to back its purchases. In the example of Table 1.1, 
Germany (trade-surplus country) purchases an extra 5 F.C. from France who spends it to 
purchase 5 F.C. from Italy. So looking at it from the end-all perspective Italy was able to raise 
funds in the range of 5 F.C. that it sold to France instead of Germany (the latter having bought 
5 F.C. from France instead of Italy) and this, on account of the facilitating mechanism 
                                                
59 See balance of payments as depicted in Rossi 2012, Table 8.6 (The result of a delivery-
versus-payment through a European settlement institution), p. 233. 
60 A simplified case-scenario merely intended to enlighten-instruct on the monetary 
intermediary role that could be assumed by a third counter-party clearing-house (operating at 
a higher hierarchical level within a three-tier system) as well as to demonstrate the 
simpler/direct type (in the bilateral case: occurring strictly between the respective trade-
surplus and trade-deficit countries) of financial-claims exchange that could take place under 
its operation. The system that is clearly needed given its inherent advantage of offering a 
wider-spectrum source from which trade-deficit countries can pool their required sales of 
financial claims is that of multilateral clearing and is thus the very type of clearing that our 
suggested payment reform propounds. 
61 In the manner of Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) funds (money/securities) transfer 
systems. 
62 Our meaning extends to that of a European settlement institution. 
63 See Cencini 2008 Elementi di macroeconomia monetaria for his original numerical 
example of a truly multilateral-case. 
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inherent to multilateral64 clearing. But in spite of that, the multilateral system may not always 
generate the funds needed by a particular trade-deficit country and the latter may ultimately 
have to appeal for assistance through the financial intervening of an international institution, 
the likes of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)65 or the ECB itself. 
We should note that the institution chosen to fill the role of ultimate credit provider (financial 
intermediate) need not necessarily be one apart from the third counter-party institution 
essential for delivering the reform we are advocating relevant to the international system of 
payments. The importance rather is to distinguish between the roles played by this third 
counter-party institution or, respective institutions66. That is, as monetary intermediate as in 
the bilateral and multilateral case scenarios or, as financial intermediate as in the financial 
intervention case scenario.  
Rossi does warn however that should the ESM accept to venture the challenges of the ‘hat’ as 
financial intermediary, its decrees would need to take certain economic factors into 
consideration in order to deliver optimally on its mission as credit facilitator67. He suggests, 
for example, some guidance principles (percentage of a country’s GDP) beyond which a 
nation should be allowed to sell financial securities in order to finance its commercial deficit. 
Likewise he strongly advises, in the spirit of Keynes, that these same limits (percentage of 
GDP) should apply to trade-surplus nations as well, rather than placing the entire burden onto 
the trade-deficit countries.  
 
Indeed, as pointed out by Keynes (1942a/1980), the international rebalancing 
should be symmetrical rather than relying on deficit countries only: a 
substantial decrease of imports in the latter countries could potentially lead 
them as well as surplus countries into a (prolonged) recession or depression. 
Rather, the rebalancing mechanism should be so designed as to induce surplus 
countries (like Germany) to increase their commercial imports from deficit 
countries (such as Greece), which need to boost their exports − not least to pay 
for debt service, that is, interest on securities sold either to surplus countries or 
to the ESM to finance the country’s trade deficit. 
(Rossi 2012: 235) 
 
He sums up his argument in a clear-sighted assessment of the current state of affairs − in this 
regard, consequential to this idée fixe of austerity that continues to pervade policy-making. 
 
Indeed, reducing imports in deficit countries − through austerity measures − 
cannot but aggravate the euro-area crisis, because it will also negatively affect 
sales figures in surplus countries like Germany (whose growth strategy is 
                                                
64 The financial market transactions implicit in multilateral clearing involve the chosen third 
counter-party international institution as well (as in the case of bilateral clearing) as simple 
monetary intermediary in that it only serves to emit the sum of money units required for the 
finalization of international payments. 
65 See Rossi 2012, p.234. 
66 Our meaning for example: the ECB could assume the monetary intermediary role merely 
issuing the required number of money units necessary for the finalization of international 
payments; whilst the ESM could assume the extra function of ultimate credit provider as 
financial intermediary. 
67 It goes without saying that this same stipulation would apply to any international/European 
institution (e.g. the ECB) taking on the role of financial intervener. 
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structurally designed to maximize exports, some 60 per cent of which are 
oriented to other euro-area countries at the time of writing). 
(Ibid.: 236) 
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ECB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ITALY                                                   GERMANY                                        FRANCE                                                        
 
 
Sells Goods:                                         Sells Goods:                                     Sells Goods: 
 
70 > Germany                                      100 > Italy                                        90 > Germany 
60 > France                                          110 > France                                     50 > Italy 
 
 
Purchases Goods:                                 Purchases Goods:                             Purchases Goods: 
 
100 < Germany                                     70 < Italy                                         110 < Germany 
50   < France                                         90 < France                                      60   < Italy 
 
 
 
SIMULTANEOUSLY  
 
 
 
Sells Financial Claims (F.C.)                 Sells F.C.:                                       Sells F.C.: 
 
30 > Germany                                        10 > France                                     35 > Germany 
5   > France                                                                                                    10 > Italy 
 
 
Purchases F.C.:                                      Purchases F.C.:                                Purchases F.C.: 
 
10 < France                                            35 < France                                      10 < Germany 
                                                               30 < Italy                                          5   < Italy                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1: Our reconstructed illustrative example of Multilateral clearing based on    
Cencini’s original numerical example (2008). 
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On re-visiting Euro Land’s options amidst a rising tide of discontent 
 
In recapitulation, we have analyzed the essence of monetary homogeneity versus 
heterogeneity in a system of payment and have assessed the advantage of the former in its 
ability to circumvent the transfer problem, whether at the national or international level. We 
have observed how the absence of homogeneity within an inter-Nations payment system can 
severely impair it with a lack of payment finality, in turn leading to substantial and soaring 
payment imbalances amongst the affected Nations. Finally, following an examination of how 
monetary homogeneity pervades a national system of payment with the effect of ridding its 
payment transactions from any monetary transfer problem encumbrance we have noted that 
such is not the case within our current non-system of international payments, whether 
considered at the European or more global level. Being based on a regime of relative 
exchange rates and lacking a third counter-party clearing-house68 as is played out by Central 
Banks at the national level, the ‘system’ is consequently afflicted with serious payment 
anomalies of notable calamitous effect as is evidenced by the manifestation of the double 
burden of external debt.  
In this regard, it is true that were the Europeans to contemplate the formation of a more 
stringently binding union beyond that of the EMU, the likes of a single sovereign state, they 
would avoid the double burden of external debt among themselves. But the current political 
climate − at the time of writing − seems to put in doubt that this might be the type of Union 
that the European nations, Member States of the Euro zone or of the EU, ultimately want to 
form. In fact it rather appears as though the current level of unionisation as already created via 
the EMU is already straining political and cultural relationships amongst the Member States. 
A European divide seems more on the brink of the agenda than any serious commitment 
towards a more closely knitted European alliance. There is even talk about the United 
Kingdom exiting the European Union. A growing disenchantment with what the latter has 
grown to be69 seems to pervade the air which, we might even say, has become increasingly 
stifling for some. A bureaucratic network with far-ranging tentacles incessantly working at 
full stretch to quench an insatiable thirst for power − would it have grown too big for its own 
britches, with the risk yet of developing into a mammoth white elephant? The economic and 
political union of the 27 member states is already being referred to as a ‘bureaucratic 
monstrosity’70. Baron Lawson of Blaby has forthrightly called for the United Kingdom (UK) 
                                                
68 We have seen how the ECB is not even currently fitting to the role. 
69 Writing in The Times and as captured by Nigel Morris of The Independent in a May 2013 
news article, former Chancellor Lord Lawson explicitly states ‘… [“b]ut all this is largely 
beside the point,” he wrote. ¨The heart of the matter is that the very nature of the European 
Union, and of this country’s relationship with it, has fundamentally changed after the coming 
into being of the European monetary union and the creation of the eurozone, of which − quite 
rightly − we are not a part¨’. And as Morris continues with his report on Lawson’s writings, 
‘[¨j]ust as entry into the Common Market half a century ago provided a much needed change 
of focus, so might leaving the EU, an institution that has achieved its historic purpose and is 
now past its sell-by date, provide a much-needed change of focus today¨’ (Morris, Deputy 
Political Editor at The Independent, 7th May 2013 The Independent news article). 
70 As per the vivid account of Nigel Lawson − Lord Lawson of Blaby − former Conservative 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a communication with The Times newspaper in May of 2013: 
‘In his piece, the former chancellor said there would be some economic costs to leaving the 
single market but it would be outweighed by not having to pay for the ¨bureaucratic 
monstrosity¨ of the 27-nation bloc’ (Hannah Kuchler, UK News Reporter at Financial Times, 
7th May 2013 FT news article). 
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to exit the European Union (EU)71. Strongly of the opinion that the UK would do better 
economically if it left the EU, he also criticized the latter for its ‘frenzy of regulatory 
activism’72 that he felt could potentially stifle the country’s economic progress. He also 
warned that too many of the country’s commercial traders are ‘secure in the warm embrace of 
the European single market’73 and as such are greatly missing out in failing to look beyond it 
to consider other business opportunities. And, on further dwelling on this, it brings to mind 
yet other avenues74 which could be explored even with Asia in the spirit of Piffaretti and 
Rossi’s contribution on an institutional approach with respect to ‘the structural rebalancing of 
global imbalances’ (see Piffaretti and Rossi 2010)75. 
Meanwhile others are even adamant that the European project76 itself is unravelling at the 
seams. In a candid reaction to political leaders’ ‘management’ of the Cyprus crisis that 
erupted in the spring of 2013, Athanasios Orphanides77 exposed some of the unpalatable and 
                                                
71 ‘Writing in The Times newspaper on Tuesday, Mr. Lawson said he would vote in favour of 
a British exit in the referendum that David Cameron has promised if he wins the next 
election’ (Kuchler, UK News Reporter at Financial Times, 7th May 2013 FT news article). 
72 ‘Mr. Lawson, who sits on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, also said 
the EU’s current ¨frenzy of regulatory activism¨ including the ¨foolish and damaging¨ 
financial transactions tax, could damage the UK economy’ (Kuchler, UK News Reporter at 
Financial Times, 7th May 2013 FT news article). 
73 Nigel Morris from The Independent, reporting on Lord Lawson’s writing to The Times 
‘Too much UK business and industry felt ¨secure in the warm embrace of the European single 
market and is failing to recognize that today’s great export opportunities lie in the developing 
world¨, the peer wrote’ (Morris, Deputy Political Editor at The Independent, 7th May 2013 
The Independent news article). 
74 Perhaps more of a structural nature but none the less bearing great economic and financial 
potential should the monetary payment reform we are suggesting be explored. 
75 Analogous to their case-study for a bilateral US-China Settlement Facility, the UK could 
explore this same avenue as a first step following their exit from the EU (whether with China 
as well or with both China and the US, with the idea and hope that other European countries 
would eventually follow their trail) − and as a milestone undertaking towards reining in the 
double burden of their external debt of which they are also a victim and will continue to be 
until an international clearing-house is set up to oversee massive monetary reforms at the 
international payment level. The analogical endeavor may seem overly optimistic and even 
far-fetched at first sight, but perhaps not on considering Lawson’s mood as he expresses ‘[t]he 
Bank of England is becoming increasingly frustrated by the mandatory nonsense emanating 
from Brussels’. He further elaborates on his thought as he explains in a next sentence in 
writing to The Times and as reported by Nigel Morris. ‘Escaping from this and reinforcing the 
escape by co-operation with the only other genuine world financial centre, the United States, 
would be a major economic plus’ (Morris, Deputy Political Editor at The Independent, 7th 
May 2013 The Independent news article). 
76 As reported by Ralph Atkins in London, ‘[h]is outspoken comments highlighted 
widespread alarm at eurozone leaders’ handling of the Cyprus crisis − including by the 
European Central Bank and European Commission’. He quotes Orphanides’s succinct 
assessment: ‘¨[t]he European project is crashing to earth,¨ Athanasios Orphanides told the 
Financial Times in an interview. ¨This is a fundamental change in the dynamics of Europe 
towards disintegration and I don’t see how this can be reversed.¨’ (Atkins, FT Capital Markets 
Editor, 22 March 2013 FT news article).  
77 The Economist captured some of his professional profile in a prelude to interviewing with 
him in March 2013. ‘Athanasios Orphanides was governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus 
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ironic truths that have come to undermine the harvest of complete European integration as 
was initially intended by the ‘masterminds’ of the Euro seedling. As his interviewing account 
sagaciously points out, at day’s end it is national interests that take priority. It is indeed 
ironic, isn’t it? That is, that national ‘protectionism’78 somehow always re-surfaces to validate 
its dominion − in trying times − over an initial game plan79 that was intent on putting such 
national ambitions on the back burner. It would seem to reinforce the argument that, above 
all, nations want to be nations. The time certainly appears ripe for a fundamental re-thinking 
of the original mission of the project. A change of course is undoubtedly warranted though 
more along the lines of structural change as could be brought about by a massive payment 
system reform, conducive to nations re-claiming their respective monetary sovereignties. 
Orphanides afforded The Economist a most forthright and straight to the point critic in 
interviewing with them, the details of which, we refer the readers to the actual transcript of 
the interview. The following are some telling excerpts from The Economist’s interview80 with 
him. ‘¨The politics, in my mind, is what makes this episode so ugly, that some governments, 
to serve their own national or narrow political interests, arrived at a decision that inflicts 
irreparable damage to Cyprus¨’81. As well, it is worth taking heed of his closing comments as 
he reminds of the already existing disparities among the Member States ‘¨[t]hat will add to the 
divergences we already have and make the recession in the periphery of Europe deeper than it 
already is. This is really a disaster for European economic management as a whole¨’ (ibid.: 
March 2013). 
In yet another episode, this time involving Pascal Lamy, Head of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), general discontent with the current political objectives of the EU was 
again not spared. He was speaking at a Brussels conference on the future of the EU as 
external player. Martin Banks, Senior Journalist at The Parliament Magazine captured some 
of his enthralling remarks in a May 2013 article82. As Banks reported ‘World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) chief Pascal Lamy has delivered a withering verdict on the ¨European 
project¨, accusing it of having ¨lost credibility¨’. He quotes the WTO chief’s cutting remarks. 
‘¨There can be no doubt that, on the world stage, it has lost a lot of credibility in the eyes of 
many people. This is not because of any diplomatic failure but, more dramatically, is the 
result of people seriously questioning that Europe and EU is united¨’. 
                                                                                                                                                   
from 2007 to 2012, giving him a seat on the European Central Bank’s governing council and 
oversight of Cyprus’ banks’. On a personal and academic note it documented the following.  
‘Mr Orphanides was raised in Cyprus, received his PhD in economics from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology and was an adviser at the Federal Reserve Board. He is now a lecturer 
at MIT and a fellow at the Center for Financial Studies at the Goethe University of Frankfurt’ 
(G.I. at The Economist, Washington, D.C., 28th March 2013 edited transcript of the 
interview). 
78 Our meaning: in the loose sense of overall national interests. 
79 Our reference is with respect to the European project on the whole. 
80 (G.I. at The Economist, Washington, D.C., 28th March 2013 edited transcript of the 
interview obtained via a combination of telephone and writing communications). 
81 His straight-shooting comments were in reference to how he believes Cyprus’s ultimate fate 
got tangled up in the grip of ambitious political interests prevailing the upcoming September 
2013 German election. 
82 (Banks, Senior Journalist at The Parliament Magazine, 16th May 2013 article, The 
Parliament Magazine). 
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Yves Mersch, member of the ECB executive board, wrote an FT article83 in which he 
mentions that ‘calls are becoming louder for the ECB to introduce new tools, swallow ever 
more risk and start economic fine-tuning. But this would be a diversion. The successful 
measures taken by the ECB are there to buy time for the political authorities to fix the 
governance framework and implement reforms. They cannot be a substitute for the repair 
work’84. On pondering his assessment of the situation, it is true that measures undertaken by 
the ECB cannot single-handedly be substitutes for the repair work needed on a home-national 
level. But the ECB could take on a vital role as reform leader itself if it became the 
instrumental tool with which to revamp the international payment system, at the European 
level, as a decisive and innovative first step towards curing the continent’s monetary and 
financial ills. The executive council member’s observations are right on target when he writes 
‘[t]he eurozone faces a triple problem: stretched states, fragile banks and shrinking 
economies. If addressed properly, we can make a virtuous cycle that will help with all three. 
If managed poorly, however, they could descend into a vicious cycle’85. In considering his 
critical appraisal, it would seem timely indeed to venture a new approach by envisioning a 
way to circumvent the continent’s economic and financial distress from an entirely different 
perspective. In this regard, perhaps it is time to incline our ear to the wisdom of Rossi’s 
analytical findings whereby he concludes the following. 
 
The euro-area crisis that broke out near the end of 2009 is not the result of 
excessive fiscal deficits in the sense of the Maastricht Treaty. Indeed, it is not 
the behavior of public sector officials with the complacency of domestic or 
foreign banks’ managers that can explain the structural disorder pervading the 
EMU. This disorder has a systemic origin, which pertains to a structural 
discrepancy between the essential laws governing money and banking, on the 
one hand, and the practical working of the euro-area-wide payment system 
(TARGET2), on the other hand. European institutions need therefore to design 
a monetary-structural reform in order for the TARGET2 system to comply with 
the nature of bank money at the international level, analogously to what 
actually occurs within domestic payment and settlement systems around the 
world. 
(Rossi 2012: 236) 
 
If the reality of the facts strongly suggests that our economic and financial woes are not 
subjectively consequential but rather the effect of a serious structural flaw in our current non-
system of international payments86, why not step back and consider a more radical solution as 
a viable alternative to resolving our plight? Conventional approaches, thus far, have left much 
to be desired and have proven to be more self-defeating than progressive. Delaying a fresh 
plan of attack any longer, runs the risk that the situation may start to ‘descend into a vicious 
cycle’87, with no point of return. Instead of chasing after an even nigher alliance whose 
                                                
83 The Financial Times article is titled: Europe’s ills cannot be healed by monetary innovation 
alone. It appeared in the FT on the 24th of April 2013. 
84 (Mersch, member of the ECB executive board − writing in to the Financial Times in an 
article that appeared in the FT on the 24th of April 2013). 
85 (Mersch, member of the ECB executive board − writing in to the Financial Times in an 
article that appeared in the FT on the 24th of April 2013). 
86 Whether considered at the European level or on a grander scale worldwide. 
87 In reference to the pictorial expression as coined by Mersch, ECB executive board member, 
in an article that he wrote and which appeared in the FT on April 24th, 2013. 
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‘sustainable development’ appears unattainable − realistically, perhaps the times are better 
suited to embracing a ‘sustainable retreat’ (Lovelock 2006: 7). This brings us back to the 
consideration of our third option as introduced earlier88 – as a way to tackle an escalating 
economic and financial crisis. The approach that we advocate implies the upholding of 
monetary sovereignties whilst embarking on a massive structural reform of our current non-
system of international payments. Though our main presentation model will target a smaller 
scale application at the European level, it will eventually dwell into larger global scale 
adaptabilities.  
But let us first close on a lighter note (withal, of serious substance) than the dry humdrum that 
will follow in the ensuing chapters − nonetheless important − as we explore the construct of 
external debt, and explain through the presentation of other pertinent concepts and principles, 
the disastrous effect of its double burden given our current non-system of international 
payments. Moreover, we will show how a reform of the latter would be instrumental in 
circumventing the very payment anomaly that causes it. We thus leave the readers to ponder 
an analogous account of ‘sustainable retreat’ versus ‘sustainable development’ from an 
environmental perspective that, not so surprisingly, echoes our current state of affairs on an 
economic and financial level. In the end, we suffer the very making of our own kind. Next is 
Lovelock’s89 enlightened reflection90. 
 
The few things we do know about the response of the Earth to our presence are 
deeply disturbing. Even if we stopped immediately all further seizing of Gaia’s 
land and water for food and fuel production and stopped poisoning the air, it 
would take the Earth more than a thousand years to recover from the damage 
we have already done, and it may be too late even for this drastic step to save 
us. To recover, even to lessen the consequences of our past errors, will take an 
extra-ordinary degree of international effort and a carefully planned sequence 
for replacing fossil carbon with safer energy sources. We as a civilization are all 
too much like someone addicted to a drug that will kill if continued and kill if 
suddenly withdrawn. We are in our present mess through our intelligence and 
inventiveness. It could have started as long as 100,000 years ago, when we first 
set fire to forests as a lazy way of hunting. We had ceased to be just another 
animal and begun the demolition of the Earth. We are the species equivalent of 
that schizoid pair, Mr Hyde and Dr Jekyll; we have the capacity for disastrous 
destruction but also the potential to found a magnificent civilization. Hyde led 
us to use technology badly; we misused energy and overpopulated the Earth, 
but we will not sustain civilization by abandoning technology. We have instead 
to use it wisely, as Dr Jekyll would do, with the health of the Earth, not the 
                                                
88 Refer to INTRODUCTION, The Euro zone − On the horns of a trilemma. 
89 James Lovelock is a British independent scientist and environmentalist in the Chemistry 
and Earth science fields. He is the originator of the Gaia Theory that ‘proposes that organisms 
interact with their inorganic surroundings on Earth to form a self-regulating, complex system 
that contributes to maintaining the conditions for life on the planet’ (Wikipedia encyclopedia). 
In Lovelock’s own words: ‘There is nothing unusual in the idea of life on Earth interacting 
with the air, sea and rocks, but it took a view from outside to glimpse the possibility that this 
combination might consist of a single giant living system and one with the capacity to keep 
the Earth always at a state most favorable for the life upon it’ (from What is Gaia? by James 
Lovelock, James LOVELOCK’s website: http://www.ecolo.org/lovelock/index.htm). 
90 In this parallel argument is couched great insight and wisdom from which we could draw 
from. 
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health of people, in mind. This is why it is much too late for sustainable 
development; what we need is a sustainable retreat. 
(Lovelock 2006: 6−7) 
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Part II  A new analytic reasoning: forming a 
macroeconomic perception from macroeconomic roots 
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2   On money; double-entry bookkeeping, nations as 
macroeconomic entities, the macroeconomic law of the 
identity between each single agent’s sales and purchases, 
double double-entry bookkeeping; balance-of-payments in 
relation to double-entry recording  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We now move towards unveiling the anomalies of our current non-system of international 
payments through a macroeconomic perspective emanating from macroeconomic 
foundations. 
It is not for any other particular reason other than a very macroeconomic one that Cencini and 
Citraro emphasize that ‘[t]he fact that country A’s net interest is paid both by its residents and 
by the country itself would have no consequence in the joint balance of payments of A and R 
if the macroeconomic payment of A were entered both in A’s and in R’s current or capital and 
financial accounts’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 281). When concerned with monetary systems 
at the international level, the macroeconomic aspect is taken to a whole new level of stringent 
importance. After all, it is at this very level − macroeconomic level − that the pathologies 
affecting our respective economic systems manifest themselves and so it is crucial that we 
angle our observations of their symptoms and subsequent analysis of their root causes from 
this starting point, that is, from a macroeconomic viewpoint based on true macroeconomic 
groundwork. 
Moreover, it is through its monetary sovereignty that a nation delineates the core of its 
specificity and establishes its very economic identity. It is thus just as imperatively important 
that we conceptualize it from a holistic perspective, that is, as the set of its residents − 
operating on behalf of its residents and not additionally to them, thus from a purely 
macroeconomic standpoint. It is through this nation as a whole that the macroeconomic law 
of the identity between each single agent’s sales and purchase − deriving from the flow aspect 
of bank money, particularly from banks’ bookkeeping manner in issuing it − takes on a very 
specific significance with respect to international payment transactions among countries. 
Ultimately, it is the countries themselves − defined by their respective monetary sovereignties 
and central banking systems − that become these economic agents on the international scene. 
Thus this identity between each single agent’s sales and purchase plays itself out last but not 
least at the international level and its unique significance at the latter level should not be 
unheeded. To understand it for all is worth, will help home in the analysis and understanding 
of the origins of the anomalies that plague our current international monetary system. 
Finally, the decision to embrace a macroeconomic versus a microeconomic approach in our 
analysis of the monetary disorders that pervade the capitalist system worldwide, stems from 
the influence of compelling apologists91 regard the argument that these deeply rooted 
economic anomalies emanate from the structural malfunction of monetary infrastructures that 
form the basis of payment systems, respectively at both the national and international level. 
                                                
91 Schmitt, Cencini et al. 
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Consequently, the pathologies need to be evaluated and addressed from a purely 
macroeconomic as well as structure-oriented viewpoint ‘allowing the separation of the 
structural causes of economic crises from accidental disturbances due to economic agents’ 
behaviour’ (Cencini 2012: 194). 
As we set sail, we should bear in mind that a macroeconomic approach invokes economic 
laws that relate to a country’s economic system considered as a unit and, per se, the analysis 
necessitates in-depth abstract reasoning92.  
Let us return to the very basics, money − bank-money that is − since without banks the 
production of a country’s output would lose its economic raison d’être, much less money-
income would be nonexistent. 
 
 
As regards money, bank-money 
 
What can we say about money, that is, bank-money? What is bank-money and in which 
manner do banks issue it?  
Money is essentially bank-money as it cannot be other than what it exists as: the result of the 
implementation of double-entry bookkeeping by banks − essentially, a flow. Money, bank-
money is a flow. It does not flow unless we are meaning instantaneous velocity, as bank-
money is the flow itself. Hence, it should not be conceived of as matter or stock93, neither as 
an asset per se. It is none other than a ‘dematerialized vehicle’94 through which payment 
transactions are conveyed and this, via its instantaneous flow. 
Bank-money’s instantaneous flow is the very flow-vehicle that exists only in payment 
transactions. Matter-of-factness, its flow is present only the very instant a payment takes 
place. Banks issue the said bank-money as a simple accounting unit95 − a mere book-entry 
                                                
92 See Cencini 2012: 50, 54.  
93 The importance in understanding ‘that money is not a stock, that it does not circulate within 
a country or across countries, and that its ‘velocity’ is infinite, since in each payment it is 
instantaneously recovered by the bank issuing it’ (Gnos and Rossi 2012: 12) becomes crystal 
clear when the analysis graduates to the international level. It is at this stage that when bank-
money is considered for what it is and what it is not, that it becomes definitely perceptible that 
countries, considered as a whole, that is, − each as the set of their respective residents − 
should never become indebted to ‘a stateless financial bubble’ (ibid.: 12).  
94 Cencini informs us that this conceptual way of viewing money is originally linked to Adam 
Smith. ‘It was this great Scottish economist who provided the first arguments against the 
concept of commodity-money. And it was his definition of money as the ‘great wheel of 
circulation’ that introduced the idea of a totally dematerialized vehicle which identifies itself 
with its charge (current output)’ (Cencini, 1988: 2). 
95 What should be kept in perspective is that though banks emit nominal money, real money 
arises through production, both events happening simultaneously. In other words, it is by 
means of labour – through the payment of wages − that nominal money associates with 
current output and once united, together they form real money: income. ‘Banks issue nominal 
money, and production creates real money in the same movement: the payment of wages’ 
(Cencini 1988: 2). Thus with regard to banks issuing a simple accounting unit (as stated 
within our text) it is important to take note of Cencini’s further clarification ‘it is correct to 
say that nominal money can count the product because it carries it, but, carrying it, nominal 
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marking − a double-entry bookkeeping96 that simultaneously delineates, both an asset and a 
liability, the vehicular flow. 
Bank-money can also be thought of as liquidity, that is, if we think of liquidity as ‘a quantum 
of money with no purchasing power of its own. Such money is also called nominal or 
vehicular. The vehicle currency has no economic value, for its function is not to finance any 
net purchases but to ¨monetize¨ the economy’ (Schmitt, 1973: 9). 
It is important to retain that bank-money can never be the end term97 of a payment transaction 
because it is purely an intermediate instrument, a simple means. ‘La monnaie n’est jamais un 
terme, ou un bien final, dans les échanges; elle est pur instrument d’intermédiation’ (Schmitt, 
1984: 49). It is thus that in emitting bank-money, banks engage primarily in a monetary 
intermediation rather than in a financial one. ‘Dans l’émission, la banque est donc un 
intermédiare monétaire et non à proprement parler financier’ (ibid.: 44). This is not to say that 
financial intermediation is not part of their day-to-day operations, it is just that this ‘financier’ 
role is very distinct from that of their monetary intermediation. The latter involves the 
creation of bank deposits whereas in assuming the role of financial intermediate they facilitate 
the transfer of an income between economic agents. We next highlight this fundamental 
distinction in the banks’ dual intermediary role using Schmitt’s very words. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
money is real money so that, finally, it is the latter and not the former that plays the role of 
unit of account’ (ibid.: 26). 
96 Meghnad Desai highlights Schmitt-Cencini’s strict adherence to ‘the discipline of double 
entry book keeping’ in a scintillating foreword to Cencini’s 1988 Money, Income and Time, A 
Quantum-Theoretical Approach. His reflection merits the following interludial pause to 
capture his words. ‘The revolutionary message from the Schmitt-Cencini école de Dijon is 
that money and income are not two separate entities. Money is not a commodity and its value 
should not be related to its commodity-like properties. Money is just another way of 
expressing the economic (not the physical) nature of output. In exchanging money for output, 
one is exchanging two forms of an identical ‘object’. Tautologies and identities impose a 
logic more ruthless than equations do, and the Schmitt-Cencini strategy is to adhere 
rigorously to the discipline of double entry book keeping. Thus the notion of banks creating 
money or of money circulating with a finite velocity are demolished carefully and thoroughly 
by Alvaro Cencini in this book. Money loaned by a bank is activated only when drawn upon 
by the borrower to pay someone but both before and after this instant of payment, banks’ 
books balance. Each debt is matched by a credit, each liability by an equivalent asset’ 
(Meghnad Desai in his Foreword to Cencini’s 1988: xii). 
97 As a matter of fact this does happen in international payment transactions (given our 
currently defective international payment system) and consequently leads to serious world 
monetary disorders. Schmitt (1984) distinguished between bank-money, an instrument of 
intermediation utilized within national economies purely as a means of payment and bank-
money that somehow transforms into a final object of payment in international payment 
transactions. He called on an international payment reform that would defer to the vehicular 
nature of bank-money in order to circumvent this unbridled payment disorder that, apropos, 
still today continues to fuel world economic and financial malaise. ‘Dans les économies 
nationales, les monnaies bancaires sont des instruments d’intermédiation, la théorie le 
reconnaît depuis toujours; lancées dans les paiements internationaux, les monnaies bancaires 
sont au contraire des biens finals; elles sont dénaturées; la réforme doit donc assurer le 
maintien dans les paiements internationaux de la nature purement ¨circulatoire¨ de la monnaie 
bancaire’ (Schmitt, 1984: 76). 
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L’intermédiation financière est néanmoins une opération couramment pratiquée 
par les banques. Elle existe et peut être constatée quotidiennement mais elle est 
toujours distincte de l’intermédiation monétaire. La distinction est respectée par 
la terminologie puisque l’intermédiation monétaire est la création de dépôts, 
l’intermédiation financière étant la transmission d’une épargne. 
(Ibid.: 44) 
 
To re-assert, it is through the theoretical construct of emission98 that both the distinction and, 
definite interrelation of nominal and real money find their outlet. Though banks issue nominal 
money, banks in themselves cannot afford it its purchasing power – the latter comes from 
nominal money’s integration with current output. And this happens at the very moment wages 
are paid to workers. ‘[m]oney acquires its purchasing power at the very instant it is paid out to 
workers’ (Cencini 1988: 31). Real money thus emerges as ‘the ‘load’ carried by nominal 
money, the ‘empty vehicle’’ (ibid.: 31). Defined in other terms, a monetary entity is thus 
moulded by the simultaneous union of shell and product, nominal and real money, 
respectively. Moreover, a conception of nominal money arises as that of the form enclosing 
the very kinship that connects output with labour. Cencini succinctly captures money’s dual 
aspect − so quintessentially evidenced by the interrelating yet very distinctive characteristics 
of its nominal and real make-up − in his following observation. 
 
Of course, real money is not material in the obvious sense of the term. The 
materiality of money is defined by the identity, established through the payment 
of wages, between money itself and current output, and not by its physical 
properties. Likewise, nominal money is not money with no real existence. This 
term is only meant to define the concept of the form of value and not the virtual 
or hypothetical existence of money. But − and this is a crucial proposition to 
which we shall come back again and again − it would also be wrong to believe 
that nominal money can exist autonomously from real money. Nominal money 
and real money are so tightly linked together that it is impossible to determine 
one of them without simultaneously determining the other. Yet the distinction 
of the two concepts is of the uppermost significance since it allows the classical 
economists to prove that, although it is not a commodity, money defines the 
whole of produced goods. 
(Ibid.: 30)  
  
Now it is because banks are not endowed with the divine ability to create a net asset from 
nothing that ‘[t]he emission of money, therefore, has to give rise to a book-keeping entry 
defining, at the same time, a debt and an equivalent credit to the same person’ (Cencini 1995: 
12). What is more, ‘in the same way as the discovery of the number zero marked an important 
advance in the field of mathematics’, as Cencini reminds us, it was the conceptualization of 
bank-money as an asset-liability that turned the key ‘towards understanding the laws ruling 
                                                
98 ‘Keynes’s monetary analysis is indeed the first to provide the elements for the definitive 
solution of the neoclassical dichotomy between real and monetary variables. And the 
integration between (a-dimensional) money and output is precisely the cornerstone of 
quantum theory’. (The latter is in reference to the Schmitt-Cencini theory of money emissions 
from which evolved their modern theoretical approach − quantum monetary 
macroeconomics.) And moreover, as Cencini continues and sums up ‘since the emission of 
money pertains to the banking system, the association of money and output shall result from 
this emission’ (Cencini 1988: 7). 
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our economic systems’ (ibid.:13). Actually, it is the milestone that helps explain the 
appearance of income (money-income) in what our contemporary economic systems have 
come to evolve as, that is, capitalistic systems. Money-income is after all, what is required to 
finance payments in a monetary system99. The crux of the matter is that the asset-liability 
emitted by banks must somehow connect with the goods and services of the real economy 
outside the confinements of the banking establishment, if it is to be transformed to income, 
money-income. In Cencini’s words it ‘has to be linked to a payment allowing for the 
transformation of nominal into real money’ (Cencini 1995: 14). He further points out that only 
one type of payment does not necessitate the pre-existence of income, that which concerns 
the payment of wages. ‘In fact, while the payment of all the ‘other factors of production’ 
implies the pre-existence of money both as a unit of account and as an income, the 
remuneration of labour is completely original: it is this operation that allows for the 
transformation of (nominal) money into income (real money)’ (ibid.: 14). 
Keynes’s monetary ideology of production is where he developed logical identities that lead 
to the terminus a quo of the macroeconomic bedrock of macroeconomics. In fact, his identity 
between global supply and global demand concerns ‘the economic system taken as a whole, 
to wit, the global economic system’ (Cencini 2012: 47). The idea of a period of tâtonnement 
(ibid.: 44) preceding a point of equilibrium as claimed by Walras’s GEA (general equilibrium 
analysis) is rejected as Keynes evidences that there is no basis to justify that supply and 
demand ever do calibrate, this by the very fact that they are the alter ego effect of a single and 
unique manifestation. And as such, both are invariably and necessarily equal to each other. 
Through the process of production a double-faced macroeconomic entity100 is born, producing 
at once supply − the ‘physical output measured in wage units’ (ibid.: 46) − and, demand − the 
money-income ‘necessary to finance the final demand for this very output’ (ibid.: 47). It is 
thus that ‘national product and national income are the two aspects of one and the same 
object, so that, literally, one is the definition of the other’, a notion upheld and ‘already clearly 
shown by Smith in The Wealth of Nations’ (ibid.: 46−47). Keynes’s logical identity between 
supply and demand crystallizes the lien as brought about by production between supply 
(physical output) and demand (income, the ‘product-in-the-money’ as coined by Schmitt 
1998)101. Production is hence envisioned as a macroeconomic event by which physical output 
is monetized and as such ‘a positive income is formed, which defines a net increase of wealth 
for the whole economy’ (ibid.: 46). It is irrelevant that production might be generated by one 
                                                
99 It might serve well to remember after all that ‘Keynes’s attempt to construe a monetary 
theory of production is based in fact on the idea that money and output are associated through 
production. As clearly suggested by Keynes’s concept of wage units, the payment of wages is 
the transaction allowing for the association of money and output − and, therefore, also for the 
transformation of money proper into money income’ (Cencini 2012: 46). 
100 And as Cencini reminds ‘following Schmitt (1998), we could call ‘the product-in-the-
money’’ (ibid.: 46). 
101 Cencini explains, more importantly, that the identity is a ‘macroeconomic law’ that 
‘derives directly from the numerical nature of money as emphasized by its asset-liability 
definition (see Schmitt, 1975), and from the very essence of monetary production’ (ibid.: 47). 
He reminds as well that one of the first objective of the science of macroeconomics is to 
delineate ‘the logical laws’ (ibid.: 47) that drive our monetary economies such that we can 
thereafter better define the anomalous deficiencies that obstruct the optimum operation of 
their respective systems. He cautions on the observation that, moreover, ‘logical laws apply 
equally in an ‘orderly’ or in a ‘disorderly’ system, and that it is precisely when they are not 
heeded that they still demand their due, thus revealing the pathological state in which the 
economic system has put itself’ (ibid.: 48). 
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agent or, by the entire set of a nation’s firms, the end effect will be that of a net augmentation 
in domestic income102. 
As the readers are probably beginning to formalize, it is at the international economic level 
that macroeconomics’ inherent logical laws will be better understood and appreciated. In turn, 
it will be that much easier to apprehend the monetary anomalies that manifest themselves at 
the macroeconomic level of our world economies. Withal, it will become that much clearer as 
to why and how these global financial disorders actually originate and therewith unfold their 
detrimental wrath from within the current infrastructure of our international payment 
‘system’. And whence we reach this stage, we should not forget the fact that the logical 
workings of macroeconomic identities never waiver and thus loyally apply within an 
operational system whether the latter is dysfunctional or not. Instead, the system itself will 
malfunction and consequently yield deficient results if it is that its infrastructure is not 
conducive to the natural workings of the laws that govern the applicable macroeconomic 
identities. 
Having clarified the nature of bank-money from a distinctive national perspective, 
thenceforth, we can more easily embrace the domain of macroeconomics by drawing on the 
importance of understanding nations as macroeconomic entities. It all centers on production. 
Through its process, a country’s bank-money is able to monetize the goods and services of its 
nation as a set103, forming a net income104 for its economy as a whole, its macroeconomy.  
Now, in as much as the nature of bank-money is invariant whether considered from a national 
or international perspective105, a country’s very currency is what identifies the nation with its 
own ‘macroeconomic set’ and this, on account of the fact that production is necessarily a 
macroeconomic occurrence106of the said macroeconomy. This is even more evident if 
                                                
102 ‘According to this interpretation, Keynes’s concepts of global supply and global demand 
stand for macroeconomic supply and macroeconomic demand, and concern every new 
production taking place in a given domestic economy’ (ibid.: 47). 
103 Cantor’s development of the notion of set is just as instrumental for the field of monetary 
economics as was the conceptualization of zero (first amongst a series of negative and 
positive integers) to double-entry bookkeeping, in that, as noted by Cencini, it ‘helps define 
the whole of a country’s economy’ (ibid.: 54).  Consequently, when we describe a nation’s 
macroeconomy we intend the set of its inhabitants and this explains why any economic 
transactions executed by the latter must always ‘be evaluated with respect to the set itself in 
order to determine whether they are of a macroeconomic nature’ (ibid.: 54). As Cencini 
pointedly distinguishes ‘an event is of a macroeconomic nature if it modifies the situation for 
the set of a country’s residents, whereas it is of a microeconomic nature if it does not alter the 
initial situation of the set’ (ibid.: 55). 
104 It should also be kept in mind that ‘[l]abour is at the origin of income, and this is 
essentially the reason why production is a macroeconomic event. The formation of a new 
income requires a new production, which itself requires − as a prerequisite − a positive 
‘expenditure’ of labour’ (ibid.: 57). 
105 ‘[T]he vehicular nature of money does not change when we move from an economy of 
production to an economy of exchange’ (ibid.: 60). That is, from an economy of production 
within nations to an economy of exchange at the international level, ‘international economics 
being identified with international exchanges’ (ibid.: 58). 
106 ‘[D]etermining the amount of income available in the country as a whole (the 
macroeconomic set), production is a macroeconomic event even if it is carried out by a single 
producer’ (ibid.: 54). 
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considered abstractly as in the case of multinational production107. The reason being is that a 
nation’s unique currency is that which is ultimately responsible for monetizing the goods and 
services being produced as part of its national output, whether the latter are produced within 
its own nation or, abroad. ‘Commodities produced in the USA, for example, are monetized in 
dollars, and it is precisely this monetary identity which defines their origin’ (Cencini 1995: 
123). 
Before we forge ahead to elaborate on the subtle yet substantive significance with reference to 
the principle of double-entry bookkeeping, let us recapitulate. Thus far, we have seen why 
banks can’t issue money as assets per se. The asset-liability, a mere accounting book-entry 
which but defines the issuing bank’s acknowledgement of debt, needs the process of 
production in order to mould with current output and acquire purchasing power. Through 
labour it thus transforms into money-income that is net for the country as a whole. We should 
also by now have a clearer understanding as to why the identity of macroeconomic supply and 
macroeconomic demand logically derives from this asset-liability characteristic of bank-
money, as does the identity between each economic agent’s sales and purchases (see Schmitt 
1975). We will eventually examine, more thoroughly, why the latter identity also very 
naturally applies to nations, that is, to countries as macroeconomic entities.  
Next, moving onwards to double-entry bookkeeping. 
 
 
As regards double-entry bookkeeping and double double-entry 
bookkeeping 
 
The fundamental significance, we could even speak of practical essence with respect to the 
double record-entry aspect of bank-money is that this distinctive element accounts for the fact 
that ‘income is always necessarily deposited with banks’ (Cencini 2012: 60). And a good 
proof of this is that this vehicular manner − double-entry bookkeeping − by which banks can 
and only can issue money108 is what lays the foundation from which originates the 
macroeconomic law of the identity between each economic agent’s sales and purchases. On a 
national level this implies that the labour force (wage earner) is a seller on the labour market 
(the instant wages are paid to the worker) and a simultaneous purchaser on the financial 
market. On paying wages to workers, banks credit the latter with a bank deposit. This marks 
the income earners’ net purchase of bank deposit claims with the very banks where their 
income is held (in the form of bank deposits and defining the said income holders’ financial 
market purchase). What is important to retain here, is that what these income earners (or, any 
other future economic agent eventually replacing initial income holders or workers) own is 
                                                
107 ‘Multinational production, as the name clearly suggests, takes place in various countries, 
and not in a true international ‘space’. This is confirmed by the fact that a production 
‘nationality’ is not determined by the place where it is carried out, but by the money it is 
associated with. Petrol extraction in extra-territorial waters is defined on the basis of the 
money used to cover its costs, and it is therefore part of the national production of the country 
(or countries) whose money is paid out to the factors of production’ (Cencini 1995: 123). 
108 Without doubt, money − bank-money − is needed to measure the whole of a 
macroeconomy’s goods and services, its national output. But as we have also shown, bank-
money is not only vital in its role as an accounting unit but ultimately, through wage payment 
and the formation of bank deposits a new and net income appears − for the whole of the 
country’s economic system − which essentially monetarily defines the said country’s output. 
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not income per se but rather bank deposit claims with the banks whereby it is deposited (see 
previously cited above). And so when owners of bank deposit claims want to purchase on the 
commodity market, they must sell on the financial market (the banks whereby their income is 
held) their claims on these bank deposits in order to obtain the necessary finance to do so109.  
Hence it does become very evident that, ‘[o]wing to the bank-entry nature of money’ and the 
macroeconomic identity between each economic agent’s sales and purchases which derives 
from bank-money’s double-entry recording of payment transactions, inevitably then ‘income 
is always necessarily deposited with banks’ (ibid.: 60). 
But how does this all play out at the international level? Well firstly, we have seen that 
nations are considered as macroeconomic entities by the simple fact that their respective 
unique monies ‘outside their issuing banking systems, define the acknowledgement of debt of 
their entire countries’ (ibid.:58). Nations are inevitably and necessarily implied in the 
payment transactions of their residents and as such reciprocally interchange between being net 
debtors of the rest of the world or, net creditors and this, on behalf of the set of their residents. 
We have also explained that bank-money’s vehicular and nominal aspects do not vary, 
whether considered from within a national or international context. Within its country 
borders, bank-money represents the acknowledgement of debt of the very bank issuing it, 
whereas across its borders it represents the acknowledgement of debt of the said country, 
considered as a whole − as the set of its residents. And since this asset-liability is a flow that 
is instantaneously issued and returned from and to the same bank, it can thus never be 
transported (within or abroad). This fact clearly defining it as a mere means of payment, 
crystallizes the reason why it could never, of its own, finance a payment − its instantaneously 
occurring flow, very simply, is never intercepted. Matter-of-factly, this asset-liability is itself 
the flow whose instantaneousness and circular direction is to and from the very issuing bank, 
existing only during payments, to record the payment transactions. ‘Because of its necessary 
circular flow, money cannot finance any net purchase, either within a single banking system 
or between countries. This clearly means that purchases have to be matched by simultaneous 
sales carried out through the circular flow of money’ (ibid.: 60).  From an international 
perspective, this establishes the premise by which the difference between a country’s 
payments and receipts to and from foreign nations should equilibrate, always. This means that 
a nation’s purchases ‘of foreign real goods, services, and financial assets is necessarily 
balanced by its sales of domestic real goods, services, and financial assets’ (ibid.: 60). Hence 
is the proof that the macroeconomic identity between each nation’s (here considered as the 
economic agent) sales and purchases is also very real for countries, as macroeconomic 
entities. And the functional applicability of this macroeconomic principle will never waiver 
despite the state of affairs, that is, despite the fact that the infrastructure of the system (to wit, 
international payment systems as currently set up within the Euro area or worldwide) might 
not be conducive to its theoretical requirements. In fact it applies in defiance of any 
microeconomic endeavours whether with respect to the individual economic players’ 
misunderstanding of applicable macroeconomic laws − a lack that could well explain why 
they would implement payment systems with dysfunctional infrastructure − or, in spite of any 
economic or financial decisions that they might then execute within these deficient systems. 
                                                
109 As interestingly observed by Cencini ‘banknotes themselves are nothing more than claims 
on the central bank’s deposits’ and as such ‘the law is always verified: the purchase of real 
goods and services is necessarily balanced by a sale of financial claims’ (Cencini 2012: 60). 
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Let us exemplify to what extremum and just how independently of economic agents’110 
decisions this infallible rule will apply, at the international level. 
We begin our demonstration by referring to an illustration of Cencini whereby he describes 
the applicability ‘of the identity between each country’s sales and purchases’ (ibid.: 60). He 
considers the example of a trade deficit country and explains how transactions would evolve 
depending on whether the country was or was not that of a key-currency. He differentiates 
between the two case scenarios by clearly stipulating that if the said country is a non reserve 
currency nation, it pays for its net commercial purchases either through an augmentation of its 
external debt (net foreign borrowing) ‘or by reducing its official reserves of foreign 
currencies’ (ibid.: 60). This implies that, ultimately, the non key-currency country finances its 
net commercial purchases with ‘a net sale of financial claims − either domestic financial 
claims if it gets indebted, or claims on foreign bank deposits if it reduces its official reserves’ 
(ibid.: 61). But next is the crux of the problem that can arise − given the yielding construct of 
the relative system of exchange that forms the basis of our current system of international 
payments − in the case in accordance with which the exemplary country is of key-currency 
grade. Somehow, still today, it is erroneously considered that such a country ‘can settle its 
trade deficit’ (ibid.: 61) by exporting an amount of its own currency to the asset side of its 
trading partner’s banking system. However, as Cencini reminds us, given the very principle of 
double entry accounting, what is actually transferred to the creditor-country is not a quantity 
of the debtor-country’s money but rather, a claim on the bank deposits of the latter. Moreover 
this shows that yet again in this key-currency case scenario, the debtor country’s ‘net 
commercial purchases are financed by’ its’ ‘net financial sales’ (ibid.: 61). Infallibly, the 
macroeconomic identity between each trading nation’s sales and purchases holds. What 
then is so anomalous with this end result? The problem is that the relative system of exchange 
underlining the infrastructure that governs our current international payment system is 
deficient in its ability to work in a complementary manner with the very principle of the 
identity. Quite seriously, the system is at odds with the identity’s fundamental significance 
and consequently leads to grave monetary disorders one of which, being that, it enables 
‘monetary duplication’ (see Cencini 1995: 13 and 2012: 65). Let’s step back in order to 
properly consider this. As understanding the reason for the occurrence of this anomaly should 
in turn help us understand other detrimental effects that originate within our current 
international system of payments given its lack of respect for bank-money’s vehicular nature 
and principle by which it is issued by banks via an asset-liability double-entry bookkeeping.   
In today’s ‘system’ of international payments (based on a regime of relative exchange), a 
reserve currency nation has the special advantage (otherwise known as ‘the exorbitant 
privilege’ see Rossi 2009 and 2012) of being able to pay for its net commercial imports using 
its own currency. Very simply, it transfers its bank deposit claims over to the net exporting 
country. Hence the latter is paid with a mere acknowledgment of debt, an I.O.U. if you will111. 
But despite the fact that today’s bank accounting device of ‘double-entry book-keeping grants 
the ‘vehicular’ use of currencies both at the national and international levels’ (Cencini 2000: 
12) the ‘key-currencies standard regime under which we live in’ (Cencini 1995: 7) ‘allows for 
a phenomenon of monetary duplication’ (ibid.: 13). On examining the international 
accounting book-keeping entries, it can be observed (as was first noticed by Rueff 1963) that 
                                                
110 Implying independently of any behavioural influence to include ‘decisions taken at the 
microeconomic level’ (ibid.: 61) of the respective trading countries interacting as 
macroeconomic entities in an international setting. 
111 Outside its issuing national banking system, a country’s currency is nothing but an 
acknowledgement of debt of the institutional banking system of the said macroeconomic 
entity, the country considered as a whole.  
46 
when a key-currency nation pays for its net commercial imports, an amount of this debtor’s 
currency is recorded on the asset side of the exporting-creditor country’s banking ledger. ‘To 
this end, no bank of issue should be able to lend a foreign creditor the currencies against 
which it had already created a buying power in its own monetary field’ (Rueff 1963: 326). 
Now in keeping with the vehicular nature of bank money, the importing-debtor country’s 
currency inevitably undergoes an instantaneous flow-back to its original point of issue, that is, 
to its country’s very bank system. What should and does follow next is that the sum of its 
currency recorded on the asset side of the exporting country’s bank accounting system 
‘should be immediately replaced by an equivalent amount of financial claims’ (Cencini 2000: 
13). ‘This is indeed what happens’ (ibid.: 13), given the exporting-creditor country’s ‘banking 
system becomes the owner of a bank deposit’ (ibid.: 13) which came into being and still 
remains in the importing-debtor country. This means that the same claims over the debtor/net 
importing country’s bank deposits are at the simultaneous disposal of both the debtor and the 
creditor country. However, the ones at the disposal of the latter are mere duplicates of the 
original counterparts still attached to the country of issue (key-currency importing country). 
More importantly, contrariwise to the duplicates, only the claims flowing within the debtor 
country carry real substance, ‘[s]ince the national output defining the object of these claims is 
not itself doubled’ (ibid.: 13). And we should remember that whilst the issuing country’s 
banking system (debtor) will loan within the debtor country ‘the totality of its deposits’ (ibid.: 
13) ‘the banking system’ (ibid.: 13) of the exporting-creditor country ‘is free to lend its 
duplicates on the foreign exchange market’ (ibid.: 13).  It soon becomes clear that the system 
of relative exchange rates that forms the basis of our current non-system of international 
payments is the very culprit of the latter’s many economic, financial and political woes. For 
one, it permits key-currency countries to become indebted by paying with a mere 
acknowledgment of debt (in which case it deprives the payment system of payment finality, 
see also Rossi 2012). Moreover, their I.O.U.s thus transformed into positive-asset duplicates, 
they eventually find their way to the foreign exchange market to fuel a speculative market − 
of what is best referred to as xeno-currencies ‘as suggested by Triffin’ (ibid.: 13) (see also 
Triffin 1968) − which in turns fuels an erratic fluctuation in exchange rates112.  
If instead, ‘the system of international payments were founded on the circular use of an 
international currency’ (Cencini 2000: 14) like it would be were it based on a system of 
absolute exchange rates, an inherent procedural mechanism would evoke a reciprocal transfer 
of financial securities to the exporters of goods and services as final compensation (real 
payment finality) for their exports. This optimal system currently not in place, consequently, 
the export-sellers potentially remain with a claim on the import-buyers (with particular 
reference to key-currency net importing countries). If we were to reform the structure of 
international payments ‘on the circular use of’ (ibid.: 14) an international monetary unit of 
account, duplicates would not themselves be transformed into positive assets and in the case 
especially of a key-currency country, the latter would thus have to exchange financial 
securities in order to finance its net imports in such a way as to assure payment finality. This 
exchange would trigger a refluxing such ‘that the instantaneous reflux of its currency would 
be explicitly recorded, thus avoiding the book-keeping duplication of financial claims taking 
place today’ (ibid.: 14). 
                                                
112 ‘The passage from the present system of relative exchange rates, implied by the use of 
national currencies as international objects of exchange, to a system of absolute exchange 
rates, in which currencies are no longer traded, will guarantee costless the stability of 
exchange rates without forcing countries to abandon their monetary sovereignty’ (Cencini 
2012: 66). 
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Now as indicated earlier, within the Euro zone, a similar occurrence of international payment 
finality absence is also evidenced given the confines of the regime of relative exchange rates 
that forms the basis of the existent non-system of international payments. Only, this problem 
was not so evident till the onset of the 2009 financial crisis, particularly the ‘euro-area crisis’ 
as referred to by Rossi. ‘In fact, before the euro-area crisis broke out near the end of 2009, 
that is to say, during the first ten years of Euroland, this problem was not perceived, as the 
large majority of those claims that resulted from a lack of payment finality between EMU 
member countries were cleared through the purchase by creditor countries’ financial 
institutions (including pension funds and insurance companies) of either corporate or 
government bonds issued by residents in debtor countries’ (Rossi 2012: 228). This meant that 
the debtor countries ‘were thereby in a position to finance their trade deficits through a sale of 
financial assets’ (ibid.: 228). Moreover, the reciprocal exchange would have likely enabled 
the instantaneous refluxing of their respective currencies versus remaining on the asset side of 
the exporter country’s balance sheet as a problematic duplicate. 
This absence of payment finality witnessed within the Euro zone, highlights the serious 
deficiencies inherent within ‘the infrastructure and mechanics of the TARGET2 … system’ 
(ibid.: 222).  In his 2012 paper regarding TARGET2 imbalances, Rossi warns that  ‘exporting 
countries still have a claim on the ESCB – also called the Eurosystem, which includes the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of euro-area member 
countries – once these countries are ‘paid’ for those goods, services, and/or assets that their 
residents export in excess of what they import during the relevant period of time. It is 
therefore a payment deficit that originates intra-euro-area imbalances eventually’ (ibid.: 221). 
Clearly, ‘all those unsettled positions within the euro-area-wide payment system’ (ibid.: 222) 
point to the alarming fact that ‘trade-surplus countries still have a claim on trade-deficit 
countries. Their debt-credit relation is not settled thereby. Quite to the contrary, it grows 
further, period after period, owing to repeated trade imbalances of the same algebraic sign’ 
(ibid.: 230). 
In sum, the problem in having an international ‘system’ of payment based on a regime of 
relative exchange rates113 is that currencies are exchanged against one another as though they 
were themselves commodities114 that have to be paid for. Hence Keynes’s ‘transfer problem’ 
in reference to the difficulty of getting the financing of a debtor-country’s payment over to the 
creditor-country, particularly if the former does not have the distinguishing characteristic of 
being a reserve-currency country. Without this privilege, even the payment of net imports 
proves to be self-defeating as the country ends up having to finance the transport vehicle as 
well, in addition to financing the payment of the purchase itself. Simply, the accounting 
infrastructure via which international payments are processed is set up incompatibly with the 
vehicular nature of bank-money as dictated by its double-entry bookkeeping. Specifically, its 
current deficient construct is such as to render it incapable of properly respecting the infallible 
workings of essential macroeconomic laws such as the identity of each economic agent’s 
(nation as macroeconomic entity) sales and purchases which identity, let us remember, 
derives from the very vehicular nature of bank-money and banks’ double-entry bookkeeping 
                                                
113 Such a regime operates in defiance of bank-money’s vehicular nature; in fact, it is within 
this regime’s non-conducive setting that bank-money rather ends up being considered as an 
asset per se. 
114 And, this runs against the fundamental essence of the macroeconomic law of the identity 
of each country’s sales and purchases as derived from the principle of bank’s double-entry 
bookkeeping of bank-money − a mere unit of account. 
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of it. In the absence of a proper115 system of international payments, a country’s purchases are 
not necessarily matched by equivalent116 sales. Moreover, in addition to robbing the payment 
system process of payment finality117 and, let alone the detrimental consequences118 of the 
monetary duplicates themselves, both effects which result because of a lack of true 
understanding119 of bank-money’s inherent circular nature, this shortcoming is but one part of 
the problem. The added fact that the current ‘system’ of international payments does not 
respect nations as ‘macroeconomic entities’ (Cencini 2012: 58) existing independently of 
their residents, leads to yet another very serious monetary disorder at the macroeconomic 
level that particularly affects countries’ external debt120. The problem is general and concerns 
both the net interest payment and the very formation of external debt. The analysis applies as 
well to reserve as to non reserve-currency countries: given the construct of today’s ‘system’ 
of international payments, a real and monetary payment add up to one another and this 
happens whether the country is of key-currency or not. Though in the latter case (non key-
currency), the country’s second monetary payment (with respect to its net interest) negatively 
affects its official reserves, the implications differ for a reserve-currency country121. We thus 
come to realize that not only is it important that a true international payment system’s 
infrastructure respect the inherent vehicular nature of bank-money and the principles and 
                                                
115 Such as one of absolute exchange rates, whereby country currencies would be exchanged 
against themselves via the intermediary of ‘an international currency playing the role of a 
common standard and of an international means of payment’ (Cencini 2012: 65), analogously 
to how the payment process evolves in a national setting between secondary and central bank-
money.   
116 Despite the infallible application of the identity, we have to keep abreast of the problem: a 
country’s transfer of its claims on its domestic bank deposits over to foreign creditors as a 
form of payment, will lack payment finality in that it is but a transfer of a mere 
acknowledgement of debt of its very own institutional banking system. This lack of payment 
finality is currently evidenced in the Euro zone given the zone’s monetary system is without a 
true unique currency (see Rossi 2012; also Cencini 2012a). The current situation, with respect 
to Member States’ international payment transactions which result in ‘soaring imbalances’ 
(Rossi 2012), very much reminds of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ (see Rossi 2009 and 2012) that 
is afforded to key-currency countries and particularly enabled through an international 
‘system’ of payment that, still today, is based on a regime of relative exchange rates. A 
regime that, incidentally, is partial to reserve-currency countries, if permitted a further 
parenthetical remark. 
117 Our meaning: our current regime of relative exchange rates enables key-currencies to act 
as though they were net assets (see also Rossi 2012 for an explanation of same phenomenon 
currently occurring within the Euro zone). 
118 If we remember what happens whence they find their way to the foreign exchange market 
and are traded as though they were commodities, the end result causing erratic fluctuations of 
exchange rates. 
119 As is evidenced by the manner in which international payments are currently carried out. 
120 This is not to say that today’s economists deny the existence of nations independently of 
their residents. Rather, by accepting the existence of a country’s external debt, they do, 
implicitly, recognize that a nation exists as well as a macroeconomic entity. However, it is the 
infrastructure of our current ‘system’ of international payments that is not compatible with 
this very reality. Consequently, countries get indebted (additionally to their residents) even 
though their residents have paid the totality of their purchases. 
121 Given its indebtedness, in relation to its net interest payment (as well in general), does not 
involve the sale abroad of domestic financial assets − an outcome of its key-currency status. 
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identities which derive from it, but so too is it just as important that the operational system is 
programmed in such a way as to recognize and respect the macroeconomic existence of 
nations, independently from that of its residents. 
Now, before we progress towards ultimately defining a country’s external debt and 
pinpointing the source of the crucial monetary disorders that currently affect it, it might be 
worthwhile to discuss the distinction of double-entry bookkeeping from that of double 
double-entry bookkeeping. 
The differentiation arises on resorting to a more comprehensive meaning of double-entry 
bookkeeping. Though the principle implies the double recording of payment transactions in 
the accounting ledgers of the banks that carry them out, it does not imply that only the payee 
is credited and the payer is debited. ‘As a matter of fact, each payment is double-entered 
twice, once with respect to the payer and once with respect to the payee’ (Cencini and Citraro 
2012: 261). This is in accordance with the true recognition that banks play only an 
intermediary role and that ‘money is a simple catalyst, a means of payment, and not the object 
of the payment’ (ibid.: 261). The authors consider the simple example of when output is 
purchased by the holders of income. ‘[T]he bank issues money to the benefit of the payer − it 
credits the payer with a positive amount of money − and carries out the payment on his 
behalf: it debits him with an equivalent amount. Simultaneously, the bank credits the payee 
with the same sum of money, and debits him by making him a bank deposit holder’ (ibid.: 
261). Hence the essence of double double-entry bookkeeping by which banks can indeed 
remain pure intermediaries whilst carrying out double credits and debits in a twofold manner 
with respect to payers and payees, a manner which respects the vehicular aspect of bank-
money. 
Now Cencini and Citraro explain how this intrinsic property which characterizes the principle 
of double-entry bookkeeping, that is, the recording of payment transactions via a twofold 
credit and debit − true double-entry bookkeeping: double double-entry bookkeeping − very 
naturally translates to the accounting of international transactions. 
 
[T]he very principle identifying a national payment system can also be taken as 
the necessary reference for the economic recording of international payments. 
Mutatis mutandis then, each payment between residents and non-residents as 
well as each payment between countries (sets of residents) should be recorded 
as a double credit and a double debit, leading inevitably to a perfect balance 
between the payments recorded by each country, and those recorded by all the 
world countries taken together. In other words, based on the rules of double-
entry book-keeping, the balance of payments of each individual country should 
necessarily add up to zero. Likewise, surplus and deficit countries being inter-
related, the current account of all world countries should thus be perfectly 
balanced, as should be the world capital and financial account. 
(Ibid.: 262) 
 
Nevertheless, they advert to the reality of a very different state of affairs that has become 
mysteriously alarming, whereby the world current and, capital and financial accounts are 
widely at variance − absolutely otherwise − with their expected harmonic balance. ‘Known as 
the world current account discrepancy and the world capital and financial account 
discrepancy, these imbalances are a clear symptom of the disorder characterizing the current 
international monetary system’ (ibid.: 262). The authors refer us to Citraro’s 2004 in-depth 
study that moreover evidences that ‘[s]o far, however, analyses of world accounting 
discrepancies have identified their cause with statistical misreporting, thus failing to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of a phenomenon that has shown no abatement despite significant 
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improvements in data collection (Citraro, 2004)’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 288-89). They 
draw our attention to the fact that, still at the very time of their recent writing ‘conventional 
solutions fail, because they rest on a flawed understanding of the principles of international 
macroeconomics. To be clear, the macroeconomic aspect of international transactions goes 
totally unnoticed in traditional analysis. The lack of clear distinction between the aggregate of 
a country’s residents and the country as a totality − the set of its residents − points to why the 
world accounting discrepancies are still a mystery’ (ibid.: 262). 
Next, let us regress a little so as to briefly revisit the true meaning of the balance of payments, 
particularly as can be evidenced from its relation to the principle of double-entry 
bookkeeping. 
 
 
On re-visiting the balance-of-payments and its interrelatedness with 
double-entry bookkeeping 
 
Setting the stage then, let us take account of two important and factual points. The first is that 
‘[c]onventionally, transactions are entered in two major accounts: the current account (CA) 
and the capital and financial account (KFA) according to the principles of double-entry book-
keeping’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 264). Yet despite this accounting convention, the 
equality of effect with respect to balance of payments − as should be expected from the strict 
adherence to double-entry recording − very much lacks. ‘One of the most puzzling problems 
balance-of-payments experts have been confronted with is that of reconciling the statistical 
discrepancies resulting from data collection and compilation with the necessary equilibrium 
of the balance of payments entailed by the use of double-entry book-keeping’ (ibid.: 264). 
The authors provide a compelling approach to interpreting the true meaning that should 
logically ensue from the balance of payments identity (see 10.1 ibidem 264122), that is, if 
insightfully understood from a macroeconomic perspective whilst, keeping abreast of the very 
principle which underlines double-entry bookkeeping. Their analysis draws a comparison 
between Meade’s (see Cencini and Citraro 2012, as well Meade 1951) ‘one-sided vision of 
the balance-of-payments equilibrium’123 with that of a less orthodox and innovative 
interpretation of the identity as is afforded by ‘applying to countries the macroeconomic law 
formulated by Schmitt (1975) in his Théorie unitaire de la monnaie, nationale et 
internationale. According to Schmitt’s law, each agent’s purchases are immediately balanced 
by equivalent sales and, reciprocally, each agent’s sales are necessarily matched by equivalent 
purchases made by the same agent’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 266).  
Now we have shown that Schmitt’s macroeconomic law of the identity between each 
economic agent’s sales and purchases derives directly from the fact that bank-money is but an 
acknowledgment of debt of the very issuing bank, a mere unit of account − a flow whose 
circular direction is never intercepted from instantaneously returning to its very point of issue. 
Matter-of-factly, ‘[c]ompliance with double-entry book-keeping guarantees the vehicular use 
of bank money’ (ibid.: 266). As such, money per se, can never finance a purchase which 
implies that ‘each economic agent can finance its purchases only through simultaneous sales 
                                                
122 Specifically, equation 10.1 as referred to by Cencini and Citraro 2012, p. 264.  
123 See Cencini and Citraro 2012, p.267 
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of the same amount’ (ibid.: 266)124. In thinking about it, it is indeed the manner by which 
bank-money is issued, that is, via double double-entry bookkeeping, that accounts for the 
double-sidedness of payment transactions. As a result, each one of the latter should be 
‘recorded as a debit and as a credit of both the seller and the purchaser’ (ibid.: 266). 
Contrarily to ‘Meade’s one-sided vision of the balance-of-payments equilibrium’ (ibid.: 267) 
whereby ‘the matching of debits and credits simply follows from the trivial observation that a 
country’s sales are another country’s purchases’ (ibid.: 267), Schmitt’s interpretation of the 
said equilibrium of the balance of payments, considered internationally, implies ‘that each 
country is at the same time a seller and a purchaser’ (ibid.: 266). His analysis derives from his 
very own macroeconomic law (see Schmitt 1975) of the identity between each economic 
agent’s sales and purchases that itself is a natural consequence ensuing from the rule125 that 
underlines double, double-entry bookkeeping. And, when Schmitt’s macroeconomic law is 
‘applied at the international level it concerns the flow of payments carried out by countries’ 
(ibid.: 266) and the law is validated whether with regard to the CA or, the KFA126. Hence it is 
through the international application of Schmitt’s macroeconomic law of the identity between 
each economic agent’s purchases and sales which itself derives from the very principle of 
double-entry bookkeeping − double, double-entry bookkeeping − that the latter’s 
interrelatedness with the balance of payments becomes clear. In retrospect, it all boils down to 
the simple fact that bank-money is emitted by banks as a record-flow ‘that has to comply with 
the rule of double-entry book-keeping’ (ibid.: 266), the very manner by which it is issued by 
the said banks, and at that as a mere acknowledgment of debt. This essential fact lays the 
basis from which we can then readily understand why it is that money per se can never be the 
object of a payment transaction. And as well understand, the natural relevance of Schmitt’s 
macroeconomic law regard the identity between each agent’s sales and purchases that ensues 
from this double double-entry bookkeeping. Moreover, considered from an international 
perspective, it ultimately becomes evident how the latter identity, in turn, translates over to 
‘the balance of payments being a fundamentally logical identity’ (ibid.: 262). Through an 
illustrative account, Cencini and Citraro 2012 show that the ‘overall identity is thus the 
consequence of the logical requirement to enter each single transaction in compliance with the 
principles of double-entry book-keeping’ (ibid.: 265). Their example demonstrates just how 
the identity ‘implies the necessary equality between the net receipts (expenses) of a given 
country and its net foreign lending (borrowing)’ (ibid.: 266). They take the example of a 
trading country and illustrate the ideological implications of the identity with respect to 
international payment transactions as recorded in both its current and capital and financial 
                                                
124 Cencini and Citraro 2012 moreover remind us of what this means from an international 
perspective: ‘when a country purchases on the commodity and financial markets, it has to 
finance its purchases by equivalent sales on one or both of these markets’ (ibid.: 266). 
125 In an international setting, the rule establishes the premise by which each payment 
transaction between nations is doubly recorded, once with respect to each country − as both a 
credit and a debit for each of the countries. This reinforces the fact that from an accounting 
perspective, ‘each country is at the same time a seller and a purchaser’ (ibid.: 266). 
126 Specifically, as per the authors’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012) elaboration ‘every transaction 
in the current account being an income-related flow while every transaction in the capital and 
financial account is an asset-related flow’ (ibid.: 266), the balance of payment equilibrium 
‘implies the necessary equality between the net receipts (expenses) of a given country and its 
net foreign lending (borrowing)’ (ibid.: 266). However, we will later show that a thorough 
analysis of these payment flows proves crucial to understanding and finally pinpointing an 
anomaly that underlines substantial balance-of-payments imbalances that then lead to serious 
world monetary disorders. 
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accounts respectively, depending on whether the nation is considered a net commercial 
exporter or, net commercial importer127.  
 
[I]f a country has a positive trade balance, this implies that it is a net purchaser 
of foreign claims. Indeed, the credit entered in the country’s current account is 
balanced by a debit entered in its capital and financial account. Because of its 
net sales of real goods and services, the country benefits from a payment that is 
immediately invested toward the purchase of foreign financial claims, so that 
the credit of the country’s current account is matched by a capital outflow. The 
opposite applies when the country runs a trade balance deficit. Its net 
commercial purchases are balanced by a net sale of financial claims, that is, by 
an increase in its foreign debt. 
(Ibid.: 266) 
 
Now, the law of the identity between each nation’s purchases and sales which is essentially 
the identity of the balance of payments ‘applies equally well to payments relating to capital 
flows only’ (ibid.: 266). Cencini and Citraro explain by considering the example of ‘the 
payment matching a country’s net export of financial bonds’ (ibid.: 266). ‘[T]he capital 
inflow corresponding to the country’s sale is immediately balanced by an equivalent purchase 
of claims on foreign bank deposits, which defines a capital outflow. By selling its financial 
bonds, the country is the recipient of a foreign investment and becomes the owner of foreign 
bank deposits’ (ibid.: 267). 
On summarizing then, when international payment transactions are carried out in such a 
manner as to respect the fundaments of double double-entry bookkeeping, it should always 
validate the fundamental identity of a nation’s balance-of-payments. Moreover, given the 
interrelatedness of debtor and creditor nations, ‘the current account of all world countries 
should thus be perfectly balanced, as should be the world capital and financial account’ (ibid.: 
262). But in reality, this is not how things evolve. Despite the fact that payment transactions 
are entered in strict conformity with the principle of double entries (as per above) a balance-
of-payments discrepancy is continually and increasingly evidenced with respect to both the 
world current and, capital and financial accounts. But what is equally as outstanding is that 
the source of the discrepancy has been a long-time mystery that continues to elude the 
understanding of many. ‘Economists and IMF experts explain the existence of what they call 
a statistical discrepancy between the current account and the capital and financial account by 
referring to inaccuracies in data collection and compilation, the absence of simultaneity 
between corresponding entries, and differences in the sources of related data. ‘Because data 
from different sources may differ in coverage, accuracy, and timing, the balance of payments 
accounts seldom balance in practice as they must in theory’ (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003, 
p.320)’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 267).  
If it is indeed a ‘fact that balance-of-payments entries are recorded in accordance with the 
rules of double-entry-book-keeping’ (ibid.: 267), where best then could we look to unravel the 
very source of the world balance-of-payments statistical imbalances? In a next chapter we 
will attempt to show why an examination of international payment flows might be a good 
starting point. 
 
 
                                                
127 The true implications of the balance-of-payments identity as outlined above, could ideally 
be established through the implementation of a new and generalized system of international 
payments. 
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3    The black hole. An analysis of the monetary flows 
implicated in a country’s net foreign borrowing and of the 
consequential monetary deficit that is pathologically 
generated 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On examining international monetary flows, we are able to discern the manifestation of 
serious anomalies within our current international payment system. Each time a debtor 
country benefits from a net foreign borrowing to pay for its net foreign purchases/total 
imports or to increase its international reserves and refinance its domestic economy, in so 
doing, the country doubles its external debt. It might also bear a simultaneous increase in debt 
and decrease in official reserves128, the latter ultimately financing a monetary deficit. That is, 
the difference in its monetary inflows and outflows that arises upon borrowing from abroad.  
We have a look at the monetary flows that are implicated for a country whenever it is 
involved in a net foreign borrowing due to the necessity to finance its deficit, difference 
between its total purchases (commercial and financial) and its total sales (commercial and 
financial). Specifically, we examine how these flows evolve, as dictated by the very 
fundament of double-entry bookkeeping. We soon detect that the faulty structure of our 
current system of international payments is unable to complement the flow-aspect of bank 
money and is essentially responsible for generating the costly monetary deficit that infallibly 
arises.  
 
 
On the sovereign and external debt of a country 
 
Broadly speaking, external debt intends the debt of a nation that is owed to foreign creditors. 
However, it is important to understand the expression within context of the specific meaning 
that is attributed to the said country. That is, whether we are referring to the domestic 
economy of the country or, to the country considered as its own macroeconomic entity (as the 
set of its residents). This is because when expressed with respect to a nation’s domestic 
economy, it is not associated with any pathology129. But the situation is altogether different 
when the expression refers to the nation as a whole: it is here that the expression transcends to 
                                                
128 The decrease in official reserves defines the second charge given a decrease in reserves is 
tantamount to an increase in debt. From here onwards, any time that we will speak of 
reduction in official reserves, we will implicitly consider it equivalent and interchangeable 
with the incurring of a new debt. 
129 External debts are anomalous only to the extent that, in today’s non-system of international 
payments, they include sovereign debts. Sovereign debts are indeed anomalous and their very 
existence is what defines the pathology. ‘Sovereign debts are always the charge of an external 
debt already carried at 100 per cent of its value by the domestic economies of countries whose 
imports are greater than their exports’ (Schmitt 2014: 14). 
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that of a country’s sovereign debt and this time the debt is considered anomalous and in fact, 
it should not even exist, that is, as a proper infrastructure would have it, in a true system of 
international payments. Our analysis of international monetary flows, in this chapter, aims to 
establish the double burden of external debt with respect to its very formation. We do this by 
evidencing the duplication that arises when a sovereign debt pertaining to the country as a 
whole simultaneously and pathologically adds to that of the ordinary (see Schmitt 2014) debt 
of a nation’s domestic economy. ‘Every economist makes the distinction between a country as 
a whole and its domestic economy. This distinction, not at all original since the beginning of 
our science, acquires an increased significance once referred to the separation between 
‘ordinary’ debt and sovereign debt’ (Schmitt 2014: 20). 
Let us ponder the significant meaning that underlines Schmitt’s following message on 
considering sovereign debt, sovereignty and the borrowing of foreign currencies. 
 
Economists speak a lot of sovereign debt. What is totally unknown is the fact 
that the sovereign debt, incurred by deficit countries themselves, adds up to the 
ordinary debt incurred by their respective domestic economies. Moreover, the 
sovereign debt is conceived of as the unique charge arising out of net imports. 
Indeed, it has also to be admitted that the idea of sovereignty remains blurred. It 
can be correctly grasped only when foreign currencies lent to countries, set of 
their respective residents, are distinguished, as they must logically be, from the 
foreign currencies lent to their domestic economies:  
a. Foreign currencies lent to countries are real values; they are real 
values even though they are monetary. 
b. Foreign currencies lent to domestic economies respect the logical 
nature of money, because they are nothing other than pure numbers 
whose function is only to measure real goods. 
The illogical nature, the ill nature we could say, of the foreign currencies 
borrowed by countries themselves is but the translation of the ‘pathological’ 
character of external debts’ second charge. 
(Schmitt 2014: 13−14) 
 
The essential point here lies in the ‘distinction between money units and sums of real goods’ 
(ibid.: 37). That is, foreign currencies lent to the nation as a whole are considered as having 
real value because after all these ‘foreign currencies borrowed to pay for net imports have as 
their object real goods to be exported in a future period’ (ibid.: 37). It is with this same logic 
that we observe that the compensating loss of the borrowing country’s domestic resources, 
entailed in the payment of its net imports or domestic re-financing, implies a loss of a net 
asset that leads to the formation of an anomalous sovereign debt which duplicates its ordinary 
external debt by adding to it. 
 
 
The net monetary outflow 
 
Schmitt’s macroeconomic identity (1975) that stipulates that economic agents’ sales and 
purchases are simultaneously and inversely balanced stems from the flow aspect of bank 
money that comes with adherence to double double-entry bookkeeping. We remember that 
this means that money, per se, can never be the end term of a payment and this holds as well 
at the international level. ‘[T]his means that, when a country purchases on the commodity and 
financial markets, it has to finance its purchases by equivalent sales on one or both of these 
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markets’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 266). Moreover, we will see that in an international 
context, Schmitt’s identity ‘concerns the flow of payments carried out by countries’ (ibid.: 
266). But it is particularly because ‘exchanges do not occur in the form of barter, but through 
monetary payments’ (Cencini 2012a: 37) that ‘what matters the most is that these real 
exchanges are conveyed through monetary flows that are ‘neutral’, that is to say, that do not 
generate any pathological deficit’ (ibid.: 27), that is, a difference between a nation’s total 
monetary inflows and outflows. 
Now a country, considered as a whole130, is necessarily involved in its residents’ international 
payments because of the need to convert the national currency into a foreign one. It can 
access this foreign currency either through exports revenues or in incurring a debt by 
borrowing abroad. The thing to keep in mind is that though the identity of every country’s 
sales and purchases holds in an international context, it does so on a microeconomic level, 
that is, between the countries’ residents. On a macroeconomic level however, given the 
absence of an international monetary institution to act as a monetary mediator of a country’s 
international payment transactions131, a country’s sales and purchases get disconnected in 
time132 with the consequence of transforming the identity into a costly ‘condition of 
equilibrium’ (see Cencini and Citraro 2012: 283). That is, a new external loan133 is required in 
order to cover the very monetary deficit that results from the international monetary flows that 
are implicated, when a country benefits from a net foreign borrowing. Through an analysis of 
the country’s monetary flows we will attempt to evidence how and why this happens. 
Particularly, we will explain how a pathological imbalance arises between the country’s 
monetary inflows and outflows and attempt to unveil the origin of this malfunction. 
The accounting structure of our current ‘system’ of international payments is the very 
malfunction responsible for originating a pathological difference between the monetary 
inflows and outflows that are implicated whenever a country pays its deficit through a net 
foreign borrowing. Adherent to double-entry book-keeping but paradoxically systemically 
unfit to supplement the inherent flow aspect of bank-money, the current payment 
infrastructure causes the implicated monetary flows to engender an anomalous asymmetry 
between its total outflows and inflows. The resulting monetary deficit or gap is compensated 
                                                
130 ‘A country is the set of its residents, and the public sector is only one of these residents. It 
is therefore mistaken to identify a country with its public sector, or with the State. A country 
gets indebted insofar as its residents borrow abroad’ (Cencini 2012a: 2). Schmitt also 
elaborates on the importance of the conception of a country considered as a whole by 
emphasizing that foreign borrowings should not ever pertain to it (e.g. some country A). 
‘Country A does not carry on any international exchange on is own account. Every purchase 
and every sale of this country, to or from abroad, are transactions of A’s domestic economy, 
commercial and financial, of its private or public sector. External borrowings of country A as 
a whole should therefore not exist’ (Schmitt 2014: 28). 
131 That is, ‘implementing the debit-credit relationship’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 283) 
relating to payments between countries (set of their respective residents) − the 
‘macroeconomic transactions’ as Cencini and Citraro 2012 put it, in reference to ‘Schmitt’s 
fundamental argument as to the existence of macroeconomic transactions’ (ibid.: 283). 
132 ‘Instead of being ‘coupled’ thanks to the mediation of money, a country’s sales and 
purchases are separated. In these circumstances a country’s overall exports and imports are no 
longer the terms of an identity. It is still claimed that they must be equal, but the autonomy of 
exports with respect to imports opens the way to a possible inequality, which leads to the 
world discrepancies affecting the global current account as well as the global financial and 
capital account’ (Cencini and Citraro: 282). 
133 Specifically, by an amount equal to the monetary deficit that results within its economy.  
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by an equal reduction of its official reserves. The important fact to retain here is that if our 
current system of international payments were to operate akin to how it transpires within a 
nation, it would furnish ‘at zero cost the missing monetary inflow required to balance 
monetary outflows and inflows’ (Cencini 2012a: 31) thus avoiding it being covered through a 
new debt or through a reduction of official reserves, that is, through a substantial loss of asset 
that pathologically doubles the country’s external debt134. That is to say, in a fitting system of 
final payments, the borrowing nation’s augmentation in debt, in following with its domestic 
economy’s sale abroad of financial bonds, would more simply and directly be associated with 
its net goods and services purchase135 from the rest of the world (see Cencini 2012a: 37). In 
the absence of a proper system of final payments at the international level136, the monetary 
flows happen such as to disconnect the associated real flows, resulting in a costly loss of asset 
for the borrowing country: a further increase in debt of the same amount of the net foreign 
borrowing137. 
Now whether a country’s net foreign borrowing is expended to refinance itself in its own 
national currency or, to pay for its net imports, the negative end result is the same: monetary 
flows evolve in such a way138 as to generate an additional anomalous cost for the borrowing 
                                                
134 Hence the occurrence of sovereign debt is detected. 
135 In reference to the case scenario whereby a country’s net foreign borrowing is utilized for 
the purpose of paying for its total imports. 
136 In a later chapter, we will elaborate both a multi-country as well as a single-country reform 
that could properly furnish payment finality to international payment transactions without 
generating an anomalous duplication of countries’ or a country’s external debt. 
137 The borrowing debtor-country has to ‘borrow’ twice to pay for its total imports. It obtains 
a first loan (ordinary external debt) following the sale of its IOUs (the FBD: foreign bank 
deposit) and then a ‘second’ loan when it expends the very FBD to carry out the payment of 
its net foreign purchases. Yet this ‘second’ borrowing leaves it with no compensation what-
so-ever (after all, the associated ‘credit’ to the second monetary debit or outflow is no new 
credit, rather only the reproduction of the original one) after the FBD consumption which 
translates in a loss of net asset (ordinary external debt thus duplicates through the inclusion of 
a sovereign debt) for the borrowing debtor-country. See Schmitt’s elaboration, next. ‘[A] 
resident’s foreign borrowing can bring in foreign currencies that remain available 
‘somewhere’ in its domestic economy… [to] this extent external borrowings are not net, 
because the currencies that are available are ‘liabilities-assets’ and not net liabilities… only 
matter the foreign currencies that are both received and spent by the country as a whole’ 
(Schmitt 2014: 42−43). Moreover, the second, pathological debt is the loss of a net asset 
because it has as its object the real goods that the debtor-country will produce at a future date. 
‘[If] a dollar is obtained to finance a net import, it is despite all an ‘asset-liability’ and not a 
net asset. Why is it nevertheless correct and even necessary to conclude that it is a net asset’ 
(ibid.: 37)? As Schmitt explains, ‘[t]he fact is that these borrowed currencies are real assets 
of the lending countries’ (ibid.: 37). ‘The sum borrowed is the value of future exports of real 
goods by the deficit country’ (ibid.: 36) that the rest of the world pays for, in advance. ‘[T]he 
currency lent to finance surplus imports is in fact spent by the country where it originates, R, 
to pay for the import of a future product of A’s economy’ (ibid.: 38). 
138 Our current defective international payment system is incapable of neutralizing (see 
Cencini 2012a) the costly pathological imbalance that arises between the country’s monetary 
inflows and outflows. 
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country. Let us start by examining how they evolve when a country undertakes a sale abroad 
of domestic financial claims in order to pay for its net imports139. 
We suppose a country C and we examine the totality of the monetary inflows and outflows for 
this country when its domestic economy (DC) borrows abroad from the rest of the world 
(RW), that is from the residents of some other country R, to pay for its (DC) net imports. The 
currency denomination of the loan is dollars and the amount is z billion $. Let us have a look 
at the transactional monetary140 flows implied141.  
The first flow vehiculates money RW ($) instantaneously and circularly142 from RW’s banks 
and back to RW’s banks. In so doing, RW’s banks simultaneously credit and debit DC with 
z billion $ in exchange for its ceding of IOUs of a same amount value. The credit reflects the 
receipt of IOUs by RW’s banks while the debit reflects DC’s purchase of an RW bank deposit 
of same value143.  
The second flow is another instantaneous circuitous record-entry to and from RW’s banks.  
DC is simultaneously credited and debited for an amount of z billion $ following its request 
that RW’s banks carry out a payment on its behalf, that of its net imports (real goods and 
services exported by the residents of RW to DC). What happens is that, at execution of the 
order to pay, DC’s bank deposit with RW’s banks is cancelled given DC cedes it in exchange 
for the payment that RW’s banks makes on its behalf. As such, DC is simultaneously both 
credited (revocation of its RW bank deposit) and debited (on account of the payment carried 
out by RW’s banks, on its behalf) for a sum of z billion $144. Let us keep in mind that in order 
                                                
139 Our exemplary anecdote is analogous to a case elaborated by Cencini (see Cencini 2012a, 
Appendix 2) whereby he examines the monetary flows implicated when the domestic 
economy of a certain country A borrows abroad to pay for its net commercial imports. 
140 As stipulated in the Cencini (2012a) case of his appendix 2, the real flows involved consist 
of the financial bonds (IOUs for sake of simplicity and in keeping with Cencini’s epithet) that 
the domestic economy of DC issues and which are of a value of z billion $.  These IOUs are 
exchanged for a portion of RW’s domestic output, valued at z billion $.  
141 Cencini emphasizes the important point at the onset of his case scenario of appendix 2 
where he refers to countries A and R ‘exchanges do not occur in the form of barter, but 
through monetary payments. It is therefore necessary to consider the monetary flows implied 
in this transaction between A and R in order to verify if they are ‘neutral’ or if they are the 
source of an anomaly entailing a supplementary, pathological cost for A and/or R’ (Cencini 
2012a: 37). 
142 Bank money always returns to its point of issue and, at instantaneous velocity. 
143 Hence, the end result of this transactional flow is that DC has traded z billion $ of IOUs in 
return for a deposit (bank account) of the same value with the banks of RW. 
144 It is via this final monetary flow of z billion $ that DC expends (gives up) its bank deposit 
with the banks of RW in exchange for gaining possession of its imports of real goods and 
services, as exported by RW’s residents. Essentially the end result, in real terms, of this 
second monetary flow, is that DC has exchanged a part of its future domestic output (IOUs) in 
exchanged for a part of RW’s current domestic output (exported real goods and services), 
both valued at z billion $. But what is important to retain from this fact, is that DC’s 
expenditure of the loan that it obtained from RW’s banks (in exchanged for DC’s IOUs) 
essentially consists of RW’s payment for a part of DC’s domestic output that the latter will 
produce in the future. ‘It is country R as a whole that becomes the owner of the real goods 
that will be exported’ (Schmitt 2014: 38) by country C, in a future period. Thus, ‘these 
borrowed currencies are real assets of the lending countries’ (ibid.: 37). Moreover, given 
RW’s loan disbursement has not the capacity (purchasing power) of paying twice the amount 
of z billion $, it is actually either a new debt of DC or a loss in official reserves that 
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to achieve one real flow (the exchange of DC’s IOUs against part of RW’s domestic output), 
country C incurred two monetary outflows versus one monetary inflow. Granted, one debit 
monetary outflow did yield it (as counterpart) a bank deposit with RW’s banks but this very 
bank deposit was subsequently cancelled by RW’s banks (DC credited by RW’s banks) 
following DC’s request that it carry out its payment of net imports on its behalf, which 
payment RW did carry out: hence the second debit monetary outflow. Yet, all in all, there is 
only one monetary inflow to be accounted for, given the second credit, part and parcel, of the 
second monetary flow is the same credit that is part and parcel, of the first monetary flow145. 
An asymmetry in monetary flows is detected: monetary outflows do not balance with 
monetary inflows and thus we would be best to heed to their suspected non-neutrality146 and 
rather expect that ‘they are the source of an anomaly entailing a supplementary, pathological 
cost’ (Cencini 2012a: 37) for country C as a whole. 
Now, if we examine these two monetary flows one at a time, seemingly it evidences no 
pathology. But, if considered wholly, it is then that we notice the anomaly: ‘a discrepancy 
appears’ (Cencini 2012a: 37) between country C’s total outflows and inflows. This means that 
the ‘match’ in relation to DC’s acquisition of its net imports, valued at z billion $, is a double 
payment of this same amount by country C, which is fulfilled once through its increase in 
debt (financial bonds transfer to RW) and once again through a new debt or through a 
reduction of its official reserves by a same amount (notice that the end all transfer into its 
official reserves is nil after the cancellation of its RW bank deposit)147. This is so, because in 
our current system of international payments the law of the identity of each country’s sales 
and purchases falters (on a macroeconomic plane): a country’s sales and purchases are 
actually separated in time. ‘[T]he present ‘non-system’ fails to account for the 
macroeconomic aspect of international payments’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 283). It ‘does 
not provide a book-keeping structure allowing for this identity to be constantly satisfied. The 
lack of an international central bank implementing the debit-credit relationship to each 
                                                                                                                                                   
compensate and inevitably incur the payment of DC’s net imports, through an equivalent 
anomalous sum reduction: the foreign bank deposit is inescapably dissolved resulting in the 
loss of a net asset. It is an anomalous reduction given it amounts to an additional monetary 
payment by country C on the whole, on top of the real payment of DC’s residents. Hence, the 
macroeconomic payment of C, as a whole, adds to the microeconomic payment of C’s 
residents. Indeed, two payments, each of z billion $, are required by country C in order to pay 
its net imports valued at z billion $ only. And, the monetary flows involved in the transaction 
clearly evidence this: two monetary outflows from C versus one monetary inflow (foreign 
loan from RW). We next elaborate this in the text. 
145 If we elaborate this point in the spirit of Cencini’s appendix 2 (see Cencini 2012a), we 
could say that the initial credit with which DC is credited with by RW’s banks, ‘obtained in 
exchange of its IOUs’ (Cencini 2012a: 38) and which defines an ‘inflow of foreign currency 
to the benefit’ (ibid.: 38) of C, ends up being re-directed to the residents of RW from its 
initial beneficiary, that is, DC. As such, we can ascertain that the second credit that arises 
when DC relinquishes its bank deposit of z billion $, (the ‘second’ inflow of foreign currency) 
is ‘nothing else than the reproduction or replication of the first credit payment’ (ibid.: 38). It is 
representative of the very first and only inflow of foreign currency to the benefit of DC rather 
than that of a ‘second’ inflow. It definitely ‘does not define a new inflow of foreign currency’ 
(ibid.: 38) to its profit. 
146 See Cencini 2012a. 
147 And, given that a loss in assets is considered an increase in debits, this double payment 
confirms that the analysis of the double burden of external debts will inevitably apply with 
respect to the formation of external debts.  
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payment carried out by a country has the annoying consequence of transforming the above 
fundamental identity into a condition of equilibrium’ (ibid.: 283). Hence, the compensating 
factor brought about, by the borrowing country’s official reserves that end up being reduced 
accordingly. The outcome: if we add up the two monetary outflows (representative of the two 
debits incurred by C, one on obtaining RW’s bank deposit of z billion $ and one on account of 
RW’s payment of C’s net imports of a same value, on C’s behalf) and deduct from these the 
one and only inflow of foreign currency to C’s benefit of z billion $, we end up with a net 
monetary outflow. ‘The difference between foreign currency outflows and inflows defines a 
monetary deficit, which is necessarily covered through a decrease’ (Cencini 2012a: 38) in the 
international (official) reserves of C or through a new loan. Clearly then, in the absence of a 
proper transactional payment system at the international level, ‘foreign borrowing is at the 
origin of a monetary deficit entailing the pathological duplication of the borrowing’ (ibid.: 4) 
debtor-nations’ external debt. ‘As surprising or absurd as this might seem, respecting the 
principle of double-entry book-keeping leads inevitably to the discovery of a pathological 
difference between the monetary outflows and the monetary inflows related to the 
transactions implied by a country’s foreign borrowing’ (ibid.: 4). 
Now as we have pointed out earlier, a same negative outcome for borrowing country C 
happens even in the case when the purpose for its net foreign borrowing is to enable a 
domestic currency refinancing for its national economy148. We next examine this case 
scenario149 in order to evidence this but even more so to demonstrate the reason for which this 
negative outcome manifests itself each time a country borrows from abroad either to finance 
its net commercial imports or to refinance its domestic economy: the manifestation is none 
other than the effect of ‘compliance with double-entry book-keeping, each credit-payment is 
also immediately a debit-payment’ (Cencini 2012a: 15). Cencini elaborates on this and it is 
worth heeding his succinct observation on comparing the situation as it happens at an 
international level with what transpires at a national level. That is, with respect to how the 
missing monetary inflow − a consequential development related to the very adherence to 
double-entry bookkeeping − is furnished free of cost within national borders, whilst across 
nations’ borders it ends up being compensated by the borrowing nation’s official reserves.150 
                                                
148 Our meaning here is that the ‘foreign loan is used to refinance its domestic economy’ 
(Cencini 2012a: 15). In other words, the country utilizes the net foreign borrowing to increase 
its international reserves and ultimately re-finance its national economy in its domestic 
currency. 
149 Here again we base our demonstration of this particular case by referring to Cencini’s 
original account of this case scenario, this time as per appendix 1 (see Cencini 2012a: 34−36). 
Once again, we observe that ‘a gap is formed between money outflows and inflows, which is 
covered through an equivalent loss in the country’s official reserves’ (ibid.: 4) or through a 
new foreign loan. 
150 ‘[W]hen a country benefits from a foreign loan, of say x billion dollars, its external debt 
increases by twice this amount, i.e. by 2x billion dollars. The demonstration rests on the 
double-entry book-keeping nature of bank money, and applies to every conceivable case. In 
fact, the existence of a monetary gap between outflows and inflows is the unavoidable 
consequence of the implementation of double-entry book-keeping. In other words, a 
difference between monetary outflows and inflows arises every time an economic agent 
benefits from a loan, whether foreign or domestic. What makes all the difference between 
what happens when loans are obtained from abroad or from within a domestic or national 
economy is the presence or the lack of a system of final payments. In the case of domestic 
loans, the duplication is neutralised by the system of national payments, which provides at 
zero cost the missing monetary inflow required to balance monetary outflows and inflows. In 
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What we need then is an infrastructure of international payments that not only recognizes 
bank money’s vehicular aspect inherent to double-entry book-keeping but moreover, a system 
that is able to complement this flow nature of money rather than work against it, in an 
anomalous way and, with crippling consequences whether with regard to the phenomenon of 
duplication (xeno-currencies) or, with respect to the double burden of external debt. A third 
counter-party institution is required at the international level to monetize payment transactions 
(convey financial component) ‘allowing for the real payment of each of them, including 
external debt servicing’151 (Cencini 1995: 360). Only such a central (third counter-party) 
institution, through the issuance of its own central money, would properly complement the 
infrastructure required to provide the system of payments with the necessary homogeneous 
zone that is able to take ‘into account the fundamental heterogeneity of national currencies’ 
(Cencini 1995: 156), a fundamental essence to payment finality. 
But that all said, something else must also be considered along with banks’ adherence to 
double-entry bookkeeping (whenever issuing bank money) and that is, the very object of bank 
money. It will help home in the why it is that the transactional bank payments involved, leave 
in the end, ‘no counterpart at all for the borrowing country’ (Cencini 2012a: 16) despite the 
rise in its external debt (ceding of IOUs)152. It has to do with the logical fact that the bank 
deposit that DC (domestic economy of country C) obtains from RW’s banks, following the 
ceding of IOUs, outlines an exchange of domestic output (the object) between the two 
countries: RW provides DC with a part of its current domestic output (suppose a value of z 
billion $) in exchange for a part of DC’s future domestic output (same value) that it will 
produce at a future date. And, as we have already pointed out, given that the purchasing 
power of RW’s domestic output is not double, it is only logical that it is thus unable to pay for 
anything else. This means that it is country C as a whole that ultimately bears the cost of the 
foreign borrowing and this, in addition to its residents’ initial payment. The macroeconomic 
payment (monetary) of country C considered as the set of its residents, thus adding to that of 
the microeconomic payment (real) of its residents. 
We soon observe that it is through double-entry bookkeeping, from which it derives its flow 
aspect, that bank money and its associated purchasing power have their full impetus. It is 
                                                                                                                                                   
the case of foreign loans no such a system exists up to now, and the missing monetary inflow 
is compensated through a loss of the country’s international or official reserves’ (Cencini 
2012a: 31) or through a new foreign loan. 
151 We will elaborate on external debt servicing in a later chapter. 
152 The key factor here is that the indebtedness which results from the sale abroad of domestic 
financial claims (IOUs) has no counterpart in the sense that it has no counterpart with which 
to pay neither a borrowing country’s net imports nor the said country’s refinancing of its 
domestic economy: this is because the counterpart (the bank deposit obtained with RW’s 
banks of equivalent value) of these IOUs, logically pays − as the exchange dictates it − for a 
future domestic output of the borrowing country, the very IOUs (one could even say that the 
sobriquet alone of these ceded financial claims hints to their expected future fulfillment in 
return for the current payment from RW). As such the counterpart pays for nothing else, it 
simply cannot, given its object’s (money-income originating from RW’s domestic output) 
purchasing power is not double. The borrowing country as a whole is thus left to cover the 
cost of its net imports or, refinancing of its domestic economy and it does so through an 
equivalent new external borrowing. This is so on account of the very fact that ‘the currency 
lent to finance surplus imports is in fact spent by the country where it originates, R, to pay for 
the import of a future product of A’s economy’ (Schmitt 2014: 38). Schmitt’s reference to 
some country A, as example, translates to country C in our case scenario; as well R translates 
to RW in our sample demonstration. 
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here, within this international context as it relates to transactional bank payments, that we can 
best appreciate the true meaning of this. In our case-reference, RW’s current domestic output 
is what finances the purchase of IOUs (DC’s) it is exchanged for, and this happens all in one 
double-entry bookkeeping stroke: the instant that DC experiences a credit-debit153 that yields 
it a bank deposit with RW’s banks, following the ceding of its IOUs. Essentially, dissimilar to 
‘the export of a product of p, the export of a product of p°’ (p and p° meaning current and 
future periods respectively, see Schmitt 2014: 38−39) ‘is paid by a loan, more exactly by the 
real object of this loan’ (ibid.: 38−39). 
Let us now return to the re-enactment of this case scenario (see Cencini 2012a, appendix 1 for 
original demonstration). 
Again, the country that we suppose is country C, only this time, we examine the totality of the 
monetary inflows and outflows that are implied for this country whenever it borrows from the 
rest of the world (RW) in order to allow for its domestic economy (DC) to re-finance itself in 
national currency154. DC155 borrows from abroad a sum of z billion $, the currency 
denomination of the loan being in dollars. We have a look at the transactional monetary flows 
involved. 
The first flow consists of a monetary inflow of foreign money, that is, a credit-payment of z 
billion dollars for DC. This is as a result of DC’s (its residents) sale of financial claims (IOUs) 
to RW’s residents. Now, as we know, ‘in compliance with double-entry book-keeping, each 
credit-payment is also immediately a debit-payment’ (Cencini 2012a: 15) such that DC is 
‘necessarily credited and debited’ (ibid.: 34) simultaneously, for a sum of z billion $156.  At 
this stage, we could say that the external debt that DC has newly incurred has a counterpart −  
the ownership of a bank deposit with RW’s banks of z billion $. But what is important to 
remember here157 is that in spite of this, the amount of foreign monies (dollars) DC has 
acquired for its cession of financial claims is NIL: the double-entry bookkeeping’s 
simultaneous credit-debit of z billion dollars leaves it with a zero entry-sum of dollars, the 
payment-transaction being ‘a zero sum transaction in terms of money’ (ibid.: 34).  
Thus far, there are two monetary flows to account for: one inflow worth of z billion $ into DC 
as a result of its ceding of IOUs, which inflow entails a simultaneous outflow of same value 
such as to enable DC to acquire an RW bank deposit of z billion $ worth. 
                                                
153 The bookkeeping entry-structure that governs transactional payments is such that ‘every 
credit-payment is an equal and simultaneous debit-payment, every debit-payment being an 
equal and simultaneous credit-payment’ (Cencini 2012a: 16). 
154 Our meaning is in keeping with original description of appendix 1 of Cencini 2012a: DC 
will ask RW’s banks to transfer the foreign borrowing (z billion $) to country C’s official 
reserves ‘in exchange for a deposit denominated in national money’ (Cencini 2012a: 34) that 
is, money C. 
155 Specifically, we mean the domestic economy of country C to include both its private and 
public sectors. 
156 To ensure that there is no misunderstanding as to the reason: the credit allocated to DC by 
RW’s banks is as a result of DC selling z billion $ worth of IOUs to the residents of RW. The 
ensuing debit which happens simultaneously to its credit is representative of DC being 
debited by RW’s same banks as purchase-payment for its RW bank deposit, of an equal worth 
of z billion $. 
157 Now and next when we will do a sum up comparison of total inflows and outflows for 
country C. 
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But next, if DC wants to convert these dollars into an equal amount of its domestic currency, 
it cannot simply transfer158 this sum of foreign money to its central bank, because in actual 
fact, it has no foreign currency to speak of, ‘for it never gets hold of any foreign currency 
whatsoever’ (ibid.: 34). What it holds is ‘not a sum of foreign currency, but a foreign bank 
deposit’ (ibid.: 34) so that all that DC can do is to ask RW’s banks to ‘transfer’159 the 
ownership of this bank deposit to the benefit of DC’s central bank (RC160). And when DC 
does ask RW’s banks to carry out this transfer of ownership to RC, on its behalf, it 
irrevocably relinquishes its very own ownership over this foreign deposit, which is 
consequently annulled. 
What happens next is that RW’s banks will all at once both credit and debit RC for an amount 
of z billion $. ‘As imposed by double-entry book-keeping, this inflow of dollars is 
immediately matched by an equivalent outlfow’ (ibid.: 34). This is because RC is ‘not paid in 
money, but through money, notably through a circular flow’ (ibid.: 34−35) enabling RC to 
gain ownership of a bank deposit newly acquired and originating with RW’s banks. And, 
which deposit essentially yields it a right of ownership over a portion of RW’s national 
output. The main point here is that the object of the said bank deposit is ‘an undifferentiated 
quantity’ (ibid.: 35) of RW’s domestic output, ‘and not a sum of money’ (ibid.: 35). 
Consequently, the end result for RC is that not any amount of foreign monies are ‘deposited 
into its assets’ (ibid.: 35) the z billion $ flowing simultaneously in and out of it. The reality is 
that the debit that RW’s banks submits it to, is such as to secure the payment for RC’s newly 
acquired ownership of a bank deposit with the banks of RW. The very fact that ‘every credit-
payment is an equal and simultaneous debit-payment’ (ibid.: 16) makes it that RC does not 
inherit its newly acquired bank deposit for free, it has to pay for it. This explains the reason 
for which RC is debited, and as well evidences the second and last monetary outflow.  
In sum, the transfer to RC that RW’s banks carry out on behalf of DC in following with the 
latter’s ‘decision to transform its bank deposit denominated in dollars into an equivalent bank 
deposit denominated in’ (ibid.: 35) its domestic currency, generates a sequence of significant 
accounting entries, that is, ‘significant’ in the sense of the effect that they bring about. Let us 
re-capture them in a next paragraph. 
RW’s banks proceed with the transfer by simultaneously debiting and crediting DC. Let us 
consider this as the first monetary outflow161 for country C: the credit is simply the cession of 
DC’s bank deposit of z billion $, whilst the debit is on account of the fact that RW’s banks 
carry out a payment, to the benefit of RC, on its behalf. 
RW’s banks then simultaneously credits and debits RC. This results in a second monetary 
outflow for country C: the credit reflects the transfer of DC’s foreign bank deposit ownership 
to its benefit and the debit is simply to account for RC’s payment for acquiring an equivalent 
bank deposit of z billion $ value. 
                                                
158 If DC ‘could be credited with a positive sum of dollars or of any other foreign currency 
without being simultaneously debited, then a transfer would be conceivable’ (ibid.: 34), the 
foreign monies owned by DC would thus simply be transferred to RC (the official reserves of 
country C’s central bank). ‘Yet, money is a simple flow, and cannot be ‘stopped’ in its 
circulation’ (ibid.: 34). 
159 Let us be clear on our meaning from the onset: all that DC can actually do is to ask RW’s 
banks to cancel its (DC) bank deposit and to credit RC instead with an equivalent bank 
deposit. In fact, the bank deposit of DC is never actually transferred to RC: it is rather 
destroyed and another equivalent deposit is created to the benefit of RC. 
160 We designate RC to mean the official reserves of the central bank of country C. 
161 That is, if we were to omit the original inflow that grants DC a foreign deposit with RW’s 
banks, following its cession of IOUs. 
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The problem is that when we consider the totality of monetary flows for country C, we end up 
with two monetary outflows and only one monetary inflow. This is because whilst the two 
monetary outflows add up to each other162, it can be clearly observed that the totality of 
credit-payments involved reflect one and the same monetary inflow into country C. It 
benefits, from a first credit-payment, when RW pays for DC’s sale of IOUs. This credit 
however is subsequently cancelled when DC gives up its acquisition of the foreign bank 
deposit (counterpart to its cession of IOUs) such that RW’s banks can credit RC with an 
equivalent bank deposit (hence, the debit-credit that DC is submitted to by RW’s banks). RC 
then benefits, itself, from a credit-payment (when RW’s banks credit it with a bank deposit on 
behalf of DC) but this ‘second’ monetary credit-inflow is none other than the original 
monetary inflow into country C’s domestic economy, following DC’s cession of IOUs.   
Now the essence here is that the monetary deficit that arises from the difference in monetary 
outflows and inflows, essentially the net monetary outflow, as sustained by country C ends 
up being compensated by RC, that is, by its country’s official reserves. After all, the foreign 
bank deposit that RC acquires is ‘immediately swallowed up by the monetary ‘black hole’ 
formed by the difference between’ (Cencini 2012a: 36) the country’s total inflows and 
outflows. The end all result is that there is no counterpart what so ever for country C’s cession 
of IOUs (initial increase in its external debt) given that the very foreign bank deposit that RC 
ultimately benefits from, is instantly absorbed, or said another way, expended, in the 
conversion-payment implicated in refinancing its national economy. Country C has to pay 
twice the amount of the foreign borrowing, once via its internal resources (cession of IOUs) 
and once again via its external resources (reduction in official resources). 
Keeping in mind that a loss in asset translates to an increase in debits, we can conclude that 
country C incurs a doubling of its external debt, once through the microeconomic transaction 
of its residents’ sale of IOUs and once again through the macroeconomic transaction that 
reduces its official reserves − the latter manifestation essentially defining the very formation 
of sovereign debt: the pathological component of country C’s external debt. 
 
 
What do we derive from the facts? 
 
What insight can we derive from the facts concerning the flow of international payment 
transactions? In a nutshell we could say that at an international level, the problem affecting 
transactional payments, as is evidenced when considering the totality of a borrowing debtor-
country’s monetary inflows against its outflows, is that the country has first to pay (IOUs) just 
to get access to its trading partner’s currency (acquisition of FBD following sale of IOUs). It 
then has to pay once again (revocation of FBD resulting in reduction of official reserves) such 
as to actually carry out the payment, in foreign currency, for which initial purpose the loan 
was actually sought, e.g. payment of net foreign purchases. Hence the transfer problem as 
famously referenced by Keynes. The fact is that countries (non key-currency) do not pay their 
                                                
162 They ‘are distinct and separate (they are even separated in time)’ (Cencini 2012a: 35). The 
two credit-debit payments amount to a total of two monetary outflows for country C. Granted, 
though two of the ‘three’ debits lead to the acquisition of a foreign bank deposit, we should 
not forget that the one initially acquired by DC is subsequently relinquished in a debit-credit 
when RW’s banks is asked to transfer it to RC. Thus, the debt-payment of RC adds to that of 
the domestic debt-payment of DC, yet country C retains only one credit for two distinct debits 
that add up to each other: it pays twice z billion $ for acquiring the ownership of only one 
foreign bank deposit of this same value.  
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imports, neither their surplus imports (in effect rendering the latter problematic), with their 
own currency (see Schmitt 2014). Rather, they pay them in the currency of the creditor 
country (dollars in our case scenario) because this latter’s currency is after all ‘the only 
currency fit to pay’ (ibid.: 4) their (borrowing countries) imports, that is, in our current 
‘system’ of international payments based on a regime of relative exchange rates. And with 
respect to net foreign purchases, this inevitably entails the sale of financial bonds by the 
borrowing debtor-country (first payment) just to get access to the foreign currencies it 
requires with which to ultimately carry out the payment (second) of their surplus 
purchases.163 As Schmitt reminds us, the deficit nation has to pay two times the required 
‘amount of foreign currency in order to settle its net imports’ (ibid.: 14). 
One way to understand that these two payments (first and second) are two distinct payments 
incurred by the borrowing country and, that moreover add to each other, is to consider the 
two distinct loans that respectively enable them. ‘[T]hese two loans do not pertain to the same 
reality’ (ibid.: 5). As Schmitt points out, whilst the object of the first foreign loan is a future 
good of the borrowing country, ‘the object of the other is a product of the rest of the world’ 
(ibid.: 5), that is, ‘the external product is the object of the money incomes formed’ (ibid.: 5) in 
RW: rest of the world. This, in itself, confirms ‘that these two external loans’ (ibid.: 5) cannot 
be reduced to one single loan. ‘In reality, the total amount borrowed is of 2 dollars and not of 
one dollar only’ (ibid.: 5). Hence, ‘the external debts’ charge falls not once but twice on the 
countries whose expenditures are greater than their gains in foreign currency’ (ibid.: 4). 
From an international monetary-flow perspective, we should remember that the net monetary 
outflow implies an anomalous ‘net debit’ (see Schmitt 2014) for the debtor country as a 
whole. This is so because this very ‘net debit’ has no counterpart credit given the deficit 
country benefits from one and only one first credit (FBD acquisition following its sale of 
IOUs). The ‘second’ is no new credit and hence its associated debit is net. Granted, this net 
debit still yields it (DC/RC) a foreign bank deposit (double-entry book-keeping compliance) 
but given that the purchasing power of the latter is not double and notwithstanding that it has 
already been spent164 as payment for the debtor country’s IOUs, its ultimate dissipation is 
nothing else but a mere use of money RW ‘as a specious real good’ (Schmitt 2014: 30).  
 
Debits-credits formed in money R define this foreign currency as mere object 
of intermediation between real goods, whereas net debits of country A as a 
whole, scientific definition of its sovereign debt, lead to the use of money R as a 
specious real good. 
(Schmitt 2014: 30) 
                                                
163 Schmitt reminds that contrarily to surplus imports, ‘imports are paid, in foreign currencies, 
by exports’ (Schmitt 2014: 7), that is ‘imports-exports’ (see ibid.: 7), and for this reason do 
not require any other external loan. But, ‘additional imports are the source of a true problem 
since, by all evidence, they are not paid for by any export of real goods. Uncompensated by a 
real export, net imports can be balanced in foreign currencies only through a foreign loan’ 
(ibid.: 7). As such, unlike being paid by an income originating within the borrowing country’s 
own domestic economy as are compensated imports (‘imports-exports’ see ibid.: 8), these 
‘[s]urplus imports, on the contrary, are paid by an income formed within the domestic 
economies of the rest of the world’ (ibid.: 8). 
164 It has been spent with income originating from RW’s domestic production. As Schmitt 
captures it, ‘[t]he search for truth about the charge, simple or double, of external debts, 
requires the study of the relationship effectively holding between the two payments of net 
imports, in money R and in money A’ (ibid.: 31). Schmitt’s reference to R and A translates to 
RW and C in our case scenarios.  
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In closing, it would be negligent not to mention the parallel that can be drawn between 
Schmitt’s 2014 observation (as captured by the above quote) and a same observation he’d 
made in a previous work of 1984. We once again draw the attention of the reader to our 
footnote (# 97) whereby we pointed out the distinction that Schmitt had emphasized, as early 
as 1984, with respect to bank-money as instruments of intermediation within nations and 
bank-money that transforms into final objects of payment across national borders. 
In a next chapter, we resume our quest for unraveling the enigmatic source of the world 
balance-of-payments statistical imbalances by elaborating our analysis of the implication of 
these international monetary flows’ evolvement.   
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4    World balance-of-payments asymmetries: the global 
capital and financial account net inflow and current 
account monetary deficit. A single macroeconomic 
source? 
 
 
  
Introduction 
 
In a previous chapter, our analysis of international monetary flows evidenced the double 
burden of external debt with respect to its very formation. In this chapter we attempt to 
demonstrate the double burden of external debt with regard to the net interest payment. We 
show how its payment from the debtor-country’s current account entails yet another 
anomalous charge that is incurred by the country as a whole with the end all result exactly 
doubling the country’s net interest payment. We do this by taking into account the highly 
significant macroeconomic nature of international payment transactions. Our analytic 
approach aims to explain, parallelly, the enigmatical imbalances that defiantly continue to 
manifest in the worldwide balance-of-payments despite the implementation of numerous 
statistical improvements in data compiling. In one fell swoop, we unravel the very pathology 
behind the world accounting discrepancies, contemporarily flagged as the ‘mystery’165 of the 
current account missing surplus166 and capital and financial account missing capital 
outflow167, and trace its unique168 macroeconomic origin to the double charge of the net 
interest payment. 
Let us first briefly touch upon the importance of remembering that countries do exist as 
macroeconomic entities. 
 
 
                                                
165 ‘Experts know only too well that a numerical discrepancy exists between global current 
accounts as well as between global capital and financial accounts. Statistical data show it very 
clearly, and economists all over the world follow Krugman and Obstfeld in calling these 
discrepancies a ‘mystery’’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 277). 
166 ‘[T]he relevance and evolution of the world current account deficit are such that it would 
be naïve to impute it to statistical shortcomings in data collection and compilation. It thus 
appears entirely justified − following Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) − to speak of the 
‘mystery of the missing surplus’’ (ibid.: 273−274). 
167 In their 2012 paper, Cencini and Citraro aim ‘to show how the mystery of the ‘missing 
surplus’ and of the ‘missing capital outflow’ can be unravelled by a new macroeconomic 
approach, while evaluating the IMF experts’ intuition about the role played by capital flight 
and by the so-called ‘interest income position’’ (ibid.: 262). 
168 Given the interconnectedness of the capital and financial account with that of the current 
account, ‘[t]he balances of these two accounts should be mirror images of each other, which 
clearly suggests that the two world balance-of-payments discrepancies must be the effects of 
one and the same cause’ (ibid.: 275). 
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On the essence of a nation as its own macroeconomic entity 
 
Before re-examining the concept of a country existing as a macroeconomic entity, with a 
particular view to emphasize the inherent implication, we think it important to first deliberate 
some basic generalizations that specifically concern transactions between nations. We begin 
by revisiting a few, though nonetheless essential, differences between national and 
international macroeconomics.  
 
 
Distinguishing factors between economies: domestic economy versus international 
economy 
 
As we have pointed out earlier on, the essential distinction that sets a domestic economy apart 
from that of an international one is that ‘the former is an economy of production and 
exchange while the latter is merely concerned with exchange’ (Cencini 2005: 179). And we 
remember that this implies then, that we can never speak of international production. The 
only thing that is logically conceivable is that of national production, ‘world output 
(multinational output included) being entirely the making of nations’ (ibid.: 179). Cencini 
elaborates on an important natural consequence of this. ‘It thus follows that a hypothetic 
international money could not derive its value from international production. At the 
international level the integration between money and output must first pass through the 
intermediation of national currencies’ (ibid.: 179). It is through its very integration with 
produced output, that a country’s currency is transformed into income. ‘As the distinction 
between money and income confirms, money is the ‘vehicle’ or ‘means’ by which payments 
are carried out, but it is not itself the ‘object’ of any payment. It is income that discharges 
debts and not money proper. Within countries, money acquires its purchasing power (that is, 
it becomes income) through its association with production. It is because produced output 
becomes the real ‘content’ of money that payments are effective’ (ibid.: 183).  
Moreover, with respect to the formation and thus origin of income, let us remember that it is 
through production that ‘output is given a monetary form and a positive income is formed, 
which defines a net increase of wealth for the whole economy’ (Cencini 2012: 46). 
Surprisingly, this seemingly trivial factor will take on new relevance when we later consider 
the analysis of Schmitt 2014 regarding the double charge of external debt169 that is implied in 
a net foreign borrowing (e.g. for payment of a country’s net imports). 
Now, at the international level, whilst the financial aspect of payments is not in itself 
problematic, on the contrary, the monetary aspect of international payments becomes a true 
element of concern and evidences an especially significant disparity that exists between an 
international and domestic economy, which distinction should be heeded. The problem stems, 
as we have seen earlier, from the heterogeneity of country currencies. Within the nation, a 
central money170 (the country’s single currency) renders homogeneous the various money 
units as issued by its secondary banks, through an inter-bank ‘system of clearing operated by 
the central bank’ (Cencini 2005: 179). On defining a country’s very currency, Cencini 
                                                
169 Particularly, we will see Schmitt place strategic importance on the origin of the income 
that is specifically implicated in the payment (external loan disbursement) of a debtor-
country’s sale of financial securities (net foreign borrowing for the purpose e.g., of paying for 
the totality of its net foreign purchases, see Schmitt 2014). 
170 ‘Through what Schmitt likens to a catalytic process, the different bank monies are given a 
common form (central money) and become part of a unique national currency’ (Cencini 2005: 
179). With respect to the Schmitt reference, see Schmitt 1984.  
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elaborates the following. ‘The monetary units issued by banks pertaining to the same banking 
system are undifferentiated elements of the same set: national currency’ (ibid.: 179). 
Nevertheless, he warns that homogeneity, ‘is not an intrinsic characteristic of banks’ money 
but the result of a process’ (ibid.: 179) that is, ‘[i]t is through inter-bank clearing that the 
monetary units issued by each single bank are made homogeneous’ (ibid.: 179). Specifically, 
he discerns and emphasizes the following point: ‘[e]ach commercial or private bank is a 
different institution whose spontaneous acknowledgement of debt would remain 
heterogeneous with respect to that issued by any other private bank was it not for the system 
of clearing operated by the central bank’ (ibid.: 179). Contrarily, at the international level, we 
have a very different set of circumstances. It is not just that domestic currencies uniquely 
differ from one another but that moreover ‘their heterogeneity is not dealt with by any system 
of international clearing’ (ibid.: 180). Quite simply, our current non-system of international 
payments very much lacks in this regard. Being based on a system of relative exchange, we 
have to remember that what this means with respect to international payment transactions is 
that ‘the transaction taking place on the foreign exchange market specifies’ (ibid.: 180) not 
‘the identity between’ (ibid.: 180) two currencies, rather it ‘is essentially a barter between’ 
(ibid.: 180) them and as such ‘it leaves them fundamentally as heterogeneous as they were 
before being exchanged’ (ibid.: 180). 
It is not our intent here to revisit the specific differences between a regime of relative versus 
absolute exchange. Our aim is simply to point out, that for lack of a proper international 
banking system empowered with the ability to either establish the homogeneity (see ibidem) 
of currencies akin to how it happens within nations or, provide for a homogeneous monetary 
zone amidst sovereign nations171, the monetary aspect of international payment transactions 
becomes a genuine transfer problem that leads to serious monetary disorders at the 
international level. Not to re-examine the phenomenon of duplication172 associated with key-
currency nations, let us simply remind that with respect to non key-currency countries (the 
system of relative exchange being particularly partial to the former) the transfer problem or 
monetary aspect of international payments becomes very costly. ‘A great disparity exits 
between reserve and non-reserve currency countries. In particular, the asymmetry is such that 
while reserve currency countries can ‘pay’ for their net purchases simply by crediting the 
exporting countries with an amount of national money, non-reserve currency countries are 
forced to purchase a foreign currency in order to pay for their trade deficit’ (ibid.: 184). 
Specifically, it ‘is forced to increase its financial debt’ (ibid.: 185) just ‘to get hold of the 
reserve currency required’ (ibid.: 185). But ‘non-reserve’ and ‘reserve’ currency country 
aside, we remind that any country benefiting from a net foreign borrowing to pay its net 
foreign purchases, ‘‘imports-without-exports’’ (see Schmitt 2014), will suffer a doubling of 
its external debt given the second charge incurred by the country as a whole − the very 
formation of sovereign debt that pathologically adds to the external debt of the country’s 
residents. Given the infrastructure of our current ‘system’ of international payments, external 
debts include sovereign debts but, as earlier suggested, we should take heed of the fact that 
the latter are definitely anomalous and should not thereby even be enabled to form. Today’s 
international payment system clearly lacks an essential component as part of its overall 
mechanism. In its present form − without the benefit of a third counter-party institution to 
mediate the totality of payment transactions, akin to a process occurring within nations or, 
amid a proper homogeneous monetary zone of sovereign nations − the system conceptually 
and procedurally misses, entirely, the macroeconomic element so naturally inherent to a 
country’s international payment transactions. The international monetary disorders that 
                                                
171 Our meaning here is simply of nations having each their own respective currency. 
172 That is xeno-currencies, as per our earlier description. 
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consequentially manifest173 are admittedly very costly for countries, more so, so illogically 
unnecessary. The double charge entailed in a country’s net interest payment is yet another 
very taxing macroeconomic disorder and we will attempt to evidence this in our exposition of 
the ‘missing surplus’ and of the ‘missing capital outflow’.174 
 
 
The country as a macroeconomic entity −  what about the macroeconomic existence of 
nations? 
 
Well, one good starting point is that if it were not for the recognition175 of a country’s 
macroeconomic entity, ‘the implication for international transactions would merely reflect 
what already happens at a microeconomic level’ (Cencini 2005: 248). Yet it is clear, just on 
considering the account of official reserves176 that it ‘is not the account of any particular 
resident but it reflects the reserve position of the country taken as a whole’ (ibid.: 248). A net 
augmentation as deriving, for example, from net commercial sales ‘defines an international 
gain for the country itself: neither its formation nor its ownership can be attributed to’ (ibid.: 
248) any individual denizen of the nation. Rather, it ‘concerns the country as such … which, 
as the set of its residents, represents them all indistinctly’ (ibid 235−36). Cencini elaborates 
the case-scenario such as to crystallize the evidence that indeed ‘countries have a 
macroeconomic existence that cannot be identified with that of their residents … If the 
residents of a country are paid in a foreign reserve currency for their net commercial exports, 
none of them is a creditor of the rest of the world, but their country is. This is so much so that 
the sum of foreign currency obtained from abroad is first changed into an equivalent sum of 
national currency − with which exporters are paid − and then transferred to the country’s 
foreign reserve account at the domestic central bank, where it defines the net gain of the 
country as a whole’ (Cencini 2012: 58−59). 
Similarly, as he further points out, the same principle underlines the global perspective that is 
applied to a country’s international investment position (IIP). ‘The IIP reflects the country’s 
                                                
173 The Gnos and Rossi observation concerning the logical laws that imbue the 
macroeconomic approach of Schmitt et al., in analytic interpretation, is well worth the 
reminder. ‘[T]he present system of payments is inconsistent with the laws governing capitalist 
economies. Even more than physical laws, logical laws prevail under whatever conditions. If 
the payment system does not comply with them, they apply anyway, and the discrepancy 
between them and the way payments are actually carried out is sanctioned by the emergence 
of a pathology, which affects the whole economic system’ (Gnos and Rossi 2012: 10−11). 
174 See Cencini and Citraro 2012. 
175 Albeit, still today, it remains a very blurry recognition: ‘[t]oday, economists and experts 
are caught in a self-contradictory situation, … while acknowledging the principle of the 
mandatory equality between debits and credits, they recognize it only at the microeconomic 
level, while missing the international side of macroeconomic payments. Whereas, on the one 
hand, they overlook the fact that countries exist as macroeconomic entities, on the other hand 
… they work out a properly macroeconomic concept like the international investment 
position’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 291). It is not surprising then, that with such an obscure 
understanding of the macroeconomic existence of nations that, our current ‘system’ of 
international payments remains saddled with an indistinct and faulty infrastructure that, 
likewise, is unable to account for the element of macroeconomic entity that is naturally 
implicated and necessarily ensues from the international transactions of a country’s residents. 
176 Or, if you will, just on considering ‘the very conception of official reserves (country’s 
reserves as opposed to private reserves)’ (Cencini 2005: 249).  
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financial position, and is clearly concerned with the global situation of the nation’ (Cencini 
2005: 248). 
But undeniably, the ultimate thrust that can seal a nation’s existence as its very own 
macroeconomic entity is the existence itself, of its unique country currency. Cencini drives 
the point home when he reminds us that, after all, a currency is essentially the 
‘acknowledgement of debt’ of a nation’s very banking system. ‘Being an acknowledgement 
of debt spontaneously issued by a country’s banking system, national money is what gives 
nations their own economic identity and specificity’ (ibid.: 250). 
In sum, why is it so important that the macroeconomic entity of a country177 be so explicitly 
recognized? It boils down to its natural implication when the international payments of its 
country residents are concerned. But more so, it is on account of its very involvement that we 
need to ascertain that this implication of the country as a whole occurs neutrally, that is, as a 
mere intermediation on behalf of the set of its residents, and that it does not create an 
anomalous situation that leads to the addition of two distinct costs. 
Now, much of international trading is reciprocal such that the implication of a nation with 
respect to the foreign payments of its denizens is compensated ‘so that the analysis can be 
limited to the payment carried out by the residents’ (ibid.: 250). This is because reciprocal 
transactions occur neutrally, without entailing any anomalous results as it does, for example, 
when a country is a net importer and benefits from a net foreign borrowing.  
Contrarily, the one-sided transaction such as is involved in a country’s net interest payment is 
a clear scenario of monetary macroeconomic dysfunction. As pointedly observed by Cencini, 
‘when transactions are unilateral a problem arises’ (ibid.: 250). Specifically, ‘the payment of 
net interest by a country’s indebted residents necessarily involves the country itself, whose 
payment − in the present system of international payments − adds up to that of its residents’ 
(Cencini 2012: 65). Irrefutably, a better understanding and clearly defined recognition of a 
nation existing as its own macroeconomic entity would be a progressive step when re-
considering the proper infrastructure that should be implemented such that the international 
system of payments can omit this double payment. ‘The double charge of net interest 
payments could be avoided only if the macroeconomic existence of countries were explicitly 
accounted for, and payments carried out respecting the flow nature of money’ (ibid.: 65). It is 
true indeed that the vehicular aspect of money, as well, needs to be reckoned with in a proper 
system of international payments: ‘because of its circular flow − a national currency can never 
leave the banking system from which it originates’ (ibid.: 64). More so, as earlier pointed out, 
this confirms the country currency’s unique economic fingerprint, given after all, it is the 
‘acknowledgement of debt’ (Cencini 2005: 250) of its very own banking system. But what 
also matters is that, again, ‘[b]ecause of its necessary circular flow, money cannot finance any 
net purchase, either within a single banking system or between countries’ (Cencini 2012: 60). 
This implies that at the global level, country ‘purchases have to be matched by simultaneous 
sales carried out through the circular flow of money’ (ibid.: 60). We will see through our 
continued analysis of monetary macroeconomic disorders that both these factors178 take on 
                                                
177 It is at this level, that the international economy has its full impetus. Cencini sums it up, by 
emphasizing the following. ‘[T]he involvement of nations in the external payments of their 
residents is a direct implication of the macroeconomic aspect of international economics. It 
derives straightforwardly from the necessity to convey between countries the foreign 
payments of their residents, that is, from the need to convert domestic into international 
payments’ (Cencini 2005: 250). 
178 Issued as an acknowledgment of debt by the very banking system of their respective 
nations, currencies are necessarily linked to their country origin; because of the flow aspect of 
bank money, it can never be the end term of a payment, whether within countries or beyond 
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particular significance at the international level of payments, specifically from the perspective 
of a country considered as a whole, that is, as its own macroeconomic entity. 
We thus carry on with our journey by briefly reviewing the progress realized to date in 
understanding world accounting discrepancies. 
 
 
The evolving tide with regard to the interpretation of global balance-of-
payments statistical gaps 
 
To begin with, back in 2000, Schmitt documented the ‘curious phenomenon’ of the world 
current account net deficit as having been ‘shrouded in mystery’ and, since ‘some time’ (see 
Schmitt 2000). ‘Let us dwell briefly on a point that is incidental yet important: the growth of 
deficit within the trade balance, equivalent to the paid interest, explains a curious 
phenomenon, which economists have known and accepted for some time, but which has 
remained shrouded in mystery: namely that the sum total of the current-account transactions 
of all the countries in the world is not nil but largely negative. This cannot be helped, because 
debts D** define the net deficits of all countries taken together’ (Schmitt 2000: 15−16)179. 
According to Schmitt, this was ‘enough to convince one that net interest relating to external 
debts is subjected to two distinct payments that should on no account be taken as one single 
payment. The double weight of interest is thus a true theorem’ (ibid.: 16)180. 
So it would seem that the idea of a missing surplus was not novel, even back then, and 
clearly, Schmitt had already begun to unravel its mystery. But, from another standpoint, as 
Cencini and Citraro point out, still in 2012 mainstream thinking continued to be baffled by it: 
‘[t]raditional attempts to explain world accounting discrepancies have sought to highlight the 
imperfections in statistical data collection, promoting a series of technical measures liable to 
improve balance-of-payments statistics’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 262). According to the 
latter authors, the fact that, despite numerous statistical improvements, ‘world accounting 
discrepancies’ still mystify traditional reasoning, can be explained. It lies with one important 
point. ‘[C]onventional solutions fail, because they rest on a flawed understanding of the 
principles of international macroeconomics. To be clear, the macroeconomic aspect of 
international transactions goes totally unnoticed in traditional analysis. The lack of a clear 
distinction between the aggregate of a country’s residents and the country as a totality − the 
set of its residents − points to why the world accounting discrepancies are still a mystery. If 
nation-states as such are not directly affected by the international transactions carried out by 
their residents, it becomes impossible to understand why, despite significant improvements in 
statistical reporting, world current, and capital and financial accounts remain severely out of 
balance’ (ibid.: 262). 
                                                                                                                                                   
their national borders: the very principle of double double-entry bookkeeping from which 
stems its flow nature, guarantees this. 
179 Schmitt’s reference to D** implies the ‘debt elicited by the payment of interest’ (Schmitt 
2000: 5) whereas D* intends the net ‘interest debt’ (ibid.: 5) itself. ‘We observe that debt D* 
is met by LDCs’ domestic economy, whereas debt D** diminishes their international 
reserves’ (ibid.: 15). LDCs intend ‘the group of developing countries’ (ibid.: 5) trading with 
the rest of the world. 
180 See Schmitt 2005 and 2007 for some of his further writings on his development of the 
Interest Theorem. 
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Yet according to Schmitt’s 2000 account, it appears the World Bank was however aware of 
the fact that ‘the payment of interest brings about an equivalent reduction in the net transfers 
accruing to the LDCs at the hand of the rest of the world … We see that interest imposes a 
first cost on LDCs, registered in their current-account balance and that interest imposes a 
second cost on these countries, precisely because its payment cancels an equivalent fraction of 
transfers granted by the rest of the world’ (Schmitt 2000: 20). This fact is indeed noteworthy 
and, if its implicit meaning is correctly understood, it certainly sets the stage for Schmitt’s 
2006 ‘fundamental argument as to the existence of macroeconomic transactions’ (Cencini and 
Citraro 2012: 283). After all, as earlier explained by Schmitt, ‘[e]verybody can see that the 
payment of interest scoops out an equivalent deficit, since the amount of foreign currency 
received from exports is reduced by the sum of paid interest’ (Schmitt 2000: 22−23). 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Schmitt, though ‘[e]conomists are perfectly cognizant of debts 
D*’ (ibid.: 23), ‘with respect to net interest due by countries, the scientific community hardly 
ventures any further’ (ibid.: 23). Rather, it remains ‘oblivious to debts D** which do emerge 
in the real world, the payment of debt D* giving invariably rise to a second and equal debt, 
D**’ (ibid.: 23). There is where the paradox appears to manifest, that is, ‘economists and 
experts are caught in a self-contradictory situation, which explains why they are still unaware 
of the double payment of net interest, hopelessly searching for a statistical solution to the 
world balance-of-payments discrepancies’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 291). Specifically, 
though ‘the expression of ‘unrequited transfer’’ is correctly referred to by the World Bank and 
the IMF (see Schmitt 2000: 23), they seem to miss the crucial point that ‘payment of debt D*’ 
(ibid.: 23) does give ‘invariably rise to a second and equal debt, D**’ (ibid.: 23). And yet this, 
by itself, should easily confirm the addition of the two distinct debts (D* + D**). Schmitt is 
very clear in explaining why that is. ‘[I]nterest debt (D*) is positively and definitively paid as 
soon as an export tout court − and not an amount of excess exports − is transferred abroad, by 
a transaction which both the World Bank and the IMF rightly refer to by the expression of 
‘unrequited transfer’. For interest to be actually settled within period p, rather than being 
carried over to a later period, one only needs to fund its payment by an export taking place 
right in p’ (ibid.: 23)181. Let us be very clear as regard the blind spot of the ‘scientific 
community’ (see ibidem and Cencini and Citraro 2012) and as it stands, still today: though 
well in the know of the ‘unrequited transfer’ (see Schmitt 2000) involved in the 
microeconomic payment of net interest that takes place in the debtor-country’s current 
account, it somehow overlooks the macroeconomic element inherently implied by this very 
initial real payment, that is, that it inevitably entails a second monetary payment of equal 
value. Only this time, at a macroeconomic level: international reserves are inescapably 
burdened (see ibid.: 24). 
Clearly then, it becomes all the more convincing that the problem with today’s international 
‘system’ of payments is that this very non-system (see Cencini and Citraro 2012) ‘fails to 
account for the macroeconomic aspect of international payments, which leads to the 
formation of a monetary deficit each time an LDC pays its net interest on debt. The decrease 
in LDCs’ official reserves necessary to restore equilibrium defines a dramatic loss of 
resources suffered by debtor countries, and accounts for the global discrepancies affecting the 
world current account and the world capital and financial account’ (ibid.: 283). Moreover, as 
summed up by Schmitt (see ibid.: 283), the anomalous payment (the ‘second cost’ as referred 
to by Schmitt 2000) ‘of net interest amounts to the expenditure of a saving suffered by the 
debtor country’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 283) ‘and to a saving of an expenditure enjoyed 
by the creditor country’ (ibid.: 283). 
                                                
181 See Schmitt’s ‘preliminary notes’: ‘p, any year whatever when interest falls due’ (Schmitt 
2000: 5). 
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Now it is interesting and certainly worthy to note Schmitt’s 2014 theoretical advances 
whereby he distinguishes (albeit, in an entirely independent argument) the payment of 
compensated imports from that of ‘imports-without-exports’ (see Schmitt 2014) depending on 
the origin of the income behind the payment, that is, whether it is financed by an income 
formed by the domestic production of the debtor or, creditor country. In following with 
Schmitt’s 2014 analysis (with respect to the payment of net imports), one could infer182 that 
the unilateral transfer involved in the net interest payment of the debtor-country’s external 
debt ‘obtains the reconstitution of’ (Schmitt 2014: 8) the creditor-country’s ‘own domestic 
income’ (ibid.: 8) and, simultaneously creates a hole in the debtor-country’s economy. That is 
to say, it ‘leads to the formation of a monetary deficit’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 283) 
suffered by the debtor-country. And particularly a double183 deficit as is evidenced in the case 
of LDCs, which for the most part are trade-balanced countries184. The double deficit185 is 
ultimately covered by a simultaneous increase in debt (new foreign loan to provide it with the 
foreign currency required to pay for the totality of its foreign purchases) and, decrease in its 
official reserves (expenditure of the foreign bank deposit corresponding to said loan − the 
monetary conversion cost, the payment in foreign currency incurred to the country as a 
whole). Thus, the debtor-country is indebted twice, that is, it incurs two payments, each of a 
same value of its net interest payment. Hence, we observe a doubling of the net interest 
payment.186  
                                                
182 The readers should nevertheless be on the qui vive that the two arguments (Schmitt’s 
earlier analysis of the double payment of net interests and his 2014 analysis of the payment of 
net imports) are not exactly the same. When a country pays for its net imports, commercial 
and financial, it obtains part of the rest of the world’s output, whilst the payment of its net 
interests consists of an unrequited transfer and, not to mention, the analysis of net interests 
payment has its own specificities. The difference between the two analyses should become 
clearer, later on, when we will more closely examine Schmitt’s 2014 argument with regard to 
the payment of net imports. 
183 Later on in our paper, we will elaborate on how the missing surplus can be inferred from 
the occurrence of this double deficit arising in the debtor-country’s current account (see 
Cencini and Citraro 2012). The authors evidence the manifestation of two deficits in the 
debtor-country’s current account versus one surplus in the creditor-country. 
184 Just to draw a comparison, ‘[t]he trade balance of least developed countries (LDCs) being 
essentially even’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 283) their external debt net interest payment 
would generate a double deficit that would be financed partly by a new foreign loan, partly by 
a reduction in its official reserves. Whereas, in the case of a country whereby its trade-surplus 
was, say the double of its due net interest payment, half of the surplus revenue would go 
towards the paying of the net interest payment and the remaining half towards restoring the 
said country’s ‘internal relationship between income and output’ (Cencini 1995: 317). In 
supposing a country whose ‘amount of net commercial exports’ (ibid.: 315) ‘is twice the size 
as the external debt servicing carried out by its residents’ Cencini explains the following. 
‘Half of the foreign exchange earned through net commercial exports is paid out by the 
country as external debt servicing, while the other half is used to recover the domestic income 
transferred to the rest of the world by the indebted residents’ (ibid.: 315). 
185 We will later on explain just how this double deficit comes about. 
186 It should be noted that though one of these, loan-payments or costs, is legitimate, the other 
is pathological in the sense that its cost is incurred by the country as a whole (official reserves 
reduction), in addition, to that of the initial cost incurred by its residents. 
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Curiously enough, despite the insightful advances and theoretical progress of some, Cencini 
and Citraro’s 2012 findings, still delineate an economic community that continues, overall, to 
be trapped in a statistical resolve with respect to world accounting imbalances. 
If we consider the world current account for example, international trade has it that ‘[a] 
country’s net commercial exports are the rest of the world’s net commercial imports’ (Cencini 
and Citraro 2012: 272). One would expect from this that, naturally then, ‘the world current 
account, that is, the current account of all the individual countries taken together, should be 
perfectly balanced. ‘In principle, the combined surpluses and the combined deficits arising 
from the current account transactions of all countries (including international organizations) 
should offset each other, because one country’s credits are the debits of another’ 
(International Monetary Fund, 2000, p.2)’ (ibid.: 272). But the situation is very much 
otherwise and substantially so with statistical realities reporting a significant global current 
account deficit. ‘In reality, statistics show ‘that the world as a whole is running a substantial 
current account deficit that increased sharply in the early 1980s and has remained high’ 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003, p.314). The first study on the world current account 
discrepancy was carried out by an IMF Working Party, whose official report was published in 
1987. Now, although many statistical adjustments suggested by the IMF Working Party 
experts have since been implemented by specialists in data collection and compilation, the 
discrepancies in world current account balances have not substantially lessened’ (Cencini and 
Citraro 2012: 272−273). The latter authors clearly demonstrate this in their statistical tables 
(see ibid.: 273) which capture the world current account balance for years ranging from 1978 
to 2002 and, document the IMF as data source. Looking particularly at years from 1985 
onwards (given 1987 was the year of the first IMF official report), it becomes clear that 
indeed ‘statistical adjustments’ have not done much in easing the global current account 
imbalance. Moreover, it certainly vindicates Cencini and Citraro’s claim that ‘the relevance 
and evolution of the world current account deficit are such that it would be naïve to impute it 
to statistical shortcomings in data collection and compilation’ (ibid.: 273). 
And, what is more, yet another discrepancy is reported ‘at the world capital and financial 
account level. As a country’s capital outflows are another country’s capital inflows, world 
capital flows should balance: the sum of capital inflows should equal the sum of capital 
outflows. ‘For the world as a whole, every inflow into one country is an outflow from another 
country; if all transactions are properly recorded, their total should add up to zero’ 
(International Monetary Fund, 1992, p. xiii). This is however not what happens in practice, 
the world capital and financial account showing a substantial net capital inflow’ (Cencini and 
Citraro 2012: 274). On thinking about it, it is wondrous after all, that despite the very fact that 
‘the world is a closed economy and since the balance of payments is construed according to 
the rules of double-entry book-keeping, the necessary balancing of’ (ibid.: 272) each of these 
world accounts is not empirically proven. It thus become increasingly convincing that 
something is not quite right, as though some elements were indeed mysteriously missing from 
the equation and, with a cause, itself, mysteriously unbeknownst. But as the latter authors 
sagaciously point out, one thing is certainly clear. That is, given the tight interrelatedness 
between these global accounts187, ‘[t]he balances of these two accounts should be mirror 
images of each other, which clearly suggests that the two world balance-of-payments 
discrepancies must be the effects of one and the same cause’ (ibid.: 275). Yet, as they explain, 
though IMF economic researchers had ‘observed that the ‘negative sign of the 
discrepancy…in investment income is consistent with the positive sign of the discrepancy in 
the global financial account data’ (International Monetary Fund, 2003, p.4)’ (ibid.: 275), still, 
the missing surplus and capital outflow were merely being connected to statistical 
                                                
187 Specifically: the world current account and the world capital and financial account. 
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inaccuracies related to misreporting of data, though albeit, specifically to ‘‘the systematic 
misreporting of international interest income  flows’ (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003, p. 314)’ 
(Cencini and Citraro 2012: 275). Nevertheless, progress was on the brink with some 
economists venturing that much closer to a trailhead that could potentially lead them to the 
culprit-source of world accounting discrepancies. In their continued search of a sound 
explanation of the ‘missing surplus’, Krugman and Obstfeld had already connected the size of 
the discrepancy in the global current account with that of variations related to interest 
payments. ‘Analysing the problem of the ‘missing surplus’, Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) 
observe that a strong correlation exists between the size of the world current account 
discrepancy and the size of interest payments’ (ibid.: 288). And statistics did confirm this 
observation, since as per Cencini and Citraro: ‘when world interest rates fell (mid-1980s, 
early 1990s) so did the world current account deficit, whereas it grew bigger every time 
interest payments rose because of a rise in either interest rates or the volume of external debt. 
‘World interest rates rose sharply after 1980, and the size of the world interest payment 
discrepancy increased with them. The interest payments hypothesis therefore offers a 
potential explanation for the increase in the global deficit’ (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003, 
p.322)’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 288). According to the latter authors, it is thus that the 
‘interest payments hypothesis’ was borne. An observed correlativity had re-ignited the hopes 
of a scientific community that was evidently determined to press forward in its endeavor to 
unveil the source-cause of world accounting imbalances. But as they documented, its188 quest 
had certainly been that of a long journey and not without its blind alleys. For example, back in 
1986, Dooley’s analysis had also raised hopes when he’d set out ‘to capture unreported 
capital flows’ (ibid.: 278). But though it was initially thought that his analysis had ‘the merit 
of emphasizing the pathological aspect of capital flight by identifying the need to account for 
asymmetrically reported capital flows’ (ibid.: 278), it was found that, overall, his method was 
not completely developed. Though his course of action to capture the magnitude of escaping 
capital flows certainly had validity, on the whole, it was felt that his methodological approach 
was not without its shortcomings and could easily lead to a circular claim (see ibidem), unless 
it was further advanced189. They elaborate, very clearly, on their reasoning. ‘As essential as it 
might be to quantify the problem, it cannot be considered more than a first step on the long 
way leading to its understanding and to its solution. A wide gap exists between reported 
statistical data; that is a fact. The various methods elaborated by the World Bank, Morgan 
Guaranty, Cline, and Dooley suggest comparable ways for measuring this gap. But how can it 
be adequately explained? As we have already pointed out, unless capital flight is defined and 
measured independently of the balance-of-payments misreporting, it will be viciously circular 
to claim that, as the gap measures capital flight, capital flight is its cause. The measurement of 
the gap due to unreported capital flows shows the evidence and the extent of the problem; it 
fails to explain it’ (ibid.: 278−279). 
In considering the general state of things as it continues to exist today, there is indeed much 
merit in Cencini and Citraro’s 2012 claim that the reason conventional analysis is still unable 
to demystify the cause of global accounting imbalances190, is quite simply that it bypasses the 
                                                
188 That is, the scientific community’s quest. See Cencini and Citraro 2012. 
189 According to Cencini and Citraro 2012, this was also the risk inherent in alternate 
methodological approaches such as propounded by other endeavoring economists, that is, as 
in the ‘various methods elaborated by the World Bank, Morgan Guaranty, Cline, and Dooley’ 
(see ibidem). See also the working paper of Claessens and Naudé (1993) that Cencini and 
Citraro 2012 recourse to when analyzing the different approaches attempted in order to 
quantify capital flight. 
190 And, along with it, the double charge of net interest payments. 
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international aspect of macroeconomic transactions, notwithstanding, quite unknowingly. 
‘Today, economists and experts are caught in a self-contradictory situation, which explains 
why they are still unaware of the double payment of net interest, hopelessly searching for a 
statistical solution to the world balance-of-payments discrepancies. In fact, while 
acknowledging the principle of the mandatory equality between debits and credits, they 
recognize it only at the microeconomic level, while missing the international side of 
macroeconomic payments’ (ibid.: 291). One thing is certain and, quite evidently, too little 
emphasis has been placed by traditional analysts on the true meaning behind the fact that a 
nation does subsist as its very own macroeconomic entity. So much so, that still in 2014, 
Schmitt must address the reality that the concept of sovereignty exists but in obscurity. Very 
interestingly, he brilliantly challenges the state of affairs by introducing a most innovative 
approach to conceptualizing it. In so doing, he takes the notion of sovereignty to a whole new 
level capable of homing in on a truly scientific meaning of countries existing as 
macroeconomic entities. Though we will later elaborate on just how his innovative approach 
might help us better understand the global monetary anomalies currently afflicting 
international payment transactions, let us merely adumbrate for the time being, using 
Schmitt’s own writings. ‘Indeed, it has also to be admitted that the idea of sovereignty 
remains blurred. It can be correctly grasped only when foreign currencies lent to countries, set 
of their respective residents, are distinguished, as they must logically be, from the foreign 
currencies lent to their domestic economies’ (Schmitt 2014: 13). 
In sum, traditional theories, thus far, remain conceptually deficient in providing a complete 
analysis of global balance-of-payments statistical gaps that could soundly explain the exact 
cause behind them. The situation undeniably calls for a fresh analysis of our present non-
system of international payments, specifically of, the effects of the monetary flows that are 
implicated in international payment transactions. We next set our attention on showing how 
the imbalance that arises between the totality of inflows and outflows can as well explain both 
the ‘missing surplus’ and, ‘missing capital outflow’191. 
In a following section, we thus return to our analysis of international monetary flows, this 
time with a dual aim. We will attempt to explain how the two global accounting 
discrepancies192 derive from a unique source-cause and, concurrently confirm the pathological 
double charge inherent in a country’s net interest payment. 
This brings us next to our review of the world current account and, world capital and financial 
account discrepancies. We show193 that both imbalances are effects originating from a same 
source: countries’ external debt servicing. We begin our analysis with that of the global 
current account net deficit or, the ‘missing surplus’. 
  
 
On the global current account net deficit, contemporarily referred to as the 
‘missing surplus’  
 
It is not only that double-entry bookkeeping inherently enforces a faultless balancing of 
credits and debits194 and that the identity195 between each nation’s purchases and sales 
                                                
191 See Cencini and Citraro 2012. 
192 The global current account net deficit and, global capital and financial account net capital 
inflow. 
193 Our conclusive explanation stems from the analysis as elaborated by Cencini 2005a, 
Cencini 2005, Cencini and Citraro 2012. See also Schmitt 2012. 
194 That is, double credits and double debits. See Cencini and Citraro 2012: 262. 
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naturally ensues from this, but also the fact that trading countries are reciprocally linked in 
their exchanges196, that one would expect the world current account to add up to nil. ‘[B]ased 
on the rules of double-entry book-keeping, the balance of payments of each individual 
country should necessarily add up to zero. Likewise, surplus and deficit countries being inter-
related, the current account of all world countries should thus be perfectly balanced, as should 
be the world capital and financial account’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 262). Yet as the latter 
authors have pointed out, the reality is that both world accounts continue to evidence 
substantial discrepancies. The global current account, for its part, amounts to a net deficit. 
And what is more, as we will attempt to show, it is very much linked to the global capital and 
financial account imbalance that is marked by a net capital inflow. 
Now, as earlier explained, ‘[n]umerically far too important to be simply due to errors and 
omissions in statistical data collection and compilation, the world current account imbalance 
has usually been correlated to misreporting of international investment income transactions 
and to capital flight’ (Cencini 2005a: 1. See also Cencini and Citraro 2012). On considering 
the statistical components that are methodically captured within the accounts of a country’s 
balance-of-payments197, it becomes clearer as to how this correlation might of come about. 
                                                                                                                                                   
195 The very fact that the ‘fundamental balance of payments identity’ (Cencini 2005a: 4) does 
fall apart at the international macroeconomic level, that is, that it reduces to ‘a condition of 
equilibrium’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 283) should be enough cause for alarm that 
something else is fundamentally wrong, the culprit. After all, ‘an identity is an equality that 
holds under any circumstances’ (Cencini 2005a: 15). And more so, given that a nation’s sales 
are another’s purchases and vice versa: ‘the world as a whole is a closed economy’ (see 
Cencini 2005a and, Krugman and Obstfeld 2003), it can’t but baffle that the identity, indeed, 
does not hold at the global level. As well, the discrepant sums are way too substantial to 
accrue to mere compilation errors or fact that entry-data emerges from varied channels. It 
does seems odd then, that despite all, IMF statisticians (see International Monetary Fund 
1993) resign themselves to ‘claim that, ‘because data for balance of payments entries often 
are derived independently from different sources, implementation of the double-entry 
recording system is not perfect’ (ibid.: 160)’ (Cencini 2005a: 15). Would it not be more 
logical, instead, to reason it out deductively? That is, to deduce that it could have more to do 
with the fact that the infrastructure of our current international payments system might, very 
simply, be at odds with the macroeconomic laws that should otherwise govern it, such as the 
identity? ‘[W]e are confronted with the choice between a logical identity that does not allow 
for individual behaviour to play any equilibrating role at the global level, and a conditional 
equality in which a prominent role is reserved for an adjustment mechanism based on 
individual and aggregate decisions. Inherently macroeconomic, the first alternative 
emphasizes the structural aspect of the system of international payments and aims at 
explaining today’s economic disorders by referring to the lack of alignment between the laws 
the present system should comply with and its actual working. The second alternative, on the 
contrary, is essentially microeconomic and it is implicitly centred on the idea that economic 
order is the momentary result of a process of adjustment taking place between opposite forces 
in a constantly renewed attempt to equilibrate more or less diverging forms of behaviour’ 
(Cencini 2005a: 8). 
196 ‘[A] country’s net entries in its current account being necessarily matched by equivalent 
net entries of opposite sign in the current account of the rest of the world, the current account 
of the world considered as a whole should always be equal to zero’ (Cencini 2005a: 1). 
197 It might be efficacious, from the onset, to take notice of the IMF’s specific classification 
with respect to the two main accounts that make up countries’ balance-of-payments and, their 
respective components. ‘According to the fifth edition of the IMF Manual, the standard 
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Still, understood from this narrow perspective, the clues remained frail and misleading. It 
should not surprise that the discrepancies continued to lack a sound explication. 
But in 2005 Cencini, and again with Citraro in 2012, ventured a different distinctly 
macroeconomic approach in tackling the problem (See Cencini 2005a and Cencini and Citraro 
2012, respectively). They advanced that the two world accounting discrepancies were the 
effect of a same source-cause and, particularly originating from countries’ external debt 
servicing. They substantiated their findings with those emanating from Schmitt’s long time 
investigation198 of the double charge linked to the net interest payment of countries’ external 
debt. Their analysis began with a new construe for what the meaning of capital flight should 
intend if it is to be heralded as a viable avenue capable of demystifying the global accounting 
imbalances. Using their own words: ‘[i]f capital flight is to explain world balance-of-
payments discrepancies, it has to be shown that it is at the origin of unreported capital flows’ 
(Cencini and Citraro 2012: 276). Essentially, their focus centers on properly re-defining the 
causality such that it could soundly explain the pathology behind the discrepancies. That is, in 
lieu of attempting to measure unreported capital flows and thereafter linking these to capital 
flight, they primarily characterize the latter ‘analytically, and then measure it accordingly’ 
(ibid.: 279). Their purpose is thus to demonstrate that the very accounting imbalances are the 
effects of an anomaly that marks ‘a capital flight, whose amount corresponds very closely to 
that of the world discrepancies’ (ibid.: 279). They particularly caution on the importance of 
defining and measuring ‘capital flight independently of the discrepancies appearing in the 
world balance of payments and generically identified with unreported capital flows’ (ibid.: 
277) to avoid being drawn into circular argument by otherwise simply deducing ‘that capital 
flight is the cause of these discrepancies from the assumption that capital flight is measured 
and defined by these same discrepancies’ (ibid.: 277). In other words, it is only in this 
manner, observed primarily from a distinct entity perspective rather than simply in relation to, 
                                                                                                                                                   
components of the balance of payments are classified in two major accounts: the current 
account, and the capital and financial account (itself made up of a capital account and a 
financial account). Transactions entered into the current account relate to goods and services, 
income, and current transfers. Exports and imports of real goods and services, compensation 
of employees, investment income (dividends, profits, reinvested earnings, and interests), 
workers’ remittances, and gifts are among the transactions entered in the current account. The 
major components of the capital account are capital transfers (transfers of funds linked to, or 
conditional upon, acquisition or disposal of fixed assets), and acquisition/disposal of non-
produced, non-financial assets (patented assets, leases or other transferable contracts, 
goodwill). Finally, transactions relating to direct, portfolio and other investments, and to 
reserve assets are entered into the financial account’ (Cencini 2005a: 2). See also IMF 1993. 
It is also interesting to note, as observed by Cencini, that contrarily to what the name appears 
to suggest, the balance-of-payments intends transactions, in a broad sense, rather than being 
concerned specifically or, only, with payments. ‘As stated in the Balance of Payments Manual 
edited by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the balance of payments is essentially ‘a 
statistical statement that systematically summarizes, for a specific time period, the economic 
transactions of an economy with the rest of the world’ (International Monetary Fund 1993: 6). 
A wider instrument than the simple record of foreign payments, the balance of payments is 
concerned with all sorts of international transactions, included those that do not involve any 
payment. Thus, ‘despite the connotation, the balance of payments is not concerned with 
payments, as that term is generally understood, but with transactions’ (ibid.: 8)’ (Cencini 
2005a: 2). 
198 See Schmitt 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2012. 
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that capital flight could ever be effectively evaluated as a potential source-cause of world 
accounting variances. 
 
 
So on to the development of a new meaning for capital flight 
 
It would seem that a fresh understanding of the concept was borne from an insight as 
provided, albeit primitively, by the World Bank when back in 1985 they began to associate it 
with that of ‘an unrecorded capital outflow, that is, of a capital lost by some countries without 
being recorded in the balance of payments to the rest of the world. This seems to be the first 
meaning given to capital flight by the World Bank, by which it refers to the increase in 
external debt and, at least implicitly, to the payment of interests’ (Cencini 2005a: 21). See 
also World Bank 1985. This led to the measure of capital flight as a difference originating 
between capital inflows and outflows and, defining an inexplicable sum lost from debtor-
countries’ official reserves. ‘According to the World Development Report, in fact, capital 
flight is measured as the difference between capital inflows − as determined by the increase in 
external debt and net foreign investment − and capital outflows − as determined by current 
account deficits and variations in official reserves’ (Cencini 2005a: 21). Now, as pointed out 
by Cencini, this new perception of capital flight was not without implying that the global 
balance-of-payments variances could very well ‘derive from a loss of capital suffered by 
indebted countries and that this loss is closely related to the payment of their current account 
deficits. Furthermore, if we take into consideration the fact that current account deficits are 
mostly due to interest payments, we arrive at the conclusion that the payment of interest on 
external debt is the most likely common cause of world accounting discrepancies’ (ibid.: 23). 
So from having thus established a distinct individual cause from which the pathology of 
global accounting imbalances could potentially emanate, further study appeared ‘to 
corroborate the idea that both the ‘missing surplus’ and the ‘missing capital outflow’ exist 
because the payment of interest fails to be recorded in both the current account and in the 
capital and financial account of creditor countries’ (ibid.: 24). On first consideration, this 
seemed to suggest then that ‘[t]he world current account discrepancy would thus pose the 
problem of tracing down the payment of interest in order to enter it to the benefit of creditor 
countries’ (ibid.: 24). Yet further in-depth consideration offered another more innovative 
perspective: the prospect that a second anomalous payment was at play. As intuitively 
observed by Cencini, it could be ‘that the payment of interest elicits a second, pathological 
payment of net debtor countries’ current account’ (ibid.: 25) amounting to ‘an over-
expenditure carried out by the indebted countries and unrecorded by creditor countries’ (ibid.: 
25). This then led to substantial progress on the subject matter as he further advanced the 
challenge that ‘[i]nstead of looking for the ‘missing surplus’ in order to transform it into a 
recorded payment, the problem would then be avoiding the overpayment of interest in the first 
place’ (ibid.: 25). The key word here is that of ‘overpayment’ as the mere thought of the 
possibility of an anomalous ‘over-expenditure’ shed light on a new way of conceptualizing 
the problem and this meant not only knowing what happens but more so how the pathology 
actually manifests. It was no longer enough to suspect that the world accounting discrepancies 
might very well be the counter-part results of a same source-cause linked to external debt 
servicing. If, the latter does indeed involve a second anomalous payment that shouldn’t even 
happen, then shifting the focus to discovering more about the how it happens, was certainly 
pre-emptive to finding a way to correct the anomaly199. 
                                                
199 Cencini hinted to a viable investigative starting point by reminding that given that the 
‘discrepancies are concerned with the transactions entered into the balance of payments. They 
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To append to the above and before we begin on a more elaborate account of the malfunction 
of the flows implied in the payment of net interest, let us first mull over yet another brilliant 
observation, this time as pointed out by Schmitt as early as 2004 and which observation he re-
visits in 2014 in his analysis of external debt’s double charge (see Schmitt 2004 and 2014). 
His explanatory description characterizes the very foreign currencies as implied in the net 
interest payment of a country’s external debt, Brazil’s, in this 2004 example of his, and hints 
to their pathological role in the formation of the world accounting discrepancies. ‘The sum of 
foreign currencies flowing out of Brazil for the interest payments are thrown into a state of 
dysfunction owing to the fact that they usurp the status of real assets; if order, justice and 
logic prevailed, no monetary unit could ever intrude into the category of real assets, 
comprised of goods and services, bonds and securities. In the present sorry state of affairs, 
each and every unit of (foreign) currency thrown into the transnational interest payments 
assumes two fundamentally distinct and separate predicates all at once: it ¨functions¨ as a 
medium of exchange and, simultaneously, it equally ¨malfunctions¨, the exact pathology lying 
in the fact that when the interest payments are taken into account, the logical equality between 
the inflow and the outflow of foreign currency is adversely affected’ (Schmitt 2004: 46). 
Next, we turn our attention to explaining the connotation with reference to the adjective 
missing, when describing the puzzling occurrence of a ‘missing surplus’. 
 
 
The ‘missing surplus’ 
 
We begin our explanation by evidencing how the payment of net interest entails a double 
deficit for the debtor-country, e.g. LDC200.  
If we keep abreast of the macroeconomic element inherently implied in cross-border 
payments, we will understand from the on start, how this naturally ‘leads to the formation of a 
monetary deficit each time an LDC pays its net interest on debt’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 
                                                                                                                                                   
are thus the sign of a disorder deriving from the recording of flows’. (Cencini 2005a: 25). He 
further advanced the following worthy observation. ‘The payments of interest made by the 
current account correspond to a transfer to the creditor countries of part of the debtor 
countries’ domestic output: a stock. If two flows were necessary for the transfer of this unique 
stock, a discrepancy would appear that could not be considered merely the side effect of 
imperfect data collection’ (ibid.: 26). Rather, as he suggested ‘the disparity between stock and 
flows’ (ibid.: 26) would more pointedly reflect an infrastructure malfunction of the 
international payment system. ‘[T]he present system of international payments is so structured 
as to impose on indebted countries a double payment of interests. Two equivalent flows are 
required to convey the real payment of net interests between countries’ (ibid.: 27) giving ‘thus 
rise to an unreported capital outflow defining a net loss for the indebted countries’ official 
reserves. It is this unaccounted loss that explains the mystery of the ‘missing surplus’. To 
understand it thoroughly it is necessary to unveil another little understood phenomenon: the 
macroeconomic servicing of external debt’ (ibid.: 27). 
200 In following with Cencini and Citraro’s demonstration, we exemplify the case-scenario of 
least developed countries keeping in mind that ‘[a]dmittedly, the world current account  
discrepancy does not refer solely to LDCs. Yet it is also certain that LDCs represent a 
substantial part of the world’s indebted countries, so that their net interest payments account 
for most of the world’s missing current account surplus’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 286). For 
this very reason, the data easily corroborates theoretical expectations, that is, when an analyst 
attempts to depict a correlation between world accounting discrepancies and the net interest 
payment. 
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283). It is also important to remember that the interest payment201, is funded by the debtor-
country’s commercial exports given that it is processed by the current account202. What this 
all means, is ‘that the payment of interest scoops out an equivalent deficit, since the amount of 
foreign currency received from exports is reduced by the sum of paid interest’ (Schmitt 2000: 
22−23). And, what this translates to, effectively203, is that some of the debtor-country’s 
imports will be left uncovered, by an equal amount to the net interest payment (Cencini 
2005). Now given that our country-case (LDC) under observation has a trade account that is 
balanced, it will have to finance the monetary deficit204 (uncovered imports) in its current 
account with a foreign loan205. But we have to remember, as previously established (see 
Schmitt 2014), that the foreign income implied in this loan has not a purchasing power that is 
double such that it finances only the purchase of the debtor-country’s financial bonds (IOUs) 
and nothing else. This means that the sale of IOUs by the debtor-country can only provide it 
with the access to the foreign currency it requires to cover its uncovered imports, through the 
acquisition of the foreign bank deposit following the sale of its IOUs. In this sense, the deficit 
entailed by the first206 payment of net interest (the microeconomic payment) is thus made up 
for in that the debtor-country has restored its previous207 level of internal resources. But a 
monetary deficit208 remains: the debtor-country has now to expend this foreign bank deposit 
                                                
201 That is, the first interest payment or, charge. 
202 Now, this is so, because it involves ‘the transfer to R of part of A’s domestic output … 
since interest is the income paid to R for an investment of capital in A. Part of the output 
generated by this investment is due to R, which precisely means that A pays its due by 
transferring part of its domestic resources to R’ (Cencini 2005: 260). The author’s reference to 
R and A in his case-example, intends respectively, the creditors of A ‘(countries R)’, and 
‘indebted countries (A)’ (see ibidem: 257). ‘The first payment of interest is the transfer to A’s 
creditors of a sum of foreign exchange earned by A through its exports of real goods and 
services. This first flow of ten units out of A’s current account is matched by an equivalent 
flow into R’s current account and corresponds to a stock of equal amount: the real resources 
transferred from A to R’ (ibid.: 269). 
203 If we consider the case whereby the country (e.g. LDC) has an even trade balance, in 
following with the LDC case-model of Cencini and Citraro 2012. 
204 The net interest payment essentially creates a hole (‘monetary deficit’ see Cencini and 
Citraro 2012 and, Schmitt 2000) in the debtor-country’s economy that is never recovered on 
account of the very unilateral aspect of this transfer payment. Ultimately, it is a reduction in 
the debtor-country’s official reserves that will compensate. On this note, Schmitt has an 
interesting observation as follows. ‘The cost involved when the ‘vacuum’ (or the ‘black hole’) 
is filled is less clear in periods when LDCs land a surplus. Nevertheless, in no conceivable 
circumstances could it be inferred that the payment of interest does not produce an equivalent 
deficit’ (Schmitt 2000: 23). 
205 ‘In order to face the current account deficit entailed by the payment of in, A has to increase 
its exports or incur a new debt by selling financial claims to R. The trade balance of least 
developed countries (LDCs) being essentially even, let us consider the case (by far the most 
widespread) where A finances its current account deficit through a new loan’ (Cencini and 
Citraro 2012: 283). The authors’ reference to ‘in’, ‘A’, and ‘R’ in their exemplary case, 
intends the sum of net interest (in) payment to R, the LDC (A) and some other country (R), 
respectively. 
206 That is, as carried out by the debtor-country (LDC’s) residents. 
207 Our meaning: previous to the first microeconomic payment of net interest. 
208 What distinguishes this monetary deficit from the first (uncovered imports) is that it ‘is not 
matched by a current account surplus of the creditor countries’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 
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in order to complete the purchase of its uncovered imports. As such, it is the country as a 
whole that, this time, comes to the rescue. Hence the second209 payment of interest which 
brings about a loss in the country’s official reserves. The relevant point here is that this 
second payment of interest is also processed by the debtor-country’s current account, 
notwithstanding that the cost of it is incurred by its capital and financial account210. This 
implies two deficits in the debtor-country’s current account versus one only surplus in the 
creditor country, thus the mystery of the ‘missing surplus’ is unveiled: a surplus is missing 
from the global balance-of-payments and this consequently leads to the world current account 
net deficit. ‘The fact that two deficits are present in the current account of the indebted 
countries while foreign creditors are only paid once fully explains the discrepancy existing at 
the global current account level. A’s current account deficit is twice the amount of R’s current 
account surplus, which is why a surplus is missing in the world current account’ (Cencini and 
Citraro 2012: 285). The authors’ inference in their case-example, with respect to A and R, is 
that of LDC (A) and some other country R. 
The fact that the unilateral transfer payment, as pointed out by Schmitt, ‘amounts to the 
expenditure of a saving suffered by the debtor country’ (ibid.: 283) macro-economy ‘and to a 
saving of an expenditure enjoyed by the creditor country’ (ibid.: 283) macro-economy, 
explains why it is that, though the pathological macroeconomic payment is recorded in the 
current account of debtor nations, it is not entered into the current account of creditor 
nations. And this in turn, demystifies the manifestation of a global current account net 
                                                                                                                                                   
285).  This is because it happens at the macroeconomic level and as such, involves the country 
as a whole, ultimately reducing its OR (official reserves) by a same amount as that of the net 
interest payment. Given the current deficient state of our international payment system, the 
monetary deficit (uncovered imports) that is initially generated by the microeconomic 
payment of net interest, will be ‘paid both by a foreign income and by a domestic income’ 
(Schmitt 2014: 58), that is, by the expenditure of the foreign bank deposit (foreign income) 
that was obtained following the cession of IOUs (domestic income). ‘[T]hrough its change in 
money R, the same imports are settled through the expenditure of a foreign income from the 
moment they are defined to the debit of country A, considered as a whole’ (Schmitt 2014: 58). 
The author’s inference with respect to ‘money R’ is that of some other foreign currency; 
whereas ‘country A’ implies some debtor-country. When all is finally settled and concluded, 
indeed, the duplication of net interest payments, lies in the very fact that, ultimately, net 
interests are paid both in real and in monetary terms, that is, in products and in money. 
209 This second macroeconomic payment is incurred to the country as a whole, through a 
reduction in its official reserves. 
210 ‘[T]he second payment of interest is carried out by A’s current account even though its cost 
is taken over by A’s capital and financial account. Both the payment of interest and of imi are 
in fact entered in A’s current account since they imply the transfer to R of part of A’s domestic 
output. This is clearly true for the payment of i, since interest is the income paid to R for an 
investment of capital in A. Part of the output generated by this investment is due to R, which 
precisely means that A pays its due by transferring part of its domestic resources to R. As for 
imi, it is likewise clear that its payment originates in A’s current account, since it is this 
account that is debited for all of A’s imports, including those which cannot be financed by A’s 
exports’ (Cencini 2005: 260−261). The author’s reference to A, R, imi and i, intends 
respectively, ‘indebted countries (A)’, the creditors of A ‘(countries R)’, ‘the payment of 
imports no longer covered by the exports because of the payment of interest, imi’, and ‘the 
payment of interest itself, i’ (see ibidem: 257, 258). 
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deficit211 and explains the ‘missing surplus’. As well, the loss suffered by the debtor nations 
when their official reserves come to the rescue of the monetary deficit remaining in their 
respective current accounts, ‘explains the world capital and financial account discrepancy, 
and thus solves the mystery of the ‘missing capital outflow’’ (ibid.: 289). Let us next consider 
how the monetary flows implied, evolve in such a way as to lead to the manifestation of a net 
capital inflow that explains the ‘missing capital outflow’. 
 
 
On the global capital and financial account net capital inflow, 
contemporarily referred to as the ‘missing capital outflow’ 
 
 
Back to capital flight 
 
So with a new understanding of capital flight at the helm, a door was opened that eventually 
led analysts onto the right path towards unveiling the global capital and financial account 
discrepancy. As emphasized by Cencini and Citraro 2012, what had to be found was a flight 
of capital that could ‘be identified as a pathological capital flow only partially recorded in the 
world balance of payments’ (ibid.: 279). The authors found that the optimum approach in 
realizing this was to factor in the macroeconomic element inherently implied in international 
transactions, when analyzing a country’s net interest payment as a possible source-cause for 
world accounting imbalances. After all, ‘if double-entry book-keeping is complied with, no 
payment between residents and non-residents can generate any world current account or 
capital and financial account discrepancy. If we specify as microeconomic the payment 
between residents and non-residents, we can therefore conclude that no microeconomic 
payment can ever be the cause of a world balance-of-payments discrepancy (statistical 
misreporting notwithstanding)’ (ibid.: 280). This led them to consider the possibility of a 
second pathological payment occurring at the macroeconomic level. 
Their analysis highlighted a distinct observation from the on start. Despite the fact that a 
country’s macroeconomic net interest payment adds to that of its microeconomic payment, 
this ‘would have no consequence in the joint balance of payments of’ (ibid.: 281) the debtor 
and creditor countries involved,  if the debtor-country’s macroeconomic payment was 
recorded in the ‘current or capital and financial accounts’ (ibid.: 281) of both countries. But 
such is not the case as the world accounting discrepancies well evidence. Let us see why that 
is and just how it also unveils the ‘missing capital outflow’. 
 
 
The ‘missing capital outflow’ 
 
As we have earlier established, the unilateral transfer involved in the first payment of net 
interest inevitably entails a monetary deficit in the current account of the LDC, leaving it with 
uncovered imports that will have to be covered by a foreign loan and, ultimately by the 
                                                
211 We refer the readers to Cencini and Citraro 2012 for their compilation of data that clearly 
supports a correlation between the global current account imbalance and the payment of net 
interest by LDCs, for an interval period of 26 years (1980−2005), (see ibidem: 286, IMF 2007 
and World Bank 2007). 
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countries official reserves212. Analyzing this from a flow’s perspective, whilst keeping abreast 
of the inherent macroeconomic aspect at play, the following can be observed. Altogether, the 
LDC’s capital and financial account incurs two flows, one relating to the foreign loan sought 
on account of its current account deficit (result of uncovered imports) and one relating to the 
loss of OR that are ultimately expended in the payment of these uncovered imports. But the 
problem is that the ‘two flows compensate’ (Cencini 2005: 270) resulting in a net capital 
inflow that is recorded in the debtor-country’s capital and financial account, but with no 
counter-part capital outflow in the creditor-country’s balance-of-payments. This is on account 
of the fact that the second anomalous payment does not accrue to any particular resident of 
the creditor-country, neither does it ‘identify with any official transfer from’ (Cencini and 
Citraro 2012: 284) the debtor to the creditor-country but rather benefits the latter’s macro-
economy, that is, the creditor-country, as a whole. The second anomalous payment of interest, 
thus goes totally unrecorded in the creditor-country’s balance-of-payments and, decisively 
enlightens the phenomenon of the global capital and financial account imbalance: the world’s 
capital and financial account net capital inflow, as well, the ‘missing capital outflow’213. 
 
 
On the interest payment double charge 
 
Having demonstrated that external debt servicing is indeed the unique source-cause behind 
both global accounting discrepancies, we can further observe that the very evidence of these 
world imbalances corroborates the hypothesis of a ‘net macroeconomic payment’ (ibid.:281). 
That is, notwithstanding that the macroeconomic payment of the country as a whole adds to 
that of its residents’ microeconomic payment, but more so if considered globally, the 
discrepancy clearly reveals an extra net expenditure on the part of the debtor-country with 
respect to the creditor country. Because the initial net interest payment from the debtor to the 
creditor country involves a transfer that is unilateral ‘the lack of reciprocity precludes the 
balancing of the macroeconomic payment of’ (ibid.: 281) the debtor-country with an equal 
payment from the creditor-country, at the macroeconomic level. This leads to a loss of 
internal resources on the part of the debtor-country that is never re-covered: ultimately its 
official reserves are compromised. And given that the implied pathology also leads to a 
recording asymmetry214 on considering the whole of both countries’ balance-of-payments, 
                                                
212 We refer the readers to Cencini and Citraro 2012 for their compilation of the relevant data 
covering an interval of 29 years (1976−2005), that evidences a reduction in LDCs’ official 
reserves from an otherwise expected value. The discrepancy attests, very evidently, to an 
amount consumed by the second pathological net interest payment: a calamitous cost incurred 
by the country as a whole (see ibidem: 286−288, also World Bank 2007). 
213 Cencini and Citraro 2012 sum up the following important observation, regard the missing 
global capital outflow: ‘To the extent that LDCs account for the greatest part of the net 
interest payments occurring worldwide, the missing world capital outflow is thus explained 
by the loss in official reserves suffered by LDCs because of the second (pathological) 
payment of interest, gone unrecorded in the creditor countries’ balance of payments’ (ibid.: 
288). 
214 ‘The first payment of interest benefits LDCs’ creditors, residents of R, and is recorded both 
in A’s and in R’s current accounts. Yet, while the second, indirect, payment of interest is also 
recorded in A’s current account − because it implies the transfer of a positive amount of A’s 
domestic resources − its counterpart remains unrecorded in R’s balance of payments − since it 
amounts to a gain obtained by country R considered as a whole. If we look at the global 
85 
inevitably, it all comes out in the wash, as is well evidenced by the world accounting 
discrepancies. Schmitt’s argument that ‘the pathological payment of net interest amounts to 
the expenditure of a saving suffered by the debtor country … and to a saving of an 
expenditure enjoyed by the creditor country’ (ibid.: 283), is easily vindicated. See also 
Schmitt 2006. 
In sum, the double charge of debtor-countries net interest payment lies in the fact that the 
second macroeconomic monetary payment is a pathological spin-off that is entailed by the 
first microeconomic real payment of the countries’ residents and that, undeniably, the two 
payments add to one another. The added cost is incurred to the country as a whole, through a 
reduction of its official reserves by a same amount as the net interest payment. 
In a next chapter, we re-examine the double charge of a country’s external debt with respect 
to its very formation, this time by considering, singularly, the approach of Schmitt’s 2014 
analysis. We will review his latest and most revolutionary reasoning as he explains the very 
formation of sovereign debt that is ultimately responsible for duplicating countries’ external 
debts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
current accounts of A and R, we can thus easily verify that, only half of the payments entered 
by A’s current account are recorded in R’s current account, and a global deficit arises whose 
amount is determined by the indirect payment of A’s net interest on its external debt’ (Cencini 
2005: 267−268). Specifically, on the sovereign debt that is pathologically included in its 
external debt (see Schmitt 2014). 
86 
5      The double charge of external debt: the very formation 
of sovereign debt 
    
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In a precedent chapter we have evidenced the double charge of a country’s net interest 
payment from which the duplication of the country’s external debt could be deductively 
reasoned. In a next segment we attempt to show, this time through a single-handed approach, 
how this duplication arises whenever a country benefits from a net foreign borrowing to pay 
the totality of its imports. We do this by highlighting the formation of a sovereign debt that 
pathologically duplicates the charge of the country’s external debt. The study that permeates 
our presentation is that of Schmitt’s multi-level analysis regard the subject.215  The arguments 
that he advances, to prove the formation of a sovereign debt that anomalously doubles the 
charge of countries’ external debts, are enthrallingly convincing given their logical and 
scientific character. 
Our aim is not to re-create the meticulous and profound details of Schmitt’s very analysis but 
rather to present its grandes lignes, with a particular intent to encapsulate the vital and crucial 
points that form the basis of his varied arguments in confirming the existence of an anomalous 
and unnecessary double charge. 
 
 
Net imports −  a distinctive payment 
 
The payments of ‘imports-exports’ and that of ‘imports-without-exports’216 are distinctively 
dissimilar from one another. In simple terms, ‘imports-exports’ intend compensated 
imports217 in that they are paid, in foreign money units, by the country’s exports whilst 
                                                
215 See Schmitt 2014. 
216 We will often return to these two expressions of Schmitt’s that pervade his 2014 paper. His 
analysis revolves about some country A that he defines as the deficit nation given its imports 
are more than its exports. As per his own description, ‘[s]urplus imports over exports is the 
deficit, the country being itself ‘in deficit’, its purchases being greater than its sales, but also 
‘in excess’ with regard to its imports. ‘Imports-exports’ are exchanges insofar as purchases 
and sales are equal. ‘Imports-without-exports’ are the excess of imports over exports; these 
imports are net’ (Schmitt 2014: 16). 
217 See Schmitt 2014. Or, ‘exchanges’, as intentionally referred to by Schmitt (see ibid) given 
it implies the position of equality of receipts (export-sales) and expenditures (import-
purchases), that is, with respect to his case-example (country A). Now as he explicitly 
specifies, the equality ‘so obtained is that between the payments in dollars of A’s imports and 
exports, and not that between the values of the real goods exchanged by A and R’ (ibid.: 3). 
His meaning with regard to R is simply some country-example R (rest of the world) whose 
currency is that of dollars or MR (money R); this currency is foreign to country A whose 
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‘imports-without-exports’ imply surplus imports for the deficit country. It is the requital of 
these surplus imports that is particularly problematic as, given the current deficient state of 
our international payment ‘system’, it leads to a double218 and unjustified charge for the 
deficit country. As a matter of fact, the totality219 of a country’s imports is invariably paid in 
foreign money such that as far as its ‘imports-exports’ are concerned, the country acquires the 
foreign currency it requires to pay for them, through the payment of its exports. Very clearly, 
the need for a foreign loan, in the case of ‘imports-exports’, is not warranted: the nation earns 
for free, by way of its export-receipts, all of the foreign money it needs for its import-
expenditures of a same value. Contrarily, with respect to the net disparity (‘imports-without-
exports’) between its expenditures and receipts, the deficit country (e.g. say country A220), 
must take up a foreign loan221 and this entails a very peculiar and nefarious consequence for 
country A. The peculiarity − and one that matters − of this foreign loan, is that it involves a 
foreign income222, that is, an income that originates within the production of the domestic 
economy of country R (rest of the world), for example. It is evidently the only way by which 
country A can obtain the foreign currency (money R) that it requires to pay for its net imports, 
given the latter have no actual exports-revenue that covers them and, money R is the only 
acceptable223 currency that can enable the payment of country A’s total imports. Now, the 
implication of an income originating from the production of R’s domestic economy in the 
payment of country A’s surplus imports should be a clear harbinger of the inevitable double 
charge that this will entail. Country A will first have to borrow from R, just in order to obtain 
                                                                                                                                                   
domestic money is referred to as MA (money A). The rate of exchange is to be understood as 
constant and, with 1 (billion) dollar = 1 MR = 1 MA. 
218 ‘The initial formation of external debts relate to net imports, also called surplus imports. 
External debts are initially equal, interest included, to the value or cost of net or surplus 
imports. Yet, external debts are ‘multiplied by 2’ if they add up to twice as much as the value 
of surplus imports’ (ibid.: 16). Schmitt also specifies the deficit country’s external debts as the 
debts of its residents (domestic economy) and additionally the debts of this deficit nation 
considered as a whole, maintaining that both debts add to one another and that this leads to an 
anomalous duplication of this nation’s external debts. He explicitly refers to the external debt 
as it pertains to the deficit nation’s domestic economy as the ordinary debt whilst he defines 
the debt of the nation itself (taken as the set of its residents) as the sovereign debt. This latter 
debt which is included in the external debts is in fact the pathological duplication of the 
ordinary debt and we will later again elaborate this point as we continue to study Schmitt’s 
argument in this regard. 
219 In Schmitt’s text (2014), the terms imports and exports refer to, respectively, the total 
purchases of commercial and financial assets or goods, and the total sales of commercial and 
financial assets or goods. 
220 We will as well and throughout, refer to a/the deficit country as some country A, in 
keeping with Schmitt 2014’s country-example with respect to the country in deficit. 
221 As Schmitt describes it, ‘additional imports are the source of a true problem since, by all 
evidence, they are not paid for by any export of real goods. Uncompensated by a real export, 
net imports can be balanced in foreign currencies only through a foreign loan’ (ibid.: 7). 
222 The fact that the deficit country’s net imports are paid by a foreign income is a recurring 
theme in Schmitt’s arguments and one which is central to the confirmation of the double 
charge. 
223 That is, acceptable to the rest of the world, as payment for country A’s imports. See 
Schmitt 2014. 
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in the current period (p0), the value of the goods224 that its domestic economy will produce in 
a later period (p1) to the benefit of country R. It should be understood that though the real 
borrowing consists of an advance borrowing225 from its (A’s) domestic economy’s future 
output, this borrowing is strictly enabled through a loan that A obtains from R, which loan 
actually finances this very production of A’s future real goods. For all intents and purposes, 
country A will have to sell financial bonds (IOUs) to R. It is an income from the domestic 
economy of R, not of country A’s, that ultimately enables the financing of this advance 
borrowing from A’s future output and, this first foreign loan, by itself, will increase226 A’s 
external debt (formation of the ordinary debt of its domestic economy) in the initial period in 
which the borrowing occurs. This first foreign borrowing is required such as to enable A to 
pay for its net imports in real goods.  But, as it has been explained earlier, the income from 
R’s residents (investors) has not the purchasing power to pay both the acquisition of A’s 
(future) real goods (object of R’s ordinary loan) and, for A’s net imports. The deficit 
country’s sale of IOUs will provide it the purchase of a foreign bank deposit (FBD). This first 
loan finances the production of A’s future real goods, it is thus spent227 by A to finance this 
very production of real goods that are immediately228 appropriated by R229. Consequently, yet 
                                                
224 In his own words, ‘the sum borrowed is logically of 2 dollars when, in order to pay for its 
surplus imports, country A and its domestic economy borrow abroad foreign currencies (1 
dollar) and real goods that will be produced by A’s domestic economy (of 1 dollar value): it 
is undoubtedly more obvious to consider the real borrowing as taking place inside A’s 
economy. This is perfectly exact on condition that it is understood that this loan is granted to 
country A by the outside world; these two loans do not pertain to the same reality’ (ibid.: 5). 
And this is all the more reason for which the two would add up to each other, after all, as 
Schmitt points out ‘[b]oth external loans are observable in practice’ (ibid.: 4). Moreover, as 
he reminds, the object of each differs such that it would not be logical to conceptualize them 
as reducing to one unique foreign loan. ‘In each period country A must borrow 1 dollar 
abroad in order to obtain ‘now’, in advance, goods of 1 dollar value that its domestic economy 
will produce and export in a subsequent period. The object of this loan is therefore a (future) 
good of country A itself. Through the other external loan, which it realizes in the same period, 
country A obtains 1 dollar in order to pay in money R (dollars), and not in domestic currency 
(MA), its net imports. The object of one of these foreign loans is a product of country A, 
whereas the object of the other is a product of the rest of the world’ (ibid.: 5). 
225 ‘In each period country A must borrow 1 dollar abroad in order to obtain ‘now’, in 
advance, goods of 1 dollar value that its domestic economy will produce and export in a 
subsequent period’ (ibid.: 5). 
226 Schmitt’s case scenario assumes it to be zero at the on start of the period under review. 
‘A’s external debt is nil at the beginning of the first month of our investigation’ (ibid.: 3). 
227 The idea that A exports future goods via the expenditure of the FBD obtained from R, 
means that R finances a future production of A, yet A’s expenditure for the financing of this 
production takes place in A.  
228 That is, before they (real goods) are actually produced. 
229 It should be considered that what is actually achieved by the deficit country, through this 
first loan from R, is equilibrium of its balance of payments that also applies to deficit nations. 
‘In order to acknowledge the undeniable fact that balance of payments’ equilibrium applies 
also to deficit countries, it is essential to include the real aspect of the foreign loan that 
finances their surplus imports’ (ibid.: 30). As Schmitt points out and as outlined in the 
example he refers to, throughout his paper, the equilibrium of the deficit nation’s balance of 
payments is always, nevertheless, strictly adhered to. ‘In the example we are using throughout 
this paper, country A’s surplus imports are equal to 1 MR. Even though A is a deficit country, 
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another loan will be required to finance the payment of A’s net imports. It is this second loan 
that creates A’s sovereign debt, this time incurred by the country as a whole and, with the 
anomalous result of doubling230 the deficit country’s external debts. 
This brings us to the study of a first proof of Schmitt 2014, whose paper endeavors to show 
that the existence of this sovereign debt is the effect of an anomaly that detrimentally alters 
the formation of deficit countries’ external debts, whenever these countries benefit from a net 
foreign borrowing to finance their net expenditures. 
 
 
Net imports are paid both in real and in money terms 
 
As the title of this section suggests, the main idea of this proof is that, given our current 
‘system’ of international payments, net imports have to be paid twice: once in real terms and 
once again in money terms. The argument assumes that the indebted nation borrows abroad 
twice231, in order to meet these two payments. One of the two foreign loans enables the 
indebted country A (its domestic economy) to give up, and this from the period its net imports 
take place, a part equal in value to e.g. 1 MR (money R), of its future output. In other words, 
the loan provides A with the means to pay its net imports in real terms. The other232 loan 
provides A with the money R required to cover the difference between A’s total expenditures 
and its total sales: its net imports233. One of the loans finances A’s exports of future goods 
whilst the second finances the monetary payment of A’s net imports234. The object of the first 
loan is a sum of real goods235 whereas the object of the second loan is an amount of money R. 
                                                                                                                                                   
its balance of payments equilibrium is perfectly respected: its purchases have a value of 11 
MR, equal to the value of its total sales, because its exports* equal to 1MR add to its exports+ 
equal to 10 MR’ (ibid.: 29). In this sense, it should be naturally understood ‘that this loan of 1 
MR is, from the outset in the period considered, the payment by the rest of the world of a real 
export of the deficit country’ (ibid.: 30). We will see, that this point is a salient feature that 
forms the basis of yet another of Schmitt’s proof of the double charge, as we cover it in a 
separate section of this chapter. 
230 The sovereign debt of the country as a whole adds to the ordinary debt of A’s domestic 
economy. We will later more closely examine this additive correlation between the two debts 
that indeed both manifest within a same period, thus resulting in a double charge for the 
deficit country. 
231 In another simpler demonstration of the double charge that we will later exhibit, Schmitt 
(2014) assumes that the deficit nation borrows abroad only once the currency that it needs for 
the payment of its net imports. Nevertheless, he shows that the result is the same: the charge 
is double. 
232 The order of the foreign loans required is not important, since both loans are necessary 
and, take place in the same period. 
233 This payment, in money R, of A’s net imports, is the very source of the sovereign debt. 
234 It should be observed that though A spends 2 MR in favor of R, this does not correspond to 
a flow of 2 MR from A to R. In fact, despite that they are both in favor of R, one of the two 
expenditures occurs in A and defines the acquisition by R of a future real good of A. 
235 The fact that the object of the first loan is a sum of A’s future real goods means that the 
loan granted by R finances the production of these future real goods, which will be exported 
by A only in a subsequent period but are immediately appropriated by R.  
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Now, we observe that the inceptive236 formation of external debts is connected to surplus 
imports. The problem is that the payment of these ‘imports-without-exports’, by way of a 
foreign borrowing, inevitably leads to a double charge. It is here that the distinction of the 
nation considered as a whole (set of its residents) from that of its internal economy, becomes 
crucial and thus we should keep abreast of this as we continue our study. 
The thrust of Schmitt’s argument237 is that if the deficit238 nation where to borrow abroad only 
once, it would be unable to pay the totality of its net expenditures. On account of our current 
non-system of international payments, the nation’s internal economy incurs the cost of the 
real payment of its deficit, whilst the nation as a set incurs its monetary cost: it will ultimately 
bear the financial responsibility to carry out the requital of its net imports in foreign currency 
units. It should be clearer by now as to why that is, if we remember that the deficit country 
has no export revenue with which to cover the value of its net imports, contrarily to how it 
pays for its ‘imports-exports’. This means that it will have an inadequate supply of the 
foreign239 money (MR) that it requires to cover the value of its net imports. And, if one mulls 
this over, it is soon realized that this implies the need for a foreign loan, hence a foreign 
income240, indispensably. 
In order to establish equality between the payments in foreign currency units of country A’s 
exports and imports, the country must undergo ‘two necessary equalisations’ (as coined by 
Schmitt 2014: 3). It must sell financial bonds, of a value of 1 MR, to the avail of R, real goods 
that A’s internal economy will furnish in a future period. Simultaneously, A has to borrow 
abroad, a same amount in money R. Each of the two equalizations is unique and consists of a 
separate and very distinct reality. One is attained via the delivery of part of A’s output that it 
will produce and export in another period (payment in real terms) whilst the other is arrived 
at, through the foreign borrowing of an amount of money R (payment in money terms). Still, 
each is of an equivalent value of 1 MR and both necessitate a foreign loan of this value. 
Considered integrally, it becomes obvious that the two loans generate a double charge for the 
deficit country. In sum, despite their trenchant distinctions, both foreign loans are 
indispensable to country A for the payment of its net imports: one enables it to balance its 
                                                
236 ‘External debts are initially equal, interest included, to the value or cost of net or surplus 
imports. Yet, external debts are ‘multiplied by 2’ if they add up to twice as much as the value 
of surplus imports’ (Schmitt 2014: 16). 
237 That is, in this first proof of the double charge and in several other demonstrations that 
Schmitt resorts to, to confirm the reality of a double charge (see Schmitt 2014). 
238 ‘Surplus imports over exports is the deficit’ (Schmitt 2014: 16). 
239 Let us deviate, even if only slightly, from the issue at hand and consider the following 
important observation: in the case of the Euro zone, one might assume that net imports do not 
necessarily imply a net foreign borrowing for the deficit country given there is no need to 
carry out its (surplus imports) payment in a foreign money, this on account of the zone’s 
‘unique’ currency (the Euro). But, if we heed the fact that, in reality the zone is without a 
unique money, it should then be understood that without a net foreign borrowing to cover a 
deficit nation’s net purchases, the situation leads to payment imbalances between the Euro 
zone trading partners, given the lack of payment finality that this inevitably entails (see Rossi 
2012). 
240 Though the underlining theme of this proof of Schmitt’s is not deliberately centered on the 
idea that the deficit country’s net imports are paid by a foreign income (neither that it 
highlights the effects that ensues from this and, that we will cover in our review of a next 
proof of Schmitt 2014) it is nevertheless observed that it ultimately sets the basis for the real 
payment, that is, one of the foreign loans, necessary though non-sufficient, for the payment of 
its net imports. 
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exports and imports of real goods whilst the other enables it to balance its gains and 
expenditures of foreign money. Moreover, considered separately, each loan is necessary241 but 
not sufficient on its own. 
In his demonstration of this proof of the double charge, Schmitt differentiates242 between 
‘exports*’ and ‘exports+’ with the former relating to the sale of future output whilst the latter 
refers to that of current sales. The basis of his argument is that the foreign borrowing obtained 
by A’s internal economy has only the income able to finance ‘exports*’ (sales of its domestic 
economy’s future output) and not that of A’s net imports, as well243. Specifically, the latter 
remain unpaid, and this even after a real payment has been carried out by A’s domestic 
economy. The result is that A will thus have to obtain yet another foreign loan to cover its 
outstanding net imports: this second244 cost is, this time around, incurred by country A as a 
whole and consists of the monetary payment of the net imports. The deficit (net imports) is 
thus acquitted following a settlement of twice its original value245, one part being settled via a 
real payment (ceding of A’s future output), whilst another equal part of it is settled through a 
monetary payment (foreign currency, MR). The point being, that one payment only should be 
sufficient for A to settle its debt of 1 MR (value of its net imports) such that after its cession 
of a same value of output (future real goods), A should be considered finally quits246 of its 
external debt related to its net imports. It should not have to pay once again the same value in 
money terms. But as Schmitt describes it in actual fact, when exports* of a same 1 MR value 
of A’s net imports, are added to exports+ (current products of 10 MR value), this results in the 
real debt, the cost of which is incurred by A’s internal economy. The monetary debt forms 
when ‘imports-exports’ are actually topped by the net imports, the cost this time being 
incurred by the nation as a whole. Consequently, the two debts add247 to each other. The 
charge is thus evidently double. 
                                                
241 Schmitt’s own words, on the current situation which mandates that the deficit country’s 
imports be financed via a foreign money: ‘[t]his time the foreign loan of 1 dollar is no longer 
enough; it is still necessary, but it is forcefully accompanied by a second external loan of 1 
dollar’ (Schmitt 2014: 6). 
242 He applies ‘the same distinction to imports even though they all concern actual values. 
Imports+ correspond to exports+; imports* to exports*’ (ibid.: 19). His numerical (see 
ibidem) demonstration delineates total imports of 11 (value units); a ceding of exports+ 
amount to 10 of A’s current real goods whilst exports* of 1 are the goods that A’s domestic 
economy will produce and export in the future; imports* of 1 consists of A’s net purchases 
whilst imports+ of 10 relate to A’s current expenditures compensated by its exports+ sales 
(current real goods). 
243 ‘[T]he expenditure of the sum borrowed, equal to 1 dollar, has only one effect: it enables 
economy A to increase by 1 the value of exported real goods, exports* of 1 adding up to 
exports+ of 10 dollars’ (ibid.: 20). 
244 ‘The double charge of external debts is real for the one part and monetary for the other’ 
(ibid.: 19). 
245 ‘On either hand it is only paid up to its value, nothing more. In our example, country A’s 
net imports of 1 MR value cost exactly this value both in a sum of real goods and in money 
units’ (ibid.: 19). 
246 Though albeit, it is understood that even if the payment takes place in the current period, 
the actual re-imbursement takes place in a subsequent period. 
247 As Schmitt sagaciously reflects, ‘[i]t would be illogical to apprehend them as one unique 
debt, as if the monetary debt (payment of an import) simply represented the real debt 
(payment of export*)’ (Schmitt 2014: 20). Moreover, the fact that the cost of one is incurred 
by the nation as the set of its residents whilst the other is incurred by A’s internal economy, 
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The crux of his argument is that there are two equalizations248 to be met by the deficit 
country, one being that it must balance the amount of its export-values with that of its import-
values (both, of real goods) and, the other is that it must offset the amount of its foreign 
currency-expenditures with that of its receipts of foreign currency. It thus requires two distinct 
foreign loans in order to carry out both equalizations. This is better understood when we 
remember that A’s domestic economy clearly earns only 10 MR in export-revenues: the 
payment by R of exports* of 1 MR has the sole effect of financing an equivalent sum of 
future real goods and as such it does not increase A’s export-receipts249 (earnings of foreign 
currency), in the current period. Consequently, another foreign loan will be required to cover 
the outstanding net imports. So, as Schmitt questions ‘[w]here is the money that the domestic 
economy is lacking to be found’ (ibid.: 21)? His answer to this essential query, is by now, not 
surprising: ‘[t]he missing unit of money comes from country A as a whole, since it has been 
proven that it does not come from its domestic economy’ (ibid.: 21). Hence the double charge 
is vindicated: indeed, two distinct foreign borrowings, each of 1 MR value, will be required 
by the deficit country in order to pay its surplus imports of a same value. The cost of one of 
the loans is paid in real terms by A’s domestic economy, the other cost is ultimately settled in 
money terms by the nation as the set of its residents250.  
Now Schmitt elaborates his argument by pointing out, nonetheless, that at the very moment 
that A’s internal economy acquires the foreign loan from R’s lenders in exchange for the real 
goods that it will produce in a future period, these goods are immediately (before they are 
actually produced) appropriated by R. This being the case, ‘[i]t forcefully follows that the 
sum of money borrowed abroad is the foreign payment of a future export of economy A’ 
(ibid.: 22). How then, could this same sum of money (1 MR only) simultaneously pay its net 
imports of the current period251? The reason for the need of yet another foreign borrowing of 
equal value, for the payment of A’s net imports, is again obvious given that the first foreign 
loan acquired by A’s internal economy funds exports*, and these only: its net imports are still 
outstanding. 
In sum, the payment of A’s external debt in (future) real goods that are immediately 
appropriated by R, defines the ‘ordinary’ debt of its domestic economy. The monetary 
payment252 of its external debt affects the nation as a whole and, defines the sovereign debt. 
The two very distinct debts being defined both in kind and in money terms, the charge 
inevitably doubles, the sovereign debt undeniably adds to that of the ‘ordinary’ debt.  
                                                                                                                                                   
leads Schmitt to distinguish between a sovereign debt (as carried by the nation as a whole) 
from that of an ‘ordinary’ debt (as carried by the domestic economy of A) See ibid. We will 
return, in a next section, to the import of these distinctions given they form the basis from 
which derives the additive aspect of the two payments, real and monetary. 
248 To use Schmitt’s very expression (see ibid.: 20). 
249 Our meaning is that though the foreign loan that A’s domestic economy obtains, finances 
an increase in exports (future), the very exports*, the increase is in kind only and not in way 
of export-receipts.  
250 Again, we see the important distinction that Schmitt emphasizes between a nation as the 
set of its residents and, the said country’s domestic economy. And, the essence of this 
distinction helps to crystallize the additive element of the two distinct debts, each carried 
independently, from one another: the sovereign debt clearly adding to the ‘ordinary’ debt. 
251 As he points out, ‘it is obviously inconceivable that the same loan of 1 MR pays for, at the 
same time and for the same period, an export of 1 MR and an import of 1 MR of a same 
economy’ (ibid.: 22).  
252 In Schmitt’s own words, ‘[c]ountry A as a whole comes to the rescue of its domestic 
economy by paying its debt in money units’ (ibid.: 24). 
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Net imports are paid by an income originating from the domestic 
production of the rest of the world 
 
Through an alternative demonstration of the duplication of countries’ external debts, Schmitt 
once again evidences the double charge generated by the deficit country’s need to borrow 
twice the amount of its net imports, in order to settle their payment. This new proof is only 
slightly different from the previous one and rests on the fact that the deficit country’s net 
imports are paid by an income originating from the production of R’s domestic economy253. 
We will see that the consequence of this is detrimental for the deficit country (A). The 
payment of the difference between A’s imports and exports by means of a loan granted by R 
(hence income of R), reduces the payment by R of its own imports (A’s exports) and is at the 
origin of a new difference between A’s expenditures and its sales, which can only be covered 
through yet a new foreign loan. 
In essence, because the loan granted by R, is spent by A to finance its net imports, this 
payment of A, in turn finances part of R’s imports. The result is therefore that, an equivalent 
part of A’s exports will ultimately have to be paid by A, itself. What happens is that the very 
payment by A of its net imports, reconstitutes254 by a same amount the domestic income of R 
with which the latter pays a same portion of its own imports from A, hence reducing its 
payment of A’s exports by a same amount. This leaves country A, short of money R (MR)255 
with which to pay its now uncovered imports that are no longer paid through its export-
revenues (from R)256. This is thus the reason for which country A requires yet a second loan 
to cover these newly uncovered imports. Specifically, A has to obtain once again257 money R 
                                                
253 Again and throughout this chapter, we intend (in following with Schmitt 2014) by R, some 
country or countries of R (rest of the world); by A, some deficit country, the deficit being the 
net imports or, as defined by Schmitt, ‘[s]urplus imports over exports’ (see ibidem: 16, 
Expressions).  
254 Schmitt sums up the core of his argument which develops from the idea that R 
reconstitutes its own internal (domestic) income from A’s payment (with an income from R) 
of its (A’s) net imports. ‘Country A obtains the value of 1MR (1 dollar in our example) of the 
income formed by the rest of the world’s domestic production. The expenditure of this 
income by A is the external payment, of 1 MR, of part of its total imports, whose value is 11 
MR. Countries or country R thus obtains the reconstitution of its own domestic income. For R 
this payment of 1 dollar in value finances its imports from A. Alternatively said, country A 
finances itself R’s imports, valued at 1-dollar, that is to say, A’s own exports. This means 
beyond any doubt that economy A’s exports, whose value is 10 dollars, are paid by the 
country itself to the extent of 1 dollar’ (ibid.: 8). 
255 And this will be the source of a true problem for country A, as Schmitt reminds, that is, 
‘from the moment one examines what really happens in our economies, where the sum of 
imports is always paid in foreign currencies’ (ibid.: 7).  
256 We remember that ‘imports-exports’ are paid, in a foreign currency, by a country’s (e.g. 
A’s) exports. The need for a foreign borrowing is thus not necessary for these very imports. 
The country earns via it export-sales all the foreign currency that ‘it spends for its imports of 
equal value’ (ibid.: 7). But, the situation changes once the deficit country pays for its net 
imports by means of a foreign loan granted by the rest of the world (income of R). The 
consequence being that this very payment of A (deficit country), in turn, reduces R’s payment 
to A, for its (A’s) exports, by a same amount. The result is that A’s imports are no longer 
integrally covered by its export-revenues, the latter having been reduced by R. 
257 Now at this stage (though all same period), the residents of A (its government included) 
would no longer be implicated, having already paid their net imports, such that even if the 
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(1 MR), in order to cover the integral payment of its imports (that are no longer covered 
integrally by its export-revenues from R, the latter having reduced this payment to A). 
Another way to understand this very proof is to consider the fundamental question as posited 
by Schmitt. ‘In terms of real goods, country A imports more than it exports, to a value of 1 
MR. As far as its imports are concerned, country A’s wealth is increased by real goods valued 
at 1 MR. The essential question that arises here is the following: does country A pay for the 
increase of its wealth in real goods’ (ibid.: 7)? The reason the question is crucial is that if the 
answer were in the negative258, the increase in A’s external debt would be single and not 
twice the amount of its net imports. Now the essential point to remember when considering 
the payment of importations is that we should be mindful ‘of distinguishing their payment in 
money R from that of money A’ (ibid.: 7). This is because, though there is no difference 
between the payment of ‘imports-exports’ and ‘imports-without-exports’, this is only to the 
extent that the deficit country’s purchases are executed in its own currency. However, we 
should stay abreast of the fact that R (its exporters) is paid also in its own currency, money R, 
for the totality of A’s purchases. This means that A will have to borrow the amount it requires 
in money R (1 MR) in order to pay for its ‘imports-without-exports’. But, as we have already 
observed, this foreign loan of 1 MR is not sufficient for country A given that after it spends it 
to finance its net imports, it finds itself with a renewed deficit of a same amount: uncovered 
imports that are no longer covered by its export-revenues. Let us revisit why, exactly, this 
happens. As Schmitt emphasizes, this is on account of the fact that even though ‘imports-
exports’ and ‘imports-without-exports’ are both paid in money R, nevertheless, ‘an essential 
distinction separates, all the same, the two payments’ (ibid.: 8). The difference lies in where 
the income that substantiates the payment originates from, that is, whether it originates from 
within the deficit country’s own internal economy or rather, from a production of R’s 
domestic economy. 
It has already been established that ‘imports-exports’ are paid by an income originating within 
the domestic economy of our example-country (A)259. We have also seen that the situation is, 
however, very different when it relates to the payment of net imports. And the essential 
difference is all about the vital fact that ‘imports-without-exports’ are very simply just that, 
without exports. That being the case, it is logically impossible to conceive that their payment 
is financed by an income originating from the domestic economy of the deficit country. As 
                                                                                                                                                   
government (or some other institution) of country A, would in practice be the one to issue 
new financial bonds to sell to R, the cost of this second loan would ultimately be incurred by 
the country as a whole. That is, through the expenditure of the new FBD (foreign bank 
deposit) obtained (result of second sale of financial bonds, the IOUs), thus leaving the country 
as a whole with no compensation-counterpart (FBD) to yet a newly acquired external debt (of 
same value of its net imports): the very formation of the sovereign debt which doubles the 
deficit country’s external debt, by adding to the ‘ordinary’ debt of its residents (first loan from 
R that enabled the payment of A’s net imports).  
258 That is, specifically, in the period under investigation. 
259 Schmitt refers to these very imports as ‘compensated imports’ and his following remark is 
worthy of being noted. ‘Incomes spent for its imports compensated by its exports, 10 for 10, 
are interior to county A (are domestic incomes of country A). In each period A’s national 
production is, for example, of a value total of 26 dollars (1 dollar = 1 MR). Its imports of 10 
dollars value reduce its domestic income to the value of 16 dollars. This loss is exactly 
compensated by its exports. A domestic income of 10 dollars value is the final payment of 
equivalent imports of A’s economy. Despite the fact that their external payment is carried out 
in foreign currencies, such as the dollar, country A’s compensated imports are financed by an 
equal amount of its domestic product, object of its exports’ (ibid.: 8). 
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Schmitt highlights, ‘[t]he reason being that the exports corresponding to the surplus imports 
are nil. It is therefore an income formed in R and not in A that finances the ‘imports-without-
exports’ of country A’ (ibid.: 8). 
And now this brings us back to the initial stage of the fundamental question260, that is, 
whether or not, the deficit country pays, within the period under examination, for its imports 
in excess of its exports and, at that, in real goods. The answer lies with the fact that the 
payment by A of its net imports, with an income borrowed from R, entails the payment of its 
exports (itself, in lieu of R), by a same amount. This is because the very payment reconstitutes 
R’s own internal income with which it (R) pays a same portion of its own imports, thus 
reducing by a same amount its payment of A’s exports. This savings for R, very obviously, 
comes at an extra payment for the deficit country (A). Hence, the answer to the fundamental 
question finds merit only if characterized by affirmation. The deficit country, indeed pays 
and, in the period in question, for its surplus imports, that is, ‘for the increase of its wealth in 
real goods’ (ibid.: 7). It does so by the mere fact that its very payment of its net imports has 
the effect of paying a same portion of R’s own imports, thus reducing the latter’s payment 
(same amount) of A’s exports. This implies that A will actually have to pay a same sum of its 
exports (real goods), itself261.  
Now the impact of this development is that it forcibly generates the assured need for yet 
another foreign loan on the part of the deficit country, that ultimately finds itself deficient of 
foreign currency (unrequited exports by R) with which to pay the totality of its imports, 
specifically its imports that are now no longer covered by its export-revenues from R. The 
duplication of its external debt is therefore, inevitably, ascertained262. The undisputed 
authenticity of the need for a second loan (source of the sovereign debt) rests with the fact 
that net imports are paid with a foreign income. 
 
 
Action-Reaction 
 
Schmitt takes a scientific approach to demonstrate a general application263 of his proof by 
envisioning a reaction that naturally follows an action. That is, at the instant that the deficit 
country pays for its net imports with a loan (income) from R (the action), what naturally 
follows from this is that R pays A’s exports less (the reaction), by an exact same amount of 
A’s surplus imports. The action and reaction happen simultaneously264 in that the payment of 
the net imports reconstitutes R’s domestic income with which it pays its own imports from A 
(a savings for R): the reaction naturally translating into the fact that this means they reduce 
their payment of A’s exports by a same amount. All develops in one fell swoop. 
                                                
260 In Schmitt’s own words, ‘does country A pay for the increase of its wealth in real goods’ 
(ibid.: 7)? 
261 ‘[C]ountry A pays its own exports to the exact extent that it pays its own imports by an 
income borrowed abroad. These two payments, which reduce to one, are carried out through 
the expenditure of an income of 1 dollar, borrowed from country R by country A’ (ibid.: 8−9). 
262 As Schmitt succinctly sums it up: ‘[s]ince A’s exports of 10 dollars value are only paid up 
to 9 dollars by R, the second external loan of 1 dollar is absolutely necessary to country A, 
which would otherwise have at its disposal only 9 dollars to pay for imports equal to 10 
dollars’ (ibid.: 9). 
263 See Schmitt 2014: 9 
264 ‘In reality, imports and exports vary concordantly and simultaneously; under no 
circumstances do imports ever vary alone’ (ibid.: 10).  
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Schmitt’s demonstration causes us to ponder yet another fundamental question which he puts 
forward. ‘At the beginning, the totality of purchases are imports-exports of 10 dollars value. 
Surplus purchases are ‘imports-without-exports’ of 1 dollar. What then is simultaneously the 
value of this same country’s ‘exports without imports’’265 (ibid.: 10)? The idea that he 
advances is that the reaction to the action can’t but reduce the amount of foreign currencies 
that A will receive for its exports, specifically, to ‘9 dollars only’ (ibid.: 11). Moreover, he 
points out that this very reality goes missing in traditional thinking, that is, a crucial fact is 
bypassed: ‘the rest of the world reduces the payment that it devotes to A’s exports by the 
exact value of the payment it devotes to A’s surplus imports’ (ibid.: 11). And, that this fact 
means none other than ‘an equal part of A’s exports is paid by A instead of being paid by R’ 
(ibid.: 11). Now exports of the deficit country that are not paid by the rest of the world entails 
a high price for the said nation, as much as the value of the deficit itself, that is, the surplus 
imports: hence the double266 charge. Ultimately, it will require two267 foreign loans, each of a 
same amount of that of its net imports, such as to settle the payment value of the totality of its 
imports. 
The claim of the double charge is all the more vindicated by the very fact that there is no 
doubt that deficit nations definitely pay in full and, in each period, their net imports, by the 
mere fact that ‘it is they, instead of the rest of world, that pay for an equal amount of their 
own exports’ (ibid.: 12). Moreover, it is on account of this very fact that it should not be 
expected that they should have to indebt themselves further, through yet a second foreign 
borrowing which inevitably and unnecessarily doubles the initial value of their deficit, the 
surplus imports. But the reality is that deficit countries are indeed, detrimentally affected268 by 
the current status of our international payment system, when it comes to paying their surplus 
imports, with an income which originates from the domestic economy of the rest of the world. 
                                                
265 The question does cause one to ponder that, indeed, a same portion of A’s exports will, as 
a result, no longer be covered via the payment of an import (R’s to A). In this sense, it does in 
fact leave part of A’s exports without imports, that is, without the corresponding payment 
from R that would otherwise be part of A’s export-revenues. But one point we should be clear 
on is that A’s exports have not changed from their initial value of 10 MR or dollars, it is just 
that as a reaction to the action (A’s payment of its net imports with an income from R), these 
exports of A’s, can now ‘only finance imports up to a value of 9 dollars’ (ibid.: 12). Schmitt 
emphasizes this point by clarifying that the foreign loan obtained by the deficit country’s 
internal economy does not increase ‘in money its export receipts; its acquisitions of foreign 
currencies, on the contrary, remain at their initial level of 10 MR. It is effectively so, A’s 
economy can rely only on 10 MR, a sum that is insufficient for the total payment of its 
imports, whose value is of 11 MR’ (ibid.: 26). Following the expenditure of the first foreign 
loan, however, A’s acquisition of foreign money units is reduced from its former level of 10 
MR, to 9 MR. 
266 ‘The sum of imports is of a value of 11 dollars. If exports worth 10 dollars were paid in 
their totality to country A by the rest of the world, ‘imports-without-exports’ would be of 1 
dollar worth; in reality they are of 2 dollars, because, for the exact amount equal to 1 dollar, 
A’s exports are not paid by R’ (ibid.: 12). 
267 ‘[T]hrough the action exerted on its imports, henceforth incapable to force R to pay 10 
dollars for its (R’s) imports of this very value and thus receiving for them only 9 dollars, 
country A has to recur to a second external loan of 1 dollar in order to finance its imports of 1 
dollar value that are no longer financed by its exports’ (ibid.: 12). 
268 As Schmitt describes it, ‘it is a true disease affecting all the payments of net imports in 
foreign currencies’ (ibid.: 13). 
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Now in closing our discussion of this proof, it is worth mentioning the following. Schmitt 
brings up another interesting point in the elaboration of his argument of the double charge. 
That is, that it is more the additive element of the anomalous sovereign debt to that of the 
‘ordinary’ debt that is actually missed rather than the existence of the sovereign debt itself. 
This is because the very sovereign debt is the only charge269 that is observed as seemingly 
being generated from surplus imports. Regardless, the end all detrimental result is an 
authentic product of our current ‘system’ of international payments. And, the very pathology 
of the double charge rests with the fact that the sovereign debt is a debt that should not exist at 
all, since deficit countries’ net imports have already been paid by their respective internal 
economies. This brings us to a next demonstration of the double charge of external debts 
whereby Schmitt elaborates the additive lien between sovereign and ‘ordinary’ debts. 
 
 
The duplication of external debts derives from the additive lien between 
sovereign and ‘ordinary’ debts 
 
Schmitt’s argument that we illustrate in this section centers about the fact of whether or not 
the two payments, that of the ‘ordinary’ debt and of the sovereign debt, actually add up to 
each other. His demonstration confirms that they indeed do add up and this result, in turn, 
proves the double charge of nations’ external debts. His approach starts by examining the 
monetary tie that, in effect, connects each of the two payments by the fact that payment is first 
carried out in country A’s domestic currency (MA) and, once again, in a foreign money (MR). 
We recall the fact that the ‘ordinary’ debt is carried by country A’s residents and is generated 
as a result of its foreign borrowing (the ‘ordinary’ loan from R) for the purpose of paying its 
net imports. Now despite the fact that the totality of A’s imports are first paid in its domestic 
currency (MA), they are also, ultimately, paid in money R (very source of the sovereign debt). 
And, we will see that it is the fact that the latter debt is carried by country A, as the set of its 
residents, that the two distinct debts (or charges) add up.   
Schmitt lays out, from the outset, a proper understanding of a country’s external debt in that it 
merely equals the value of its internal economy’s surplus imports, the ‘imports-without-
exports’. He elaborates his description, which essence we capture through his own words 
‘[t]his is the value of the legitimate, ‘ordinary’ debt defined by the balance of payments’ 
(Schmitt 2014: 32). The author emphasizes that what doubles the external debt is the fact that 
this ‘ordinary’ debt entails yet another debt, the sovereign debt that ultimately adds to it270. 
                                                
269 ‘[T]he Troika forces deficit countries to pay the rest of the world, R, as a consequence of 
their action (surplus imports) even though these countries have already entirely paid R 
through the reaction (non-payment of an export), of which nobody is aware’ (ibid.: 13). This 
brings us to an important observation à propos de, that is, that the reason for which the 
reaction is missed might very well be related to the fact that, unlike the case of the ‘ordinary’ 
debt, the sovereign debt is cumulative in time. The reason being that any time an old 
sovereign debt is reimbursed, a new gap is created between the deficit country’s total 
expenditures and its total receipts, the payment of which brings back its (deficit country’s) 
very sovereign debt to its previous level. 
270 ‘The addition of the sovereign debt ‘multiplies by 2’ the charge of A’s external debt, 
which finally amounts, erroneously, to 2 MR for a deficit of 1 MR’ (ibid.: 32). We recall that 
Schmitt defines the deficit as the net imports. ‘Country A’s external debts are the debts of this 
country taken as a whole and the debts of its domestic economy. Surplus imports over exports 
is the deficit’ (ibid.: 16). 
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But what is even more outstanding is that the double charge of external debts remains 
unknown, still today, by economists, politicians and other key players in general. ‘What is 
totally unknown is the fact that the sovereign debt, incurred by deficit countries themselves, 
adds up to the ordinary debt incurred by their respective domestic economies. Moreover, the 
sovereign debt is conceived of as the unique charge arising out of net imports’ (ibid.: 13). Yet, 
as Schmitt insists ‘[s]overeign debts are always the charge of an external debt already carried 
at 100 per cent of its value by the domestic economies of countries whose imports are greater 
than their exports’ (ibid.: 14). Let us see, exactly, why that is. 
But before dwelling further, if we were to start by pondering the mere, though nevertheless 
essential, fact that international transactions, whether financial or commercial, are very much 
une affaire271 of a country’s internal economy, we should then more readily understand that 
the idea of foreign loans carried by the country as a whole is nonsensical. Yet these loans, or 
charges, do materialize and are very much a reality of our current ‘system’ of international 
payments. So how is it that they even come to subsist if, logically, they are indeed 
inconceivable? 
It begins with another fundamentally important reality that applies to nations, whether or not 
they are in deficit. That is, compliance with the balance of payment’s equilibrium. The deficit 
nation borrows abroad272 ‘in order to finance its expenditures without receipts’ (ibid.: 29). 
This means that the deficit nation’s exports of future real goods (exports*) add, in the period 
under examination, to its current exports (export+) such that, considered integrally then, the 
value of its total purchases is the same as that of the totality of its sales273. In acquiescence 
                                                
271 We next extend on our meaning, using Schmitt’s own explanation. ‘Country A does not 
carry on any international exchange on its own account. Every purchase and every sale of this 
country, to or from abroad, are transactions of A’s domestic economy, commercial and 
financial, of its private or public sector. External borrowings of country A as a whole should 
therefore not exist. This is to say that its sovereign debt should be permanently nil, whatever 
the value, even if it is high, of its entire national economy’s surplus imports’ (ibid.: 28). 
272 Its domestic economy borrows from R such as to obtain ahead of time, that is, now in the 
current period, the value of the goods that it will produce in a subsequent period. The effect 
of this first foreign borrowing is that it enables the deficit country (its internal economy) to 
pay for its surplus imports in real goods, in accordance with its balance of payment’s 
equilibrium. 
273 This does not mean however, that the deficit nation has obtained equality in way of export-
receipts. That is, if we remember that the payment by R of exports* has the sole effect of 
financing the production of an equivalent sum of future real goods and as such it does not 
increase the deficit nation’s export-receipts, in the current period. Specifically, this first 
foreign loan that the deficit nation’s domestic economy obtains, finances an increase in 
exports (future), the very exports*, but the end-all effect in the current period, is an increase 
in kind only and not in way of export-receipts. It therefore, still, has to obtain yet another 
foreign loan to pay for its outstanding net imports, in money R. 
Just the same, the real element that forms the basis of the first charge, very object of this first 
foreign loan from R, the ‘ordinary’ loan, needs to be reckoned with. Unfortunately, as 
Schmitt points out, such recognition goes missing in our contemporary economic community. 
‘Economists take heed only of exports of current or ‘actual’ products, forgetting completely 
about exports of future goods. This is the viewpoint of the alleged economic science today. It 
is incomprehensible, because exports* are directly observable in all cases, which are indeed 
frequent, when a country’s imports exceed its exports. The deficit country is forced, in order 
to finance its expenditures without receipts, to borrow foreign currencies abroad’ (ibid.: 29). 
Moreover Schmitt stresses the fact that in order to better understand that ‘sovereign debts are 
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with the equilibrium of its balance of payments, the nation’s domestic economy, as such, 
carries the first charge of its deficit. In essence, this first foreign loan274 is required to allow it 
(deficit country’s internal economy) to pay for its net imports in real goods. It thus becomes 
indispensable that ‘the real aspect of the foreign loan that finances their surplus imports’ 
(ibid.: 30) be taken into account. It is only then that it will be fully acknowledged that nations 
are obliged to incur the cost of its deficit, not once but twice. Once, in accordance ‘with their 
balance of payments’ equilibrium’ (ibid.: 29) and once again, ‘because of the sovereign debts 
that form spontaneously against them’ (ibid.: 29)275.  
So, it is, that even though the concept of foreign loans as carried by a country as a whole, is 
logically nonsensical, the reality is that they do manifest and, are the very source of sovereign 
debts. Moreover, these debts are always carried by the country as a whole, in addition to a 
same-value debt that is being carried, already, by its internal economy: the cost of the 
‘ordinary’ loan. ‘Sovereign debt is thus finally acknowledged in its precise nature: it is carried 
in addition to the debt that is naturally included in the balance of payments’ (ibid.: 29). 
Now as Schmitt readily admits, it is entirely normal that the internal economy of country A, 
ends up carrying a debt as a result of the ‘ordinary’ loan it obtains from external lenders (R’s 
investors), which loan allows it to pay its net imports in real terms. No one could logically 
contest the legitimacy of this first payment. What is questionable is that as a consequence of 
its ‘imports-without-exports’, the deficit nation should have to incur yet a second cost of same 
value, in order to pay these surplus imports, a second time in money terms276.   
The author reminds us that, after all, real goods are the very objects of exchanges, whether 
the latter are domestic or external. And, for this very reason, it is important to keep abreast of 
the fact that the ‘ordinary’ loan is and from the start of the initial period a payment by R for a 
part of the deficit nation’s future output: A’s exports*. According to Schmitt, if balance of 
payments could be correctly understood, a clear comprehension of sovereign debts would 
naturally follow in that the ‘money that defines them is erroneously added to the real goods, 
which are the unique object of international exchanges’ (ibid.: 30). 
The fact that net imports consist of a distinctive payment, that very much differs from that 
whereby imports are covered by current exports, again comes to mind. As Schmitt points out, 
in these latter exchanges (‘imports-exports’), the use of foreign money ‘is a zero sum 
transaction, leaving only as extant the demand (imports) and the supply (exports) of real 
goods’ (ibid.: 30). But, what needs to be heeded is that to the extent that money R (MR) is 
spontaneously demanded and supplied, the resulting credits-debits in MR ensures that money 
intercedes only ‘as mere object of intermediation between real goods’ (ibid.: 30). However, 
such is not the case when the very monies that explain sovereign debts, that is, the net debits 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘free lunches’ for the rest of the world, not for indebted countries’ we must first ‘acknowledge 
the undeniable fact that balance of payments’ equilibrium applies also to deficit countries’ 
and as such we must ‘include the real aspect of the foreign loan that finances their surplus 
imports’ (ibid.: 30). 
274 The deficit country borrows from R in order to obtain in the current period the value of the 
goods that its domestic economy will produce in a next period. 
275 Schmitt’s meaning is that in order to settle in full, its deficit (net imports), nations have 
two obligations: in addition to meeting the required compliance with regard the balance of 
payments’ equilibrium, through a first foreign borrowing (the ‘ordinary’ loan), the deficit 
nations must also have their respective governments, on behalf of the nation as a whole, carry 
the cost of an additional foreign loan, this time to pay the net imports in money terms.  
276 ‘R’s claims are legitimate and morally acceptable only for the extent of the debt incurred 
by A’s economy, which spends more than it earns. The additional debt, formed in excess, of 
country A itself is a sovereign and totally unjustified, charge’ (ibid.: 29). 
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of the nation as the set of its residents, ‘scientific definition of its sovereign debt, lead to the 
use of money R as a specious real good’ (ibid.: 30). In this latter case scenario, the foreign 
money clearly plays more than an intermediary role: it forms the basis of the very excess 
monetary payment, source of the sovereign debt that delineates the double charge of external 
debts. 
The problem with today’s non-system of international payments is that the two charges, as 
related to the ‘ordinary’ and the sovereign loan and, each of an equal value of the deficit 
country’s net imports, do add up. But more importantly, the problem arises more on account 
that this fact is not recognized277. The consequence of which, the deficit nation as a whole 
ends up carrying the cost of the net imports in money terms (in MR) without heeding the 
fact278 that these ‘imports-without-exports’ have already been paid, a first time, in the nation’s 
own money (in MA). Such is the relation, in effect, that holds between the two payments, in 
regard to the deficit country’s surplus imports and which indeed verifies its additive element. 
The second payment undeniably adds to the previous one rather than cancels it: this is 
ascertained by the mere fact that the second takes place unknowingly279, or without 
acknowledging that the first justifiable payment has already been assured by the deficit 
nation’s domestic economy. 
The fact of the matter is that the first foreign borrowing which generates the ‘ordinary’ debt 
merely consists in the domestic economy’s (A’s) compliance with its balance-of-payment’s 
equilibrium, the payment in real terms: the exports*. The sovereign debt280 that ensues and 
which cost is carried by the deficit nation as a whole, leads to an anomalous second charge 
that defines the payment in money terms. 
                                                
277 And this, despite that statistical data supports the claim of the duplication of countries’ 
external debts. See Schmitt 2014: Section 8 Statistical verification of the double charge of 
external debts. 
278 Schmitt explains how this happens. ‘The sum total of country A’s imports is initially paid 
in its own domestic currency, in units of MA. Surplus imports are therefore paid in money R, 
though initially they are paid in money A. ‘Scholars’ ignore the deficit’s payment in money A 
simply because foreign countries convert this payment into money R. It is true that country A 
as a whole pays directly the deficit in money R without caring about the payment in money A, 
which is nevertheless certain’ (ibid.: 31). 
279 Or, as Schmitt precisely describes it, ‘without caring about the payment in money A’ 
(ibid.:31). 
280 Should there remain an iota of dubiousness regard the true existence of sovereign debt, 
Schmitt shares an essential observation in his case-scenario of a certain deficit country A 
whereby its total imports is that of 11 MR (net imports being of 1 MR value) whilst its total 
exports amount to 10 MR. ‘Whether the sovereign debt exists or not, country A’s domestic 
economy pays the totality of its imports, whose value is of 11 MR. And whether the sovereign 
debt exists or not, A’s domestic economy obtains only 10 MR as payment for its total exports 
of already produced goods’ (ibid.: 31). If one ponders this, it becomes clear that A’s exports* 
which are added to its exports+, consists of a payment in kind only and, more so, of a future 
delivery of A’s output, such that, logically then, it does not bring it export-receipts in the 
initial period in question. ‘No one would conclude that the export of real goods produced in 
the same period has been raised to the value of 11 dollars. It remains, on the contrary, equal to 
10 dollars’ (ibid.: 37). Country A must therefore resort to yet a second loan in this same initial 
period in order to finally settle the payment of its net imports, and it does so, this time in 
money terms. Precisely, this second loan amounts to yet another charge that this time around 
ends up being carried by the country as a whole, the very sovereign debt that undeniably adds 
to the ‘ordinary’ debt of the country’s internal economy. 
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Schmitt elaborates on his claim of the double charge by clearly defining the calculation of the 
formation of a country’s new external debt in that it is strictly equal281 to the positive variation 
between its exports (sales) and imports (purchases), in a given period. Despite this reality, 
what is actually observed in practice is that whilst ‘[t]he ‘ordinary’ debt is simply the charge 
of paying ‘imports-without-exports’ (ibid.: 31), for its part, the sovereign debt ‘is equal to the 
payment in money R of country A’s surplus imports’ (ibid.: 31). But the fact of the matter 
remains, that in theory, the exact total of a country’s new external debt282 is very simply the 
value of its internal economy’s surplus imports: the justifiable ‘ordinary’ debt as delineated 
by its balance-of-payments. The fact that the external debt ends up to be twice this value is 
because, indeed, an anomalous sovereign debt of a same value ultimately adds to this first 
‘ordinary’ debt. And in this sense, we could say that the pathological aspect of external debts 
is the fact that they include sovereign debts, which debts should not even exist. To this we 
could add, as Schmitt observes, that where traditional thinking errs on the side of properly 
‘quantifying external debts’ (ibid.: 34) and as well the magnitude of their effect, is that it 
concentrates on the insignificance that the ratio of debt-amount to output-value truly brings in 
determining the country’s accurate extent of external debt formation.  
 
 
Sovereign debt is cumulative in time 
 
In a further demonstration to show that the two debts, that is, the ‘ordinary’ and the sovereign 
debt, are definitely distinct debts that thus add to each other, Schmitt shows moreover that 
they also evolve differently ‘in the flow of time’ (ibid.: 32). He considers again the case-
example, country A against R (rest of the world). Each month, A forms a new deficit of 1 
dollar (MR). This time, a series, not just one, of months is the period (considered in its 
totality) within which international exchanges take place. He points out at the outset, that 
what is observed is that a sovereign debt of 1 dollar (MR) forms each month ‘because this is 
the amount of the ordinary debt formed each month’ (ibid.: 33). But he warns that one other 
very interesting observation is the fact that the evenness-rapport between the two debts is not 
retained, if one were to measure the entirety of both ‘ordinary’ and sovereign debts formed for 
a total period extending from 0 to n. For example, what will be noticed is ‘that the sum of all 
the ordinary debts formed in each period, from 1 to n (30), is equal to 1 MR in the thirtieth 
period whereas the sum of all the sovereign debts formed in the same interval of time is of 30 
MR in the thirtieth period’ (ibid.: 33). Now, though this may cause one to think then that the 
sovereign debt is therefore not the illegitimate duplicate of the ‘ordinary’ debt, it remains 
indeed just that. Schmitt explains, precisely, the reason for which it might seem otherwise. 
‘The unique difference is the following: ordinary debts are effectively paid in each successive 
period while sovereign debts, remaining unpaid, ‘inflate’ over time’ (ibid.: 33). The fact that 
the payment of the ‘ordinary’ debt does take place and this, in each successive period, leads 
one to correctly reason that what is actually happening ‘is that the ordinary debt formed in the 
second period is nothing other than the repetition of the external debt already formed in the 
first period’ (ibid.: 33). Understood in very simple terms: whilst A’s internal economy 
                                                
281 ‘The only data that matters are those of the balance of payments. If x MR is the sum of all 
the expenditures, y MR being the lower sum of all the gains, country A’s foreign debt 
increases by (x−y) MR’ (ibid.: 31). 
282 Precisely, ‘the exact extent of its external debt is simply the difference between the sum of 
foreign currency that the country spends and gains. If the sum of expenditures (imports) is of 
x dollars while the sum of gains (exports) is of y dollars, the correct amount of the external 
debt thus formed is of (x−y) dollars’ (ibid.: 33−34). 
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reimburses, in a subsequent period, residents of R from who they have borrowed 1 dollar 
(MR) in the initial period, this reimbursement is nevertheless matched by a new foreign 
borrowing of a same value. The two (reimbursement and new borrowing) being reimbursed 
and newly obtained by A’s domestic economy, all within a same period (e.g. second or 
subsequent), the external debt thus formed in that particular period is merely the ‘repetition’, 
to use Schmitt’s connotation, of the debt previously formed. This is the reason that the total 
amount of external debts evident in this second or subsequent period adds up, always, to 1 
dollar (MR) only. And, this same result could assuredly be expected, as well, for a total period 
whereby n is 30, for example. ‘Ordinary’ debts are not cumulative in time. 
Sovereign debts, on the contrary, add up with time, that is, if A’s net imports are renewed 
period after period, its sovereign debt increases, even though its ‘ordinary’ debt does not, as 
Schmitt has established. The very reason that the sovereign debt, for its part, is cumulative in 
time, is because whenever an old sovereign debt is reimbursed, a fresh gap is created between 
A’s total expenditures and its total receipts, the payment of which brings back A’s sovereign 
debt to its previous level.  
All things considered, in particular the fact that the two debts each manifest very uniquely  ‘in 
the flow of time’ (ibid.: 32), should be sufficient evidence in itself, that the two are definitely 
distinct debts that therefore logically and quite convincingly add283 to one another, hence 
vindicating Schmitt’s claim of a double charge. 
We now turn our attention to one of Schmitt’s more general demonstration of the double 
charge of countries’ external debts. 
 
 
The single loan proof −  a general explanation of the double charge 
 
In the preceding sections we have concentrated on some of Schmitt’s demonstrations of the 
double charge of countries’ external debts, which illustrations supposed that deficit nations 
borrowed abroad, twice, the amount required for the payment of their net imports. We next 
evidence his illustration of the single loan proof which assumes, this time, that the indebted 
nations resort to foreign borrowing one time only in order to settle the international payment 
of these ‘imports-without-exports’. Schmitt shows that, withal, the consequential result is the 
same: the charge of the country’s external debt doubles. 
The resonant timbre nonetheless evoked from this rather, more general, proof of the double 
charge, clearly resounds the malfunction that severely clouds the interrelationship between 
money and real goods, in today’s international payment transactions. 
Schmitt begins by highlighting the difference between two types of foreign currency loans 
that are obtained from external lenders284. He distinguishes between the loans whose foreign 
monies bring mere ‘credits-debits’, the very ‘ordinary’ loans as obtained by countries from 
                                                
283 Though they evolve differently in the course of time, the sovereign debt being cumulative 
whilst the ‘ordinary’ debt is not, they very evidently, add to each other, in a given time period. 
284 Schmitt once again considers some country A which, in the period under examination, 
‘raises the value of its imports to 11 dollars while maintaining its exports to the value of 10 
dollars. To finance the difference, A borrows 1 dollar (always in billions) from sleeping 
partners (foreign lenders)’ (Schmitt 2014: 36). He specifies that the loan under study concerns 
‘the positive difference between imports and exports of country A considered in its 
transactions with the rest of the world (R)’ (ibid.: 36). 
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external lenders and, those whose currencies (foreign) bring ‘credits-without-debits’285 to the 
borrowing country. Moreover he differentiates between the net economic gain as obtained 
through the nation’s exports-receipts and, the positive gain as obtained when it borrows 
abroad286. Whilst the former defines ‘a net economic value, a monetary sum obtained and not 
due, a net credit and not a credit-debit’ (ibid.: 36), the sum of external currencies that it 
disposes287 of as a result of the foreign borrowing, the ‘ordinary’ loan288, are positive 
monetary assets and liabilities, the one as well as the other.  But Schmitt reminds us, 
nevertheless, of one essential fact: given that the external loan of foreign currencies has been 
sought for the real payment of its net imports, ‘[t]he sum borrowed is the value of future 
exports of real goods by the deficit country’ (ibid.: 36). This then, firmly confirms, that 
‘foreign currencies borrowed to pay for net imports have as their object real goods to be 
exported in a future period’ (ibid.: 37). He considers, all the same, that external currencies as 
lent by R’s lenders to A for the purpose of the latter’s real financing of its surplus imports 
(essentially R’s purchase of A’s exports*) are, first and foremost, assets-liabilities, that is, 
rather than net assets. Yet, though they are primarily, assets-liabilities, he nonetheless shows 
that they are net assets, after all289. It is in considering what differentiates a mere sum of units 
of money from that of a sum of real goods that we inevitably understand just why that is. 
                                                
285 The two expressions ‘credits-debits’ and ‘credits-without-debits’ are that of Schmitt 2014 
who utilizes them to differentiate the very foreign currencies of the two types of external 
loans.  
286 ‘The new foreign loan obtained by the deficit country (A) brings in a sum of foreign 
currency (1 dollar), which is positive, not nil, and it increases the country’s assets in foreign 
currencies’ (ibid.: 36). Moreover, Schmitt clarifies that foreign currency held in a nation’s 
reserves (private or official) is immediately considered as a positive asset even in advance of 
it being converted to a financial asset (toward R). ‘It is a positive value, whether or not it is 
changed into foreign financial assets, bonds or shares, private or public’ (ibid.. 35). He 
furthermore warns that, in fact, part of the problem of our current international system of 
payments is on account that ‘foreign money present anywhere in the national economy 
defines a positive value’ (ibid.: 35). He adds to this by recalling the particular case of foreign 
currency sums that are present in a country’s economy but that have not already been spent 
towards foreign financial assets. Now the reason that these should perhaps be heeded is that 
they actually define ‘rights on foreign banks that will have to pay, as is the case for any 
demand deposit, their clients’ purchases’ (ibid.: 36). Specifically, if these foreign currencies 
have been obtained through a foreign loan, then we should remember that they have already 
been spent by the external lenders (of R), in their payment for a future product (import) from 
A’s internal economy. 
287 Schmitt specifies his meaning in the following statement. ‘Any currency borrowed abroad 
is part of the borrowing country’s positive assets until the moment that it is spent in favour of 
a non-resident’ (ibid.: 36). We note as well the importance here of his differentiation between 
real goods, that he considers exclusively as part of a country’s balance of payments, and that 
of bank deposits which are not to be considered as either financial or commercial goods. That 
is, except for, foreign currency reserves. ‘The only bank assets that are true goods are foreign 
currencies in the reserves’ (ibid.: 36). 
288 It is important to observe, as Schmitt points out, that at this stage of the foreign borrowing, 
external lenders are mere ‘creditors of a sum of money, namely of the dollar that is the object 
of the transaction’ (ibid.: 36). 
289 He also stresses the essential point that ‘[o]nly the foreign currencies borrowed to finance 
net imports are concerned here. These currencies can be ‘returned’ or refunded, in equivalent 
units, only in a subsequent period’ (ibid.: 37). 
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Now considered on their own290, ‘ordinary’ loans are merely monetary liabilities and assets. 
But the very aspect of the loans of foreign currencies transforms, the instant they effectively 
bring positive assets to the deficit nation, that is, to match the level of the totality of its 
imports. As such, it becomes the purchase payment of an export of part of A’s future 
output291. Moreover, it is a future export of A that country R as the set of its residents will 
become owner of, rather than the external lenders themselves, and this in a subsequent period. 
It is in this sense that it can be affirmed that the foreign currency lent (R to A) is therefore a 
monetary-asset and real-liability for the borrowing country and, a real-asset and monetary-
liability for the lending country. And in this sense as well, they are indeed net assets, of the 
borrowing countries. The end-all effect of the said foreign loan is that nation A, gains access 
to units of money R whilst it relinquishes a portion of its future output (real goods); country 
R, for its part, obtains real goods (future) whilst it parts with mere money units. 
Let us recapitulate the essential points. The foreign money units that A borrows from R to 
finance its surplus imports are thus monetary assets-real liabilities. That is as far as country 
A as a whole is concerned292. This means then that these foreign currency units are real assets 
of country R293. And indeed they are as after all, they can effectively be reimbursed only 
through a future output that A’s domestic economy will produce in a later period294. In this 
sense, it will be a ‘different’295 dollar or MR, though of an equal amount, that will ultimately 
be returned to R, following a future export of A, in a next period. 
                                                
290 Schmitt elaborates on the specificity of ‘ordinary’ loans in that they ‘all result in the 
equality, for both the lenders and borrowers, between purely monetary assets and liabilities. 
Considered in itself, before reimbursement and interest, the transaction provides a ‘liability-
asset’ to the lending country and an ‘asset-liability’ to the borrowing country. The required 
definitions are clear: ‘ordinary’ is every loan whose function is not to finance net imports’ 
(ibid.: 38).  
291 ‘As soon as the international loan of a currency has the function and effect to increase the 
revenues of a deficit country, to bring them to the level of its total imports, it changes its 
nature: it becomes the payment of a future export of real goods’ (ibid.: 38). 
292 ‘At country A’s level, the liability is the transfer of the monetary payment of the future 
export of real goods while the asset is merely and simply a sum of foreign currency’ (ibid.: 
40). 
293 ‘The fact is that these borrowed currencies are real assets of the lending countries’ (ibid.: 
37). Schmitt explains exactly why that is. ‘As soon as one agrees, as facts require, that the 
positive asset obtained by the lending country (R) is real − since the final object of the 
currencies lent consists in a quantity of real goods equal to 1 dollar value produced in p0 by 
A’s economy − it is illogical to assume that country R acquires a positive monetary asset; 
since p the credit obtained by country R is ‘real’’ (ibid.: 38). Moreover, these assets become 
net following A’s payment of its net imports. ‘The asset of foreign lenders becomes net as a 
result of the payment of its deficit by country A’ (ibid.: 40). 
294 Given that the object of R’s loan to A is a real (future) product of A (that it will produce 
and export to R in a later period), it is only logical that these borrowed currencies are real 
liabilities of A rather than monetary liabilities, hence why as well, they are real assets of R, 
the lending nation. ‘[T]he mere observation of facts requires compliance with the real object 
of this loan: it is and it can only be an import by and for R of one of A’s future exports, which 
will occur in p0’ (ibid.: 37). 
295 We next elaborate on our meaning through Schmitt’s own account. ‘Let p denote the 
period when the surplus import equal to one-dollar value is acknowledged and p0 the period 
when the external debt incurred in p is repaid. Since the set-lender, country R, obtains in p0 
the reimbursement of its loan, it is not the dollar initially lent that it gets back, but the dollar 
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The preceding developments of Schmitt’s argument culminate to an important and focal point 
of his single loan demonstration: the acknowledgment that ‘the currency lent to finance 
surplus imports is in fact spent by the country where it originates, R, to pay for the import of a 
future product of A’s economy’ (ibid.: 38). This is to say that as of the initial period (p) that 
the foreign loan is sought by A, a part of its future output is immediately appropriated by 
country R (as set)296. Country A, considered as the set of its residents, will have to freely 
relinquish real goods that its domestic economy will produce in the future to the benefit of 
country R, itself considered as a whole. That being the case, the double charge297 in the 
payment of its net imports through a foreign loan, is the fact that it must, furthermore, 
spend298 the acquired foreign bank deposit to finally settle the payment, in money terms. It 
thus loses the very counterpart (foreign bank deposit) of the loan that has already increased its 
external debt by a same amount of its net imports, and it is in losing this counterpart that its 
external debt doubles299. That said, the problem with our current ‘system’ of international 
payments starts with the fact that this duplication of the charge of countries’ external debt, 
which duplication truly manifests, remains very much in the dark amidst traditional bookmen, 
economic and political alike. Precisely, with respect to two vital points: one being that in 
assessing the deficit country’s international exchanges, only exports+ (current period, p) are 
taken into account whilst exports* (future period, p0) are not (considered integrally, R’s 
imports are simply A’s exports+)300; moreover, they omit to differentiate assets-liabilities as it 
regards the country’s internal economy from assets-liabilities as it concerns the country as a 
                                                                                                                                                   
that pays for an export of country A in period p0. This clearly means that the dollar paid in 
period p is a net monetary asset obtained by country A’s domestic economy’ (ibid.: 37). And, 
given that it is effectively a net monetary asset in period p, it becomes logically clear why it is 
also considered a real liability, in period p. That is, as opposed to being a monetary liability. 
296 ‘This is necessarily so, because country R as a whole becomes, by means of an external 
loan granted by its residents, the owner of real goods of 1-dollar value to be produced and 
exported by country A as a whole’ (ibid.: 42). 
297 ‘If A’s surplus imports were paid only once, this country would retain ownership of the 
newly borrowed dollar. Its net purchases worth 1 dollar would nevertheless be paid by the 
future cession of real goods worth 1 dollar. Each country would obtain and give real goods of 
1-dollar value’ (ibid.: 42). In following with this laudable observation, Schmitt logically 
concludes that ‘[o]n no account would country A suffer an additional loss of foreign currency’ 
(ibid.: 42). 
298 ‘The current status of the payment of surplus imports is a ‘non-system’ precisely because 
the deficit country loses 2 dollars to pay a net import whose value is 1 dollar only. Country A 
must indeed spend the sum of 1 dollar borrowed abroad, a debit that adds up to the cession of 
real goods that its economy must produce and export later’ (ibid.: 42). 
299 That is, the loss of a net asset being equivalent to an increase in debt. 
300 As Schmitt points out, in actuality, only the deficit country’s exports of the current period 
(exports+) are acknowledged. ‘The great scholars content themselves with thinking and 
saying that, in the exchanges between A and R, A’s exports are R’s imports. They only retain 
in this respect the exchanges between real goods and they are absolutely right in this respect. 
They are nevertheless seriously mistaken because … imports of real goods positively carried 
out by country R are indeed of a value equal to country A’s imports; their measure on both 
sides is of 11 dollars. This is necessarily so, because country R as a whole becomes, by means 
of an external loan granted by its residents, the owner of real goods of 1-dollar value to be 
produced and exported by country A as a whole’ (ibid.: 42). 
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whole301. Essentially, in missing the first point, they inevitably miss the second. That is, if 
exports* were actually taken into account, then the need to distinguish between assets-
liabilities, depending at which level they occur, would naturally be understood. This is 
essentially where Schmitt’s single loan argument delivers its full impetus. Specifically, in 
regard to R, considered as the representative set of its residents rather than as concerning its 
internal lenders (investors of R), the units of money that it lends to A are real assets in that it 
is country R as a whole (as opposed to the lenders themselves) that becomes owner of future 
goods of A that the latter will produce and export in a subsequent period302. As for nation A, 
considered as a whole303, the units of foreign currency that it borrows are real liabilities 
because they imply the giving up of part of the country’s output, that it will export to the 
benefit of R, in a later period. 
In sum, when the pertinent transactions are considered integrally, one readily observes that 
the deficit country incurs two debits, once in the loss of its future goods to R and again in the 
loss of the foreign bank deposit (loan-counterpart)304, each of an equal value of its net 
imports. On the other hand, the net imports consist of its sole credit305. The deficit country 
therefore incurs two external debt charges, each amounting to the value of its net imports, and 
this as a consequence of borrowing abroad only the single not double value of these very 
‘imports-without-exports’. 
The problem with the current status of our international payment system is that money is 
unable to maintain its neutrality in international exchanges. Unlike the purely intermediary 
role that it plays out within nations, across borders it takes on a pathological aspect, behaving 
like a specious good, as though it was truly a real good. And this is inevitable, whenever the 
payment of a deficit country’s net purchases (imports) involves a foreign income, as is 
implied in a net foreign borrowing. This is why no matter which approach is utilized to 
analyze the duplication problem of external debts, that is, through a double or single loan 
                                                
301 ‘[W]hat present-day scholars forget is to distinguish the assets and liabilities as they occur 
at the level of countries themselves, that is, as set of all their residents, from the assets and 
liabilities concerning simply a part of their residents’ (ibid.: 39). In essence, this is where the 
merit of Schmitt’s distinction between two types of foreign loans comes in. That is, 
considered at the level of both A and R’s internal economies, the foreign currency loans are 
mere assets-liabilities and liabilities-assets, respectively. But considered at the level of their 
respective countries, each considered as a whole, the foreign currency loans are monetary 
assets and real liabilities for A and real assets and monetary liabilities for R. 
302 ‘Concerning country R as a whole and not merely its sleeping partners, the dollar lent is a 
real value because it means the appropriation of real goods that will be produced and exported 
in the future by country A’ (ibid.: 41). 
303 ‘This involves a consequence, also essential, for country A as a whole, as the set of all its 
residents. This set gives up a part equal to 1 dollar of its own future output’ (ibid.: 41). 
304 ‘Two debits of country A: future real goods of 1-dollar value + expenditure of the sum of 1 
dollar borrowed abroad’ (ibid.: 42). Now it should be observed that the first debit corresponds 
to the ‘ordinary’ debt as incurred by A’s domestic economy, as a result of the ‘ordinary’ loan 
it obtains from R for the real payment of its (A’s) net imports; this ‘ordinary’ debt is included 
in the balance-of-payments equality, attained by adding to A’s exports+, its exports*. As 
regard the second debit, it corresponds to the sovereign debt; the very reason for which it is a 
sovereign debt is because the loss of the foreign currency (FBD) that should otherwise 
increase country A’s international reserves, public and private, is suffered by country A 
considered as a whole. 
305 ‘A unique credit of country A: its net import of 1-dollar value’ (ibid.: 42). 
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argument, it will always unveil the same circumstantial consequences that manifest given the 
procedural system infrastructure that currently governs inter-border payments. 
 
 
Whether from a single or double loan perspective, overall compatibility subsists 
 
No matter the approach of the analysis, whether based on a single or double loan argument, 
the same consequential result is ultimately demonstrated: that of an anomalous formation of a 
sovereign debt. This is inevitable given that the underlying themes, that form the basis of the 
theoretical claims that are advanced, compatibly overlap, irrespective of the perspective from 
which they are demonstrated. 
Whether the duplication stems from the fact that a net foreign borrowing implies a foreign 
income or payment in both real and money terms or, payment in domestic and in foreign 
currency or, from the undeniable fact that a sovereign payment adds to that of an ‘ordinary’ 
payment, we evidently observe a same pathological result: the formation of a sovereign debt.  
Quite clearly, no matter from which perspective one studies the phenomenon of external debt 
duplication, all of the underlying themes come into play even if some do so more prominently 
in one argument than in an alternative demonstration. Moreover, this can also be said whether 
or not the argument is that of a single or double loan proof. Again, it will demonstrate the 
same infallible result of the double charge. Let us consider why. 
Whether or not a deficit country borrows only once or, twice, the value of its net imports, it 
will ultimately incur a double cost such that in both case scenarios the result is the same. On 
mulling this over it becomes difficult to expect otherwise, for the very reason that all of the 
underlying themes that drive any one argument, even if subtly, are always compatibly at play, 
no matter the approach of the demonstration. 
For example, in the single loan demonstration, it becomes obvious by mere virtue of the 
inevitable expenditure of the foreign bank deposit (very counterpart of the ‘ordinary’ loan) 
that the double charge arises from a second anomalous payment, in money terms and, this in 
addition to an initial payment, in real terms. An anomalous sovereign charge thus adds to that 
of an ‘ordinary’ charge. And, evidently, a foreign income is implied (part and parcel fact of 
the very problem). Moreover, we could say that the double cost ensues from the fact the net 
imports are firstly paid in domestic currency and once again in a foreign currency.  
Now, some of these same elements are at play even if one or more, to a greater extent than 
others, in a double loan demonstration and, moreover the resulting double charge manifests, 
nevertheless. If we consider for example, the argument that illustrates the fact that net imports 
are paid both in real and in money terms, we see that Schmitt’s double charge claim is once 
again, reflected by overlapping themes. One underlines a more prominent one, that is, no 
matter that the main trust of the argument is the fact that net imports are paid once in real 
terms and once again in money terms, another fact nevertheless fundamentally subsists: the 
net foreign borrowing implied, involves a foreign income306. And again, the second sovereign 
                                                
306 We have seen that this means an additional costly payment for the deficit country. 
Contrarily to the case of its ‘imports-exports’ whereby the payment in foreign currency is 
provided free of charge via the deficit country’s exports, not to mention that the provenance 
of the income for these ‘imports-exports’ originates from its domestic economy, when it 
comes to its ‘imports-without-exports’ such is not the situation: the deficit country will have 
to pay and at that a double charge, to finally settle the payment of these very imports, with an 
income that originates from abroad. 
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money payment that ensues from the first ‘ordinary’ real payment307 undeniably adds to the 
latter. We observe that no matter that, this time around, the approach is that of a double loan 
argument, the overall themes recur and, the result is the same: the pathological formation of a 
sovereign debt that should not ever exist. In sum, the deficit country’s domestic economy 
indebts itself a first time when it spends the ‘ordinary’ loan from R to finance its future 
production of real goods to the benefit of the latter. But given that this means that the payment 
of its net imports remains outstanding, it inevitably incurs a second indebtedness at the 
macroeconomic level (sovereign loan), in order to finally settle the payment of its net imports, 
which it does, only this time in money terms. 
If we next consider the case whereby the central theme of the double loan argument is more 
the fact that net imports are paid with an income (foreign) that originates from the production 
of R’s domestic economy, we not only observe the same pathological result but also that other 
underlying themes again recur, thus evidencing this argument’s compatibility with other 
previous demonstrations, whether single or double loan arguments. By virtue of the fact that 
the net imports are paid with a foreign income entails yet another underlying point and one 
that has presided in other arguments already exhibited, both single and double loan 
demonstrations alike: the fact that these ‘imports-without-exports’ will ultimately cost the 
deficit country two payments that undeniably add to each other. This, on account of the fact 
that the reconstitution of R’s own domestic income, when A carries out308 the payment of its 
net imports309, actually reduces its (A’s) exports-receipts from R which means that it will have 
to resort to yet another foreign loan to cover its now uncovered imports. The first payment is 
incurred by its domestic economy whilst the second by the country as a whole: the sovereign 
debt thus adds to the ‘ordinary’ debt. Again, we evidence the pathological formation of a 
sovereign debt that doubles the deficit country’s external debt. 
No matter which approach the argument takes on, whether through a double or single loan 
demonstration, all are adequately compatible and lead to the same consequential result: the 
anomalous formation of a sovereign debt that doubles the deficit nation’s external debt. 
Next, in a third and closing part of our work, we turn our attention towards reformation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
307 It is opportune to recall here that this first real payment, from which the very ‘ordinary’ 
debt materializes, is carried out by the deficit country in compliance with its balance-of-
payments equilibrium. Yet, the deficit country uncaringly pays, once again and in addition to 
this somehow unacknowledged first real payment, only this time in money terms. 
308 It spends this first ‘ordinary’ loan in the payment of its net imports. 
309 Specifically that is, with an income from R. 
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PART III     The Reform 
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6       The single-country reform 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter we concentrate on presenting a payment system reform that could easily be 
adapted by any world single-country. This revolutionary reform is a work that was engineered 
by Bernard Schmitt (see Schmitt 2014) in following with his in depth study of the double 
charge of countries’ external debt. The reform aims at salvaging the domestic income of 
deficit countries that is unnecessarily lost to the benefit of a financial bubble310, whenever a 
net foreign borrowing is involved in the payment of these deficit nations’ net imports. 
Schmitt’s outline for a reformation of the payment system of net imports, primarily and 
decisively abolishes the double charge of external debt for the reforming countries and this, 
even if these nations single-handedly adapt the reform. 
Again, our intent is not to reiterate every detail of Schmitt’s pioneering and preeminent 
research that underlines his vanguard plan for a much needed payment system reform but 
merely to highlight its essential steps, as well as its advantageous and promising practical 
application. Schmitt himself readily admits to a work in progress that will require the devout 
attention of many field specialties and experts to ensure a sound implementation of the reform 
he advocates, such that it could yield the enhanced empirical results that it endeavors to 
produce311. 
The first section of the chapter introduces this single-country reform through a brief coverage 
of yet another, particularly relevant, demonstration of Schmitt’s proof of the very double 
charge of external debt. 
An ensuing second section then enters the realm of Schmitt’s reform plans that could 
beneficially modify the existing system of external payments for any endeavoring country 
even if the reform was implemented by these countries, on an individual basis. 
 
 
A purchase unpaid in a foreign money is not necessarily unpaid in a 
country’s own domestic currency 
 
In this proof of the double charge, which incidentally very relevantly sets the foundation from 
which Schmitt’s reform make-up elaborates, he highlights the point that though a net 
expenditure forms an equivalent debt, the very debt is created in a specified currency. That is, 
                                                
310 ‘The desirable result is reached as soon as the domestic income spent for the payment of 
net imports remains the property of the deficit country itself, as if purchases (imports) were 
carried out between residents’ (Schmitt 2014: 56). As our ‘system’ of international payments 
currently has it, this very income is lost to the benefit of the surplus country. 
311 ‘To develop the reform in all its details will require the work of several weeks (possibly a 
month) of a number of experts. It remains that the reform’s endeavour is to cancel the second 
charge of external debts, a task that will be fulfilled only if the reform’s main lines are 
correctly proposed and applied’ (ibid.: 52). ‘We present here only a summary; it will be 
necessary to discuss it in a rigorously detailed way’ (ibid.: 83). 
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the fact that it is unpaid in a foreign currency does not imply that it has not been fully paid in 
a country’s own domestic money312. Moreover, given our current non-system of international 
payments, it is the country as a whole that is ultimately saddled with the cost of ensuring the 
payment of external net purchases, in foreign money. The argument of Schmitt’s proof, tout 
ensemble, rests on the fact that the country’s indebtedness is robbed of any, whatsoever, 
compensation313.  
The problem compounds in that the very indebtedness is not differentiated, whether 
conceived as occurring at the level of the country considered as a whole or, at the level of its 
residents, that is, at the microeconomic level314. Apropos, Schmitt reminds us that it is not 
nations themselves who engage in international trade. After all, it is their inhabitants that 
initiate the purchase and/or sale transactions.  Moreover, the fact is, that a country’s resident 
does definitely pay, and this from the onset, the entirety of its foreign purchases. But 
somehow, for the most part, the economic community considers these imports unpaid until 
they are finally paid or settled in the exporters’ currency. And, the infrastructure of our 
‘system’ of international payments as it stands today, very simply, complements this belief315. 
In fact, if it were not for our defective ‘system’ of international payments, as it exists today, 
and were the likes of Schmitt’s advocated reform already in place, external purchases fully 
paid in a country’s domestic currency would no longer be thought of as outstanding unpaid 
                                                
312 ‘We can immediately see the mistake made as consisting in declaring unpaid precisely the 
difference between purchases (imports) and sales (exports) of the country. By erroneously 
confusing a country’s debt with a debt held by it residents, many economists believe, just as 
falsely, that a purchase that remains unpaid in money R is also unpaid in money A’ (ibid.: 93). 
313 ‘Is it required by the facts, as they occur, that if the country gets indebted its debit is in no 
way compensated? Answers are well known … the credit that the country should derive from 
it goes missing’ (ibid.: 94). 
314 ‘Everyone knows that a country, as the set of its residents, is not itself part of the people 
that it unites in the set. No country is a resident; no country is a person. Despite this evidence, 
even the most ‘distinguished’ economists conceive countries’ indebtedness as though it were 
of the exact same nature as that of the debts incurred by their residents’ (ibid.: 92). 
315 Schmitt comments on the misapplication of the ‘free lunches’ accusation: ‘This is the 
explanation nevertheless retained: ‘imports-without-exports’ are totally unpaid, hence are 
‘free lunches’, because they are paid in money A and are unpaid in money R’ (ibid.: 93). But 
as he clarifies, ‘it is export-surplus countries, not the deficit countries that get a free lunch. 
Deficit countries pay positively the totality of their foreign purchases, included their ‘imports-
without-exports’. And export-surplus countries obtain two times the payment of their net 
exports, first to the credit of their lenders, then, a second time, to the benefit of a ‘financial 
bubble’. Only making the first payment is logically, morally and economically justified. The 
second payment is but an unwitting extortion’ (ibid.: 56). To this he adds a clear distinction 
between ‘imports-without-exports’ and ‘imports-without-payments’ that should be heeded. 
We capture the essence of his warning in the following statement. ‘If country A’s ‘imports-
without-exports’ were ‘imports-without-payments’ it would be correct to sentence it to finally 
pay them. Its unpaid purchases would indeed be the acquisition of goods produced by another 
country, values illegitimately lost by the holders of incomes formed within surplus countries. 
In reality, however, country A (representative of all other deficit countries) pays all its 
imports, through the expenditures of both a domestic income, formed in units of money A, 
and a sum of foreign currency, units of money R. Despite its deficit, the value of its 
expenditures to the benefit of R is therefore equal to the sum of all its purchases, including its 
‘imports-without-exports’. It would thus be patently false to say that surplus imports are 
unpaid purchases’ (ibid.: 83). 
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purchases. Moreover, no debt would correspond to them and this, for neither the country as a 
whole, neither its inhabitants316. The issue comes down to determining whether or not a 
domestic economy actually forms a debt whilst paying the entirety of its purchases. And, this 
means that much depends on how we define the very payment, that is, versus its actual 
reimbursement317. We will return on this, further on. 
What we need to keep abreast of, is whether or not, a purchase unpaid in foreign money is 
thus definitely an outstanding debt, very simply318, even if fully paid in a country’s own 
domestic currency319. An observation of what actually transpires in practice, would quickly 
remind us that, whether a question of ‘imports-exports’ or ‘imports-without-exports’, both 
these imports are effectively paid primarily in a country’s domestic money by its affected 
inhabitants, who moreover, are not concerned with carrying out their external payments in 
foreign money. And so, from the perspective of the deficit country’s residents, no foreign 
indebtedness should subsist. And therefore logically neither should it, for its country as a 
whole320. But the fact is that in actuality the deficit nation, considered as the set of its 
residents, is nevertheless implied in the settlement of these payments in foreign money. And 
this even if the source of the foreign debt is born with the deficit country’s residents, 
themselves. That all said it remains that the reason the situation becomes problematic is that 
the foreign debt that is carried out by the country as a whole is not compensated321 and as 
such its very cost is ultimately incurred by the deficit nation, as a whole322. We will see, in a 
next section, that this is a factor that Schmitt’s reform endeavors to address323. The solution324 
                                                
316 ‘We observe, however, that several countries, such as A, have contracted substantial 
external debts, in several years, which they are often unable to settle fully. This is because 
external debts do not fail to form even if the logical analysis that we have just summarized 
states their impossibility. This contradiction is only apparent because, as they exist in our 
eyes, external debts have been formed by the ‘non-system’ of international payments. If the 
reform had always been applied, external debts would not exist nor would, therefore, the 
crisis that is defined by the impossibility to serve them fully’ (ibid.: 93). 
317 ‘It is the repayment of the sum lent that defines, before the reform, the external debt of 
country A’ (ibid.: 97). Schmitt’s reference to country A intends the deficit country. 
318 As Schmitt expresses it, ‘tout court’ (ibid.: 93). 
319 Schmitt ascertains that it is certainly not and explains just why that is. ‘It is crystal clear 
that this debt is defined only in units of foreign currency and not at all in units of the national 
currency of the country whose expenditures exceeds its receipts, since the difference 
mentioned does only concern debits and credits in money R (dollar) … It is certain, therefore, 
that the debt so subscribed is null because any purchase already paid is a zero debt’ (ibid.: 
93). 
320 ‘As the country’s residents do not incur any external debt, it is necessarily the same for the 
country itself, the set of its residents’ (ibid.: 94). 
321 ‘[T]he credit that the country should derive from it goes missing’ (ibid.: 94). 
322 But moreover, as we have pointed out many times over, in addition to the real cost that is 
borne by the country’s residents. 
323 ‘Is it required by the facts, as they occur, that if the country gets indebted its debit is in no 
way compensated’ (ibid.: 94)? 
324 That is, the solution as advocated by Schmitt’s reform whereby ‘[c]ountry A gets 
effectively indebted for 4 dollars to the rest of the world, but an equal credit, equivalent in 
dollars of the domestic income spent for the net imports, is collected by the country whose net 
debt does therefore not increase’ (ibid.: 94). 
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lies with balancing the country’s debit (net as it results in reality and, as incurred by the 
deficit nation as a whole) with a credit that, today, becomes lost325. 
Now, the idea of the missing compensation326 is essentially the whole trust of Schmitt’s 
argument here, in that it is logically inconceivable that the country as a whole, ‘considered 
separately from the sum of all buyers and sellers’, should incur an ‘external debt now net’ 
(ibidem). But was is just as dysfunctional, moreover adversely consequential327, and this on 
account of today’s international ‘system’ of payments, is the fact that this debt adds to that of 
the deficit nation’s internal economy, therefore doubling the initial cost-value of its net 
imports: the double charge of external debt. And, the reason that it adds is that, the very 
compensation that the nation as the set should generate from its acquired net328 debt, is lost. 
The payment process infrastructure that underlines the current system of international 
payments actually robs the said nation of its compensation that, in effect, is totally absorbed 
by the payment in money terms, that is, the payment in foreign money. Consequentially, this 
is an internal income of the deficit country that is forever lost for the country as a whole, to 
the benefit of the surplus country, itself considered as a whole329. This lost domestic income 
that manifests in the deficit country’s net external debt, is essentially what Schmitt’s reform 
intends to recover330. 
In essence, the aim of Schmitt’s reform is twofold in that in counterbalancing the deficit 
nation’s first loan/debt331 (second period), not only does it neutralize this latter debt but also 
in so doing, it annuls the nation’s (as a whole) sovereign debt332. Ultimately, it effectively 
counteracts the formation of net external debts333 for the deficit nation. 
                                                
325 Schmitt explains the situation, as it stands today, in that in as much as ‘it does not become 
the owner of the domestic income (equivalent to 4 dollars) spent in the ‘purchases-without-
sales’ of its domestic economy, country A gets nevertheless indebted for 4 dollars to the rest 
of the world’ (ibid.: 95). ‘It’ or, ‘country A’ is understood by Schmitt to be the ‘deficit 
country as a whole’ (see ibid). As well, his reference to ‘4 dollars’ intends the value of the 
deficit: the net imports of his example-country, A. 
326 ‘It is totally wrong that a country, considered separately from the sum of all buyers and 
sellers − which is the general case without exception − be forced to assume, without the 
slightest compensation, an external debt now net. In this respect, the only correct position is to 
assert that external debts incurred by countries should not even exist’ (ibid.: 95). 
327 ‘It is illogical that countries get indebted, but − and this is much more serious − it is 
terribly unjust that net imports are submitted to the double payment of their value: in order to 
pay its purchases (of 14 dollars) exceeding its sales (10 dollars), thus for the payment of that 
difference whose value is of 4 dollars, the deficit country has to pay twice 4 dollars to the rest 
of the world’ (ibid.: 95). 
328 ‘As this debt, defined in units of foreign currency, is not balanced by any credit, it is net in 
all likelihood’ (ibid.: 94). 
329 ‘[E]xport-surplus countries obtain two times the payment of their net exports, first to the 
credit of their lenders, then, a second time, to the benefit of a ‘financial bubble’’ (ibid.: 56). 
330 Specifically, by ensuring that this ‘domestic income spent for the payment of net imports 
remains the property of the deficit country itself, as if purchases (imports) were carried out 
between residents’ (ibid.: 56). 
331 It should be noted that pre-reform, this first foreign loan/debt of the deficit country (A) is 
referred to as the ‘ordinary’ loan/debt by Schmitt. 
332 That is, considering the double effect of the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ in that it 
compensates two loans of R to A. We will cover this again, in more details. 
333 The end all effect is that though the deficit country borrows abroad twice, the first loan is 
neutralized with a counter-loan such that when it borrows a second time around, this second 
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In sum, this demonstration of Schmitt’s claim of the double charge of external debts centers 
about the simple fact that deficit countries do indeed primarily pay their net imports with an 
income formed domestically. They do so in mere compliance of the balance of payments’ 
equality, hence the formation of the ‘ordinary’ debt. But the problem is that this first real 
payment of their deficit (the net imports) ultimately adds with the final settlement of these 
surplus imports in money terms: that is, in foreign money. And the inevitable result is that the 
domestic income that is finally spent in this second monetary payment of its net imports is 
decisively lost and never recovered334. It all boils down to the fact that prior to finally settling 
the payment of its net imports in foreign money, the deficit country has already fully paid 
these very net imports with an equal sum of its own domestic income, in the form of its 
national money. This essentially, is what leads to the double charge. So indeed, we should 
heed the fact that a deficit country’s net expenditures unpaid in foreign money are not 
necessarily unpaid in its own domestic money. In fact, this point alone, underlines the very 
reason that a reform of our current system of international payments is so indispensable if it is 
to, unwaveringly, address the built-in contradictoriness that firmly characterizes it. After all, 
as Schmitt points out, ‘even imbalances and not only the ‘purchases-sales’ are positively and 
‘actually’ paid. Debts logically arise only because of unpaid acquisitions’ (ibid.: 97). All the 
more then why we should, without a doubt, bear in mind his claim of the double and 
unnecessary charge of external debts. This calamitous and unrighteous duplication, in itself, 
clearly vindicates the practical advantage that Schmitt’s reform could bring to deficit 
countries in not only neutralizing the duplication but as well, the economical and financial 
woes that associates with it. 
In a following section, we begin our study of reform alternatives by examining Schmitt’s 
proposal with regard to the single-country reform. 
 
 
Countries could reform independently 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
loan is simply the reproduction/replacement of the very first loan. The analysis will be 
elaborated such as to consider consecutive periods. We simply point out at this stage, that the 
real payment of net imports of the deficit/reforming country (A) actually takes place from the 
second period onwards. At the end of the first period, A’s ‘Bureau’ has a debt of 1 MR (result 
of a sole foreign borrowing in this first period); at the end of the second period, the only debt 
of A is the one (third loan of the period) incurred because of the loan it contracts to cover its 
net imports of the second period, in money R, moreover this loan is compensated: 
complement of the reform. We will elaborate these details when we actually cover Schmitt’s 
single-country reform, in a next section.  
334 Simply, ‘it does not remain available within the deficit country’ (ibid.: 96) it is definitely 
lost to the benefit of the surplus country. Moreover, what is just as malsain is the fact that this 
disappearance is, today, complacently considered as a natural and, expected occurrence. 
‘Nobody has ever made the mistake of saying that the payment of net purchases abroad 
should not be carried out in foreign currency. Every economist agrees that the payment is 
made in foreign currency abroad and takes place in national money at first; it is indeed in 
domestic income that importers pay their purchases. But a second error is most often made in 
this regard: concerning surplus imports economists consider in general as ‘normal’ that the 
incomes formed and spent in domestic money disappear following their expenditure. This is 
wrong and something the reform will make impossible’ (ibid.: 98). 
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Nations, worldwide, could protect themselves against the adverse effects of the double charge 
of external debts335, by single-handedly336 undertaking a reform of their respective systems of 
external payments. Let us examine this single-country reform proposal of Schmitt’s. 
First and foremost, it must be said that Schmitt is correct in saying that the reform ‘will finally 
institute the true logic of the payment of external debts’ (ibid.: 42). As they are today defined 
and, paid, clearly does escape logic337 and more so when one is reminded of the dire, costly to 
say the very least, consequences that ensue from this ‘normality’. It is more complacency, 
rather than logic, that definitely overrides, as though the situation were a normal and expected 
result of international payment transactions that, after all, are processed within a regime of 
relative exchange rates. Perhaps, but as Schmitt advocates, it doesn’t have to be that way, 
even if that is the very regime with which the system of international payments is currently 
saddled with. The single-country reform he proposes, undoubtedly, offers a clear hegira 
towards a more positive outcome, and this even if the basis of this relative exchange rates 
regime were to remain in place, that is, for the time being. 
                                                
335 From the very onset Schmitt’s reform clarifies that ‘external debts are formed only by 
surplus imports’ (ibid.: 42). In fact, the recognition of this particular point will be primarily 
emphasized by the reform. Schmitt explains the importance regard this stipulation as he notes 
what the reform will change. ‘The current method of external debt calculation will be 
rejected. Today the total external debt of a country is measured adding the debts as incurred 
by the country’s residents. This is fundamentally wrong because the true criterion concerns 
the country as a whole and not merely its residents of the private or public sector. The 
question therefore belongs to macroeconomics, just as the law of international trade balance 
between each country’s earnings (exports) and expenditures’ (ibid.: 42). Now Schmitt does 
indeed recognize that what happens at the microeconomic level is, after all, reflected at the 
macro level. ‘It remains true, of course, that the set is affected only by its residents’ (ibid.: 
42). But the point that is asserted, particularly in reference to the measure of a nation’s 
external debt, is that the foreign currencies that are brought into a country as a result of its 
inhabitants’ external borrowing, may stay accessible within the deficit nation’s domestic 
economy and their sum is thus maintained in the official reserves of its central bank or, even 
private reserves. And, ‘[t]o this extent external borrowings are not net, because the currencies 
that are available are ‘liabilities-assets’ and not net liabilities’ (ibid.: 42). Now at the 
macroeconomic level: ‘the foreign currencies that are both received and spent’ (ibid.: 43) not 
only form net liabilities but this for the country as a set. ‘In macroeconomics, where the 
measure of external debts is scientifically accurate, only matter the foreign currencies that are 
both received and spent by the country as a whole’ (ibid.: 43) Hence from which stems the 
bench mark by which the entirety of a nation’s external debt should be measured. ‘The correct 
criterion is therefore consistent with the balance of payments: external debt increases by the 
exact value of the difference between international expenditures of foreign currencies and 
their gain’ (ibid.: 43). 
336 The reform is clear on its sovereign application, its very specific aspect that we next 
encapsulate with Schmitt’s own description. ‘The reform concerns a sovereign country. But a 
similar reform can be studied and implemented by several countries at a time. It is not 
necessary nor even recommended that a country asks a foreign authority, for example the 
IMF, to reform its external payments, even to the extent that they are made in foreign 
currency. On the contrary, every country implementing the reform is literally sovereign’ 
(ibid.: 52). 
337 Admittedly, paying double the amount of one’s net imports is not the most logical thing 
for a deficit country to do, let alone, financially sound. 
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One important feature that the reform will emphasize with regard the international 
transactions of trading countries is the element of symmetry, only this time, instantaneous 
symmetry rather than deferred338. As we have it today, the surplus country obtains the real 
payment of the deficit country’s net imports by appropriating a part of its future output. As 
such, the deficit country loses this internal income, forever. The reform will change that. The 
real payment of its deficit will no longer imply a future production but instead an actual 
ceding of its current internal resources, that is, in the form of financial securities. But the 
important fact of this new development is that this will happen in such a way339 as to counter 
the deficit country’s double charge of its external debt and is so doing, it will save that part of 
its internal income that it otherwise loses through an extra charge. It will thus pay for its net 
imports only once. 
 
 
The idea behind the ‘Bureau’ 
 
Countries embracing the single-country reform will create their own, independent, internal 
institution that will have a key role in overseeing340 the reformation of their respective, 
external payments. Schmitt refers to this institution as the ‘Sovereign Bureau’ or even simply 
the ‘Bureau’ (see ibidem). Now one brilliant yet simple stride to be brought in by the reform 
that he proposes is the fact that the ‘Bureau’ will be considered ‘co-resident’341 alongside the 
reforming country’s importers. This way, the payment of its residents’ external purchases will 
be carried out342 as though these purchases were mere internal purchases, the likes of those 
transacted amongst nationals. The problem with how these payment transactions are 
processed today is that these foreign purchases end up being paid at two different levels: once 
at the microeconomic level, in the importing country’s domestic currency and once again at 
                                                
338 Prior to the reform, though the real payment of the deficit country’s net imports occurred 
in a first period, the actual reimbursement took place in a subsequent period. 
339 We will examine this in more detail. For now, we will mention only that the deficit 
country will issue a counter-loan to the surplus country, as counter-balance to its own loan 
from the very surplus country; doing so, will neutralize one of the two charges of its external 
debt.  
340 ‘An institution to be called ‘Sovereign Bureau’ will manage the new regime’ (ibid.: 43). 
341 ‘It is enough to make the sovereign Bureau, ‘co-resident’ of the importers, the final 
beneficiary of the domestic currency spent by importers. The payment of imports will then be, 
as far as domestic incomes are concerned, exactly similar to the purchases among residents of 
the importing country; indeed more than just similar, because the Bureau and the importers 
reside in the same country’ (ibid.: 45). 
342 It is true that currently they are already firstly paid, at the microeconomic level, in the 
importing nation’s domestic money, seemingly as any other internal purchases. Nevertheless, 
they are ultimately also paid in foreign currency at the macroeconomic level. And though this 
is carried out effortlessly and gratuitously with respect to the importing nation’s ‘imports-
exports’, given that it earns all of the units of foreign money that it requires to pay these 
imports through its equal amount of exports, such is not the case for its ‘imports-without-
exports’. To the extent that there is no matching sum of exports to cover the latter, the foreign 
currency that is required to pay for them has to be purchased and it is the nation as a set who 
inevitably bears the cost. The reform will have it that the ‘Bureau’ will counter this cost such 
as to effectively neutralize it. We will later examine the strategy that is planned in order to 
accomplish this. 
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the macroeconomic343 level, in the exporting (surplus) country’s currency. But moreover, as 
we have seen, it is the fact that the two payments add to each other such as to double the 
charge of the deficit country’s net imports that is the very problem.  
Part of understanding the underlying mechanics that continue to fuel the external debt 
crisis344 that countries find themselves in today, is to understand as well the essential 
difference345 that existentially subsists between microeconomic and macroeconomic levels of 
payments and, the dire consequences that result for deficit countries, from the addition of the 
two346. As these payments materialize today, indeed, the second monetary payment at the 
macroeconomic level is an added347 cost that is incurred by the deficit nation as a whole and 
this, despite its inhabitants’ real payment that has already taken place at the microeconomic 
level. The reform will modify this phenomenon such that the ultimate payment occurring at 
the macroeconomic level will be but a mere translation of its microeconomic counterpart. 
The idea is to have the ‘Bureau’ at the helm348 of the country’s international payments, in 
their entirety349, at all times and in any given period. Clearly, its fundamental role will be to 
                                                
343 ‘The sum of imports (always in its broadest sense) is first paid by an income formed in the 
country’s domestic economy; it is the only payment that falls on residents. All external 
payments of imports are macroeconomic: it is the country as a whole that is subject to the 
obligation to pay R in foreign currencies’ (ibid.: 43). 
344 ‘The problem of external debt crisis cannot be saddled on importing residents, even if they 
are members of the public sector. This ‘crisis’ is macroeconomic, because it is only the 
country considered as a whole that is sometimes unable to pay part of its external debts’ 
(ibid.: 44). It is this anomalous part of its external debt, that is, the very formation of its 
sovereign debt that today forms part of its total external debt that, the reform will endeavor to 
eliminate. ‘One of the main functions of the reform is to avoid the very formation of 
sovereign debts, and prevent economies from ‘running into a crisis’’ (ibid.: 44). 
345 ‘The difficulty of understanding the crucial distinction between microeconomic and 
macroeconomic payments is one of the reasons for the error in which the present theory of 
imports’ payment finds itself. Economists believe that imports are paid between residents of 
the world, in exporting countries as well as in importing countries. This is totally wrong, 
because only importers and exporters are residents, importing and exporting countries are 
entirely distinct from their residents’ (ibid.: 44). As Schmitt points out, given the fact that they 
are finally settled ‘by importing countries, the external purchases of their residents are 
‘multiplied by 2’’ (ibid.: 44). The reform he proposes will bring in changes to the payment-
process of net imports that will rectify the anomaly that is currently associated with it. 
346 ‘Basically, the only payment of imports that is justified is microeconomic’ (ibid.: 44). 
347 ‘Let us repeat that the macroeconomic payment occurs at the expense of the importing 
country, even though its residents have paid all of their purchases. Logical consistency 
dictates that the ‘macro-payment’ does not get added to the ‘micro-payment’, but becomes its 
simple translation. This result of paramount importance, which is absent from today’s system, 
will be achieved by the reform’ (ibid.: 44). 
348 ‘It is not necessary to define the periods during which the Bureau will fulfil its functions. 
From the implementation of the reform onward, the Sovereign Bureau will be responsible for 
the factual logic of all external payments of its nation for any period’ (ibid.: 43). 
349 ‘The sum total of the reformed country’s expenditures (imports) can be entrusted to the 
Bureau. It would therefore be unnecessarily complicated to retain only the payment of surplus 
imports. In pure theory, ‘imports-exports’ do not require the intervention of the Bureau. These 
expenditures of the domestic economy are also and equally what it receives; in other words, 
their sum is zero. They thereby escape from any faultiness. But it would be a heavy and 
unnecessary charge to ask the Bureau to find and note the difference between the country’s 
118 
reduce payment transactions350 relating to imports to the likes of ‘exchanges between 
residents’ (ibid.: 53). But the ‘Bureau’ will also take on other vitally significant functions that 
will undeniably revolutionize the current payment method of deficit countries’ net imports. 
The breakthrough of the reform will not only rein in the double charge of countries’ external 
debts, it will abolish them altogether. We will eventually elaborate on just how, exactly, it 
will manage to achieve this, but first we briefly recapitulate Schmitt’s claim regarding the 
double charge itself. 
In a particularly concise, though none the less convincing, demonstration of the double 
charge, Schmitt points out that if we could come to understand that ‘imports-exports’ are also 
doubly paid351, we would then more clearly conceptualize the double payment of ‘imports-
without-exports’. Again, we see the fundamental, even if subtle, idea behind his conceptual 
construct of the ‘Bureau’ whose underlying purport he emphasizes through this very 
demonstration. 
His argument sets about by reminding that if inhabitants’ payment of their imports were 
actually carried out as though these external purchases were transacted amongst themselves, 
that is intra-nationally, they would thus be paid in only one currency: their own domestic 
currency. But just the fact that foreign exporters can exact payment in their own internal 
currency or, some other foreign currency, makes it that the deficit country, inevitably, will 
have to honor the payment in a currency other than its own352. And, as we have already 
pointed out, though this is achieved cost-free when ‘imports-exports’ are concerned, it is an 
altogether very different and costly matter when it concerns ‘imports-without-exports’353. The 
main reason being, as we have also already observed, is that net imports imply a net foreign 
borrowing and thus, a foreign income354. And this inevitably sets the stage for the double355 
                                                                                                                                                   
imports according to whether they are or not of a greater value than its exports. It is much 
easier and faster to enter all imports at the moment they take place’ (ibid.: 53). 
350 ‘One of the rules of the reform is to neutralize in some way the international expenditures 
of the domestic economy such as to render imports akin to exchanges between residents’ 
(ibid.: 53). 
351 ‘Even the ‘imports-exports’ are paid twice; it is enough to understand why to clearly grasp 
the reason why the macroeconomic payment of net imports adds to their microeconomic 
payment’ (ibid.: 44). 
352 ‘A conversion is necessary. Yet, the conversion of the domestic deficit in foreign 
currencies is a cost free transaction only to the extent that the country balances its imports and 
its exports. Indeed, exports bring the foreign currency needed to pay for imports. Within 
‘imports-exports’ the payment for external purchases is therefore simple’ (ibid.: 44). 
353 ‘Things are radically different in the case of ‘imports-without-exports’. This time the 
foreign currency gain is zero, because the export that would have provided it does not exist. 
The foreign currencies that are not earned must be purchased’ (ibid.: 44). But what is of even 
greater importance is the fact that this payment-purchase entails a double payment with an 
end all result that ‘the payment in foreign currency adds to the cost in domestic currency 
terms’ (ibid.: 44). 
354 In this sense, it should be mentioned that the argument being advocated here, applies even 
in the case of EMU countries (seemingly of a ‘unique’ currency) given that it is the mere 
implication of a net foreign borrowing involving a foreign income that consequently leads the 
situation into that of a double charge, incurred once at the microeconomic level and once 
again at the macro-level. This is in following with our claim that the Euro does not befit the 
role of unique Euro zone currency. Rossi reminds us of this searing fact: ‘Euroland countries 
still have heterogeneous currencies, although the latter all have the same denomination since 
they were encapsulated in the European Monetary Union (EMU). Certainly, EMU is a 
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charge that ensues and the consequential loss of part of the deficit country’s domestic income. 
Schmitt’s reform proposal will prevent this loss356 through the very idea of having the 
‘Bureau’ operate as a ‘co-resident’ alongside the deficit country’s importers. In particular, the 
progressive difference that the reform will bring, in addition to the beneficial element of co-
residency that the ‘Bureau’ will assure, is that the latter357 and not the creditor country will 
primarily obtain the external payments of its residents. Essentially, we will see that the all 
encompassing role that the ‘Bureau’ will assume, will have the effect of neutralizing the 
double charge that inevitably results from the fact that a deficit country’s imports, ‘imports-
exports’ and ‘imports-without-exports’ alike, are paid by both a domestic and a foreign 
income. We now return to our synopsis of the functions of the ‘Bureau’, that is, to the basic 
idea behind it. 
The ‘Bureau’ will fulfill a role of an accounting intermediary akin to that of an Exchequer, 
specifically managing the payment transactions of the country’s importers and exporters. The 
reform will ensure that the country’s ‘Bureau’ directly receive, and not the international 
economy, the entirety of its importers’ domestic currency payments, that is all of the internal 
income that its inhabitants spend on imports. In turn, it will pay its exporters in domestic 
currency such that the left over difference relating to the internal payment of its residents’ net 
imports will be its net profit, which gain it will pass over to its government358. Hence, unlike 
pre-reform, this internal income of the deficit country will be salvaged, rather than 
permanently lost to the international economy. And we remember that the reason for the loss 
was because it formed the very object359 of the foreign borrowing that was sought by the 
deficit nation in order to obtain the foreign currency it required for the payment of its net 
imports. But the reform will change this so that this internal income remains with its domestic 
                                                                                                                                                   
misnomer, since to date there is no currency union across the area’ (Rossi 2012: 221). Thus, 
deficit countries of the Euro zone must, in reality, convert the domestic payment (e.g. Italian 
euro) of their net imports in a foreign currency (e.g. German euro), rather than pay with their 
own acknowledgment of debt. And, it is because this conversion is costly that they get doubly 
indebted. 
355 ‘If the value of net imports is of 1 dollar, their total cost if of 2 dollars, importing residents 
pay half of it, equal to 1 dollar, while their country as a whole suffers the second debt, of 1 
dollar more, purchase-price of this foreign currency’ (ibid.: 44). 
356 ‘The reform will make this abnormal loss of foreign currency units impossible. A simple 
measure will have that effect. It is enough to make the sovereign Bureau, ‘co-resident’ of the 
importers, the final beneficiary of the domestic currency spent by importers. The payment of 
imports will then be, as far as domestic incomes are concerned, exactly similar to the 
purchases among residents of the importing country’ (ibid.: 45). 
357 Schmitt specifies just how the reform will change the payment of surplus imports. ‘After 
the reform it is the domestic economy, represented by the Bureau, which will receive their 
payment in national currency’ (ibid.: 45). He explains on how, today, this is clearly not the 
case: ‘[b]efore the reform, it is the external economy that receives the importers’ payments in 
foreign currency’ (ibid.: 45). He clarifies just why that is by his following emphasis. ‘Before 
the reform the sum of domestic currency spent for surplus imports is the object of an external 
borrowing’ (ibid.: 45). 
358 ‘[T]he Bureau will receive any domestic income spent by the country’s residents to pay for 
the sum of their imports, even compensated. Exports will be paid in national currency by the 
Bureau, which will therefore receive, as net gain, only the domestic payment of surplus 
imports. This gain will be transferred to the State budget’ (ibid.: 45). 
359 ‘Before the reform the sum of domestic currency spent for surplus imports is the object of 
an external borrowing’ (ibid.: 45). 
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economy, even if its ownership360 will be acquired by the country’s government, in following 
with the transfer in from the ‘Bureau’ who will re-direct to it, its net gain from the importers. 
This is the important difference that the reform will bring, in that the deficit nation will no 
longer be victimized361 by an external debt that forms against it whilst the surplus country 
appropriates362 part of its future output. Schmitt’s reform plans will bring the answer to this 
problem through a counter-loan363 of the ‘Bureau’: the latter will lend the entirety of the 
deficit country’s own foreign loan such as to neutralize this very loan. The reform will 
comply with the identity of the balance-of payments in that the rest of the world, say country 
R, will obtain a portion of the deficit country’s internal resources equal to that of its own 
output exported to the latter. The only difference, greatly beneficial at that, will be that the 
deficit country’s real payment will no longer involve the appropriation, by the rest of the 
world, of part of its future production but will instead manifest through the cession of its 
actual resources in the form of financial securities. In this way, the deficit nation will be able 
to salvage a part of its domestic income that, previously, it lost in the settlement of its net 
imports, on account of the double charge364 that the payment of these imports, implied. 
Now the reform will also incorporate a repayment of debts from previous periods365 such that 
it is inconceivable to expect that the rest of the world will incur a loss: past creditors will 
indeed be reimbursed. Simply put, the ‘Bureau’ will transfer an amount of the country’s 
domestic monetary income366 to its government in addition to the amount corresponding to 
the current period’s net imports such that this net imports’ amount is increased accordingly367. 
                                                
360 ‘The domestic income that is not absorbed by the payment of exports, that is, z’ units of 
national currency, is the definitive property of the Government applying the reform without 
any compensation’ (ibid.: 45). 
361 ‘The ‘anomaly’ is manifest because the country whose imports exceed its exports suffers 
the increase of its external debts despite the fact that it provides R with the gain in domestic 
goods that it will produce in a subsequent period’ (ibid.: 46). 
362 ‘Now, the sum of income A that is spent by country A’s national economy for the 
domestic payment of its surplus imports can still be appropriated by the rest of the world. This 
is precisely what has to be avoided. For this, it is necessary and sufficient that the Bureau 
lends abroad, in foreign currency, the whole value of its country’s net imports’ (ibid.: 56). 
Country ‘A’ is Schmitt’s example-country, the deficit country A. 
363 ‘This loan makes it entirely impossible for A’s government to lose the property of the 
income A obtained from the domestic payment that finances economy A’s surplus imports’ 
(ibid.: 57). Here again, Schmitt’s reference to ‘A’ is intent to mean the deficit example-
country, A. 
364 In fact, ‘[t]he reform will reduce the external debts of these countries to zero’ (ibid.: 47). 
That is, in neutralizing the deficit country’s first loan/debt, R to A, (second period or, any 
subsequent period to the first period) with a counter-loan that will as well compensate A’s 
second loan (R to A) of the period (given this second loan is the mere replacement of the first 
that has, after all, been neutralized), it will automatically do away with its sovereign loan and 
debt. It will then settle nevertheless the payment of its nets imports, ultimately in money R, 
with a new foreign loan but which loan, will this time be compensated. ‘External debts will 
form abroad towards foreign countries and no longer at the expense of the deficit country’ 
(ibid.: 46). We will explain in more details in a next section. 
365 ‘The reform will radically alter the payment of previous debts’ (ibid.: 45). 
366 ‘The rest of the world is not paid in the importing country’s national currency. It is 
therefore certain that this currency remains available within the importing country’ (ibid.: 45). 
367 ‘If one applies the reform only to new external debts, the gain realized by the Budget is 
only one unit of domestic currency in each period. It is logical, on the contrary, to add each 
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This will enable the payment, in the current period, as well of previous debts. That is, the 
‘Bureau’ will transfer (current period) to its government/Budget368 an extra amount of 
domestic monetary incomes (4 MR369, for example), extra to the net imports of the current 
period (e.g., 1 MR), such as to incorporate the reimbursement of the country’s previous debts 
in the payment of net imports of the current period. Thus the new net imports amount 
increases to 5 MR and this is the amount that the ‘Bureau’ will transfer to its 
government/Budget as net gain (all current period). 
 
 
More on the ‘Bureau’ and its essential functions 
 
Presented broadly370, Schmitt’s single-country reform plan aims at revoking the second371 
anomalous charge372 of external debt for the reforming country. Just how it will endeavor to 
do this is where the chief role of the ‘Bureau’ comes into play. This internal ‘co-resident’ 
institutional department will be responsible for carrying out vital functions that will unravel 
the full impetus of the reform, in all its details. We next have a look at the reform’s principal 
lines and, the basic principles behind them. 
The prime objective of the reform is to salvage the internal income that, today, is lost373 by the 
deficit country through its net foreign borrowing. The ‘Bureau’ will play a central role in 
recuperating as net gain this domestic money374 that, pre-reform, escapes nations which are 
encumbered with excess375 imports: the loss being the result of a net borrowing from abroad.  
                                                                                                                                                   
time the payment of previous debts to imports, which are therefore net for an amount of 5 
units, and not merely 1 unit, of national monetary incomes’ (ibid.: 46). The ‘Budget’ hereby 
referenced by Schmitt, is intended to imply the deficit country’s government budget. ‘It thus 
results − and this is the correct solution − that the Budget gains 5 units of domestic incomes in 
each period, not just one unit’ (ibid.: 46). It should also be understood, for sake of clarity, that 
4 MR (4 units of national monetary incomes value equivalency) is the assumed 
reimbursement amount of the country’s previous debts, which amount is added to the current 
period’s net imports of 1 MR (1 unit of national monetary incomes value equivalency), the 
Budget thus gaining 5 MR value worth of national monetary incomes; this, assuming that 1 
unit of domestic currency is equivalent to 1MR. 
368 Our reference here to ‘Budget’ is in keeping with Schmitt’s (2014) own reference and 
which intends some particular department of the reforming country’s government that, for 
example, it would refer to as the/its Budget. 
369 Again, assuming that 4 MR is of equivalent value of 4 units of the deficit country’s 
domestic monetary incomes. 
370 ‘It remains that the reform’s endeavour is to cancel the second charge of external debts, a 
task that will be fulfilled only if the reform’s main lines are correctly proposed and applied’ 
(ibid.: 52). 
371 From the start, Schmitt is crystal clear in his emphasis that ‘[i]t is a matter of fighting 
against the double charge and not against imports as such’ (ibid.: 53). 
372 Specifically, ‘the second charge that would form because of the difference between the 
country’s imports and exports’ (ibid.: 53). That is, the second charge that anomalously ensues 
from a first charge related to this very difference. ‘[I]n the actual ‘non-system’ net imports are 
paid twice for the following reason: they are paid a first time in the country’s domestic 
currency and a second time in units of a foreign currency’ (ibid.: 53). 
373 Essentially, this loss is what contributes to the double charge. 
374 Schmitt clarifies his exact meaning, again with respect to his example-country, ‘A’: 
‘[w]hen we speak of money A, as it is considered by the reform, we mean logically and 
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The temporal intervention376 of the ‘Bureau’ will be characterized by a regular everyday co-
ordination of its assigned tasks. In this way, it will ensure that any new country debt will be 
captured and managed in the same period exactly of its very formation. After all, the raison 
d’être of the ‘Bureau’ will be to prevent, en avant, the manifestation of the second 
pathological charge of external debts. Schmitt’s forward-moving way to achieve this is to 
primarily set up the reforming country’s system of external payments such that all of its 
internal economy’s foreign payments are processed as though they were being transacted 
amongst national residents377. This is where the ‘Bureau’ plays out its key role as sole and 
ultimate debtor representative on behalf378 of its country residents. That is, it will be 
responsible for transforming379 each and every payment of its internal economy, destined 
abroad, into a foreign payment over which the ‘Bureau’ will have sole debtor accountability 
towards the rest of the world, e.g. country R. 
We should again mention, given its important relevance, that the entirety of the imports-
expenditures of the reforming nation would be consigned to the ‘Bureau’. It would be too 
complex of a task to entrust it only with the payment of net imports380. Without a doubt, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
uniquely the (domestic) income formed in money A. Considered as such, money is nothing 
other than a creation of banks, while income is produced by firms, which ‘manufacture’ real 
consumption and investment goods’ (ibid.: 54). 
375 ‘[S]urplus imports are net expenditures; the income in money A that is so ‘lost’ is not 
recovered’ (ibid.: 55). The reform will change just that: it will recover it. 
376 ‘The sovereign Bureau will look after, on a nearly daily basis, the external debit (imports) 
and credit (exports) payments of its country’s domestic economy. It would not be enough to 
obtain simple reports on the external debts incurred by its country, as released by the Bureau a 
mere few times a year. It is essential, on the contrary, that any new debt be seized in the very 
period it is formed’ (ibid.: 52). 
377 The principle behind this reform specificity relates to the ‘co-resident’ aspect of the 
‘Bureau’: ‘Domestic payments to the credit of the rest of the world are carried out between 
residents, because the Bureau is itself part of its country’s residents’ (ibid.: 53). Moreover, 
concerning the external creditors themselves, Schmitt reassures that ‘[t]he domestic payments 
of the Bureau do not prevent payments of foreign creditors to be carried out at their full value. 
Put simply, it is the Bureau that carries out and obtains the payment of the transactions 
occurring between its country and the rest of the world’ (ibid.: 53−54).  
378 Our meaning is not to intend that the ‘Bureau’ will act as simple intermediate between the 
deficit and surplus country, say countries A and R, respectively. The reform would not bring 
marked changes if the ‘Bureau’ merely transmitted the external payments it was entrusted 
with. ‘The Bureau’s intermediation is not enough. Nothing changes if it simply passes on the 
payments it receives’ (ibid.: 54). Rather, we will see that not only is its role much more 
developed and complete in this regard, but that it will particularly guarantee that the internal 
(domestic) payments in the deficit country’s own currency, are strictly detached from foreign 
payments in foreign money (see ibidem). 
379 ‘It is enough to this effect that the Bureau transforms every domestic payment addressed 
abroad (by considering it its own) into an external payment of which the Bureau is itself 
personally the only debtor’ (ibid.: 53). 
380 To this regard, we remind the reader of Schmitt’s explanation, particularly in 
acknowledging that, ‘[i]n pure theory, ‘imports-exports’ do not require the intervention of the 
Bureau. These expenditures of the domestic economy are also and equally what it receives; in 
other words, their sum is zero. They thereby escape from any faultiness. But it would be a 
heavy and unnecessary charge to ask the Bureau to find and note the difference between the 
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reform is certain to progress successively if its steps, at least initially, are kept streamlined 
and effectively simplified.  
Regard the extent of the intermediating intervention of the ‘Bureau’, though we will further 
elaborate on the details of this, we will specify for the time being that it will actually annul381 
all external credits with respect to its internal economy’s imports. In this sense, the ‘Bureau’ 
will point-blank inhibit its internal economy’s net imports payment: the payment in domestic 
money will no more be the end toward obtaining an external loan. As regard the payment of 
its internal economy’s exports, they will continue to be paid in foreign currency but with the 
difference that, following the reform, the conversion382 to the deficit country’s domestic 
currency will be handled directly by the ‘Bureau’. In sum, the new external payment 
procedure of the reforming country would be organized such that with respect to its exporters, 
the ‘Bureau’ would be their sole debtor and their very claims would be specified in their own 
domestic currency; with respect to its importers, the ‘Bureau’ would be their sole creditor and 
their debts would be specified, as well, in their own domestic currency (see ibidem). 
Now on returning to the reform’s prime objective of salvaging the domestic income that, 
today, the deficit country loses through its net foreign borrowing from surplus country R to 
cover its net imports, the function383 of the reforming country’s ‘Bureau’ will be to counter 
the negative consequence of this loss. It will do this by capturing, itself, its country’s domestic 
income that would otherwise be spent towards the surplus imports. Moreover, it will acquire it 
as a net and final gain (see ibidem). And legitimately so, given that the reform will guarantee 
that the real payment of the deficit country’s net imports no longer involves a future 
production of its national resources but rather the immediate (current period) cession of part 
of its actual resources384 (equivalent value of its net imports) in the form of financial 
                                                                                                                                                   
country’s imports according to whether they are or not of a greater value than its exports. It is 
much easier and faster to enter all imports at the moment they take place’ (ibid.: 53). 
381 ‘Nothing changes if it simply passes on the payments it receives. It is necessary and 
essential that the Bureau first cancels all foreign credits for its domestic economy’s imports. It 
is not enough to replace the domestic payment; on the contrary it is necessary to suppress it 
entirely. Henceforth, from the reform onward, foreign purchases of country A’s residents will 
be zero credits of R’ (ibid.: 54). 
382 ‘It is true that country A’s exports will be paid, even after the reform, in money R. But the 
conversion of this payment into money A will no longer concern the rest of the world; on the 
contrary it will be carried out by the Bureau as if it was itself the national economy’s 
exporter’ (ibid.: 54). We reiterate that Schmitt intends some deficit country ‘A’ by his 
reference to ‘country A’; as well, ‘money A’ refers to the domestic currency of the deficit 
country (A). The foreign currency is that of the rest of the world, e.g. country R, and is 
referred to as ‘money R’.  
383 Specifically, it will aim ‘to avoid that the monetary income spent for net imports be 
‘captured’ by R to the detriment of A’s national economy. The sovereign Bureau, which 
obtains and spends all the sums of income in money A defining country A’s exports and 
imports, spends the equivalent of 10 dollars for the exporters and includes in its net income 
the sum of 1 dollar (in MA)’ (ibid.: 55). Again, the case-scenario is that of deficit ‘country A, 
whose net imports are of 1-dollar value each month’ (ibid.: 53); the total of its imports 
amounting to 11 dollars, the value of its exports being 10 dollars. ‘Its residents-importers 
spend 11 dollars, a sum that is thereby unavailable for the purchase of national output. It is 
replaced to the extent that there are exports; their value is assumed to be 10 dollars’ (ibid.: 
55). 
384 It is through the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ that the deficit/reforming country (A) pays 
its net imports (of the previous period), in each period; in so doing, country A gives R 
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securities. And indeed, the payment of external creditors is not in the least compromised as a 
result of the net profit of the ‘Bureau’, it will rather be executed in full. We will re-visit this 
accomplishment more elaborately as we continue our discussion on the role of the ‘Bureau’ 
and its vital functions. But let us simply mention that on account of the fact that the gain of 
the ‘Bureau’ is net and final, it will thus transfer this net profit over to its nation’s 
government385. Again, it is all about the idea of maintaining the deficit country’s domestic 
income intact386 rather than losing a part of it, equivalent portion to its net imports, to the 
benefit of the surplus country in a net foreign borrowing. Schmitt’s reform aims at recovering 
this loss by setting up the reforming country’s imports payments such that they do occur 
amongst its residents. The reform accomplishes this through its simple yet effective measure 
of making the ‘Bureau’ ‘co-resident’ to the country’s importers and, ‘final beneficiary of the 
domestic currency spent by importers. The payment of imports will then be, as far as 
domestic incomes are concerned, exactly similar to the purchases among residents of the 
importing country’ (ibid.: 45). Schmitt reminds us that though this is an abnormal and 
unnecessary loss that does not occur with regard to ‘imports-exports’, it definitely manifests 
when it comes to ‘imports-without-exports’. This is the problem that needs to be rectified387, 
moreover the very reason why the profit of the ‘Bureau’ must be net (final) rather than with 
‘counterpart’ (ibidem) as it would be were it to only transfer over, as mere intermediate, the 
payments it received. 
This brings us to a crucial question388 that Schmitt not only raises but as well proceeds to 
address in his explanation of how the ‘mechanics’ of the reform will operate in order to 
achieve its mission. It concerns, exactly, this net foreign loan that the deficit country resorts 
to, in order to cover the payment of its ‘imports-without-exports’. The way that this loan is 
today carried out, it inevitably leads to the surplus country’s appropriation of the deficit 
nation’s domestic income. Schmitt’s reform plan will ingeniously prevent this from 
                                                                                                                                                   
(surplus country) part (equivalent MR value of its net imports) of its domestic resources 
(actual rather than future); this is the reason why the domestic income spent in excess by A’s 
residents is thus legitimately earned by A’s ‘Bureau’, in each period. 
385 In Schmitt’s case-example, the government being that of some deficit country ‘A’ which 
he sometimes refers to simply as ‘country A’s budget’. ‘In our example, country A’s budget 
obtains without any counterpart the equivalent of 1 dollar in the period considered. The 
government’s net gain, that is its profit, is of n dollars (in MA) if, in the periods concerned, 
country A’s net purchases (imports) are of n dollars’ (ibid.: 55).  
386 Specifically, that part of it that is spent towards the payment of its net imports ‘has to 
remain the domestic economy’s property’ (ibid.: 56). Schmitt refers to this point as a 
‘practical consequence’ of the reform, that is, the fact that ‘the domestic income of the deficit 
country is unchanged’ (ibid.: 59). 
387 ‘[T]he solution consists in preventing the deficit country’s domestic income to be ‘gained’, 
even in part, by the rest of the world. This is a loss that is naturally impossible to the very 
extent of ‘imports-exports’, but the payment in domestic currency of net imports must be 
reformed; the income spent to this effect has to remain the domestic economy’s property. The 
desirable result is reached as soon as the domestic income spent for the payment of net 
imports remains the property of the deficit country itself, as if purchases (imports) were 
carried out between residents. The Bureau must thereby be credited with a net gain and not as 
a result of a simple intermediation’ (ibid.: 56). 
388 ‘A difficulty remains: how to be sure that foreign loans will not take possession, as is 
necessarily the case before the reform, of the gain in incomes A that the Bureau is supposed to 
transfer to the deficit country’s government’ (ibid.: 55)? His reference to ‘incomes A’ are that 
of the deficit country, namely A.  
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happening through a most notable function of the ‘Bureau’ who will counter-loan389 the 
entirety of its own foreign currency loan of MR value of its surplus imports (whilst 
maintaining390 the very loan), that it obtained from country R’s lenders. That is, the ‘Bureau’ 
will in turn lend the total sum of it to R. Specifically, to distinct residents (borrowers) of R. 
Understandably, it might seem odd that the deficit country would borrow abroad the sum of 
its net imports only to then turn around and lend the entirety of this foreign sum, moreover to 
the original lending country, surplus country R. But the principle behind this reverse and 
automatic loan is its very effect391: to salvage the internal income that would otherwise be lost 
through the deficit country’s net foreign borrowing for payment of its net imports. That is, if 
we stay abreast of the reality that it is through this net foreign borrowing (R to A) that the 
deficit country loses a part of its future output (equivalent portion to its net imports of the 
current period) to the benefit of surplus country R. In fact this is how the internal income (in 
the form of a payment in its own domestic currency of its net imports: issue of IOUs) of the 
deficit country inevitably finds itself under the proprietorship of the surplus lending 
                                                
389 ‘Now, the sum of income A that is spent by country A’s national economy for the 
domestic payment of its surplus imports can still be appropriated by the rest of the world. This 
is precisely what has to be avoided. For this, it is necessary and sufficient that the Bureau 
lends abroad, in foreign currency, the whole of its country’s net imports’ (ibid.: 56).  
390 ‘It would be pointless to directly discard the external loan of 1 dollar that country A 
obtains for its net imports of this value. We would simply go back to the starting position 
without a change. We thus maintain the loan as it stood before the reform. But the sovereign 
Bureau adds, as we have already established, a reverse loan. We thus have the coexistence of 
two equal-size financial transactions, which ‘contradict’ one another: the loan of 1 dollar 
granted by R to A is offset by the loan of 1 dollar granted by A’s Bureau to non-residents. It is 
understood that borrowers and lenders in the economy of R are distinct residents’ (ibid.: 62). 
Again, the reference to ‘A’ and ‘R’ intend the deficit country A and surplus country R, 
respectively. However, and matter-of-factly, the reform will effectively secure (same period 
as their formation) the real payment of the deficit country’s net imports through the fruition 
(all same period) of the balance-of-payments identity between its real imports and real 
exports, (IM and EX). In effect then, this will render the deficit country (country A) deficit-
free. That is, through the guarantee (same period) of the balance-of-payments identity, 
country A’s real imports thus being effectively fully covered by its real exports, it will no 
longer be considered a deficit country, per se. 
391 ‘If country A were satisfied to borrow foreign currencies abroad, it would certainly not 
become the owner of the equivalent in domestic money of the value of its net imports, to the 
benefit of its Bureau and then of its government. The loan of 1 dollar to the benefit of R has 
no other aim than to make sure of the gain in a domestic income of A of the equivalent of 1 
dollar, measure of economy A’s net international expenditures, by the deficit country. It is 
therefore not a matter of preventing the foreign loan of 1 dollar that country A could not avoid 
but to ‘add’, negatively, the loan of 1 dollar to R’ (ibid.: 57). Schmitt reiterates the essential 
aim of this latter loan, from country A to surplus country R. ‘This loan makes it entirely 
impossible for A’s government to lose the property of the income A obtained from the 
domestic payment that finances economy A’s surplus imports’ (ibid.: 57). This is because, by 
effectively neutralizing its own foreign loan from R (through counter-loan A to R), the 
‘Bureau’ succeeds in nullifying the extra sovereign debt (second foreign loan effect) which 
debt resulted, pre-reform, in the double charge. Today, very unfortunately, deficit country A’s 
‘government is deprived of the profit in money A that should result from the domestic 
expenditure of the income A that finances the surplus import of the period considered’ (ibid.: 
57). 
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country392. We will see that the reform will change that, very simply, through the counter-
credit that the ‘Bureau’ will grant to country R. 
Let us step back and recall the reason for which a deficit country’s surplus imports are doubly 
paid, in our current ‘system’ of international payments393. Put simply, they are first paid in the 
deficit nation’s own domestic money and a second time around, in foreign money given 
foreign exporters expect to be paid in their own domestic currency (money R). The very 
problem with this situation is that it comes about at a net loss for the deficit nation (e.g. 
country A) whilst, at the benefit of the surplus country (e.g. country R). Through a loan394 that 
it grants to the deficit nation A, country R literally gains ownership of a part of A’s domestic 
income (equivalent value of A’s net imports) that will be spent towards the payment of future 
goods that nation A will produce and export in a subsequent period. And as we know, this 
carries a dire consequence for the deficit nation in that this domestic income that its importers 
spend to meet the payment of its net imports is never recovered, it is forever lost and this, for 
the deficit nation as a whole. But nevertheless, this loan of foreign currency is indispensable 
for the deficit nation who requires it for the final settlement395 in money R of its ‘imports-
without-exports’. Still, the blatant fact remains: whatever foreign currency it does not acquire 
(automatically and freely) from its exports sales (‘imports-exports’), it must purchase it and, 
at a double396 cost at that. The result is that of an internal savings for the lending country R 
that, undoubtedly, comes at an extra pathological cost for the borrowing country (A), hence, 
the very malaise of the financial bubble. The deficit country definitely and permanently loses 
ownership397 of part of its domestic income in having to purchase, outright, the foreign 
                                                
392 ‘[A]s a consequence of the loan of 1 dollar granted by R to country A, country R becomes 
the owner of real goods of 1-dollar value that economy A will produce in the future. It thus 
immediately follows that the domestic payment, in money A, carried out by the residents-
importers becomes the property of the rest of the world with respect to country A. In real 
goods terms, country A loses ownership of a future good of its economy; in monetary income 
terms, country A loses the right to an equivalent sum in money A’ (ibid.: 57). 
393 ‘[I]n the actual ‘non-system’ net imports are paid twice for the following reason: they are 
paid a first time in the country’s domestic currency and second time in units of a foreign 
currency’ (ibid.: 53). 
394 ‘The payment of the net import in an income A would be definitely impossible. This is so 
because foreign sellers require to be paid in money R. The payment in money A occurs 
nonetheless, but the income A spent by importers is the monetary object of the loan granted 
by R, which will spend this sum of income A, equivalent to 1 dollar, to pay for the real goods 
produced in a future period and exported by A’s economy’ (ibid.: 59). 
395 ‘The two payments involved are clearly defined: even though it is a question of the 
payment of non-residents, A’s domestic economy carries it out using part of its national 
income, and therefore in money A, whereas, through its change in money R, the same imports 
are settled through the expenditure of a foreign income from the moment they are defined to 
the debit of country A, considered as a whole’ (ibid.: 58). 
396 ‘[E]xport-surplus countries obtain two times the payment of their net exports, first to the 
credit of their lenders, then, a second time, to the benefit of a ‘financial bubble’’ (ibid.: 56). 
Schmitt elaborates his meaning, again through his example-countries, A and R, respectively: 
‘income A spent for the domestic payment of surplus imports becomes the property of R’s 
economy. The loan of 1 dollar by non-residents has two effects … It means the appropriation 
of a revenue A, equivalent to 1 dollar, by R … This sum of income A will be spent toward the 
future export of a product of economy A’ (ibid.: 58). 
397 ‘Undeniably, therefore, there arises the problem of the acquisition of country A’s domestic 
income that its economy spends for the payment in national currency of its ‘imports-without-
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currency it requires in order to cover its imports that are not covered by exports-revenues. 
And, the irrevocable loss of its domestic income is what amounts to the double charge with 
regard to its net imports398. The deficit country ends up paying for the latter both in real 
(payment in its domestic currency) as well as in money terms (payment in a foreign currency). 
Now, let us see how the single-country application of Schmitt’s reform would unequivocally 
curtail the loss of this domestic income for the reforming country. The ‘Bureau’ will play an 
active role in facilitating the desired result; we could even say, in pun, it will lend a hand. In 
the strict sense, it will be responsible for carrying out399 a counter-credit loan to the surplus 
country R, (the entirety of its own foreign loan obtained from R), destined to distinct residents 
of R, that is, to borrowers distinct from R’s original lenders to A. In so doing, the ‘Bureau’ 
will neutralize400 the deficit country’s own external loan (‘ordinary’ loan and debt401) from R 
and consequently nullify the double charge of its net imports payment by avoiding the very 
formation of a sovereign debt402. More explicitly, the net403 foreign borrowing (pre-reform) 
                                                                                                                                                   
exports’. Who exactly is the new owner of the sum of 1 dollar spent by importers in addition 
to their foreign purchases balanced by economy A’s exports of the same period? We have just 
acknowledged that this income A is not obtained by anybody within economy A, which does 
not export anything in the face of its net imports. It is also certain that foreign exporters obtain 
only an income formed in money R. There only remain the lenders of funds, non-residents of 
A’s economy’ (ibid.: 58). Again, Schmitt is clear regard the ultimate outcome: ‘income A 
spent for the domestic payment of surplus imports becomes the property of R’s economy’ 
(ibid.: 58). 
398 ‘The second cost of the difference between expenditures and receipts is therefore entirely 
defined by the loss of ownership over the amount of income formed in money A’ (ibid.: 77). 
399 ‘There is a possible move, but only one, which avoids the loss of income A spent by the 
domestic economy for the payment of surplus imports of 1-dollar value: that the country, 
mechanically, lends 1 dollar on the financial market of the rest of the world’ (ibid.: 59). 
400 ‘The deficit country thus obtains, in financial assets, an external credit of 1 dollar that 
compensates exactly the debt of 1 dollar formed by the foreign borrowing of this sum’ (ibid.: 
59). 
401 That is, as this first loan R to A of any subsequent period to P1 (reform), is referred to by 
Schmitt (pre-reform). 
402 The counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ has the double effect of neutralizing A’s first foreign 
borrowing (R to A) as well as compensating A’s second loan (same period) that it needs to 
recover the entirety of its export revenues (money R), part of which it used to reimburse its 
debt of the previous period. It is this double effect that ultimately avoids the very formation of 
a sovereign debt, for A. 
403 The reform even ensures that it is no longer a net foreign borrowing, rather this loan that 
subsists will effectively be compensated through the domestic income (equivalent value in 
money R of reforming country’s net imports) that the ‘Bureau’ will receive directly from its 
country’s importers, in each period. ‘[A]n equal credit … is collected by the country’ (ibid.: 
94). Now it is important to understand that this loan/debt that subsists in each period relates to 
the debt initially incurred in period 1 and which debt is reimbursed and renewed in period 2 
and in each successive period thereafter. And, even if it is said that it is compensated by the 
net gain (domestic income, equivalent MR of A’s net imports) of the ‘Bureau’, it should be 
understood that it is not on account of the fact that it is so compensated that A’s external debt 
is zero: A’s external debt would be zero (asymptotically) even if its ‘Bureau’ did not obtain 
any net internal gain. Rather the mention/argument relating to the fact that this loan which 
subsists in each period is compensated by the gain of the ‘Bureau’ is merely to show that, 
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reduces to one loan versus two (pre-reform) if we remember nevertheless that the payment of 
its net imports, in foreign money R, is still outstanding and requires yet another foreign loan. 
But, the ‘Bureau’ having neutralized the first loan outright, the ‘second’404 is now the mere 
replacement of the first. That is, rather than a sovereign loan, as it would be were it to arise 
and subsist as a second pathological loan considered to be situated at the level of the country 
as a whole and moreover cumulative in time. Specifically, by reducing the foreign borrowing 
to a single remaining loan, the second sovereign loan (as referred to pre-reform) and its 
associated debt is obliterated and with it, the double charge405. What remains, in each period 
subsequent to the first period, is a mere subsisting loan406 that is compensated407. ‘The 
existence of only compensated debts of countries, as set of their residents, will be established 
by the reform’ (ibid.: 96). 
The result of the intervention of the ‘Bureau’ with respect to its counter-credit loan and 
domestic income (equivalent MR value of net imports) retrieval is twofold. On the one part, 
net imports will be paid solely408 in foreign money R, through the subsisting loan that the 
reforming country obtains from R to settle, in money R, its surplus imports of the period. On 
the other part, the reforming country’s internal income that its importers spend towards the 
net imports payment to the ‘Bureau’, in domestic currency (equivalent MR), is decidedly 
                                                                                                                                                   
even if each single period is considered separately, A’s external indebtedness is perfectly 
balanced.  
404 It should be noted that in fact, in subsequent periods to P1, the ‘Bureau’ borrows from R 
three times (whilst counter-lending to R once only) such that depending on the analytic 
approach, this ‘second’ loan hereby referenced (mere replacement of the first loan of the 
period, e.g. P2) could intend the loan (R to A) that A obtains from R (same period) to recover 
the entire amount of MR (money R) deriving from its total exports to R (same period), which 
MR country A partially used to reimburse the debt formed in the previous period, e.g. P1. This 
being the case, the only remaining debt of A at the end of the period e.g. P2, would be the one 
incurred as a result of the third loan that A requires to cover the monetary cost of the net 
imports of the period, e.g. P2. Now this loan/debt, which nevertheless manifests as an external 
debt of the deficit/reforming country, does not increase in time and is thus asymptotically nil. 
Moreover the loan is compensated (see explanation in above footnote), as opposed to being 
net. ‘External debts will form abroad towards foreign countries and no longer at the expense 
of the deficit country’ (ibid.: 46). 
405 That is, considering (as previously mentioned) the double effect of the counter-loan of the 
‘Bureau’ in that it compensates two loans of R to A. 
406 This is essentially the third loan that A borrows from R in order to cover, ultimately, its net 
imports in money R.  
407 Again, the reader should heed our explanation regard our meaning in that the fact that it is 
compensated is not what reduces A’s external debt to zero, which result is rather 
accomplished by the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R) that enables A to pay the totality 
of its net imports; in an elaboration based on the succession of periods, solely the loan 
obtained by A in the first period has a cost. In all other subsequent periods, the said loan is 
renewed but so is the reimbursement of the previous one, such that A’s external debt remains 
equal to 1 MR (on condition that its new net imports also remain constant). Still, this cost is 
reduced to zero (asymptotically) because when subdivided on a greater number of periods, 
this very cost tends (asymptotically) to zero. 
408 That is, rather than ‘being paid both by a domestic income and by a foreign loan, surplus 
imports are paid abroad only by R itself, which lends the necessary sum of money R to the 
deficit country’ (ibid.: 59). 
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salvaged409. The reform ensures that the surplus country receives singly the equivalence of 
country A’s (reforming country) net imports expenditure, in R’s currency. It becomes clearer 
as to where this is all headed for, that is, in regard to the reform’s impact. The intervention of 
the ‘Bureau’ is undeniably all-inclusive in its endeavors to rectify the anomaly of the double 
charge of external debts for the reforming countries. More so, it succeeds in nullifying them, 
utterly410. Through its counter-loan to R, it not only manages to half its foreign borrowing to 
one subsisting loan, from two pre-reform (essentially reducing the double charge) but 
moreover, it ensures that it is compensated411. This simply means that the deficit country’s 
external debts are effectively balanced412, that is, till they reproduce in a next period413. 
In sum, the combination of circumstances414 that result from the intervention of the ‘Bureau’ 
have it that the latter manages to keep intact the internal income of the reforming country by 
retaining proprietorship over its entirety and furthermore a part of it, equivalent to its net 
imports value (MR), is transferred as net gain to the country’s government. As well, the 
reform accounts for the principal of external debts payment415 to be incorporated as part and 
parcel of the deficit nation’s imports-purchases such that in each period, the totality of the net 
imports amount will include this payment. Accordingly, the net gain that will be transmitted 
to the country’s government by the ‘Bureau’ will also reflect the incorporation of this 
payment in the net imports amount exactly transferred. But how does the reform affect 
                                                
409 ‘The fact remains that ‘imports-without-exports’ are first settled by a domestic income. 
Country A’s importers spend, for the equivalent of 1 dollar, an income formed by their 
national economy. What is entirely new is essential: the income A thus spent remains the 
property of country A, the rest of the world obtaining only the equivalent of this sum, in 
money R. The sovereign Bureau obtains free of cost 1 unit of income A, a profit that it 
transfers directly to its country’s budget’ (ibid.: 59). 
410 ‘The reform will reduce the external debts of these countries to zero’ (ibid.: 47). 
411 ‘Country A gets effectively indebted for 4 dollars to the rest of the world, but an equal 
credit, equivalent in dollars of the domestic income spent for net imports, is collected by the 
country whose net debt does therefore not increase’ (ibid.: 94). The reference to country ‘A’ 
intends the deficit/reforming country whose net imports amount to 4 dollars (for example) for 
the period in question. 
412 ‘Let us now complete the description of the financial Bureau’s essential function, which 
consists in immediately cancelling the very formation of the (external) debt of deficit 
countries. To do this, it is enough that the Bureau credits the government of its country of the 
whole domestic income, formed in national currency, and spent for the payment of the 
‘expenditures-without-receipts’. Suddenly all the country’s debt will be redeemed by this gain 
and countries’ net external debts will be a thing of the past’ (ibid.: 95). 
413 Our meaning being, if we remember Schmitt’s clarification regard the formation of 
external debts: ‘external debts are formed only by surplus imports’ (ibid.: 42). 
414 ‘The situation created by the sovereign Bureau is twofold … The deficit country remains 
the owner of the totality of its domestic income, as if its imports were not in surplus … The 
government of country A obtains, as a final profit, the total value, in a domestic income, of 
the surplus imports’ (ibid.: 60). 
415 Schmitt provides an example of the workings of this advantageous feature of the reform. 
‘[T]he payment of the principal of external debts is part of countries’ purchases (imports). If 
the payment of the principal of country A’s external debts is of 2 dollars…in the period under 
consideration, the total surplus of imports over exports is finally of 3 dollars. The profit of the 
government’s budget is then of 3 dollars value taken out of a domestic product of a total value 
of 80 dollars’ (ibid.: 60). His example assumes net imports to be of 1-dollar initial value. 
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country R (surplus nation) with respect to ensuring that it is duly paid its surplus exports? Let 
us next examine the situation from its perspective. 
We will see that the reform actually guarantees its positive payment416 and this, in the exact 
period in which the surplus exports manifest. One way to comprehend this is to first 
understand that what the reform does for the deficit country is to cover the real cost417 of the 
real payment of its net imports such that it guarantees this real payment whilst it neutralizes 
the monetary cost of the real payment418 (of its net imports) so as to annul the double charge. 
It curtails this double charge by enabling the deficit country to avoid having to pay its net 
imports both in ‘substance’419 and in ‘form’420; it will do this by neutralizing the monetary 
cost of the real payment for the deficit country421. Now though the monetary cost of the real 
payment is neutralized by the counter-credit loan of the ‘Bureau’, it is not to say that the real 
payment of the net imports is omitted, rather the counter loan guarantees it by covering its 
                                                
416 Schmitt sets up the details of his example-demonstration, which example shows that the 
reform actually ascertains the credit protection of surplus countries. ‘Let us consider again the 
analysis of countries A and R. Country A’s ‘deficit’ is of 1 dollar. Before the reform, A 
contracts an external debt of 1 dollar to cover its deficit. The sovereign Bureau’s action, on 
the contrary, will assure that country A’s external debt will increase by 0 dollars. At this point 
what is of interest to us is not country A, but country R. Will it be injured by the cancellation 
of the deficit country’s external debt? Quite to the contrary, country R is fully paid in the very 
period in which it is in surplus’ (ibid.: 61). 
417 In reality, the reform ensures that it covers (moreover, in the same period that the cost is 
incurred) this real cost if we consider that A does indeed pay this real cost through its real 
exports (effectively reducing A’s net imports to zero); moreover, what the reform brings is 
that it allows A to convey its real payment at zero cost. This result is specifically achieved by 
the counter-loan (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’. 
418 Specifically, it neutralizes the monetary cost of its real payment whilst guaranteeing its 
very real payment; in other words, it is not the real payment that it avoids, but rather its 
associated monetary cost: the counter-credit loan that the ‘Bureau’ will lend to R will 
neutralize that cost, which cost is essentially the ‘form’ (ibid.: 64) aspect (monetary payment 
in foreign currency) of the real payment; this development in itself will curtail the double 
charge of net imports. (See ibidem: 59, 64). The deficit country will retain only the monetary 
payment of its net imports in each period but the reform will reduce the cost of this payment 
to zero (asymptotically). ‘Instead of being paid both by a domestic income and by a foreign 
loan, surplus imports are paid abroad only by R itself, which lends the necessary sum of 
money R to the deficit country’ (ibid.: 59). 
419 Schmitt’s meaning regard the ‘substance’ of net imports payment: ‘[s]ince the deficit 
country imports what it does not export (in value), it does not have all the goods that it 
produces at its disposal. Finally, it imports what it loses (always in value terms). Country A 
has a foreign good of 1-dollar value and pays it through an equal ‘export-without-
import’’(ibid.:64). 
420 Schmitt distinguishes the ‘substance’ aspect of the net imports payment from that of its 
‘form’: ‘[t]his payment is positive in foreign currency and not in units of domestic money; to 
this effect country A spends dollars and not money A’ (ibid.: 64). Thus the ‘form’ aspect 
being the payment in the surplus country’s currency, money R (dollars), the ‘substance’ 
aspect being the payment in the deficit country A’s domestic income (money A). 
421 What the reform succeeds in doing (through the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’) is to ensure 
that the ‘form’ aspect of the payment of net imports (monetary cost of their real payment) is 
neutralized and that only its ‘substance’ aspect (real cost of their real payment) remains. (See 
ibidem: 64). 
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real cost and, in the actual period in which the deficit arises (net imports); this means that the 
surplus country (R), is effectively paid in full422 and, in the same period that its surplus 
originates. What explains this is the very outcome of the counter-credit loan of the ‘Bureau’ 
which loan has the effect of paying423 a same value (MR) amount of the surplus country’s 
own imports424. In effect, what transpires is that the initial425 credit-loan that the deficit 
country (A) obtains from the surplus country (R) in exchange for its financial securities, 
‘serves’ as the foreign payment of its surplus imports whilst the loan in reverse of the 
‘Bureau’ pays for an equal portion of R’s imports426. Moreover, what ensues from these two 
counter-balancing loans is that each country’s respective indebtedness (A’s and R’s) towards 
one another, cancels out427. Thus, not only does the counter-credit loan of the ‘Bureau’ 
guarantee the real payment of the deficit country’s net imports, it also, at the same time, 
neutralizes its cost. The only cost remaining and subsisting in each period and this period after 
period is the payment in money R, for which the deficit country will require another loan of 
same amount, in order to finally settle the payment of its net imports in foreign currency. It 
becomes obvious that, already, the reform has served to avoid the double charge428 of these 
surplus imports, for the deficit country. Furthermore, it has achieved this without causing 
country R (surplus country) having to ‘suffer any loss of real income’ (ibid.: 62); the latter is 
                                                
422 ‘[T]he credit of 1 dollar granted by the Bureau to non-residents consists, for R, in the 
external payment of an equal part of its own imports, exactly ‘symmetrical’ to the imports of 
A paid by the rest of the world’ (ibid.: 61). 
423 ‘In products of the period considered, country R imports real goods of 10 dollars value. 
Part of these purchases, a fraction of 1-dollar value, is paid by the Bureau of country A, which 
lends an income of this value to country R. This is an income R, object of the (first) loan 
granted by country R to country A’ (ibid.: 61). 
424 ‘Country R imports real assets equivalent to10 dollars but it pays them only to the extent 
of 9 dollars, the difference being settled by economy A, of whom a product equal to 1 dollar 
is lent by the Bureau A to non-residents’ (ibid.: 61). 
425 More explicitly, in Schmitt’s own words: ‘country R obtains an external credit of 1 dollar. 
This is precisely the foreign credit of country A. Apart from the transfer created by the 
Bureau, this initial credit of country A is the external payment of its net imports’ (ibid.: 61). It 
is important to retain that nonetheless, the end all effect (real payment of A’s surplus imports) 
manifests on account of the counter-loan (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’ hence our referral to 
‘serves’ entre guillemets. That is, the fact remains that the real payment of A’s net imports, is 
made through this counter-loan granted to R by the ‘Bureau’. If the payment of A’s net 
imports were actually financed, simply, through the initial loan from R, nothing would change 
with respect to the present situation. 
426 ‘[T]he credit obtained by R has exactly the same effect in the opposite direction: being of 
an external origin it brings to this country the payment of an import of equal value. This 
means that R’s imports of 1-dollar value are paid by country A and not by country R’ (ibid.: 
61).  
427 ‘R owes A exactly what A owes R. As a consequence, if country R does not get indebted 
to country A, it is logical and perfectly correct and just that country A does not get indebted to 
country R’ (ibid.: 61). 
428 ‘The domestic economy pays its deficit by giving up real funds, in that it provides the rest 
of the world with the gain and possession of a part, equal to the external deficit, of its national 
product. If this expenditure of the domestic economy must be paid at an additional cost, in 
foreign currency while it has already been paid in national money, the ‘multiplication by 2’ of 
the country’s external debt is unavoidable’ (ibid.: 64). 
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duly paid, in full and, in the same period in which its surplus occurs429. In fact, the 
progressive step that the reform brings, through the counter-credit loan of the ‘Bureau’, is that 
it not only ensures, in each period and for each of the transacting countries (countries A and 
R), that the level of their respective imports and exports is equalized, in terms of value430, but 
more so it obtains the balance-of-payments identity431 between IM and EX in a way akin to 
how it happens for countries’ ‘imports-exports’; for the deficit country this particularly means 
that the identity is guaranteed cost-free432, that is, by avoiding a net foreign borrowing433 
                                                
429 The counter-credit loan of the ‘Bureau’ to R is what ensures this in that this very credit is 
the foreign payment of a portion of R’s own imports, a same amount as credited by R through 
its initial loan to deficit country A, for the external payment of its net imports. 
430 ‘This function of country A’s Bureau enables in every period the general conservation of 
each country’s imports at the level of its exports. According to the reform, even the deficit 
countries will import, in value terms, an amount exactly equal to their exports. Although its 
imports reach the value of 11 dollars, apparently 1 dollar greater than its exports, economy A 
imports a real income whose value is of 10 dollars only, at the same level as its exports. It is 
the loan of 1 dollar that the sovereign Bureau grants to residents of economy R that produces 
this outcome’ (ibid.: 62). The references to ‘economy A’ and ‘economy R’ intend the deficit 
country A and surplus country R, respectively. As regard country R, ‘[i]t actually imports 
goods worth only 10 dollars, its exports being equal to 11 dollars. But this gain is entirely 
compensated by the debit of 1 dollar defined by the loan of A’s sovereign Bureau. Given this 
debit, economy R is only credited with 10 dollars from abroad, the value exactly equal to the 
sum of its own imports’ (ibid.: 62). 
431 ‘Applied to countries, this means that a country’s imports are necessarily equal to, and 
simultaneous with, its exports, and vice versa. Thus, when a country is a net commercial 
exporter it is also a net importer of financial bonds, while a country whose trade balance is in 
deficit is at the same time a net seller on the financial market’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 
267). 
432 ‘The reform creates, for surplus imports, what already exists for offset imports, namely, 
the gratuitousness of the foreign currencies, which only serve to convert the payments already 
carried out in national currency. By giving up part of its domestic product, the deficit country 
pays off R through the expenditure of a sum of foreign currencies. Through the counter-
balancing debt, incurred by R as a result of the loan granted by the Bureau, the sum of gains 
in foreign currency is equal to the sum of its losses despite the fact that imports exceed 
exports. The equality between losses and gains means that the foreign currency that provides 
the final form to the payment of net imports is for free for the reformed country, as is the 
foreign currency used for the payment of offset imports’ (ibid.: 65). In effect, in nullifying the 
monetary cost of the real payment, the purchase of the foreign currency is neutralized as 
well, so that akin to its payment of ‘imports-exports’, the deficit country does not have to 
purchase the foreign currency it needs, to provide the accepted ‘form’ to the payment of its 
net imports: ‘the payment in money R, the only one accepted abroad’ (ibid.: 65). The 
payment of its surplus imports has effectively been reduced to one (remaining) single 
payment from that of a double payment (pre-reform); the only subsisting cost is the second 
foreign borrowing that the ‘Bureau’ still requires for the outstanding payment of its net 
imports in R’s currency, but this second and only loan ‘is now their sole cost’ (ibid.: 65). 
Again, our referenced above to the ‘second foreign borrowing’ could instead be the third 
foreign borrowing, depending on the analytic approach, as we have explained in an earlier 
footnote. 
433 ‘It is particularly advantageous here to compare the situation created by the reform to 
today’s state of affairs. In the present situation, A’s and R’s imports are nevertheless equal to 
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which, pre-reform, entailed an extra434 purchasing-cost for the foreign currency required in 
the payment of its net imports. The reform goes beyond435 achieving ‘the already verified 
parity of imports’ (ibid.: 62) between the deficit and surplus countries (A and R respectively) 
as it is established, today. We more easily understand this if we remember that the reform’s 
goal is to avoid the double charge436. 
Let us backtrack on our explanation as to just how the reform provides for the reforming 
country, the foreign money (the ‘form’ aspect of the payment) that it requires for the payment 
of its ‘imports-without-exports’, free of charge. Understanding this essentially crystallizes 
one’s comprehension of just how the double charge (of net imports) is avoided. We start by 
recalling that pre-reform, the deficit country incurs the cost of its net imports, twice437. This is 
because, to the extent that it does not earn (through exports-revenues) the foreign currency 
that it requires to pay its net expenditures, it must ultimately purchase it. This means, in 
effect, that it incurs both the cost of the ‘substance’ and, that of the ‘form’. In other words, it 
incurs the cost of both the real and, that of the monetary payment438. For ‘imports-exports’ 
the monetary (foreign currency) payment of imports is provided automatically and free of 
charge through a same gain in exports-revenues. For ‘imports-without-exports’, the foreign 
currency required to finally settle their payment is obtained through a foreign loan. But the 
problem is that the implication of a foreign loan will actually duplicate439 the payment of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
one another although A carries out net imports. The equality between imports is maintained 
by the foreign loan that country A obtains in order to finance its surplus import. This loan 
provides an additional import to country R, which finally imports real goods of the same 
value as the goods imported by country A. It is the payment of A’s future exports that has this 
effect’ (ibid.: 62). The difference that the reform will bring is that not only will it comply with 
the balance-of-payments identity by allowing R to obtain a portion of A’s domestic resources, 
equal measure to that of R’s output exported to A (latter’s net imports), but moreover all in 
the same period. That is, if we consider that, today, the real payment of A’s net imports is 
obtained through the appropriation by R of part of A’s future output. The reform will see that, 
tomorrow, the real payment will no longer involve A’s future production, but will rather take 
place through the cession of part of A’s actual resources, in the form of financial securities. 
434 That is, extra, in that it ended up doubling the actual amount of its net imports. 
435 Our meaning: given that the real payment of A’s net imports implies the cession to R of a 
same portion of A’s actual resources, that is, of the same current period that the surplus 
imports arise, rather than a future production of a subsequent period; this feature of the 
reform, achieved through the counter-credit loan of the ‘Bureau’, is what actually prevents the 
duplication of the deficit country’s external debt (net imports), by avoiding the double charge. 
436 ‘It would therefore be useless for the reform to seek to establish the already verified parity 
of imports. The function of the Bureau is of an entirely different nature. It is a question of 
avoiding that the charge of surplus imports be increased to twice its value’ (ibid.: 62). 
Through its counter-credit loan, the ‘Bureau’ will achieve just that. 
437 ‘We understand the reason for this imposed ‘multiplication by 2’ of the charge of external 
debts before the reform: it is because the deficit country has not only to borrow abroad a sum 
of income equal to its ‘imports-without-exports’, but it is forced to pay two times this loan, 
both through the cession of goods that it will produce in the future and through the settlement 
of its net imports of actual goods’ (ibid.: 62). 
438 That is, ‘the foreign currency that provides the final form to the payment of net imports’ 
(ibid.: 65). 
439 ‘The reform allows us to avoid this duplication of the debt. It achieves this through the 
cancelling of the loan’ (ibid.: 62). That is, through the cancellation of the loan that the 
deficit/reforming country initially contracts to acquire the foreign currency it requires to pay 
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deficit country’s net imports. This is because the deficit country will have to first cede the 
ownership of part of its future goods production (equivalent MR amount of its net imports) 
just to secure the loan of foreign currency it requires; moreover it will have to spend the 
foreign loan so obtained in order to settle the monetary payment (in foreign money) of its 
surplus imports, thus retaining no compensation whatsoever for its initial loan of foreign 
currency, whose payment has already been accounted for in domestic (deficit country’s) 
income440. 
Now, if we consider carefully what the reform fundamentally achieves441, in that it prevents 
that the cost of the payment of net imports be incurred both in real and in money terms, we 
soon realize just how it manages to do this442. Given that foreign exporters expect the totality 
                                                                                                                                                   
its net imports (or simpler said, to allow it to counter-lend 1 MR to R), which initial loan the 
‘Bureau’ cancels by its same MR amount counter-lending to R. 
440 ‘[T]he payment in money A takes place anyway, because it is confirmed by the sum 
borrowed abroad of the foreign currency necessary to finance net imports. By itself, even 
before the sum obtained is spent to the benefit of R, the currency borrowed is the 
transformation of payment A into a payment R’ (ibid.: 65). The reference to ‘money A’ and 
‘payment A’ intend the deficit country A’s domestic money and payment, respectively. As 
well ‘payment R’ intend a payment in money R (surplus country’s). 
441 ‘[W]e can easily understand the essential function of the reform. The goal is simply to 
avoid the surplus of expenditures over receipts of foreign currency being paid both by its 
substance and its form’ (ibid.: 64). 
442 In effect, the reform creates a (transacting) situation for the reforming countries, such that 
the foreign money (currency R) implied in the real payment of their net imports ‘is at the 
same time spent and earned’ (ibid.: 65), as it happens in the situation of ‘imports-exports’ 
whereby the ‘cost’ of the foreign currency is always free of charge. Schmitt explains the 
effectiveness of the role of the ‘Bureau’ in this regard. ‘The function of the sovereign Bureau 
could not be simpler or clearer: to prevent that the payment in foreign currency be costly and 
ensure instead that it is completely free. To the extent that expenditures and gains of foreign 
currency are equal, the foreign currency is indeed free. This is so because it is at the same 
time spent and earned. From the moment imports exceed exports, they define foreign 
currency expenditures that are not offset by any gain. These net expenditures of foreign 
money units are the second cost of net imports. The reform cancels this second cost; it is its 
entire raison d’être’ (ibid.: 64−65). It is the counter-credit lending of the ‘Bureau’ that 
achieves this very effect. Schmitt elaborates on the precise function of this counter-loan. ‘In 
order to cancel the cost in foreign currencies, which transform or give another form to the 
payment of the surplus import, the Bureau lends abroad all the sum of foreign currencies 
borrowed. In our numerical example, country A owes 1 dollar abroad; the payment in this 
form would cost it the value of 1 dollar if it did not lend 1 dollar abroad. As this loan reduces 
to nil or zero its initial borrowing of 1 dollar, its second borrowing of 1 dollar provides the 
sum of foreign currency it needs to give its final form (in foreign currency) to the payment of 
net imports. The second borrowing abroad of 1 dollar costs nothing more to the deficit 
country, because its only effect is to reproduce the first loan of 1 dollar’ (ibid.: 65). 
Specifically, it does not cost anything: the extra pre-reform conversion fee (in regards to the 
foreign currency) has been nullified by the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ which counter-loan 
compensates both the first and second loans (R to A); the desired outcome as brought in by 
the reform is that the two loans (R to A) no longer add to one another, given that the second 
foreign borrowing (R to A) is simply the reproduction/replacement of the first initial 
borrowing (R to A) which loan was effectively neutralized by the ‘Bureau’. This is the reason 
that the ‘second borrowing abroad of 1 dollar costs nothing more’ (ibidem). Explained 
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of their exports-payment in their own domestic currency, the ‘Bureau’ of the reforming 
country (A) retains the initial foreign borrowing (R to A) that provides it with the foreign 
currency (same value amount of its surplus imports) that it will ultimately require in order to 
settle the payment of its net imports, in money R. After all, it simply cannot avoid this loan of 
foreign currency, which foreign money it requires but was unable to earn through a same 
amount of exports-revenues. So the ‘Bureau’ maintains443 this first foreign loan that is 
essentially the cost of the real payment444 of its net imports, whilst neutralizing its very 
associated cost. As earlier explained, it manages to do this through its counter-credit loan to 
residents of country R. This counter-loan effectively cancels the cost445 of A’s initial foreign 
borrowing (first foreign loan of the second and, subsequent periods) such that the second446 
foreign borrowing of the ‘Bureau’ to pay its outstanding net imports in foreign money, defines 
its only cost447 for its net imports. Hence, reducing the double payment of its net imports to a 
single one essentially means it obtains the foreign currency it requires for the payment of its 
net imports, cost-free448. The double charge is efficaciously curtailed.  
                                                                                                                                                   
another way, the real payment of A’s net imports (which incidentally are no longer net as a 
result of the real payment) which takes place in P2 (period 2) and in any subsequent period 
thereafter, takes the form of the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R). Now, it is because it 
takes place through this counter-loan that the real payment does not add to the monetary 
payment, meaning that the monetary payment is costless. 
443 ‘We thus maintain the loan as it stood before the reform. But the sovereign Bureau adds, as 
we have already established, a reverse loan. We thus have the coexistence of two equal-size 
financial transactions, which ‘contradict’ one another: the loan of 1 dollar granted by R to A 
is offset by the loan of 1 dollar granted by A’s Bureau to non-residents’ (ibid.: 62). 
444 It should be clear that the real payment of A’s net imports (that, consequently, are no 
longer net) is on account of the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R) and not due to the first 
loan (in each period) of R to A (which is the case today and implies the cession of a future 
product of economy A). 
445 That is, the cost of the real payment of its net imports. 
446 Again, as previously explained, this could be the third foreign borrowing, depending on 
the analytic approach. 
447 ‘The financial Bureau destroys the first loan, while maintaining it of course, by 
compensating it with an equal loan granted to non-residents. What remains for the external 
payment of net imports is the second loan only, which is now their sole cost’ (ibid.: 65). 
448 Our meaning in that, in paying the very amount of its net imports once only and not twice, 
the ‘Bureau’ effectively obtains the foreign currency at no extra charge, rather it obtains it 
free of charge, akin to how it obtains it for its ‘imports-exports’, that is, cost-free. One notable 
and formidable factor, perhaps contrarily to what might have been expected as unattainable, 
the reform successfully achieves the cost-free charge of the foreign currency it requires, 
indirectly. That is, indirectly in the sense that it nullifies the cost of the net imports’ real 
payment whilst retaining its (net imports) monetary payment and ‘cost’ (foreign currency 
payment). Our reference with respect to ‘cost’ is in regard to the fact that the cost-free result 
is so obtained not through directly nullifying the cost of the monetary payment but rather, 
through reducing a double payment to a single one, as nullifying the cost of the real payment 
indeed achieves. That said, if we were to elaborate on our meaning: in absence of a proper 
system of international payments, A is currently obliged to borrow the amount of money R 
that it requires to convey the real payment of its net imports; but the change that the reform 
will bring, in this respect, is that it will allow A to do so (borrow) at zero cost. This is 
achieved through the counter-loan (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’. Even the cost of the monetary 
payment (in money R) of A’s net imports (the real payment having not cancelled the need for 
136 
At this stage, the reform has already reached its prime objective449 in that it has managed to 
salvage A’s domestic income that pre-reform was captured by surplus country R through its 
appropriation of part of the deficit country’s (A) future output (net foreign borrowing effect). 
The ‘Bureau’ has achieved450 this through its counter-credit loan to R. But, still, one 
remaining foreign loan is required by the ‘Bureau’ in order to ultimately settle the payment of 
its net imports in R’s currency. Let us consider then, the indebtedness-effect451 of this ultimate 
foreign loan for the deficit/reforming country, regard its external debt. We remember that the 
foreign borrowing of the deficit country has been halved by the effect452 of the counter-credit 
loan of the ‘Bureau’ which loan has the double effect of canceling the very formation of the 
debt arising from A’s first453 loan from R (2nd   period or, any subsequent period to period 1) 
and of compensating the debt formed by A’s second454 loan from R. Now, there remains yet 
                                                                                                                                                   
a monetary payment) will be reduced (asymptotically) to zero, by the reform. In an 
explanation built from an analysis of successive periods, solely the loan obtained by A for the 
monetary payment of its net imports in P1 (the very first period) has a cost. In all subsequent 
periods, though this monetary payment loan subsists in that the loan is renewed, so is the 
reimbursement of the previous one, so that A’s external debt remains constant and equal to 1 
MR (assuming the new net imports are also constant at 1 MR, period after period). When 
subdivided on a greater number of periods, this cost (P1) tends to zero (asymptotically). 
Considering all parts and aspects of the reformation then, though it is true that the real 
payment does not cancel the need for a monetary payment and ‘cost’, still, the reformation 
facilitates the reduction of this monetary ‘cost’ (asymptotically) to zero. The reform is, quite 
simply, truly splendid in its accomplishments. 
449 ‘The essential goal is thus reached, because the sum of 1-dollar value formed in a domestic 
income of economy A is no longer earned by the rest of the world. As we know well, it is the 
property of its Bureau and, ultimately, of its government’ (ibid.: 63). The reference to 
‘economy A’ is that of the deficit country (1-dollar being the value of its net imports) whereas 
that of the ‘rest of the world’ intends country R.  
450 ‘The goal is thus achieved, because country R can no longer become the owner of real 
goods that country A will produce in the future; the loan made by R to A is of a zero sum. 
Thereby one precludes that country A’s net import of 1-dollar value costs 2 dollars’ (ibid.: 
62). 
451 ‘The last act really worth mentioning concerns the external debt that country A carries 
because of its second indebtedness of 1 dollar contracted abroad’ (ibid.: 63). The reference to 
the ‘second indebtedness’ intends the second and only foreign loan that subsists for deficit 
country A, that is, with respect to the payment of its net imports, in money R. Moreover, our 
own reference to ‘‘the second and only foreign loan that subsists’’ could be inter-changed 
with ‘‘the third and only foreign loan that subsists’’, depending on the approach of the 
analysis, as explained earlier. 
452 The counter-credit loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R) cancels the first foreign loan of country A 
(R to A), such that the second foreign loan that it acquires no longer adds to the first external 
loan (now cancelled), it merely reproduces/replaces it: the double charge, as such, is avoided. 
‘It would be wrong to add to one another the two loans that country A contracts abroad in 
each period. The second loan is indeed only the reproduction of the first’ (ibid.: 63).  
453 This first loan (R to A) is necessary for A so as to provide it with the amount of money R 
that it needs to finance its loan to R (the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’, A to R). The 
occurrence of the loan is as of any subsequent period to P1, e.g. P2. 
454 This second loan (R to A) is required by A to recover the entire amount of money R (MR) 
deriving from its total exports to R (MR deficiency resulting from reimbursing the debt 
formed in the previous period, e.g. P1.) Again, the occurrence of this second loan is as of any 
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one more external loan which country A needs to obtain from R (to settle the payment of its 
net imports in money R), this is the third subsisting loan455 which it contracts period after 
period, as well as reimburses, period after period. This remaining external borrowing that 
nevertheless manifests as an external debt456 of reforming country A, is non cumulative in 
time, rather asymptotically nil457. Furthermore, as we have mentioned earlier, this remaining 
foreign loan is compensated458 rather than net. It is effectively compensated, in each period, 
                                                                                                                                                   
subsequent period to P1, period after period. Moreover, it manifests as mere replacement of 
A’s first loan (R to A) which loan is neutralized by the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R). 
In effect, it is on account of the very fact that it manifests always as mere replacement of the 
first loan (which loan is neutralized by the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’) that the counter-loan 
of the ‘Bureau’ is able to fully compensate it. Specifically, the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ 
has the double effect of compensating it (second R to A loan) in addition to neutralizing the 
first R to A loan. 
455 This loan/debt is incurred in each period, period after period, as a result of the monetary 
payment of A’s net imports. It is firstly incurred in P1 as A’s sole foreign borrowing from R, 
(1 MR), such as to enable the monetary payment of its net imports, in money R, in this said 
period. 
456 ‘The external debt does not increase at all: in the sum of periods elapsed, where imports 
are nevertheless 1 dollar in surplus in each period, country A’s external debt is only equal to 
the current deficit of its imports, that is, 1 dollar only’ (ibid.: 63). Now this outcome obtains, 
on condition that each new debt of this kind debt is reimbursed in the subsequent period and, 
if the counter-credit loan granted by the ‘Bureau’ to R, has the double effect of avoiding the 
formation of a sovereign debt (through neutralizing the first loan R to A) as well as 
compensating the second debt that derives from the need to recover the reduction of A’s 
exports-revenues (MR) caused by the reimbursement of this kind loan, in each period. We 
will later elaborate on this double effect of the counter-credit loan of the ‘Bureau’. 
457 Let us explain again on why this is by retracing our steps to the first period (P1): in this 
very first period, the ‘Bureau’ borrows abroad  (1MR) only once. There is no second loan (R 
to A) that is contracted in the first period. This is so on account of the fact that the real 
payment of A’s net imports takes place only from the second period onwards. In the first 
period a revolving fund in MR, is obtained by A through a loan granted by R. This revolving 
fund is used in P1 and, reconstituted and used up in each subsequent period, always, for the 
monetary payment of A’s net imports. At the end of P1, the ‘Bureau’ of A has thus a debt 
equal to 1 MR. This is A’s only cost, monetary, with respect to A’s net imports (the real cost 
being covered cost-free by the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’, A to R), still, the reform allows 
to reduce this very cost (asymptotically) to zero. Specifically, considered on a succession of 
periods, only this very loan that A obtains in the first period has a cost. In all subsequent 
periods, the loan is renewed but so is the reimbursement of the previous one, such that A’s 
external debt is maintained at 1 MR, period after period. Now, when this cost is subdivided on 
a greater number of periods, it tends (asymptotically) to zero. 
458 The reform will assure this through the assigned task of the ‘Bureau’ who will be 
responsible for collecting its country’s domestic income (equivalent MR value of its net 
imports amount). In Schmitt’s own words, ‘[t]he existence of only compensated debts of 
countries, as set of their residents , will be established by the reform’ (ibid.: 96). Matter-of-
factly, it is in this way that the reform will succeed in nullifying deficit countries’ external 
debts, altogether. Specifically, it ‘will reduce the external debts of these countries to zero’ 
(ibid.: 47). The novelty that the reform will thus bring is that ‘[e]xternal debts will form 
abroad towards foreign countries’ but ‘no longer at the expense of the deficit country’ (ibid.: 
46). One point remains to be clarified: this is not to say that a country’s external debt related 
138 
by the domestic income (equivalent MR value of reforming country’s surplus imports) that 
the ‘Bureau’ receives, directly, from its country importers: A’s external indebtedness is thus 
perfectly balanced. 
 
 
The mechanism of the ‘Bureau’ in a snapshot 
 
We consider our example-country A (deficit/reforming). In the first period (P1) the ‘Bureau’ 
of A borrows only once, 1 MR, from R. There is no second loan (R to A) in P1; the reason 
being, A’s real payment of its net imports takes place only from the second period (P2) 
onwards. In P1 a revolving kind of fund in money R (1MR) is acquired by A through a loan 
granted by R; the ‘Bureau’ of country A uses this fund to cover the monetary payment of A’s 
net imports. At the end of P1, the ‘Bureau’ of A has a debt equal to 1 MR. Now as previously 
indicated, the real payment of A’s net imports takes place as of P2 and in each period 
thereafter and, it takes the form, always, of the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R). It is 
because it takes place through this counter-loan that the real payment does not add to the 
monetary one (as it did pre-reform): the monetary cost of the real payment is costless.  
All develops and manifests as per the following. A’s net imports of P1 are actually paid, in 
real terms, in P2, through the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R). Likewise, A’s net imports 
of P2 are effectively paid, always in real terms, in P3, and so forth. Yet, if we assume A’s net 
imports to be of the same amount period after period, the real payment occurring in P2 
corresponds to the net imports of P2, and so on. Still, the one point to keep abreast of is that 
the payment occurring in P1 is financed only by a loan obtained from R. But, asymptotically 
the debt formed in P1 is zero, so that this potentially problematic point (regarding the sole 
financing in P1) is thus re-absorbed. Given the said conditions then, one can indeed 
conceptualize that from P2 onwards A’s net imports are paid in the very period in which they 
actually form. The distinction between a first period where A’s net imports are not yet paid in 
real terms and all of the successive periods, has been introduced by Schmitt (2014) such as to 
                                                                                                                                                   
to its deficit, its very net imports, is reduced to zero (in each period subsequent to P1) on 
account of the net gain of the ‘Bureau’; rather the deficit/reforming country’s external debt is 
reduced to zero, very simply, because the said country (A) pays the totality of its imports and 
it achieves this through the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R) via which the reforming 
country cedes a portion of its actual resources (equivalent of its net imports in MR value). 
Moreover, the result of this counter-loan (A to R) is that the reforming country’s net imports 
are thus no longer net per se and, the said country, therefore, is no longer a deficit country. 
What has to be understood, is that the deficit/reforming country’s external debt would 
be reduced to zero in each period subsequent to P1 (complement of the counter-loan of 
the ‘Bureau’), even if the ‘Bureau’ did not obtain any net gain of domestic income 
(equivalent MR value of its net imports) from its country residents. To say it again, this is 
because it is the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ that has the effect of rendering the 
deficit/reforming country a non-deficit country: its real imports being fully covered by its real 
exports (A’s actual internal resources), its external debt (deficit relating to net imports) is thus 
reduced to nil. That all said, only the external debt related to the cost of the monetary payment 
(in money R) of its net imports is what is compensated by the net gain of the ‘Bureau’. And, 
we have seen that the debt related to this cost is initially incurred in P1 and then cancelled and 
renewed in each successive period; it is a debt that is asymptotically equal to zero being that it 
does not increase in time. Still, A’s external indebtedness related to the monetary payment in 
money R of its net imports, is perfectly balanced in each single period, on account of the net 
gain (domestic income, equivalent MR value of its net imports) of the ‘Bureau’.  
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present the more pragmatic aspect of the reform, by specifically demonstrating how it could 
actually be implemented in practice. 
Let us consider for example, what transpires in P2. In this second period, the ‘Bureau’ of A 
borrows 1 MR from R; this first loan of P2 is such that A can obtain the amount of money R 
that it needs to finance its own loan to R (the very counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’, A to R). A 
(its ‘Bureau’) borrows again 1 MR from R, this time, to recover the entire amount of MR 
deriving from its total exports to R of P2 (MR deficiency resulting from reimbursing the debt 
formed in the previous period due to its monetary payment of its net imports of P1). The 
‘Bureau’ then counter-loans (A to R) 1 MR. Through this counter-loan of P2, the ‘Bureau’ 
conveys cost-free the real payment of A’s net imports of P1 (or, we could say of P2 if we keep 
in mind our previous explanation on this point), of 1 MR value: it is because this real 
payment takes place through the loan granted by the ‘Bureau’ (A to R) that indeed, it does not 
add to the monetary payment in money R of A’s net imports of the same period (P2) (the 
monetary cost of the real payment being reduced to zero, complement of the counter-loan). 
Now, the fact that the real payment no longer adds to the monetary payment (as it did so pre-
reform) precludes the very formation of a sovereign debt, for A: the double charge (pre-
reform) of its external debt is thus already effectively curtailed. But moreover, the counter-
loan of the ‘Bureau’ bears a double effect in that by neutralizing A’s first loan of the period 
(P2), it is able to fully compensate the debt related to A’s second loan of the period (P2) with 
the credit that it (A’s ‘Bureau’) obtains from its counter-loan to R. The explanation behind 
this double effect stems from the analytical argument based on the logical distinction between 
‘imputation’ on a result versus ‘imputation’ on a formation. In other words, if a debt is 
incurred as a result of a deficit and, an equivalent credit is obtained to balance the debit, the 
impact is that of ‘imputation’ on the result; however the situation is different if the credit so 
obtained has a direct impact not on a debt already incurred, but rather on the very formation 
of this debt, in which case the credit cancels the formation of the debt itself. This is exactly 
the impact of the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R): it impedes the very formation of the 
debt related to A’s first loan from R (P2), so that the only debt formed is the one following 
from A’s second loan from R (P2), which debt is therefore fully compensated by the credit459 
deriving from the counter-loan of A’s ‘Bureau’ (A to R). 
What the counter-loan (A to R) effectively enables A to do is to pay (in real terms) the totality 
of its imports. In so doing, it reduces A’s external debt to zero. Specifically, the counter-loan 
of the ‘Bureau’ allows A to convey the real payment of its net imports at zero cost, it also 
allows it to offset the monetary cost of the second loan that is required to recover the entire 
MR amount initially deriving from its total exports to R of the same period (e.g. P2), this on 
account of the very credit-compensation460 that this counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ obtains from 
R. This specific end all result is achieved through the double effect of the counter-loan of the 
‘Bureau’. 
                                                
459 Schmitt defines this credit as the ‘financial assets’ obtained from R, result of the counter-
loan (A to R) of A’s ‘Bureau’: ‘[t]he deficit country thus obtains, in financial assets, an 
external credit of 1 dollar that compensates exactly the debt of 1 dollar formed by the foreign 
borrowing of this sum’ (ibid.: 59). 
460 ‘Deficit country A is therefore subjected by its second borrowing to the only debt created 
by the first. Country A’s external debt is initially of (1−1=) 0 dollars since the Bureau lends 
also 1 dollar. Finally, the debt incurred is of 1 dollar because of the second loan. Since the 
credit that adds to it is of 1 dollar, the ‘experts’ of the Bureau do not have the choice but to 
add −1 dollar to +1 dollar, which gives the value of their country’s indebtedness, at 0 dollars, 
an excellent conclusion, although a little unexpected’ (ibid.: 63−64). 
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Now, the only debt remaining in each period (subsequent to P1) is as a result of A’s need for 
yet a third loan to cover its net imports payment of the period, which cost remains outstanding 
in money terms. For this reason it will borrow again 1MR from R. This is the debt that is 
effectively reimbursed in each new period (subsequent to P1) such that even if A renews its 
net imports deficit each new period (assuming the renewal amount of its net imports deficit 
remains the same, e.g. 1 MR) so is the re-imbursement of a same amount renewed. 
Consequently A’s external debt is maintained at 1 MR, period after period. This in itself is a 
major feat brought in by the reform if compared with today’s situation whereby A’s external 
debt is doubled through the pathological formation of a sovereign debt that moreover, is 
cumulative in time (each new sovereign debt adding to the preceding one, period after 
period). The counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ precludes the very formation of this anomalous 
sovereign debt461 by effectively neutralizing one of the double charges (pre-reform) 
associated with the payment of net imports: it neutralizes outright the monetary cost of the 
real payment (whilst maintaining the real payment462) such that the double charge is reduced, 
in each period, to a single monetary cost associated with its net imports (monetary) payment 
(in money R) of the said period. And, the cost associated with this outstanding debt derives 
from the only loan that A obtained from R in the very first period, for the monetary payment 
(in money R) of its net imports of P1; still, the reform allows for this cost to be reduced 
(asymptotically) to zero. Now, it is true that even with the reform in place, the real payment 
of A’s net imports does not cancel the need for its monetary payment in money R, which will 
remain necessary in each period. But the debt463 related to the loan (third loan R to A) that A 
will need to cover it, is nevertheless counterbalanced464 in the sense that an equivalent credit 
                                                
461 Specifically, it is the double effect of the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ that avoids the 
sovereign debt formation in that this counter-loan is able to compensate two loans (R to A): it 
impedes the formation of the first debt (first loan of the period, R to A), such that the only 
debt formed is the one following from the second loan of the period from R (needed by A to 
recover the entire MR amount deriving from its total exports to R, which MR amount A has 
partly used to reimburse the debt formed in the first period), debt that is thus fully 
compensated by the credit resulting from the counter-loan (A to R). This means then, that 
only one loan (third loan R to A) subsists for A, period after period; the double charge of net 
imports (pre-reform) is effectively curtailed in that the charge is reduced to a single sole 
monetary cost (monetary payment in money R, the very third loan of the period, R to A) and, 
which cost the reform asymptotically reduces to zero. 
462 Complement of the reform, the only cost of the reforming/deficit country’s (A) net imports 
will be real (its actual internal resources: through the loan (A to R), A will pay for part of R’s 
imports whatever their form, e.g. form of financial securities); meaning that the surplus 
imports of country (A) will be paid in real rather than in money terms. Obtained through A’s 
counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’, this result means that the reform will neutralize the monetary 
cost of the real payment and not the cost ‘tout court’ (see ibidem); the real payment has still a 
real cost (the domestic resources, actual instead of future, given up by A), but its monetary 
cost is neutralized/nullified (reduced to zero) by the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R). 
The reform (through the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’) thus ensures that the ‘form’ aspect of 
the payment is neutralized and that solely its ‘substance’ aspect remains (see ibidem: 64). 
463 Specifically, the debt is its sole subsisting external debt (same 1 dollar value as its net 
imports of the period, assuming the latter are constant period after period) of the period under 
examination. 
464 ‘The deficit country remains the owner of the totality of its domestic income, as if its 
imports were not in surplus’ (ibid.: 60). In effect, what the reform brings is that it facilitates a 
special payment transaction platform for net imports in that it is as though the latter were 
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‘equivalent in dollars of the domestic income spent for net imports, is collected by the country 
whose net debt does therefore not increase’ (ibid.: 94). This credit is essentially the very 
domestic income that the reform is able to salvage, which income was forever lost, pre-
reform, to the benefit of R at the expense of the deficit country (A). Let us re-visit, in a next 
section, just how exactly this internal income of A is lost prior to the reform. Clearly 
understanding this, will not only help hone in on the reality of the double charge of net 
imports, but more so, the advantage that the reform will bring in this regard. For this reason, 
we turn our attention to the international rule that governs external payment-transactions of 
trading countries from which derives the reciprocal parity of expenditures between these 
commercially exchanging countries, the very ‘equality of im (R) and im (A)’ (ibid.: 67). We 
will see that it is the adherence to this necessary reciprocal parity that, in effect, consequently 
doubles the cost of net imports, for the deficit country. 
 
 
The governing rule that drives international exchanges: the necessary reciprocal parity of 
expenditures between trading countries  
 
It all begins with what defines the finality465 of a payment-transaction in that, ‘international 
transactions for every country involved in external exchanges are paid off through the 
equality between acquisitions and disposals of real values’ (Schmitt 2014: 70). This sterling466 
rubric renders it inconceivable467 then, that a deficit country (A) could ever expect to acquire 
from a surplus country (R) real goods of a value in excess of what R could equally expect as 
an acquisition from A. The ‘equality of international accounts’ (ibid.: 66) would very simply, 
clearly oppose it. But this is not to suggest that this expected adherence could even be the 
source of the problem, quite contrarily, as we have it today the double charge468 of surplus 
                                                                                                                                                   
purchased/transacted as any other internal purchases of the deficit/reforming country, that is, 
‘as if purchases (imports) were carried out between residents’ (ibid.: 56). And, in remaining 
proprietor of the entirety of their internal income this means, with respect to the payment of 
the reforming countries’ net imports, that ‘the reform will reduce the external debts of these 
countries to zero’ (ibid.: 47), that is, through the establishment ‘of only compensated debts of 
countries, as set of their residents’ (ibid.: 96).  
465 Through Rossi’s re-cap we are reminded of how Goodhart once qualified ‘the finality of a 
payment’. ‘[T]he finality of a payment requires that the ‘seller of a good or service, or another 
asset, receives something of equal value from the purchaser, which leaves the seller with no 
further claim on the buyer’’ (Rossi 2012: 221; see also Goodhart 1989). 
466 In meaning simply, of greatest importance: overriding. 
467 ‘The doctrine that a country (such as A) can, in its relations with the rest of the world, 
obtain real goods without giving up other real goods is, however, extremely dubious from the 
outset, because it reduces net imports to amounts of unpaid goods. It is legitimate to qualify 
net imports as ‘import-without-exports’. But it is preposterous to claim that net imports are 
unpaid purchases’ (Schmitt 2014: 66). Matter-of-fact, ‘surplus imports are paid without delay, 
at the very moment they are obtained’ (ibid.: 66). As Schmitt pointedly clarifies ‘surplus 
imports have never been ‘purchases-without-payments’: to still owe them is to owe them a 
second time’ (ibid.: 67). 
468 Schmitt distinguishes between periods ‘p’ and ‘p*’, current and future respectively, as he 
sets out to explain why that is. ‘It is in period p that country A’s imports exceed its exports; in 
p it is therefore im(A) > im(R) that is the exact comparison of the two imports. It is also in p 
that country A borrows this difference abroad’ (ibid.: 67). But nevertheless, what particularly 
needs to be heeded is his following observation. ‘In reality, that is to say, in fact, the object of 
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imports very much ‘results from the equality of reciprocal imports’ (ibid.: 70). It is definitely 
not the adherence to the rule, then, that is avoided. On the contrary, and evidently, as we will 
re-examine, ‘imports-without-exports’ are not ‘purchases-without-payments’ (see ibidem). It 
would be illogical to expect otherwise as it would go against the international dominion of 
payment-transactions. This is the reason that what the reform needs to address is the way in 
which reciprocal expenditures uphold their equality rather than the very ‘application of the 
rule governing international payments’ (ibid.: 68). It is the manner in which this rule is 
adhered to that is the source of the anomaly rather than the rule469 itself or, the lack of 
adherence to it. And Schmitt’s single-country reform470 addresses just that, that is the way or, 
to use Schmitt’s own wording ‘the framework’ in which ‘the equality of reciprocal imports’ 
(ibid.: 70) is upheld, such that it will no longer entail a ‘double charge of net imports’ (ibid.: 
70) and therefore, a loss of domestic income for the deficit nation. 
Now since, according to the way things471 are today, it is the way that is the culprit, let us next 
re-visit then this very way, that is ‘the method by which the payments of country R are 
brought to the level of the payments, in surplus, of country A’ (ibid.: 68). Clearly 
understanding the how it happens today of this method should, in turn, crystallize our 
understanding of how the reform will alter the process by which parity of reciprocal imports 
is attained such that the double charge of net imports is forever eradicated. 
We begin by considering the foreign loan (pre-reform) that the deficit country requires from R 
on account of its net imports, that is, we consider it from the perspective472 of R. We 
                                                                                                                                                   
the sum borrowed is an export of country A since period p, therefore an import of country R, 
which does not need to wait for a successive period (p*) to bring the payment of its purchases 
to the level of its sales. Unless they remain partially unpaid, the law that triumphs is therefore 
that which states that international transactions always require the equality of im(R) and 
im(A). It is gravely regrettable, however, that the cost of surplus imports is thus ‘multiplied by 
2’’ (ibid.: 67). The double charge being thus the very consequence of the next point, which 
point, Schmitt draws our attention to. ‘Country A gives up first, through an ‘actual’ payment 
and not through a promise of future payment, a product of its domestic economy in p* and, in 
addition to this first payment, country A spends the sum borrowed in order to finance the 
difference in money R between its expenditures and its receipts’ (ibid.: 67). 
469 That is ‘the law governing international exchanges’ (ibid.: 68) which law ‘states that 
international transactions always require the equality of im (R) and im (A)’ (ibid.: 67). 
‘According to this law, any country that pays the totality of its purchases cannot obtain in real 
goods what it does not immediately give up, equally in real goods’ (ibid.: 68). Nevertheless, 
given the current operational status of our international system, it is unfortunately on account 
of how this very law/rule is adhered to ‘that the cost of surplus imports is thus ‘multiplied by 
2’’ (ibid.: 67). This is why it is the way in which this law is adhered to that must be reformed 
such that its application no longer entails, for deficit nations, a double payment of its net 
imports and thus, an unnecessary loss of internal income. 
470 ‘In other words, the mistake is not in the law requiring that A’s surplus imports 
immediately create R’s additional imports, because this law can only be found logically in the 
distinction between imports paid and imports whose payment is merely promised: what needs 
to be reformed is the framework in which reciprocal imports maintain their equality, between 
R and A, even though country A increases its imports beyond its exports’ (Schmitt 2014: 70). 
471 In reference simply, to the current status of our international ‘system’ of payments. 
472 ‘More precisely, what is the exact meaning, for country R, of the loan granted to country 
A? It is an expenditure of country R; but is this expenditure a purchase of that country or 
simply a monetary credit granted to non-residents? This question is fundamental, because the 
rule governing international payments applies to the real values and not to purely monetary 
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remember that this loan, R to A, indeed ‘an expenditure of country R’, is very much a 
purchase of real values and not ‘simply a monetary credit’ lent to residents of country A. And 
this fact matters all the more so, given that the application of the law that presides over 
international payment-transactions is in respect to real values rather than to ‘purely monetary 
transactions’. On mulling this over, one can’t but find it only logical that the loan of R to A 
would be a purchase of real values; after all, it is only in this sense that it would truly be able 
to finance473 country A’s excess purchases (net imports). Moreover, just the fact that this 
foreign loan (R to A) will be re-paid (to lenders of R) in a future period (p*) to the first period 
(p), means that an external debt474 for the deficit country (A) forms as of p and therefore the 
surplus country (R) does indeed augment475 its own imports (purchase of financial securities) 
from A (by a same amount of A’s net imports), also, as of p476. We know as well from this 
                                                                                                                                                   
transactions. Simple factual observation provides the final answer … it is a question of real 
values and not of units of money’ (ibid.: 68). 
473 ‘If the loan of 4 dollars did not provide economy A with the financing of its purchases, the 
sum borrowed would merely be money and its repayment would only be the inverse of its 
borrowing: the 4 dollars borrowed would not be part of country A’s imports. The foreign 
currency thus obtained, albeit from abroad, would certainly be an economic object, but 
distinct from any real value, of consumption or saving’ (ibid.: 68). 
474 If the re-imbursement of the loan R to A only takes place in a next period (p*) from when 
it was initially incurred (period p) a new debt is unavoidable, thus renewing A’s external debt. 
What is important to understand is that the newly formed debt (result of loan R to A, period p) 
can be written off as finally paid only through a future (p*), free-of-charge, exportation of A 
(equivalent MR value to its loan amount of period p). This results in an internal savings for 
country R as a whole, notwithstanding, at an extra unnecessary expense for country A that as 
a whole, incurs the cost of this double charge. ‘Indeed, the entire question is to exactly 
comprehend the repayment of the debt … This debt can be paid, that is cancelled, only 
through the export of products of a total value of 4 dollars formed in p* by economy A … But 
what is the result of this comprehensive observations? It is that the debt formed by the 
difference between expenditures and receipts of economy A is double … Economy A gives 
up values formed in p*on top of the payment to R’s exporters. The first of these payments is 
real (real value to be produced in p*); the second payment is monetary (settlement of net 
expenditures)’ (ibid.: 74). 
475 ‘[L]enders will recover these 4 dollars only in a period subsequent to p. We immediately 
deduce with certainty that the repayment of the sum lent will be the payment carried out by 
country A of an import of country R. The loan of period p calls for a repayment necessarily 
situated in a successive period, noted p*. Once this obvious fact is recognized we know that 
country R increases by a value of 4 dollars its imports in period p’ (ibid.: 68). Schmitt’s 
reference to the 4 dollars amount implies the first loan amount (R to A) that the deficit 
country (A) borrowed in relation to its deficit: the net imports amount of a same 4 dollars 
value. 
476 ‘It is true − we have acknowledged it − that the repayment of these 4 dollars borrowed in 
period p will take place only later. However, it would be illogical to conclude that this debit 
forms only at the moment of its repayment; it is, on the contrary and quite obviously, at the 
formation of the loan itself that the corresponding debit is formed. It is therefore in period p, 
and not in p*, that country R increases its imports by the full value of the sum of 4 dollars 
newly lent to A’ (ibid.: 68−69). Thus, ‘the equality of im(R) and im(A)’ does indeed, 
invariably, manifest. ‘Unless they remain partially unpaid, the law that triumphs is therefore 
that which states that international transactions always require the equality of im(R) and 
im(A)’ (ibid.: 67). The reference to ‘they’ implies R’s purchases (imports) whose payment it 
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fact that the re-imbursement in p* necessarily implies a payment by A (in p*) of a part of its 
own exports (imports of R, of a same amount as A’s net imports of the previous period). 
Hence, the evidence of the double charge: as of period p, the deficit country (A) loses 
ownership of part (equivalent MR value of its net imports) of its domestic resources (internal 
income) to the benefit of R’s economy. 
The interconnectedness of facts soon becomes obvious in that the deficit country’s external 
debt forms as of period p, the very period that it incurs a debt as a result of its first loan from 
R; the latter’s imports (R’s), meanwhile, increase accordingly477 (by a same amount as A’s net 
imports) and as well as of this first period p, on account of its loan to A (A’s exports of 
financial securities forming the very object of this loan), such that ‘the equality of reciprocal 
imports’ (ibid.: 70) does indeed manifest between trading countries (A and R in the case-
example). So it is that, whether a case478 of ‘imports-exports’ or ‘imports-without-exports’ the 
deficit country’s imports, in either case scenario, will always equal that of the surplus 
country’s imports479. It is inevitable480. 
Having bore witness to, and this in the same period, the parity of reciprocal imports between 
the deficit and surplus country, as a natural consequence following from the ‘application of 
the rule governing international payments’ (ibid.: 68) we now have a closer look as to why 
exactly it leads, today, to the double payment of net imports. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
thus brings to the same degree as that of its (R’s) sales (exports), result of the first loan (R to 
A). 
477 ‘The loan located in p increases in this same period country R’s imports, the products of 
economy A to be delivered to the economy R being part of the goods that A will produce in 
p*. To claim that the formation of the external debt of 4 dollars incurred by A will define an 
import of R only later, in p*, is to commit an obvious error, which consists in canceling, for 
period p, the loan of 4 dollars that economy R grants since period p. It is enough to realize 
that country R increases by 4 dollars its imports of period p to avoid this elementary mistake’ 
(ibid.: 69). 
478 ‘In the two cases country R’s imports are equal to country A’s imports. Imports of 
economic values are always equal amongst each other. In accordance with the rule of 
countries’ international payments, set R increases its imports to the exact extent set A 
increases its own’ (ibid.: 69). 
479 ‘Owing to the fact that in period p economy A’s expenditures exceed its receipts by the 
value of 4 dollars, country R adds to its imports of this period, beyond the values already 
produced, economic values that will be produced only later, in p*, by economy A’ (ibid.: 69). 
The important factor to retain from Schmitt’s observation/wording here, is that country R 
adds to its imports of this period, meaning as of period p. This is because, indeed, ‘net 
imports are positively paid from onset of being formed, at the same time of offset imports’ 
(ibid.: 66). As such ‘expenditures of surplus countries are in reality equal to the simultaneous 
expenditures of their partners’ (ibid.: 68). 
480 Schmitt explains the infallibility of this equality and, an infallibility that subsists at all 
times. ‘This equality is valid without the slightest exception, because it does not depend on 
any willingness, either of country A or of country R. The equality of reciprocal imports is 
only the direct and unavoidable consequence of the factual rule governing international 
payments. Country A’s deficit would indicate an insufficiency of country R’s imports only if 
economy A paid merely its ‘expenditures-receipts’, allowing itself to leave its surplus imports 
unpaid during an unlimited period. In reality, country A pays the totality of its purchases 
whose value is of 14 dollars, of which 4 dollars are borrowed abroad’ (ibid.: 69). The 4 
dollars amount also implies the amount of the deficit, the net imports amount. 
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Today’s double charge: effect of the method through which the parity of reciprocal imports 
is attained 
 
The problem with today’s international payment ‘system’ is that it causes the deficit country 
to bear the brunt481 of upholding the parity of reciprocal imports between itself and the 
surplus country. Quite simply, the situation leads to a sinister twist of fate in that it evolves to 
an internal savings for the surplus nation that inevitably comes at a double and unjustifiable 
cost482 for the deficit country.  Yet, as already emphasized though we will mention it once 
again, it is not the parity483 itself that needs to be addressed484 by the reform but the method 
through which it is attained485 such that it does not entail a double payment of net imports. 
Let us consider Schmitt’s case-example whereby some deficit country’s (e.g. Greece) net 
imports amount to a value of 4 dollars. The problem today486 with the payment of this net 
expenditure, is that given that it implies a net foreign borrowing the reimbursement487 of this 
external debt/loan, in a subsequent period, will in fact, simply renew the debt. Any time an 
                                                
481 More precisely, we could even say that the deficit country bears the cost ‘tout court’ (of 
the attained parity), to use Schmitt’s notable coined expression (ibidem). 
482 ‘Let us suppose we refer to the political establishment of Greece. The actual ‘non-system’ 
of international payments forces you to pay both your own deficits (why would you object to 
that?) and, in addition, the equalization by R of its own imports with yours’ (ibid.: 70). In 
Schmitt’s case-example, Greece is implied as the deficit country, also referred to as country 
A, and R is intended as the surplus country. As Schmitt moreover points out, the realization 
regard this payment anomaly can’t but cause the political authority of any deficit country 
(Greece, according to his example-country) to profoundly examine the following question. 
‘[H]ow are they to prevent the equality between A’s and R’s imports from inflicting the 
double payment of surplus imports’ (ibid.: 70)? That is, their dilemma being very clear: they 
are after all bound to the adherence of this equality according to the governing body of 
international payment transactions but nevertheless realize that the very equality bears dire 
consequences for them. 
483 ‘The equality between the payment of Greece, country A, to the rest of the world, country 
R, and the payment of R to A is certain, imposed by the rule according to which any real 
value purchased and paid is the counter value of real goods purchased and paid. This rule is 
stronger than the reform itself, which must thus conform to it. Therefore, let us repeat it, the 
goal is only to avoid that the equality of reciprocal expenditures doubles the charge of surplus 
imports in external transactions’ (ibid.: 70). Schmitt’s reference to country A, his example-
country (e.g. Greece) implies the deficit country; country R is implied as the surplus country. 
484 ‘[I]t is not a question of fighting against the equivalence of imports between countries A 
and R carrying out international transactions’ (ibid.: 72). A and R, intend the deficit and 
surplus countries respectively. Rather, Schmitt is very clear on his reform mission: ‘it is 
necessary to completely change the method by which country R’s expenditures become 
immediately equal to the expenditures of country A. The equality is necessary, but it is 
permissible and remains possible to give it an entirely different form’ (ibid.: 72). 
485 ‘The time has come to explain, clearly and simply, how Greece, for example, will prevent 
the additional import of R, engendered by its own, to impose the double charge of its external 
debt’ (ibid.: 70). The reference to ‘external debt’ intends the deficit itself, that is, the net 
imports of the deficit country, e.g. Greece. 
486 That is, given the current deficient status of our ‘system’ of international payments. 
487 As Schmitt points out, ‘[i]t is the repayment of the sum lent that defines, before the reform, 
the external debt of country A’ (ibid.: 97). Country A intends some deficit country.  
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old sovereign debt (pre-reform) is reimbursed488, a new gap is created between the deficit 
country’s total expenditures and its total receipts, the payment of which, returns489 its 
sovereign debt to its previous level. As such the deficit country loses, forever, a part of its 
domestic income, equivalent MR value of its net imports (4 dollars) and this in addition490 to 
an expenditure of same value already spent (in p) for the final settlement of its net imports in 
money terms, to the benefit of R’s exporters. Only one of these payments should be sufficient 
not its double charge. Though, a double charge rather than a single charge is what 
unfortunately, manifests today. Again, to clearly understand this requires a firm 
comprehension of what the repayment of the first foreign loan, R to A (in following with the 
occurrence of A’s net imports of period p) actually implies. The reimbursement of this debt491 
incurred as of period p, can only take effect in a subsequent period p*, through A’s export of 
products produced in p* and, that it relinquishes to R free of charge. This means, that the 
actual reimbursement effectively serves as an internal savings for R as a whole, in that it pays 
for an equivalent amount of R’s own imports (in essence A pays, itself, that part of its very 
exports of the period, p*). The very repayment492 of the loan (incurred in p), thus renewing 
A’s external debt in that A must again borrow abroad to recover the loss of export revenues 
(used to repay the loan incurred in p) to cover/pay its now uncovered imports of the period 
(p*), the resulting new gap. 
Now, we have mentioned earlier that only one payment should suffice with respect to the 
deficit country’s (A) net imports, rather than a double charge. But, international payment 
transactions happen in such a way today, that in fact, two493 distinct and additive expenditures 
(same MR value) are indeed required to finally pay A’s net imports. It is irrefutable494. The 
                                                
488 ‘[T]he pathological impact of the transfer of goods of 4 dollars value is simply to restore 
immediately the sum of foreign currency spent’ (ibid.: 71). 
489 ‘[I]nstead of being actually paid through the expenditure of 4 (billion) dollars, the external 
debt is merely reproduced by an amount equal to itself’ (ibid.: 71). 
490 ‘Economy A gives up values formed in p* on top of the payment to R’s exporters. The 
first of these payments is real (real value to be produced in p*); the second payment is 
monetary (settlement of net expenditures)’ (ibid.: 74). But most importantly the fact is, that 
both payments take place as of period p, the very period in which the net imports under 
examination initially manifest: a double charge/debt is thus incurred in one same period, by 
the deficit country (A). 
491 ‘This debt can be paid, that is cancelled, only through the export of products of a total 
value of 4 dollars formed in p* by economy A’ (ibid.: 74). The reference to 4 dollars is the 
actual amount of the loan R to A (in p), same MR amount of A’s net imports (p). 
492 Any time an old sovereign debt is repaid (which payment takes place in p*) a new gap is 
formed between A’s total expenditures and receipts, the very payment of which brings back 
A’s sovereign debt to its previous level.  
493 ‘The total cost is of 8 dollars, because country R becomes the owner of A’s domestic 
goods that this economy does not pay through its exports. The monetary cost of this 
appropriation by country R is of 4 dollars, expenditure whose sole effect is to enable a 
payment in money R that would otherwise have occurred only in money A. We thus 
understand that the transfer to economy R, outside A’s exports, of a real product of A of 4 
dollars value has a total cost of 8 dollars, which economy A firstly incurs in order to transfer 
outside equilibrium (and therefore through a loan) real products of 4 dollars value and, 
secondly, to transmit them in units of money R (4 dollars) instead of through a payment in 
money A’ (ibid.: 75). 
494 Schmitt, very clearly, explains why indeed ‘each of the two payments is as necessary as 
the other’ (ibid.: 75). ‘R’s exporters require to be paid off by products of p, worth 4 dollars … 
147 
reason being is that it is not enough that the surplus country (R) be credited495 with real goods 
(equivalent MR value of A’s net imports, e.g. 4 dollars), there remains the problem that A can 
only convey these real goods by the expenditure496 of the 4 MR obtained as counter-part from 
R, through the latter’s lending to A. When particularized, it amounts for A, to an expenditure 
of 4 MR equivalent value, just so R’s domestic economy can acquire ownership497 (as of 
period p) over the real goods that are clearly absent from A’s exports of period (p), which 
real goods will be produced and exported free of charge by A in p*, to the benefit of R as a 
whole; and in addition, a further expenditure498 of 4 MR is required of A such as to enable the 
transfer of these real goods to R, in money R. It is this second additional payment-
expenditure that effectively loses for the deficit country (A), as a whole, a part of its domestic 
income (equivalent MR value to its net imports), in that the very compensation/counter-part 
                                                                                                                                                   
R’s lenders require to be paid by the equivalent of the 4 dollars that their country (R) would 
have added to its import expenditures of p*’ (ibid.: 75). 
495 Schmitt elaborates his explanation in this regard by distinguishing between ‘expenditures-
without-receipts’ versus those expenditures of the deficit country that have reciprocally 
equivalent receipts. ‘As long as expenditures are equal to receipts, it obtains, in foreign 
currency and for free, the equivalent of what it earns. Equal to 10 dollars value, expenditures 
cost the country 10 dollars in real exports. It is true that this exchange between equivalents 
takes place through the intermediation of money. But, as a consequence of the real balance 
the monetary exchange is also balanced … Things are obviously different with regard to the 
sum of ‘expenditures-without-receipts’, equal to 4 dollars, that economy A carries out in 
period p. Even if country R is already credited for real goods of 4 dollars value, in addition to 
the goods already exported by country A within the equality of its receipts, country A can 
only transmit these goods by the expenditure of 4 dollars, a sum that it does not obtain from 
its exports’ (ibid.: 75). 
496 Country A, as a whole, thus retains no compensation whatsoever from the said loan R to A 
(period p). What this effectively translates to, is that, country A as a whole loses unjustifiably 
and forever a part (equivalent MR value of its net imports of same period) of its domestic 
income: hence, the double charge of net imports, for the deficit country (A). ‘The sum 
obtained from fund providers should remain available in A’s economy, which is already 
forced to later export gratuitously domestic goods to a value of 4 dollars that are the real 
objects of the loan of 4 dollars’ (ibid.: 76). The fund providers are intended to mean lenders of 
R; the reference to the value of 4 dollars implies the amount of A’s (deficit country) net 
imports for which the loan (R to A) is initially contracted.  
497 ‘The total cost incurred by country A for the difference between its payments (of 14 
dollars) and its receipts (of 10 dollars) is hence of 8 dollars: 4 dollars for economy R to 
become the owner of the goods missing from economy A’s exports and 4 additional dollars 
for country A to transmit these goods through the expenditure of a foreign currency’ (ibid.: 
75). 
498 ‘Let us now analyze the second payment inflicted on country A: the value of its domestic 
income that becomes the property of country R. We posit that the domestic income of 
economy A is the equivalent of 150 dollars in period p. ‘Normally’ this product must be fully 
preserved in the assets of country A. Indeed, economy A borrows 4 dollars abroad so that R 
obtains the full payment of country A’s imports. It is unfair and even dishonest to require that, 
in addition, economy A gives up ownership of a domestic income of 4 dollars value to 
country R. Yet this is the case; mere observation of the facts confirms it’ (ibid.: 76). 
Specifically, the deficit country (A) gives up ownership of this domestic income, forever, 
when it loses all compensation related to the loan (R to A) by spending the very loan to pay 
its net imports ultimately, in money terms (money R). 
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of the loan (R to A) is spent in transferring over to R the real goods (very object of the loan R 
to A) in a foreign currency. This loss is essentially the double charge for the deficit country 
(A), in regard to its net imports. Country A, never recovers this, forever lost, domestic 
income. Yet, it still owes the reimbursement of this very loan in a subsequent period (p*). 
And, to add insult to injury, this exact reimbursement will have the only effect of actually 
renewing A’s external debt incurred as of p. Indeed A will, in effect, call forth solely the 
renewal499 of its external debt through the very reimbursement of the loan/debt that it has 
incurred in p. This is because on reimbursing the debt in a next period to p (in p*) with the 
foreign currency (MR) obtained from its (A’s) exports-revenues of p*, the only effect of this 
reimbursement is to leave country A with a gap in MR for which it will have to obtain yet a 
new loan from R. It will require this new loan in order to be able to cover in money R, its now 
uncovered imports of period p*, result of having used some of its exports-revenues (money 
R/MR) to carry out the reimbursement of its loan/debt incurred, as of period p. 
Now, we should discern that though A’s domestic income is decisively lost through its second 
expenditure (period p), that is, through its payment in money terms (MR) to the benefit of R’s 
exporters, the ownership500 of this domestic income of A is lost501 as of the latter’s very first 
real payment (period p) to the benefit of R’s lenders who purchase it (A’s internal income) in 
the form of financial securities502. In fact, it is as of this appropriation by R of A’s internal 
                                                
499 ‘We thus face again the important question of who is the beneficiary of the purely 
pathological reproduction of debts apparently settled through the expenditure of 4 dollars. If, 
instead of being actually paid through the expenditure of 4 (billion) dollars, the external debt 
is merely reproduced by an amount equal to itself, it must be at the ultimate profit of 
‘somebody’; who is this ‘person’? It is essential to know that’ (ibid.: 71). In fact, it is at the 
profit of country R, as a whole: and in this sense, we could more precisely say that it is at the 
profit of a financial bubble. Schmitt elaborates on the paradoxical meaning of this by 
explaining the ‘double effect’ of an expenditure of foreign currency for the deficit country, 
e.g. Greece in his example-case. ‘When a country like Greece spends 4 dollars, there is a 
double effect … First effect of the expenditure: payment of the creditors = 4 dollars … 
Second effect of the expenditure: payment to a ‘financial bubble’ = 4 dollars … Only the 
second effect must be countered; the first payment is maintained as a debit of Greece and a 
credit of the rest of the world’ (ibid.: 72). His reference to ‘the rest of the world’ intends some 
surplus country R.  
500 ‘The product concerned changes owner since period p, when the loan is granted; the 
additional import of country R belongs therefore to period p, whereas the product that is its 
object will be provided only in p*’ (ibid.: 76). 
501 ‘The transfer of an income of A is carried out through the borrowing of 1 dollar abroad’ 
(ibid.: 81). 
502 ‘Once the necessary equality between A’s imports and R’s imports in each period is 
acknowledged, it is known with certainty that the deficit country (A) is deprived, period after 
period, of the possession of the part of its current product whose value is equal to its ‘imports-
without-exports’. The surplus of country A’s imports is thus already fully paid even before its 
economy spends, in favour of R, the sum of foreign currency borrowed abroad’ (ibid.: 80). As 
such we could say that in period p, country A loses twice over, its domestic income: a first 
time in that it loses, in p, the ownership of a future part of its internal resources (A’s payment, 
in p, to R’s lenders) and, a second time in that it loses, in p, an actual product through the very 
expenditure (A’s payment, in p, to R’s exporters) of its foreign borrowing (loan R to A). 
Specifically, the first loss relates to the real goods that it will produce free of charge in a 
subsequent period to p, to the benefit of R as a whole; the second deprivation is the loss of an 
actual product (of period p), result of the external debt incurred by the deficit country (A) 
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income (country A’s financial securities being the very object of the loan R to A) that the 
parity of reciprocal imports, between the two countries, is attained (always same period p). 
And, this very parity is what leads to the double charge in that even though the actual 
reimbursement of the loan/debt incurred in p will only take place in period p*, the debt is 
indeed incurred as of period p (the parity of reciprocal imports, itself, is evidence of this), in 
addition to the second expenditure in money terms of the same period p. 
Schmitt explains the significance of the two additive expenditures in his analysis of the 
double charge that results from it for the deficit country (A) in regard to its net imports. He 
does this by distinguishing between two distinct beneficiaries of A’s double 
payment/expenditure, that of ‘foreign lenders’ and, ‘foreign exporters’. He begins by 
clarifying that, the first payment of A (to the benefit of ‘foreign lenders’503) of an amount, MR 
equivalent to A’s net imports, takes the form of financial securities that are essentially the 
object of the loan that A receives from R. He points out that even if this was A’s sole504 
expenditure, it should indeed serve as sufficient payment of its debt incurred, result of its net 
imports of p. That is, given that the expenditure/payment after all involves the transfer over to 
R of real values, notwithstanding real values that it will produce and export to R, only in p*. 
Still, R appropriates this internal income of A, as of p. Most importantly, he reminds us that 
this first expenditure of A is what, in fact, guarantees505 the parity of reciprocal imports for 
the two countries A and R respectively, and this506, as of period p. In particular, the parity is 
the consequential effect507 of paying A’s net imports via an external borrowing. Schmitt then 
                                                                                                                                                   
following its monetary payment of its net imports. This debt itself also defines a loss of A’s 
domestic resources to R. 
503 ‘These fund providers will only be repaid in a period, p*, subsequent to that of the 
formation of country A’s net expenditures, p. A loan that is repaid in p could not serve to 
justify A’s deficit in p. Being repaid in p*, this loan constitutes a free import of country R’ 
(ibid.: 76). The reference to ‘fund providers’ intends R’s lenders or, the ‘foreign lenders’ that 
lend to A. 
504 ‘If this expenditure existed alone, the deficit country would already pay the totality of its 
debt to the rest of the world. Formed in p, the debt of country A, a value of expenditures and 
receipts in international trade of 4 dollars in our numerical example, is entirely paid by the 
transfer to country R of economic values of 4 dollars, which economy A will produce in p*’ 
(ibid.: 76). 
505 ‘The first expenditure is important for a second reason, because it maintains the equality of 
countries R’s and A’s imports … In p the expenditures (imports) of country A are equivalent 
to 14 dollars while the imports of R are only equal to 10 dollars. However, the loan of 4 
dollars means … the purchase by country R in period p of an additional product of A’s 
economy. This additional purchase of foreign goods is, by definition, a surplus import. 
Consequently, in period p country R’s imports reach the value of 14 dollars, the same exact 
amount of country A’s total imports. The equality of im(R) and im(A) results from the 
payment, through a foreign loan, of country A’s net expenditures’ (ibid.: 76). 
506 ‘[T]he additional import of country R belongs therefore to period p’ (ibid.: 76). 
507 ‘The equality of im(R) and im(A) results from the payment, through a foreign loan, of 
country A’s net expenditures’ (ibid.: 76). The crucial difference that the reform will bring 
with respect to this equality (parity of reciprocal imports between A and R), is that it will 
achieve it through the counter-loan (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’ whereby R will obtain from A an 
equal MR value of A’s net imports amount, in the form of financial securities (or whatever 
other form), thus increasing its own imports from A (moreover in p) by a same amount. Said 
another way, the reform will allow R to obtain (via the counter-loan of A’s ‘Bureau’) a 
measure of A’s domestic resources equal to that of its (R) own output exported to A. Today, 
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carries on with his analysis by explaining the essence of the second payment/expenditure of 
A’s (to the benefit of ‘foreign exporters’508). On thinking about it, it is here that the evidence 
of an anomaly509 (the double charge) becomes undeniable. Through this second expenditure, 
in money terms, A settles the payment of its net imports, to the benefit of R’s exporters510. It 
suddenly becomes obviously odd that, yet, country A still bears a second owing cost with 
regard to its net imports of p, the reimbursement (nonetheless legitimate) to lenders of R (in 
p*), for the related loan granted by R to A in p. It becomes clear that through its second 
expenditure (to the benefit of R’s exporters) country A, as a whole, loses the counterpart of its 
first expenditure/payment, the domestic income (financial securities) that was spent to the 
benefit of R’s lenders (loan R to A). Yet regardless of this loss, it still owes and quite 
understandably, R’s lenders in a future period p*: it is the reimbursement of this first loan (R 
to A) that will create an internal savings for R as a whole, at the time of reimbursement in p*. 
Though both beneficiaries of A’s double payment, exporters and lenders of R respectively, 
are legitimate in that A does legitimately and respectively owe them both (at least from their 
perspective), it is undeniably at an illegitimate extra cost for country A. The double charge is 
a fault that results from the method that is resorted to, today, by the deficit country in order to 
pay its deficit, the net imports. It is a fault that stems from the currently deficient 
infrastructure of our international ‘system’ of payments: the very method by which the parity 
of reciprocal imports between the commercially exchanging countries (deficit and surplus 
countries, specifically) is upheld. Schmitt sums it up very simply by distinguishing511 the two 
                                                                                                                                                   
the real payment of A’s net import is achieved through the appropriation by R of part of A’s 
future output. Tomorrow, the real payment will no longer involve A’s future production, it 
will instead take place through the cession of part of A’s actual resources (in the form of 
financial securities, for example). 
508 That is, R’s exporters. 
509 ‘What explains the state of affairs is the formation of two distinct debts of 4 dollars, and 
therefore of a total debt of 8 dollars, caused by a single external borrowing. This is clearly a 
serious anomaly. It is to avoid it that introducing the reform becomes necessary’ (ibid.: 77). It 
should be noted that the ‘4 dollars’ reference relates to the MR amount of some deficit 
country’s net imports. 
510 Schmitt sums up the double cost of the deficit country’s (A) net imports in that its payment 
is owed twice, that is, to the both of two distinct beneficiaries of R. ‘Country A borrows 4 
dollars abroad. We quite naturally conclude that country A’s external debt increases by 4 
dollars. This is correct but not enough. The first effect of the new debt is to give country R the 
ownership over goods that country A will have to produce and export in order to pay its debt. 
This is, for country R, the very object of its loan. But the new debt has a second effect: it adds 
4 dollars to the expenditures of economy A. The debt incurred would still be equal to 4 
dollars, if the expenditure for A’s imports were the reimbursement to the foreign lenders. As 
this is not the case, lenders have still to be reimbursed; this is the second external debt of 
country A’ (ibid.: 77). 
511 ‘The simplest way to express these two debts is to distinguish between them as follows. 
The first debt of 4 dollars is an amount of real goods that economy A will have to export to 
obtain the 4 dollars it owes to foreign lenders. The second debt of 4 dollars is explained in a 
totally different way, because it means that economy A owes its own domestic product, up to 
4 dollars, to country R’ (ibid.: 77).  The reference to ‘economy A’ intends that of the deficit 
country A; the 4 dollars is the amount of the deficit/net imports. What needs to be clear is that 
the second expenditure loses (in that it retains no ‘counterpart’ to the loan from R, in p) for 
country A as a whole, an equivalent part of its domestic income/resources (MR equivalent 
value to its net imports of p), to R; the second expenditure is effectively the loss of an actual 
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resulting debts incurred by A: the first is an amount (MR equivalent of its net imports of p) of 
real goods that the deficit country’s (A) domestic economy will have to produce as well as 
export (free of charge) in a subsequent period p* such as to convey to lenders of R the 
payment (which payment translates into an internal savings for R, as a whole512) it owes them 
for the loan (R to A) obtained in p; the second debt513 that A incurs has a special meaning in 
that in itself it defines a loss of A’s domestic resources to R: a loss of an actual product (of 
period p) caused by the external debt incurred by A following the monetary payment of its net 
imports, the very expenditure of which effectively leaves no compensation whatsoever 
remaining for A (this compensation is expended, in p, in the payment of its net imports in 
money terms). Country A retains no ‘counter-part’514 whatsoever (in p) for its initial loan 
from R and yet, it still owes a reimbursement in p* in relation to this very loan (R to A). The 
deficit country as a whole thus loses, forever515, a part (always MR equivalent value to its net 
imports of p) of its domestic income to the benefit of R. 
The pathological situation with regard to the payment of net imports is clearly captured in two 
of Schmitt’s figures (Figures 27 and 28; see Schmitt 2014). We have reproduced them exactly 
by including two diagrams numbered 6.1 and 6.2, which diagrams represent Schmitt’s Figures 
27 and 28, respectively. 
Diagram 6.1 (adapted exactly from Figure 27 of Schmitt 2014) evidences the double effect 
that the payment of country A’s external debt, the very deficit brought about by the mere fact 
of its net imports, actually implies. We see from Schmitt’s clear depiction that the double 
charge manifests as a result of a payment (of same value, each of an equivalent MR value of 
the deficit country’s net imports) that is paid to two distinct beneficiaries of R, thus paid twice 
                                                                                                                                                   
product (of period p) caused by the external debt incurred by A following its monetary 
payment of its net imports.  
512 It is country R as a whole that will benefit from an internal savings in p* when A will 
effectively carry out its reimbursement of the loan it received, in p, from R’s lenders. This 
cause, the very reimbursement means that A pays for a part of R’s own imports, hence a part 
of A’s very exports of p*; A pays these exports itself, that is, in lieu of R paying for them. 
513 ‘The expenditure by country A of the sum borrowed abroad is … the second cost of its net 
imports’ (ibid.: 80). 
514 Schmitt describes the case scenario with country A, the deficit country, as his case-
example. ‘The income created in money A by the domestic production of economy A is 
equivalent to 150 dollars. Yet, to the extent of 1 dollar, the first effect of the surplus import is 
to limit to 149 dollars the ownership of this income by country A’s residents. This decrease is 
at first offset, because country A’s economy owns 1 dollar as a ‘counter-part’. The second 
effect of the surplus import deprives country A of this ‘counter-part’. From that point on, it is 
certain that the cost of the surplus import is double, because country A additionally gives up 
an amount of real goods that its domestic economy will produce in a subsequent period (p*). 
The loss of future products is equivalent to 1 dollar. The net loss of a current income is also 
equivalent to 1 dollar. The total transfer amounts to the equivalent of 2 dollars, that is, to the 
value of the net import ‘multiplied by 2’ (ibid.: 81). 
515 ‘What has to be fully understood in this regard is the fact that the expenditure of the sum 
borrowed has only one effect: it means that country R appropriates a domestic income of 
economy A worth 4 dollars. Although country A brings its exports to the level of its imports, 
by adding the value of the domestic goods given up at zero cost in p*, it loses in period p the 
ownership of its own domestic income to the extent of 4 dollars value. The second cost of the 
difference between expenditures and receipts is therefore entirely defined by the loss of 
ownership over the amount of income formed in money A’ (ibid.: 77). The reference to ‘4 
dollars’ intends the MR value amount of some deficit country’s (A) net imports. 
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in total and as such resulting in a double charge of A’s net imports. An external debt of 4 MR 
(dollars) is ‘confirmed’ as of period p (see Schmitt’s bold line representation), 
notwithstanding, with the actual reimbursement (see Schmitt’s dotted line representation) of 
its associated loan to the benefit of external lenders (‘Lenders in R’), set for some later period 
p* (‘export of goods equal to 4 dollars’); still, a sum of 4 MR (dollars) is ‘paid’ as of period p, 
to R’s exporters.  Clearly, two distinct expenditures are necessary, today, in relation to a 
deficit country’s net imports. 
Diagram 6.2 (adapted exactly from Figure 28 of Schmitt 2014) merely confirms Schmitt’s 
claim of the double charge of the deficit country (A)’s net imports, the very deficit that 
doubles its external debt, on account of the fact that it implies a net foreign borrowing. The 
double charge being that the deficit country (A) loses, forever, a part of its internal income 
when the latter (object of R’s loan to A) is decisively spent516 in order to finally settle, in 
money terms, the payment of its net imports. And this, on top of the 4 MR (dollars) value that 
is still owed to the benefit of R’s lenders, and that A will reimburse in a future period through 
the relinquishing of an equivalent MR value of its exports, free of charge, to country R as a 
whole. 
We have included a third diagram (Diagram 6.3) to show the greener side of a potentially 
future situation, that is, as Schmitt’s single country reform would bring. His reform will 
radically modify the way by which the parity of reciprocal imports is attained such as to 
counter the double charge currently implicated in the payment of net imports. Specifically, the 
appropriation by R of the deficit country’s (A) internal income will be definitely curtailed. As 
depicted in our diagram 3, the counter-lending517 loan of A’s ‘Bureau’ (A to R) of same MR 
value518 of its own loan from R (R to A), will effectively neutralize the monetary cost of A’s 
real payment such that it is conveyed free of charge. The parity of reciprocal imports is thus 
attained whilst avoiding the double charge; the reform’s (Schmitt 2014) method of upholding 
the very parity impedes the appropriation by R of A’s domestic income. This is achieved 
given the net imports are paid through the ceding of A’s actual resources rather than through 
a future export as it currently (pre-reform) happens. That is, whereby the parity of reciprocal 
                                                
516 ‘The sum of money R that country A borrows in p is definitely spent, and therefore lost to 
it from this very period on, because it is added to the payments of its purchases of p’ (ibid.: 
77). 
517 ‘[T]he sovereign Bureau adds, as we have already established, a reverse loan. We thus 
have the coexistence of two equal-size financial transactions, which ‘contradict’ one another: 
the loan of 1 dollar granted by R to A is offset by the loan of 1 dollar granted by A’s Bureau 
to non-residents. It is understood that borrowers and lenders in the economy R are distinct 
residents’ (ibid.: 62). A intends some deficit country A and, R some surplus country. 
518 In keeping with Schmitt’s description (ibidem: 62), we refer to an example amount of 1 
dollar. More importantly, it should be clarified that though the diagram (3) representation 
shows a nullification-effect (depicted by the Xs crossing over the first loan that A receives 
from R’s sleeping partners) that the counter-loan (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’ has with respect to 
the first loan (R to A), both loans (R to A and A to R, respectively) are necessarily 
maintained. The obvious reason for this is that each of the two loans implicates particular 
residents of R, that is, the borrowers of R (loan A to R) are different citizens of R than the 
lenders of R (loan R to A). Otherwise, the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ would be nonsensical. 
‘It is essential to observe that the two loans … both subsist; they cannot cancel each other out. 
It is true, of course, that the foreign currency borrowed and lent is a zero-sum; yet the initial 
borrowing and the lending that follows it are two positive transactions even though one is the 
inverse of the other. This is the case simply because the Bureau lends 1 dollar to residents of 
R distinct from the initial lenders’ (ibid.: 78). 
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imports is, today, obtained through the payment of net imports (A’s) via an external loan. The 
significant difference that the reform will bring is that it will attain the parity of reciprocal 
imports in such a way as to avoid today’s double charge. It will achieve this through the 
counter-loan (A to R) of A’s (deficit country) ‘Bureau’ whereby R (surplus country) will 
obtain (in p) from A an equivalent MR value of A’s net imports amount, in the form e.g. of 
financial securities, thus increasing its own imports from A (moreover still in p) by a same 
amount as that of its own net output exported to A (A’s net imports of p). The parity of im (A) 
and im (R) will thus be obtained (in p) through the counter-loan (A to R) of A’s ‘Bureau’. 
 
 
 
Diagram 6.1: Adapted from Schmitt (2014, p. 74: ‘Figure 27 The repayment of A’s external 
debt’) 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 6.2: Adapted from Schmitt (2014, p. 76: ‘Figure 28 The double charge of A’s 
external debt’) 
 
154 
 
Diagram 6.3: Monetary cost of A’s real payment is neutralized (reform effect) 
 
 
Comparing today’s way of attaining parity of reciprocal imports with tomorrow’s way 
 
The first aspect to note in what the reform will bring in regard to the new attainment of this 
parity is a change in the basis of comparison, that is, specifically regard the measure519 of 
reciprocal imports. The significant change is that no longer will the deficit country’s output 
(A’s) of a future period p* be implicated. In this way520 the reform assures that none, of A’s 
internal resources (income), is appropriated by R (surplus country). The effect being that the 
monetary worth (value) of the surplus (R) country’s imports does not ultimately increase as it 
did pre-reform. And this non-increase effect521, itself, derives exactly from the neutralizing 
                                                
519 ‘The equality of reciprocal imports is always maintained but its measure is profoundly 
changed’ (ibid.: 82). 
520 In Schmitt’s own words, the following is what the reform will establish. Once again, his 
reference to ‘A and R’, intend some deficit country (A) and some surplus country (R), 
respectively. ‘In each period p all payments involved belong to this period, no product of a 
later period (p*) being involved. In the example of A and R, no domestic product of economy 
A becomes the property of the rest of the world, R. The sovereign Bureau acts in such a way 
that R’s imports in period p relate all to the period p itself. The value of R’s imports is thus 
equal to 10 dollars and no longer to 11 dollars, as is the case before the reform. This reduction 
in the value of R’s imports is a direct result of the cutting out of the first external loan of 
country A’ (ibid.: 81). 
521 In fact, the reform effect with regard to R’s imports from A, is that country R does not 
increase them but instead, it (R) pays less for them; that is, if we grasp the very effect of the 
deficit/reforming country’s counter-loan (A to R): what this loan accomplishes is that A pays 
for a part (MR equivalence of its net imports value) of its (A’s) own exports, in lieu of R. 
Thus, the result being that R pays less for its total imports from country, A. This is why R also 
receives less (MR value of A’s net imports) for its total exports to A. In today’s non-system of 
international payments, the equality between IM and EX with respect to each trading country 
(e.g. A and R) is complied with, as is the parity of reciprocal imports between the said 
countries, because R (surplus country) increases its imports from A and thus, likewise, A 
increases its exports to R. In tomorrow’s reformed system, the equality (between IM and EX, 
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effect that the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ has on A’s initial loan from R. We remember that 
though this loan (R to A) guaranteed (pre-reform) the parity of reciprocal imports between R 
and A, it did so in such a way as to allow R’s appropriation of a part (same portion MR value 
amount as A’s net imports) of A’s internal resources. What the counter-loan (A to R) of A’s 
‘Bureau’ will do is that, in neutralizing522 the first loan that A receives from R, it will 
essentially arrest the very appropriation effect of this first loan (R to A) and not to mention 
along with it, the first charge (pre-reform) of A’s net imports (monetary cost of the real 
payment of its net imports); country A will retain only the real cost of the real payment of its 
net imports and this, through the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ (A to R) which will effectively 
transfer to R a part (equivalent MR value of A’s net imports of p) of A’s actual domestic 
resources. The difference brought in by the reform being that by allowing R to acquire a part 
of A’s actual versus future domestic resources (as it happened pre-reform given the net 
foreign borrowing that was implied in A’s payment of its net imports), it avoids for the deficit 
country (A), a double charge of its net imports. Now the resulting effect of the counter-loan of 
the ‘Bureau’ regard the maintaining of the parity of reciprocal imports is that the equality is 
indeed safeguarded though, arrived at, in a different yet non-detrimental way523, particularly 
when considered from the perspective of the deficit country. Let us next examine this more 
closely. 
We have already mentioned that in neutralizing A’s initial loan from R, the counter-loan of 
A’s ‘Bureau’, in effect, precludes the value of R’s imports (from A) from increasing. This is 
because in neutralizing R’s loan to A, it essentially neutralizes R’s purchase (appropriation) 
of a real value from A, precisely, of an import from A (a part of its domestic income). What 
the reform will change is that the payment of the deficit country’s net imports will no longer 
imply a net foreign borrowing (initial loan, pre-reform, R to A). The counter-loan of the 
‘Bureau’ will have the effect of canceling out this loan (R to A). This essentially means then 
that no more will a foreign loan (R to A) be the purchase thus the import of a real value 
(output) of A’s.  So the new situation (reform) has it that instead of increasing the value of its 
                                                                                                                                                   
for each respective country, A and R) will be respected without increasing R’s imports, but by 
‘reducing’ A’s imports; more precisely said, by reducing the amount paid by A for its 
imports, which imports will, in effect, be paid by R to the same extent that A will pay for R’s 
imports. It is the counter-loan (A to R) of the deficit/reforming country’s ‘Bureau’ that is able 
to render this result.             
522 ‘The Bureau has no trouble getting this cancellation. To this effect it is enough, as we well 
know, that it maintains the first external loan of 1 dollar but add to it the loan of 1 dollar to the 
benefit of R. It follows, without any difficulty, that the entire current income of economy A 
remains the property of country A. The ‘expropriation’ of an income of A exists in the current 
situation; this is undeniable for the simple reason that it is the effect of the net foreign 
borrowing of 1 dollar. As this borrowing is now offset by a loan, the loss of a domestic 
income is reduced to zero, because the ‘import-export’ balance amounts to a zero-sum debt. 
The resulting progress is of great importance, as country A will no longer lose a fraction of its 
domestic income to the benefit of R’ (ibid.: 81). 
523 The benefit that the reform brings (through its counter-loan of the deficit country’s (A) 
‘Bureau’) is that it goes beyond maintaining the parity of reciprocal imports (the very equality 
is in fact also attained, pre-reform, via the external loan that A receives from R): it achieves 
the maintenance in such a way as to avoid the double charge of A’s net imports. It is the 
counter-loan (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’ that is able to render this favorable result. ‘It would 
therefore be useless for the reform to seek to establish the already verified parity of imports. 
The function of the Bureau is of an entirely different nature. It is a question of avoiding that 
the charge of surplus imports be increased to twice its value’ (ibid.: 62).  
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imports from A (as it did pre-reform), R actually experiences a value-reduction (in 
comparison with pre-reform) of its imports from A in following with the countering-effect of 
the loan (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’. Now, this is R’s side of things. What happens then, from 
A’s side of it, with respect to maintaining the parity of reciprocal imports, the very equality 
that the international rule obliges, overall, of exchanging countries A and R respectively, in 
ours and Schmitt’s example-countries? Well, on examining Schmitt’s elaboration concerning 
this, we observe that the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ also affects how the deficit country 
upholds its side of the bargain (with respect to the parity of reciprocal imports between A and 
R, that is): the very countering effect of A’s counter-loan (A to R), simply and effectively, 
reduces the value of A’s total imports from R, by a same MR value amount of its (A’s) net 
imports. This is because the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ decisively conveys to R (in p) the 
real payment of A’s net imports (of p), thus effectively reducing the MR value amount of the 
totality of its imports from R (in p). In fact, the guarantee524 of the real payment of A’s net 
imports in the same period that they actually originate (counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’ effect) 
has the result of canceling A’s very deficit: the net imports are no longer net and thus the 
previously deficit country (A) is no longer a deficit country per se. And, we observe that the 
parity of reciprocal imports is effectively maintained525 between countries A and R (simply its 
measured dimension changes): the reform has it that A, through the counter-loan (A to R) of 
the ‘Bureau’, reduces the MR value (the quantity remains the same) of its total imports to the 
level of R’s total imports from A. The only difference being that the reform attains the parity 
in such a way as to curtail any adverse effect that pre-reform, lead to a double charge for the 
deficit country. Specifically, the reform (through the counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’) is able to 
maintain the parity without entailing a double charge by avoiding the very net foreign 
borrowing526 that, pre-reform, obtained the parity though not without leading to a costly and 
unnecessary double payment for the deficit country. 
Now, though we have shown how the reform maintains the parity of reciprocal imports, 
something has yet to be said about the respect of the balance-of-payments identity527 between 
IM and EX of each of our example-countries, A and R respectively. This identity is also 
                                                
524 Thus, in effect, the guarantee of the respect of the balance-of-payments identity between 
IM and EX is attained in p and moreover, with a product (A’s) of p. Pre-reform, it was the 
reimbursement in p* of A’s net imports, with a product of A also of p*, that not only defined 
country A as a deficit nation but more importantly, it entailed a double charge with regard its 
deficit incurred in p: that is, its very net imports of p. 
525 ‘[E]ven though country A runs a deficit, R’s imports are equal to and not less than A’s 
imports. R’s imports are always equal to A’s imports, even when country A runs a deficit’ 
(ibid.: 82). Specifically, the reform ensures that the parity is preserved, only ‘its measure is 
profoundly changed’ (ibid.: 82). 
526 ‘It is particularly advantageous here to compare the situation created by the reform to 
today’s state of affairs. In the present situation, A’s and R’s imports are nevertheless equal to 
one another although A carries out net imports. The equality between imports is maintained 
by the foreign loan that country A obtains in order to finance its surplus import. This loan 
provides an additional import to country R, which finally imports real goods of the same 
value as the goods imported by country A. It is the payment of A’s future exports that has this 
effect’ (ibid.: 62). 
527 We recall Cencini’s elaboration regarding this identity: ‘the current financial capacity of a 
country, and what it needs to finance all its external transactions, the necessary equality 
between its total imports (commercial and financial), IM, and its total exports (of goods, 
services and financial assets), EX’ (Cencini 2012a: 18). 
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guaranteed by the reform, particularly through the role528 of the deficit country’s counter-loan 
of the ‘Bureau’. Considering the respect of this identity from R’s perspective, we remember 
that the very counter-loan (A to R) precludes R’s appropriation of A’s internal resources 
(output) thus effectively reducing its level of external purchases, precisely, imports from A as 
enabled pre-reform through its loan to A. For example, the reform’s effect (the ‘Bureau’s) has 
it that country R imports, say for a value of 10 MR versus 11 MR as the parity of reciprocal 
imports attained, pre-reform. But, if R’s exports were originally of a value of 11 MR, then 
how is it that the reform also guarantees, for R, the respect of the balance-of-payments 
identity between its imports and exports (between IM and EX)? Quite simply, that is, if we 
consider that 1 MR value of its exports is counter-balanced by the 1 MR debit-value effect 
that the counter-loan (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’ achieves. The result being that on the very 
account of the counter-loan (A to R), country R effectively receives from A, for its exports, a 
credit of a mere529 value of 10 MR: the very value of the entirety of its own imports from A, 
also now of a value of 10 MR. On the other hand, considering the respect of the identity 
between IM and EX from the deficit country’s (A’s) vantage point, we point out that yet 
again, the very identity is guaranteed. This is once more on account of the effect of the 
counter-loan of A’s ‘Bureau’. Though country A’s deficit extended its (A’s) imports to a net 
value of say, for example 11 MR (seemingly 1 MR in excess of its exports of 10 MR value), 
in reality, the reform has the effect of reducing this 11 MR value (of A’s imports) to 10 MR, 
thus to a matching amount of its total exports, also of a value of 10 MR: it is the very effect530 
of the counter-loan (A to R), of a same MR value of its (A’s) net imports, that is able to bring 
about this result531. 
So the circumstantial state of affairs that the reform brings about is that not only does it 
maintain the parity of reciprocal imports between the deficit and surplus country, A and R 
respectively, it does so without entailing a costly and unnecessary double charge for the 
deficit nation. Moreover, it guarantees the respect of the balance-of-payments identity 
between each country’s IM and EX in such a way (as effected through the mechanism of the 
counter-loan of the ‘Bureau’) as to guarantee the real payment of the deficit country’s (A) net 
                                                
528 ‘This function of country A’s Bureau enables in every period the general conservation of 
each country’s imports at the level of its exports’ (ibid.: 62). 
529 Schmitt describes the distinct circumstances that the reform will establish. ‘[C]ountry R 
does not suffer any loss of real income. It actually imports goods worth only 10 dollars, its 
exports being equal to 11 dollars. But this gain is entirely compensated by the debit of 1 dollar 
defined by the loan of A’s sovereign Bureau. Given this debit, economy R is only credited 
with 10 dollars from abroad, the value exactly equal to the sum of its own imports’ (ibid.: 62). 
530 In fact, what the reform attains (through the counter-loan, A to R, of the ‘Bureau’) is that it 
guarantees the respect of the balance-of-payments identity between IM and EX through the 
guarantee of the real payment of A’s net imports (in p and, with a product of A from period p 
rather than from p*). It is not surprising then, to verify that A (through the reform) no longer 
incurs any sovereign debt and that its external debt is simply reproduced period after period 
(on condition, bien sûr, that its net imports remain constant). Specifically, the respect of the 
balance-of-payments identity (through the real payment guarantee of A’s net imports, in p 
and with a product of p) makes it that country A is no longer a deficit country per se: its real 
imports being fully covered by its real exports (in p). 
531 ‘According to the reform, even the deficit countries will import, in value terms, an amount 
exactly equal to their exports. Although its imports reach the value of 11 dollars, apparently 1 
dollar greater than its exports, economy A imports a real income whose value is of 10 dollars 
only, at the same level as its exports. It is the loan of 1 dollar that the sovereign Bureau grants 
to residents of economy R that produces this outcome’ (ibid.: 62). 
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imports and this, in one fell swoop, in p. Pre-reform, the deficit country’s net imports were 
financed through the implication of an external loan (R to A) which meant that though an 
actual payment was contracted in p (country A precisely incurring an initial debt as of p), the 
very reimbursement of this payment took place only in p* and this entailed, for the deficit 
country, a double charge of its net imports. The counter-loan532 (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’ 
effectively cancels this initial external loan (R to A) and along with it, the negative 
consequence (double charge) that it poses for the deficit country (A). More so, it does this 
whilst maintaining the necessary parity of reciprocal imports, as well as guaranteeing533 the 
respect of the balance-of-payments identity between each nation’s respective IM and EX.  
 
 
Some correlating evidence and concluding observations 
 
In this section, we endeavour to show why, at the time of writing, two countries in particular 
might find solace in adopting Schmitt’s single-country reform: The United Kingdom534 and, 
Greece. Though both are currently members of the European Union (EU), the former is not a 
member of the euro area. This distinguishing factor may be a good starting point for the UK 
with respect to embracing the single-country reform: having never opted for the euro to 
replace its national currency, it would certainly be one step ahead in the reforming process. 
And, considering its increasingly growing disenchantment with the EU to the point of holding 
an upcoming referendum (currently planned for 2017) on its very membership of the union, 
Schmitt’s reform may prove to be a timely and appealing outlet. Undoubtedly, it would 
protect the UK from the calamitous effect that the double charge of external debt has on its 
domestic economy and ultimately on its internal employment535, thus paving the way for a 
sound and fortified economic and financial rebound, independently of a union (EU) that, by 
                                                
532 The counter-loan (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’ obtains, for the deficit country’s (A’s) ‘imports-
without-exports’, the same foreign currency intermediary role that oversees the payment of 
its offset (ibidem) imports, such that the real payment of its net imports is effectively carried 
out free of charge. This result is attained through the ‘debits-credits’ effect that the counter-
loan (A to R) creates with respect to the foreign currency (MR) that is implicated. ‘Debits-
credits formed in money R define this foreign currency as mere object of intermediation 
between real goods, whereas net debits of country A as a whole, scientific definition of its 
sovereign debt, lead to the use of money R as a specious real good’ (ibid.: 30). We recall 
Schmitt’s own description as to the overall beneficial aspect of the reform in this regard. ‘The 
reform creates, for surplus imports, what already exists for offset imports, namely, the 
gratuitousness of the foreign currencies, which only serve to convert the payments already 
carried out in national currency … Through the counter-balancing debt, incurred by R as a 
result of the loan granted by the Bureau, the sum of gains in foreign currency is equal to the 
sum of its losses despite the fact that imports exceed exports. The equality between losses and 
gains means that the foreign currency that provides the final form to the payment of net 
imports is for free for the reformed country, as is the foreign currency used for the payment of 
offset imports’ (ibid.: 65). 
533 As previously indicated ‘country A’s Bureau enables in every period the general 
conservation of each country’s imports at the level of its exports’ (ibid.: 62). 
534 We intend all four constituents countries of the United Kingdom: England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
535 ‘[T]he charge imposed by surplus purchases is at first the equal decrease of domestic 
employment’ (ibid.: 89). We will explicitly cover this effect as we elaborate on the role of a 
reforming country’s ‘Bureau’. 
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and large, strives to take the wind out of its sails. Let us begin then by considering the UK’s 
case. 
According to elaborated data536 from the World Bank (2011) and the IMF (2011), the UK’s 
gross external debt had spiraled to some 9.7 billion dollars by 2010 from an approximate 
substantially lesser amount of 5.4 billion in 2003. Though the evolution of the amounts is no 
doubt seriously alarming, the exactness of the numbers in the respective years under 
observation, is not as important as is the point of the following argument we wish to stress: 
the fact that a portion of the very amounts manifests, unnecessarily as well as cumulatively, as 
a consequence of an international payment system anomaly537. On analyzing further related 
data, Cencini (2012a) was able to evidence the existence of a substantial discrepancy between 
a justified and unjustified augmentation in the external debt of a country. The simplicity of his 
method is nonetheless efficient in corroborating his claim of an anomalous unjustified 
augmentation: very simply, he compares the justifiable538 augmentation with that of the 
existing increase such as to detect any unjustifiable portion. As it turns out, his analysis of the 
pertinent data539 concerning the UK, for the period in question, revealed an unjustifiable 
augmentation in its external debt by approximately 4,000 billion dollars compared with a 
justifiable amount of a mere 300 billion dollars. On considering it, unjustifiable amounts of 
this level, consists of a huge and unnecessary loss of internal resources for any deficit540 
country and which loss can’t but impoverish it, in time, beyond sustainability. Not to mention 
the positive gains that its economy could benefit from, where it able to prevent this very 
costly and unwarranted loss of domestic income. Let us see how Schmitt’s single-country 
reform could help a country such as the UK, not only eradicate the double charge of its 
external debt but as well, salvage the loss of domestic income that this double charge 
currently entails. 
                                                
536 See Cencini 2012a: 17 and 29, Tables 2 and 10, respectively. 
537 ‘[T]he evaluation of the effects of such a destabilising increase in countries’ external debt 
is far more negative once it is realised that part of it is of a pathological origin’ (Cencini 
2012a: 17). 
538 ‘It is easy to establish that an increase in external debt is unavoidable insofar as a country’s 
purchases of goods, services, and financial assets exceed its sales of goods, services and 
financial assets. Variations in official reserves have also to be taken into account, since every 
increase in a country’s official reserves defines an acquisition of bank deposits denominated 
in foreign currencies, which has to be financed like any other acquisition of financial assets. 
Hence, the justifiable variation in external debt is determined by the difference between the 
acquisitions, commercial and financial, which a country needs to finance, and its capacity to 
finance them through its commercial and financial sales. A deficit in a country’s current 
account and an increase in its official reserves require to be financed, while a current account 
surplus and a positive amount of foreign direct and portfolio investments increase a country’s 
current financial capacity. If a difference is found between the current financial capacity of a 
country, and what it needs to finance all its external transactions, the necessary equality 
between its total imports (commercial and financial), IM, and its total exports (of goods, 
services and financial assets), EX, is restored through a loan obtained from the rest of the 
world’ (Cencini 2012a: 17−18). 
539 See Cencini 2012a: 18, Table 3. ‘Table 3 shows the difference between the variation of 
these countries’ external debt that should have been observed, and the actual variations, a 
difference, entirely pathological, which measures the extent of the unjustifiable increase in 
debt’ (Cencini 2012a: 18). 
540 We intend any country resorting to a foreign loan to cover, for example, the cost of its net 
imports. 
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In keeping with Schmitt’s analysis541, let us first point out that whenever, in any period, a 
nation’s exports are equivalent to its imports, the monetary income created in the said nation 
is preserved542 within its economy. This is because its exports-revenues simply replace an 
equivalent monetary income spent. But such is not the case when it comes to its net foreign 
expenditures543: a discrepancy arises between its real and monetary incomes. And, it is on 
account of this discrepancy544 that the value of the said deficit nation’s real income is 
consequently reduced to the level of the value of accessible monetary income within its 
economy, which income is needed to purchase the country’s product (output). The result 
being that, in effect, the very discrepancy between the deficit nation’s monetary and real 
income reduces545, by a same amount, the value of the deficit nation’s output: essentially, its 
internal employment546. Very simply, a deficit country’s internal employment is reduced in 
tandem with its net expenditures of foreign currency (e.g. MR), hence by a same amount (MR 
value) of its net imports. This is a loss of domestic income for the deficit country that is no 
more available for the purchase of its country product (output): it is forever lost to the benefit 
of the surplus country (e.g. R) in that it ultimately serves to pay for a same portion of R’s 
imports from A (deficit country), A’s own exports547. In fact, this domestic income of country 
A, is lost as of the initial period in which it incurs a debt related to its net imports (effect of 
foreign loan from R) because it is as of then that A’s domestic income is appropriated by R, 
and is thus no more accessible for the purchase of A’s output (initial period). A’s real income 
(its production548 output), hence its internal employment, is thus diminished accordingly. 
                                                
541 ‘We analyze, with reference to a given period, an outflow of foreign currency equal to 14 
dollars and an inflow equal to 10 dollars … We give the two definitions of national income. 
In each period the new product is the real income produced, denoted inc(A) P; the 
corresponding monetary income is inc(A) M. We first show that the country’s income would 
be 4 dollars higher if country A’s exports were equal to its imports … Domestic income = 154 
dollars if exp (A) = imp (A) = 14 dollars’ (Schmitt 2014: 88). 
542 ‘To the extent that there is equality between country A’s exports and imports, the monetary 
income formed in money A remains fully available in economy A: the income A spent is 
replaced by the income A obtained’ (ibid.: 88). 
543 ‘Yet, with respect to the net expenditures of foreign currency, 14 dollars are spent while 
only 10 dollars are earned … Difference between monetary and real incomes caused by the 
net expenditures in dollars … inc(A) P − inc(A) M = 4 dollars’ (ibid.: 88). 
544 ‘If this difference were not taken into account, the value of the national product of each 
period would be inc(A) P = 154 dollars. Yet, the income produced in real goods cannot 
remain at this level; on the contrary it falls in line with the value of the monetary income 
available for the purchase of national output’ (ibid.: 88). 
545 ‘As this value is reduced by 4 dollars, the level of real production is reduced accordingly, 
from the value of 154 to the value of 150 dollars. The value of the national product of each 
period is thus inc(A) P = 150 dollars’ (ibid.: 88). 
546 ‘[C]ountries experience a decrease in their domestic employment to the extent that their 
expenditures exceed their receipts’ (ibid.: 88). 
547 ‘The whole sum of income in money A that is spent in the purchase of dollars is thus 
obtained by A’s exporters instead of being in part (4 value units) added to the income 
available for the purchase of national output’ (ibid.: 89). The reference to money A intends 
the currency of the example-country, deficit country (A).  
548 ‘This explains why the domestic income of economy A, formed in money A, is reduced by 
4 MA relative to real income, which is therefore also reduced accordingly. If, over time, 
country A’s production were of 154 units of value per period, it would only be equal to 150 
units owing to the effect caused by its surplus imports’ (ibid.: 89). 
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Thus, A’s domestic unemployment increases in any period, in accordance with its net imports 
(all same period), that is, in line with its net expenditure of foreign currency. The reform will 
prevent this outcome549 for the deficit/reforming country, that is, this loss of domestic 
income550 that today the deficit country loses to the financial bubble. And the fact that the 
reform will aim to do this, will not only benefit A’s economy but the overall welfare of R 
(any of its trading counter-parts in the rest of the world) as well. The rest of the world (R) has 
everything to gain from a mutually enhanced trading partnership, such as the healthier551 
(financially and economically more sustainable) climate that the reform552 would, without 
doubt, bestow upon the economies with whom it trades.  
Let us have a look then as to how exactly the reform will carry out its mission of salvaging553 
the domestic income that is currently robbed from a deficit country’s economy whenever it 
contracts a foreign loan to cover the cost of its net imports or, simply, the difference between 
its expenditures and receipts of foreign currency. The process554, by which it will achieve this, 
is not at all complicated. Importers of A will direct the payment (in MA) of the totality of 
their imports to the ‘Bureau’ of its deficit/reforming country (A). The ‘Bureau’ will then pay 
(in MA) what is owed to A’s exporters and, forward the difference (amount of MA that has no 
exports of A to cover, thus no exporters of A to pay) as net gain to its nation’s government. 
Now the crucial factor here is that A’s government must imperatively not utilize this gain as 
an income (of A’s) merely to be spent on the purchase of already existing output within its 
economy. Doing so would not change555 the pre-reform status of things. Instead, what the 
                                                
549 ‘[U]nemployment in the economy should in no way increase because of the highly 
undesirable but certain effect of its net expenditures of foreign currency (dollars). Thanks to 
the reform, the production of economy A will remain at the level of 154 units of value instead 
of being reduced to the value of 150 dollars by the (pernicious and not yet corrected) effect of 
the net expenditure, in each period, of a value of 4 dollars’ (ibid.: 89). 
550 In this sense, we can indeed agree with Schmitt that ‘the charge imposed by surplus 
purchases is at first the equal decrease of domestic employment’ (ibid.: 89). 
551 ‘[T]he reduction of the employment of country A’s domestic economy is harmful to the 
rest of the world. The reform is therefore necessary both for deficit countries and for their 
partners of the rest of the world’ (ibid.: 89). Country (A) intends some deficit country. 
552 ‘The essential action of the reform will be − we have already noted it − to prevent the 
pernicious effect of the surplus of foreign currency expenditures over receipts, that is, the 
decrease in the deficit country’s employment. It is obviously favourable to countries whose 
sales exceed their purchases on the international scene that unemployment does not increase 
in their partners’ economies. This is precisely the aim of the reform’ (ibid.: 89). 
553 ‘Country A gets effectively indebted for 4 dollars to the rest of the world, but an equal 
credit, equivalent in dollars of the domestic income spent for net imports, is collected by the 
country whose net debt does therefore not increase’ (ibid.: 94). 
554 Specifically, ‘[t]he situation will therefore be as follows in the example of country A … 
The domestic settlement of ‘expenditures-receipts’ will be, as today, the payment in income A 
of exports by imports … The domestic settlement of net expenditures will be, as it is not at all 
the case today, the profit in income A of country A’s government … In figures, the flows will 
be the following: of the total expenditure of 14 dollars, 10 dollars will be obtained by 
exporters, the value of 4 dollars, always in the form of an income in money A, being given 
free to country A’s government’ (ibid.: 96). 
555 ‘Nothing is nevertheless modified if the government is satisfied with using this profit as an 
amount of income A corresponding simply to an income already waiting to be spent. The 
reform requires that the government’s profit finances a new production, additional, of 
economy A’ (ibid.: 90). 
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reform obliges is that the government spends its net gain by financing yet an additional 
production to that of its domestic economy. So that, for example556 (in keeping with Schmitt’s 
elaboration), if the deficit/reforming country (A)’s output was initially 154 dollars and, was 
subsequently reduced by 4 dollars (consequential effect entailed by the differential between 
its expenditures and receipts of foreign currency for which a net foreign borrowing is sought), 
A’s government, through investment of its gain, will see that its country production is fully 
restored to that of the original level of 154 dollars. Thus, through its government investing 
into a new production whose products will not be sold onto A’s already existent product 
market, the deficit/reforming country is able to, render to R the real payment557 of its (A’s) 
net imports in the same period in which they arise and, whilst maintaining all of its national 
(A’s) income intact. We next elaborate on our meaning. We recall how the reforming 
country’s ‘Bureau’ will counter-loan (A to R) the totality of its own loan (R to A) of foreign 
currency from R. In doing so, the ‘Bureau’ conveys the real payment558 of A’s net imports, to 
R (in same period in which they arise), all the while canceling the double charge that country 
(A) would otherwise incur with regard its net imports. But, the domestic income of A that is 
yielded to R, in conveying the real payment of its (A’s) surplus imports, is nevertheless 
                                                
556 ‘Thanks to the reform, national production remains equal to 154 dollars. This gain 
provides a real advantage for both countries, R and A. Regarding country R, … it is good for 
it to become the owner of the value of 4 dollars that increases economy A’s national 
production at the level of 154 dollars instead than 150 dollars. Concerning country A, this 
increase of its domestic production, being entirely due to the additional employment 
generated by the government’s action, decreases in the proportion of 4/150 the level of 
unemployment of the country’ (ibid.: 90). Schmitt’s wording with regard country R becoming 
‘the owner of the value of 4 dollars…’ should be heeded, particularly with respect to the word 
value, in that what R actually gets for the real payment of its excess exports is simply the 
equivalent value of the amount pertaining to the new production of A’s government. What is 
important to understand is that through the investment of its net gain (in MA, though 
equivalent MR value of A’s net imports), A’s government is the final purchaser/owner of the 
very goods and services produced through its government new production (4 dollars worth, in 
keeping with Schmitt’s case example), for example, by the formerly unemployed youth (again 
to refer to Schmitt’s example-case suggestion). In no circumstances are these goods and 
services produced for country R or, in order to be sold again on the reforming/deficit 
country’s (A’s) product market. What R obtains in payment (real) for its excess exports is 
part (equivalent MR value of A’s net imports) of economy A’s internal resources (conveyed 
through the counter-loan (A to R) of the ‘Bureau’). 
557 Again, this is not to say that the government’s new production consists in the real payment 
of A’s net imports, not at all; rather what R (surplus country) receives from A as real payment 
of its net exports, is the equivalent MR value of government A’s new production, that is, an 
equal part of A’s actual resources as produced by its domestic economy, in the form of, e.g. 
financial securities. ‘[C]ountry R becomes the owner not of the ‘personal’ product of A’s 
government, but of the equivalent of this product in any of the goods of 150 dollars value 
produced by economy A in addition to its government’ (ibid.: 91). And, we remember that 
this real payment of A’s surplus imports is conveyed to R, through the counter-loan (A to R) 
of A’s ‘Bureau’. That is, the very ‘loan in reverse that takes place at the moment country A 
sends 4 dollars to country R as payment of the equivalent of the domestic production of 
country A’s government’ (ibid.: 92). 
558 This real payment of country (A) could be, for example, in the form of financial securities. 
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maintained559 in that it is gained in each period, by A’s government who obtains from its 
‘Bureau’, in money A, the equivalent of a same MR value amount of this real payment which, 
as already noted, the government invests in a new production560: the investment having an 
effect on A’s production (e.g. thus its employment level) without increasing its current level 
of output561 that is available for purchase on its product market. That is, the reform’s idea 
behind the deficit/reforming country’s (its government) new production (equivalent MR value 
of its deficit, the net imports) is not to increase the level of output (goods and services) to be 
sold again on its (A’s) product market562. Through the investment of its net gain/profit in MA 
(money A), the government of country A is the final purchaser of these newly produced 
goods and services. For example, A’s government might invest the net gain (MR equivalent 
to its net imports amount) transferred to it by the ‘Bureau’ in indispensable infrastructures the 
likes of roads, harbors, hospitals, schools, etcetera; as well, in safeguards of the environment 
such as forests and lakes; then again, in systems for the production of energy, free medical 
care and other social assistance programs. Ultimately, the aim of the reform (through its 
government’s investment of its gain from the ‘Bureau’) is to raise the level of the reforming 
country’s employment563 rather than to add to the current level of goods and services that 
                                                
559 Hence, it is here that the two main functions of the ‘Bureau’ evidence the double 
advantage that the reform will bring to the deficit/reforming country. That is, on the one hand 
through the counter-loan (A to R), it will avoid the double charge that, pre-reform, was 
inherently implied in the foreign loan (R to A) sought for the payment, in foreign currency, of 
its net imports; on the other hand, the reforming country (e.g. A) will avoid a decrease in its 
level of employment, as entailed pre-reform from the loss of a part of its domestic income 
(equivalent MR value amount of its net imports). ‘This reduction of under-employment will 
add to the advantage already obtained through the cancellation of external debts’ (ibid.: 90). 
In fact, in the new system that the reform would establish, the deficit/reforming country (e.g. 
A) would no longer lose a single fraction of its national income. Payments would be 
internalized and occur between residents (the ‘Bureau’ itself being a resident); so that, in this 
way, no monetary payment would add to the real one: this overall result, made possible by the 
counter-loan (A to R) of its ‘Bureau’. 
560 ‘It is the implementation of a completely different method of intervention that allows the 
reform to maintain national production at the value of 154 dollars. The solution presents no 
difficulty. It is necessary and sufficient that the domestic income spent for the payment of net 
expenditures be the gain of the government, a sum to be used only towards an addition of 
national production’ (ibid.: 91). 
561 ‘Let us explain in some detail … how the reform will work, the domestic income of the 
deficit country affecting production and not the national output already produced’ (ibid.: 90). 
562 Neither is the idea that the government’s (A’s) net gain of recuperated domestic income, 
which income it receives from its ‘Bureau’, enable, for it, a power of expenditure over actual 
output. ‘It would be awkward if the income spent in domestic currency on the surplus import 
purchases of economy A were to be held as straightforward purchasing power by the 
government. In this truly inefficient case, country A’s national production would remain 
reduced by the value of the net purchases of foreign assets’ (ibid.: 91). 
563 ‘In order to maintain the domestic production of its national economy unchanged at the 
level of a value equal to 154 dollars, it is imperative that its government or its budget obtains 
more than a mere purchasing power: it must obtain the power to produce and not just to buy. 
It is certain that the power to produce is legitimate and effective, and avoids inflation, only if 
the money available to this purpose defines, despite everything, a perfectly legitimate 
purchasing power. Properly defined, a ‘power of production’ is, at the same time, a positive 
purchasing power. The profit of 4 dollars value in national money (A) obtained by the 
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would them too become also available for purchase. The important point to retain is that, in as 
much as this salvaged domestic income is transferred to A’s government from its ‘Bureau’ as 
a net gain/profit, the investment of this profit (by the ‘Bureau’/its government) in a new 
production, means that the new ‘product is already purchased at the moment the profit of the 
Bureau pays for new employment’ (Schmitt 2014: 98). This is the reason for which the newly 
produced goods and services that stem from the investment of the reforming government’s 
new production cannot be resold on A’s product market564. Nevertheless, the outcome565 
achieved is indeed in line with the aim of the reform566: the investment of the government’s 
net gain restores the deficit/reforming country’s level of monetary income567 to its initial 
value, that is, to the level that it stood at prior to the country’s foreign borrowing (R to A). 
Incidentally, which foreign borrowing that, pre-reform, granted R568 the ownership of part 
                                                                                                                                                   
government of the deficit country is the power to purchase, to this extent, the domestic 
product unchanged. This, however, does not prevent the government from spending this 
amount of money A to employ people who would otherwise remain unemployed’ (ibid.: 91). 
564 Schmitt elaborates on the reason as to why that is. ‘[I]t is necessary that the profit spent by 
the Bureau does not produce any goods for consumption or investment, which are themselves 
part of the goods to be sold. The reason is that this product is already purchased at the 
moment the profit of the Bureau pays for new employment. Unlike all other productions, the 
expenditure of the Bureau’s or the government’s profit is an expenditure that is active both on 
the production and on the sale of goods: at the very instant this profit is transformed into new 
incomes, it is precisely an income already spent for the final purchase of the corresponding 
output. In other words, the holder of this very special profit becomes the final owner of newly 
and additionally produced goods. Let us recall in this regard the most interesting example: the 
profit of the Bureau can be spent to decrease youth unemployment. There can be no question 
to ask the Bureau or the government to recover its profit, that is, to sell the goods produced by 
the new employees’ (ibid.: 98). 
565 ‘The sole effect of surplus imports is to provide, through the reform, to the Bureau and 
through it to the government, the income in domestic currency whose expenditure increases 
the national product. The ensuing external debt is zero, because the deficit country gives 
immediately, to R, an equal part of its available product’ (ibid.: 99). Specifically, it is through 
the deficit/reforming country’s (A’s) counter-loan (loan A to R) of its ‘Bureau’, in each 
period subsequent to the first, that the country (A) gives to R part of its (A’s) national 
resources, which is the reason why the national income spent in excess by A’s residents 
(importers) is legitimately earned by A’s ‘Bureau’ (its government). Moreover, the respect of 
the balance-of-payments identity means that country A is no longer a deficit country: its real 
imports being fully covered by its real exports. 
566 ‘Country A upholds the property of the total value, undiminished, of the income formed by 
its national economy; it is true that it ‘loses’ the 4 dollars that it spends in payment of its net 
imports, but in fact it obtains 4 dollars from this ‘loss’, the value of the foreign goods that it 
acquires through its zero export’ (ibid.. 92). 
567 ‘[T]he incomes of the new employees raise the national income to a monetary level 
equivalent to 154 dollars, exact value of the product to be sold’ (ibid.: 99). Schmitt’s 
reference with regard ‘incomes of the new employees’ intends, specifically, the incomes as 
generated from the deficit/reforming country’s (its government) investment in a new 
production (e.g. 4 dollars worth), in addition to that of its internal economy’s production (e.g. 
150 dollars worth). 
568 Though the reform will prevent this appropriation by R of part of A’s domestic income 
(MR equivalent value of A’s net imports amount), this is not to say that R will be in any way 
compromised by the changes that the reform will bring. ‘Country R is not in the least harmed, 
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(equivalent MR value of its net imports amount) of its (A’s) internal resources (domestic 
income). This previously lost domestic income of A, is thus decisively salvaged, complement 
of the reform. The new internal production of the reforming country (e.g. some country-
example A, whether UK, or Greece, whose case we will next examine), as produced by its 
government569 in addition to that produced by its domestic economy, is sound evidence that 
this previously lost domestic income is definitely upheld570 by any country embracing the 
reform. Considered in a nut shell, the overall impact of Schmitt’s single-country reform, with 
regard to any deficit/reforming nation adapting it, is twofold and inter-linked571: not only does 
it salvage, legitimately572, a part573 of its domestic income that, in turn, can be invested 
towards reducing its country unemployment but as well574, in guaranteeing the real payment 
of its net imports (the deficit) through the counter-loan of its ‘Bureau’, it curtails the double 
charge previously associated with its deficit (the net imports) and, ultimately cancels its 
external debt altogether575. That is, the effect of the reform576 has it that the reforming/deficit 
                                                                                                                                                   
because on one side it gives up real goods out of its own real product, while on the other side 
it cancels this expenditure, because it obtains the equivalent of the additional goods produced 
by the government of country A’ (ibid.: 92). 
569 In sum, the mechanics and intent of the reform are straightforward. ‘A’s importers pay the 
totality of their purchases, 10 for the imports balanced by exports of A, and 4 to the benefit of 
their government. R’s exporters are paid in money R by R’s importers, the missing payment 
being replaced by the loan of 4 dollars. This loan of R to A is cancelled by the loan in reverse 
that takes place at the moment country A sends 4 dollars to country R as payment of the 
equivalent of the domestic production of country A’s government’ (ibid.: 92). 
570 This salvaging of its domestic income that the reformation will enable for the 
reforming/deficit country is, contrarily, to what happens today. ‘In the present ‘regimen’, 
imports balanced by exports are actually paid by every deficit country in its own domestic 
money. However, this in not the way the domestic income spent for net imports, which are in 
surplus of exports, is used, because it does not remain available within the deficit country’ 
(ibid.: 95−96). 
571 The impact is inter-linked in the sense that the amount (MR value of the net imports of the 
deficit country, e.g. A) of A’s counter-loan to R is essentially ‘the equivalent of the domestic 
production of country A’s government’ (ibid.: 92). 
572 In each period (subsequent to the initial period), the reforming/deficit country gives to R 
part of its national resources (conveyed through the counter-loan, A to R, of its ‘Bureau’); this 
is the reason why the national income (equivalent MR value of the nation’s net imports 
amount) spent in excess by the reforming nation’s residents (its importers), is legitimately 
earned by the said nation’s ‘Bureau’ or, ultimately by its government. 
573 Specifically, we intend an equivalent MR value of the amount of its net imports. 
574 ‘This reduction of under-employment will add to the advantage already obtained through 
the cancellation of external debts’ (ibid.: 90). 
575 ‘Let us now complete the description of the financial Bureau’s essential function, which 
consists in immediately cancelling the very formation of the (external) debt of deficit 
countries. To do this, it is enough that the Bureau credits the government of its country of the 
whole domestic income, formed in national currency, and spent for the payment of the 
‘expenditures-without-receipts’. Suddenly all the country’s debt will be redeemed by this gain 
and countries’ net external debts will be a thing of the past’ (ibid.: 95). The key word to retain 
from Schmitt’s reference to ‘countries’ net external debts’ is: net. That is, in that he intends 
the foreign loan/debt (R to A) that the reforming/deficit country (e.g. A) incurs, in each 
period, in order to pay its net imports, ultimately, in foreign money (MR). The reform has it 
that in the very first period under observation, this foreign loan/debt (R to A) is the only 
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country’s external debt is simply reproduced577 period after period (on the 
assumption/condition, of course, that its net imports remain constant). 
Finally, let us recapitulate the main aspects of the reform. Apart from canceling today’s 
double charge with regard to deficit countries’ external debt, the latter will (per our earlier 
mention), also be merely reproduced578 rather than augmented cumulatively period after 
period, such as it did pre-reform (consequence of the second579 anomalous charge related to a 
sovereign debt that added to that of an ordinary debt: in effect, the double charge). Moreover, 
the reform will prevent the loss of domestic income that, pre-reform, definitely vanished from 
                                                                                                                                                   
foreign borrowing that the reforming/deficit country contracts with regard to the payment of 
its net imports (in money R). In subsequent periods to this initial period (all reform periods), 
this foreign/loan debt (R to A) is contracted by the reforming/deficit country as a third foreign 
loan (R to A), ultimately, such as to enable the payment of its net imports, in foreign money 
(MR). In both cases, whether consisting of the initial period or any subsequent period 
thereafter, this very foreign borrowing (loan R to A with which the reforming/deficit country, 
ultimately, pays its net imports in MR) is the loan (external debt, e.g. 4 dollars) that, as of the 
application of the reform, will be compensated. ‘The deficit country’s external debt, 4 dollars, 
will thus be entirely compensated by an income formed and acquire in money A. Logic will 
thus be respected: a country does not carry any debt distinct from the debt of its residents, so 
that a country whose residents have fully paid their debt does only carry ‘debts-credits’, that 
is, zero sum debts … The existence of only compensated debts of countries, as set of their 
residents, will be established by the reform’ (ibid.: 96). 
576 ‘The sole effect of surplus imports is to provide, through the reform, to the Bureau and 
through it to the government, the income in domestic currency whose expenditure increases 
the national product … The deficit country borrows nothing because it pays immediately its 
‘purchases-without-sales’. Despite the cancellation of external debts and credits, surplus 
imports and surplus exports retain nonetheless the indisputable utility characterizing 
international transactions’ (ibid.: 99). 
577 ‘[T]he external debt of country A does not increase and … country R does not suffer any 
loss because of its external credit being strictly zero … The ensuing external debt is zero, 
because the deficit country gives immediately, to R, an equal part of its available product’ 
(ibid.: 99). And, we know already from previous stipulations, that the deficit country conveys 
this real payment (‘equal part of its available product’) of its net imports, through the counter-
loan (A to R) of its ‘Bureau’. ‘The rest of the world (creditor country) obtains this product as 
the object of its external loan’ (ibid.: 99). The product intended ‘as the object’ of R’s loan (R 
to A), could be in the form of financial securities, for example. 
578 We recall, as earlier elaborated, that this amounts to saying that the deficit/reforming 
country’s (e.g. A) external debt is asymptotically equal to zero. 
579 ‘The payment of the second debt has the only effect to reproduce it intact’ (ibid.: 97). 
Schmitt describes, very accurately, a deficit country’s pre-reform problem with regard to the 
payment of its net imports with a foreign borrowing from R (loan R to A), in that, in any 
period subsequent to the initial period in which its deficit (net imports) arises, the following 
manifests. ‘The second payment ends up to the financial bubble, while the first payment is 
nothing other than the reimbursement of a debt that should never have existed’ (ibid.: 96). 
Now as he points out, ‘[i]t is the repayment of the sum lent that defines, before the reform, the 
external debt of country A’ (ibid.: 97). Country (A), intends any deficit country. More 
importantly, what needs to be retained from Schmitt’s explanation is that it is the 
repayment/reimbursement of the borrowed sum that creates a whole in A’s economy (MR 
deficiency) that, itself, has to be ultimately covered or, paid, hence his meaning when he says 
‘[t]he payment of the second debt has the only effect to reproduce it intact’ (ibid.: 97). 
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the deficit country’s economy, whenever it implicated a foreign borrowing (R to A) to cover 
its deficit (net imports). The reform will ensure, through the role of its ‘Bureau’ and 
ultimately its government that this previously abnormal580 disappearing of internal income 
will, no longer, manifest. Now, what needs to be emphasized once again is how the reform 
will go about salvaging this internal income and, the reason why. Let us simply recall that to 
the extent of its net purchases in MR (money R), the deficit country will suffer an equivalent 
reduction581 in its employment level582 given that, as previously explained, the implied foreign 
borrowing will create a monetary deficit for its domestic economy, that is, in comparison with 
its real income. And therefore, logically, the latter583 is also reduced in accordance to the level 
of available monetary income (MA) to finance the purchase of output (domestic). 
On considering then the negative impact, that a deficit country’s net foreign purchases, have 
on its economy’s employment, the reform’s intent584 becomes very clear: it must 
reestablish585 the destabilized equality between the said economy’s monetary and real 
income. The sure way to accomplish this is to have its country government invest its net gain 
in a new production of other than consumer or, investment goods (such that the newly 
                                                
580 ‘Nobody has ever made the mistake of saying that the payment of net purchases abroad 
should not be carried out in foreign currency. Every economist agrees that the payment is 
made in foreign currency abroad and takes place in national money at first; it is indeed in 
domestic income that importers pay their purchases. But a second error is most often made in 
this regard: concerning surplus imports economists consider in general as ‘normal’ that the 
incomes formed and spent in domestic money disappear following their expenditure. This is 
wrong and something the reform will make impossible. These incomes will be earned, intact, 
by the sovereign Bureau’ (ibid.: 98). 
581 ‘Countries experience a decrease in their domestic employment to the extent that their 
expenditures exceed their receipts’ (ibid.: 88). 
582 ‘[T]he surplus of foreign currency purchases is an equal decrease in employment. For 
country A, for example, in its international transactions, the expenditure of 14 dollars 
confronted to the gain of only 10 dollars decreases by exactly the same amount (4 dollars) the 
production of its domestic economy. The reason is that the value of 4 dollars spent to cover 
the difference between expenditures and receipts is no longer available for the selling of a 
domestic product’ (ibid.: 98). 
583 ‘[T]he income produced in real goods … falls in line with the value of the monetary 
income available for the purchase of national output. As this value is reduced by 4 dollars, the 
level of real production is reduced accordingly, from the value of 154 to the value of 150 
dollars’ (ibid.: 88). The varying value-amounts that Schmitt refers to are simply in reference 
to some example-case that he is using to demonstrate his argument.  
584 ‘Country A’s deficit decreases its domestic production, from a value of 154 dollars to a 
value of 150 dollars. The expenditure of its gain by the financial Bureau restores to the level 
of 154 dollars the total production of its domestic economy. The conclusion is simple but 
compelling: the gain of the Bureau can only be spent to benefit new production’ (ibid.: 98). 
Schmitt describes the terms of the situation through an exemplary case. ‘Ultimately, domestic 
production of private and public firms has a value of 150 dollars and that of the Bureau, 
which spends the profit yielded by the reform, has a value of 4 dollars … At the beginning the 
production of firms has a value of 154 dollars … The domestic payment of net international 
purchases reduces to 150 dollars the value of firms’ production … Finally, the Bureau’s 
expenditure of its profit of 4 dollars value adds this value to national production’ (ibid.: 98). 
585 ‘In order to restore the balance between real and monetary income of economy A it is 
therefore absolutely necessary that the profit of the Bureau finances additional production’ 
(ibid.: 98). 
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produced goods are not also sold on its product market, along with its actual output already 
available for purchase). Thus the reform, through the venue of its ‘Bureau’ and ultimately its 
government, has the ability to positively affect the level of its national employment by simply 
investing its net gain, as transferred over from its ‘Bureau’, into a new country production. 
More so, the beneficial result being that in financing a production extra to that of its domestic 
economy, it not only enhances the level of its country employment (from that of a pre-reform 
restrained level) but as well, that of its standard of living. 
Let us now consider Greece’s case. It is true that were it to embrace Schmitt’s single-country 
reform, it would not be doing so from a vantage point as favorable as that of the UK. Though 
at this stage, it might have that much more to gain from adapting the said reform than the UK, 
given the destitute state of its economic and financial status, there is no doubt that the 
transition would be that much more taxing. The main reason being, that of the extra hurdle of 
having to break from the entanglement of its current euro zone membership, such as to 
reclaim monetary sovereignty. Still, opting for the single-country reform would at least 
provide the buffer and safety net that it will most certainly require in order to begin a 
structured rehabilitation towards a sound and, sustainable economic and financial recovery. 
If we have a look at some of the available586 data, we observe that for the period of 2003 
through to 2012, Greece had a total deficit587 of 270, 920588 (billion dollars). Now, as Schmitt 
points out, were our current system of international payments be devoid of any 
‘duplication’589 anomaly, its (Greece’s) external debt should of increased accordingly; 
instead, it amounted to some 420,586 billion dollars: a near doubling of its total deficit590. 
What is evident from this data is that it shows the extent to which Greece could of benefited, 
in avoiding this loss of internal income, had it been under the regimen of Schmitt’s single-
country reform, for the period in question. Even without exactness of statistical data given 
past debt repayment/forgiveness591, the numbers are, no doubt, staggering. 
In closing, it is worth noting the merit that Schmitt’s single-country reform would bring to 
countries the likes of the UK and Greece, both countries evidently on the brink of considering 
alternate options to their respective dilemmas. It is a fact that in the reform that Schmitt 
                                                
586 ‘Even though a full statistical proof cannot be presented, because of a lack of official data 
on debts cancellation and owing to distortions caused by exchange rate fluctuations, it is 
interesting to observe that IMF and World Bank statistical data confirm the existence of a 
totally unjustified external (sovereign) debt’ (Schmitt 2014: 47). 
587 ‘[T]he IIP being negative, total deficit corresponds to the current account deficit’ (ibid.: 
48). IIP intends the ‘international investment position’ (ibidem). 
588 ‘The amount of Greece’s total deficit between 2003 and 2012 has been of 270,920 billion 
dollars’ (ibid.: 48); ‘Sources: World Bank (2014) and International Monetary Fund (2011, 
2013)’ (ibid.: 49). 
589 ‘In the absence of any pathological duplication, the Greek external debt should have 
increased by this amount. In reality, it has increased at least by 362,086 billion dollars + 58,5 
billion dollars (only known amount of debt stock reduction) = 420,586 billion dollars. We 
therefore observe that the actual increase in external debt is very close to the double of total 
deficit, that is, 2 times the amount of surplus imports’ (ibid.: 48). 
590 ‘The data that interest us are those concerning the increase in each country’s external debt 
position and the amount of its total deficit, where total deficit is the measure of the country’s 
net or surplus imports’ (ibid.: 47). 
591 That is, on account of the fact that ‘Greece has benefited from an important reduction of its 
external debt. Following the October 27th 2011 agreement on debt restructuring, finalized 
February 21st 2012, Greek external debt has been cut by 58,5 billion dollars by the end of 
2012’ (ibid.: 48). 
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advocates, no true system of international payments can be effectively created. This is 
obvious, no doubt, given no single country on its very own can establish such a system. But 
still, his reformation plan would offer the proper venue with which a reforming country could 
obtain free of charge the foreign currency it needs to convey its total purchases through a loan 
that does not increase its external debt; that is, the reform would offer a payment processing 
mechanism that would enable the deficit/reforming country to obtain a foreign loan, in each 
period, without any increase in its external debt, rather the latter would be simply 
reproduced592 unchanged period after period. It is, something to mull over. 
Next, we consider a reform that could be implemented by a group of countries, thus allowing 
for the creation of a partial system of international payments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
592 On condition, as we have mentioned earlier, that its net imports remain constant. 
170 
7       The multi-country reform 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Lastly, we consider the multi-country reform. It particularly opens the door to a reformation 
much more comprehensive in scope. We have shown that any single nation can single-
handedly protect itself from the anomalies of our current non-system of international 
payments without having to envision the creation of a new international payment system 
shared globally. Thus, the political motive to embrace a more global system of payments 
would no doubt invite in-depth deliberations within any country seriously considering its 
potential participation within such a system. That is understandable.  
Yet, if a reform were implemented by a group593 of countries, it would facilitate the creation 
of a partial, at least initially, system594 of international payments, with the same favourable 
end results as provided for any country adapting the single-country reform. That is, within 
such a system595, a deficit country’s domestic income would remain available internally and 
the country would incur an external debt equal to zero. More specifically, the 
deficit/reforming country’s net imports would be instantaneously matched with equivalent 
exports. This is because the new payment mechanism would be that of a multilateral real-time 
gross settlement system, based on a regime of absolute versus relative exchange rates, as is 
the case today. Undoubtedly, a multilateral mechanism would offer, not less than, a better 
chance for any country of the group to match its net imports or, net exports. And, that much 
more so, the greater the number and the relevance of the countries involved as active 
members of this multi-country reform. Again, even if initially, a smaller group of reasonably 
economically and financially sound countries ventured the multi-country reform project, it 
would not be difficult to anticipate that many more neighbouring countries would eventually 
follow suit. 
We present but a skeleton version of how a multi-country reform could effectively work. We 
fully acknowledge that, realistically, a team of specialized experts from varied faculties, 
whether accounting, computational linguistics, together with several payment systems or 
clearing house program specialists would, ultimately, have to oversee the complete 
developments of any proposed plan for a new international payment system, such as the 
multi-country reform could establish, even if just partial at the onset. It is thus not our intent 
                                                
593 The decision to implement a payment reformation as a group could be taken, of course, by 
any number of nations agreeing on the necessity of this multi-country reform. Though there is 
no optimal group size, it goes without saying, that the more the merrier, in that a larger and 
more compatible group whether in similarities or diversities, or both, operating on a 
multilateral mechanism, is certain to generate more operating power for any one participant 
country.  
594 Specifically, such a multi-country reformation as adopted by a group of countries, has the 
goal to create for the group, a new system of international payments with which to replace the 
current non-system. 
595 That is, a partial system of international payments, such as we advocate in our presentation 
of the multi-country reform: a multilateral real-time gross settlement system based on 
absolute exchange rates. 
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to belabour the details of a payment system reformation plan that only a group of diversified 
experts could, in the end, refine towards a viable implementation. In this chapter we merely 
introduce it, conceptually, focusing rather, on its underlying strength for potentially providing 
the stronghold from which countries could build economically and financially sound 
partnerships. 
As a final point regard our introduction of the multi-country reform, let us ponder a statement 
of Schmitt dating back some forty years ago, whereby he’d already endeavoured a plan for a 
global monetary reform. It is clear that his reasoning, even as early as then, laid the 
conceptual foundations that still underline the basic idea behind a multi-country reform such 
as we advocate in this paper. 
 
Under the new plan, full convertibility will be restored. The very concept of 
convertibility is meaningless in the present world. The fundamental meaning of 
convertibility stands out in the new proposals. Any holder of a nominal income 
should be enabled to spend it anywhere in the world. 
(Schmitt 1973: 19) 
 
We now turn our attention to the multi-country reform. 
 
 
On the workings of a system of international payments based on absolute 
exchange rates 
 
We will begin this section by elaborating on our meaning of a system of absolute exchange 
versus that of a relative exchange. We will attempt to show how the latter is not conducive to 
exchange rate stability. And while on the issue, readers will be reminded that countries need 
not expect that a return to their respective monetary sovereignties would necessarily entail the 
return to erratic exchange rate fluctuations. That is, of course, providing they concurrently 
replace the non-system of international payments, based on relative exchange rates, that they 
currently belong to, with a system that is instead based on absolute exchange rates. In such a 
payment system as the latter, a country’s currency is simultaneously596 offered and 
demanded597, thus curtailing598 the fluctuation of exchange rates. 
                                                
596 This is because in a payment system based on absolute exchange rates, money is used in a 
strictly intermediary or, expressed differently, in a circular way, thus figuring as the term at 
both ends of a payment transaction rather than being only one of the end terms of the very 
payment transaction. ‘LA MONNAIE EST UN OBJET D’INTERMÉDIATION ET NON UN 
BIEN FINAL DANS LES ÉCHANGES’ (Schmitt 1984: 49). Thus, operating in this circular 
way, money can’t but be a pure means of payment rather than pose as the form of payment 
‘tout court’, to use Schmitt’s coined expression (see Schmitt 2014). 
597 As Schmitt explains, money does not own up to its proper role unless its user (trader in a 
commercial or financial exchange) earns and, spends it in one and the same movement such 
that any fluctuation of exchange rates is avoided. ‘La monnaie ne joue parfaitement son rôle 
que si l’échangiste la gagne et la dépense dans le même mouvement, de telle sorte qu’aucune 
partie ne connaisse ni accroissement ni diminution de sa dotation monétaire initiale’ (Schmitt 
1984: 49). Specifically (and, paraphrasing Schmitt), in non-anomalous exchanges, money 
evolves not in a single but rather in a double move or said another way, in a forward and 
backward move, that is, from the buyer to the vendor and reciprocally from the vendor to the 
buyer. ‘Dans les échanges non pathologiques, la monnaie est présente (si elle l’est) en son 
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A comparison will be drawn between the two systems of international payments (current and 
reformed) to explain, again, how the one based on a system of relative exchange is what today 
loses for the deficit country, a part of its domestic income whereas the other based on a 
system of absolute exchange avoids this very loss. At the same time, we will remind on how 
the one system (relative) leads to the double charge of a country’s external debt whilst within 
the other system (absolute) the country would incur an external debt equal to zero. 
 
 
An absolute exchange versus a relative exchange 
 
If we were to try to understand the difference between the two by perceiving it very simply, 
we could imagine the action599 of throwing one object against another. That would consist 
more of a swop600, that is, of a barter or trade of one object for another e.g. one country 
currency for another; this is what essentially transpires in a payment system based on relative 
exchange rates. In an absolute exchange, the same product defines both end terms of the 
exchange, such that the very exchange601 is the equation of its terms, this because of the 
reason that the same object/product defines them both (ibidem). And, in this sense, the 
exchange (absolute) is not established other than in the identity602 of its end terms; imagine 
for example, a same country currency being the term at both ends of the equation. In so 
doing, we begin to comprehend that in such an absolute payment system, different country 
currencies would obviously have to be represented in terms of603, or exchanged through a 
third counter-party supra currency. Now we should also understand that this would not mean 
that the purchasing power of the respective nation-currencies (to purchase real 
commodities604 produced globally), would be lost to this supra605 currency which currency we 
                                                                                                                                                   
double mouvement, de l’acheteur au vendeur et réciproquement, du vendeur à l’acheteur’ 
(Schmitt 1984: 50). 
598 Of course, complete obviation could only be attained through a more comprehensive 
system of international payments (based on absolute exchange rates), involving all the 
countries of the world. 
599 Our English paraphrase of Schmitt’s own words: ‘[s]i l’action était de ¨jeter¨ un objet 
contre un autre, il ne s’agirait pas d’un échange mais, encore une fois, d’un troc’ (Schmitt 
1984: 139). 
600 See ibidem. 
601 Our explanation consists of a paraphrase of Schmitt’s French text. ‘Le prix absolu est le 
résultat d’une action elle-même absolue. En clair, l’échange est l’équation de ses termes parce 
que le même produit les définit tous deux’ (ibid.: 139).  
602 Again, we have paraphrased from Schmitt’s French text. ‘L’échange n’est constitué que 
dans l’identité de ses termes’ (ibid.: 139). 
603 ‘The various national currencies must be expressed in terms of a general standard’ 
(Schmitt 1973: 5). 
604 The multi-country reform that we advocate in this paper follows in Schmitt’s footsteps as 
per his earlier plan for a new global monetary reform. ‘The power to buy real commodities 
produced in the world belongs to the various national currencies. The international dollar 
simply borrows its purchasing power from all national currencies to which it is related by 
conventional exchange parities. Importers pay for all their purchases by drawing on their bank 
accounts in domestic currency. At the same time, commercial banks credit the National 
Bureau (NB)’ (Schmitt 1973: 8). In our study, we substitute the intermediary supra currency, 
which currency we choose to call the NG, in lieu of Schmitt’s international dollar; the NG 
connotation implying, simply, the New Group currency. Likewise, we refer to Schmitt’s 
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have chosen to call, very simply, NG. In the multi-country reform that we advocate, this 
purchasing power would definitely remain attach to the currency of each participating 
country: the supra currency (NG) would obtain it only on loan for temporary use (ibidem 
1973), from each respective currencies of countries, members of a new partial system of 
international payments. 
 
 
Exchange rate fluctuations curtailed 
 
The problem with an international payment system based on relative exchange rates, as we 
have today, is that in such a system, money usurps the role of a final good606. This is because, 
instead of being used in a circular607 (intermediary) way such as to ensure that it always 
returns to its original point of issue, it is rather used in a straight line fashion, as though it 
could somehow be a real flux counter-part608. Consequently, when used in such an erroneous 
way, it ends up on the currency exchange market to be bought and sold as if it were, itself, a 
                                                                                                                                                   
National Bureau (NB), as the Sovereign Bureau (SB) of a country’s (participating member) 
central bank; we sub-divide the SB into two operating sections, that of the International 
Bureau (IB) and, the Domestic Bureau (DB). The distinction between the two sections is 
merely attributed to role and function and it should thus be clear that the two sections define 
two individual parts of one and the same Sovereign Bureau. 
605 In the reform that we intend, this supra currency should carry out none other than a purely 
intermediary role in any commercial or financial exchange between countries, that is, rather 
than be, itself, one of the end terms of the transactional exchange, as it happens today given 
that the ‘system’ of international payments is based on a regime of relative exchange rates. 
This means that this supra currency should have no inherent value per se: ‘its only value 
springs from the series of exchange rates between domestic currencies and the $i’ (Schmitt 
1973: 13). Again, it should be noted that in the multi-country reform that we present in this 
paper, we substitute Schmitt’s international dollar ($i) for the NG, the New Group currency, 
that is, the ‘general standard’ that each of the different country currencies would be defined in 
terms of: ‘[t]he various national currencies must be expressed in terms of a general standard’ 
(ibid.: 5). Moreover, in following with Schmitt’s earlier global monetary reform plan, 
likewise in the reform that we here introduce, it should be ‘that the exchange rate between any 
two currencies be defined by the relationship of the absolute exchange rates of each national 
currency and the international monetary unit ($i)’ (ibid.: 15). As previously indicated, we will 
substitute the New Group currency unit (NG) for Schmitt’s ‘international monetary unit ($i)’. 
The international currency unit (NG) that we will refer to, in our reform presentation, would 
be issued by a World Intermediary Bank (WIB), to be used amongst the participating 
members of the New Group strictly for the settling of their international (external) payments; 
each country, part of this reforming group, would continue to use their own respective 
currencies, for all of their national (internal) payments. 
606 Our explanation is an English paraphrase of Schmitt’s own explanation. ‘N’importe 
l’origine des monnaies lancées dans les paiements entre les nations, elles usurpent toutes le 
rôle de biens finals, car elles sont, à tort bien sûr, libérées de la définition contraignante de 
toute monnaie véritable: au lieu de s’écouler dans les mouvements circulaires, elles sont 
utilisées en ligne droite, contrepartie des flux réels’ (Schmitt 1984: 135). 
607 That is, as in a ‘flux-reflux’ movement. See Schmitt 1984. 
608 See ibid.: 135. 
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real good. This effect, undoubtedly, fuels speculation that, in turn, leads to erratic 
fluctuations609 of exchange rates. 
Now, as Schmitt has always advocated, the problem with the anomalies related to our current 
system of international payments does not lie with importations or, more precisely, net 
importations. What we need to address is, more justifiably, the false610 monetary payments 
that they entail, not to mention the economic and financial havoc that deficit and surplus 
countries alike611, consequently endure. Thus, the focus should not be that of protectionism612 
but rather that of rectifying a monetary disorder such as our system of international payments 
is currently plagued with. 
It is true that no country can pay, in a final or conclusive manner, its importations (net 
including) other than through its commercial or, financial exports. Specifically put613, in a 
non-pathological system of international payments, money per se can never be the final 
                                                
609 See Cencini 2000. 
610 Our explanation is a paraphrase of Schmitt’s own description regard the problem. ‘Le vrai 
problème n’est pas dans l’ouverture des frontières aux flux réels, mais dans leur fermeture 
aux faux paiements monétaires’ (Schmitt 1984: 137). 
611 Our meaning is that the disorder escapes no country in the end, that is, if we remember the 
inflation damage that key-currency countries cause the rest of the world (R), by settling their 
net imports (the deficit) from R (rest of the world) with a mere acknowledgment of debt, their 
very own: the domestic money (R’s), created against it (as it sits on the asset side of R’s 
banks) within the respective surplus countries (in R) is thus demanded without being 
simultaneously offered.  If instead, international payments were carried out, overall, in a more 
orderly and pathologically-free manner, these key-currencies (e.g. dollars) would fall under 
the governing rule of the ‘flux-reflux’ such as a regime based on absolute exchange rates 
would oblige: the commercial and financial goods purchased by key-currency countries 
would thus integrally be paid by the said countries, through their own respective sales of 
commercial and financial goods. We next capture some of Schmitt’s own words regard our 
paraphrased explanation of his thinking on the issue. ‘Si la démarche décrite était 
rigoureusement suivie, on constaterait que les paiements extérieurs en dollars seraient tous 
soumis à la loi du flux-reflux, les produits et les titres achetés par A étant intégralement payés 
par le pays dans ses ventes de produits et de titres’ (Schmitt 1984: 57). ‘A’ is intended as 
some key-currency country (e.g. US).  
612 In his explanation of the problem, as being that of a monetary one (versus that of a 
country-agent’s overindulgence e.g. fact of having net imports), Schmitt points out that the 
solution, therefore, does not lie in protectionism. ‘Dès que la France aura intégré dans son 
propre circuit économique le flux de ses paiements créditeurs et débiteurs face à l’étranger, 
elle pourra lever tout protectionnisme, car le désordre est monétaire et il ne l’atteindra plus’ 
(Schmitt 1984: 137−138). His reference here to France, is simply intending some deficit 
example-country. In other words, the solution for such a country is not to draw rein with 
regard its importations but rather in internalizing its external payments. ‘Une seule mesure est 
efficace: internaliser les paiements extérieurs’ (Schmitt 1984: 136). 
613 Or, as expressed in Schmitt’s own words as per the following. ‘Un pays ne peut en aucun 
cas payer ses importations sinon par ses exportations de biens réels et de titres financiers. Le 
lecteur n’en doute plus, aucune monnaie ne peut constituer la contrepartie finale d’une 
importation. Et dans le régime du change absolu de sa monnaie, la France paiera ses 
importations non en francs, ni en aucune autre monnaie, mais par ses exportations de biens, de 
services produits, de titres, sans excepter les transferts financiers (paiements d’intérêts, de 
dividendes, de royalties, d’aides économiques)’ (Schmitt 1984: 144). His reference to France 
intends some example deficit country. 
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counter-part to an importation. But this is essentially what happens in an international 
payment system that is based on relative614 exchange rates. The reason being, as we have 
earlier evidenced, is that within such a system the external payment of a deficit country’s net 
imports through its financial exports (foreign loan and income) is carried out in two distinct 
stages: the first obtains for the deficit country the foreign income it requires with which to pay 
its net imports, though not without R’s (rest of the world) appropriation of part (MR 
equivalence of its net imports amount) of its own domestic income; in the second stage, the 
deficit country ultimately pays its net imports in money terms (foreign currency). The two 
subsistent and distinct stages means, as we have earlier explained, that the deficit country 
unnecessarily pays its net imports twice, once in real and once again in money terms, thus 
losing, forever, an equivalent portion of its internal income (equivalent MR value to its net 
imports) in the process. In other words, instead of paying its net imports, once in real (e.g. via 
an intermediary supra national money), the deficit country pays them twice, in real and in 
money. And, paid (net imports) in this manner, money inevitably and, pathologically becomes 
one of the end terms of the exchange (as though it were itself a real good) rather than being 
merely utilized in a circular and neutral way that would naturally befit its purely 
intermediary nature, as a means of payment. And, as we have already pointed out, the 
problem with money being one of the end terms of an international exchange615 is that it 
(money as such, a ‘specious’ real good) eventually finds its way to the foreign exchange 
market where it fuels a pathological capital, ‘currency-goods’ that ‘are exchanged one against 
the other’ (see Cencini 2000: 17 and 18), driving speculation that, in turn, fuels erratic 
fluctuation of exchange rates (see ibidem). 
If a system of international payments were, instead based on absolute exchange rates, money 
per se, would be precluded from ever being able to be the final counterpart to a purchase. 
And, in such a system, exchange rate fluctuations would be curtailed, accordingly. That is, as 
already clarified, complete obviation of fluctuations could only be attained through a 
comprehensive system of international payments to which all world countries were participant 
members. 
 
 
More on a system of international payments based on absolute exchange rates 
 
It is probably clear by now, having elaborated the nature of bank money as a means rather 
than an object of payment, that transactional real exchanges between nations should be 
reciprocal616 if we are to avoid that the external payment by any one nation is but a mere 
                                                
614 ‘In a regime of relative exchange rates, currencies are exchanged one against the other and 
exchange rates are defined as the ratio of this very exchange’ (Cencini 2000: 17). 
615 Thus, becoming clearly, an object of payment rather than merely a means of payment. ‘It 
is also easy to understand that, in this case, currencies are actually transformed from means 
into objects of payment’ (Cencini 2000: 18). 
616 Our meaning is not at all that a nation should always aim to balance its commercial 
exchanges but simply that its real exchanges should be balanced, as per need, through 
transactions on either or both of two distinct markets, that of the commodity market as well as 
the financial market. ‘Trade balance equilibrium is neither a necessary nor a desirable 
requirement of international transactions. On the contrary, a sound monetary system should 
allow industrialized countries to increase their commercial exports (thus exploiting fully their 
productive capacity) and less developed countries to increase their imports (which they so 
terribly need to do in order to increase the material standard of living of their population and 
speed up their economic growth). Applied to international payments, the principle of clearing 
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acknowledgement of its own debt617. We have shown that this only leads to a monetary 
duplication phenomenon618 whereby mere currency duplicates are considered as viable 
objects of payment, as positive assets in themselves619 who, moreover, find their way to the 
foreign exchange market to wreak serious havoc as ‘speculative capital’620: traded as though 
they were real goods, they fuel erratic exchange rate fluctuations through speculative621 
supply and demand. We have furthermore mentioned the inflationary effect that manifests in 
any surplus country (e.g. non key-currency country A) whenever the duplication of a reserve 
currency (e.g. MR) serves as the final payment of a key-currency country’s (R’s) net imports 
from country A. The effect can be explained in that, simultaneously deposited with R’s 
banking system and, on the assets side of A’s banking system, the reserve currency is thus 
duplicated; specifically, what is entered in A’s banking system is a mere duplicate622 that 
moreover, anomalously increases the capital available within A. That is, not being 
                                                                                                                                                   
implies the balancing of the transactions occurring on the commodity and on the financial 
markets. This means that a net commercial surplus must be counterbalanced by an equivalent 
net purchase of securities, the country whose balance of trade is in surplus being a net 
importer on the financial market’ (Cencini 2000: 19). 
617 It might be useful to recall here Cencini’s elaboration on the creation of bank money as an 
acknowledgement of debt. ‘Let us start from the creation of bank money. Made possible by 
the discovery that zero is the first number in the series of integers, double-entry book-keeping 
is based on the principle of the perfect balancing of positive and negative numbers. Now, 
double-entry book-keeping is also the instrument by which banks create money as their 
acknowledgement of debt (‘I owe you’, or IOU). If we were to isolate money creation from 
any other transaction, we would quickly realize that what banks can create is only a 
magnitude that is simultaneously positive and negative, a debit and a credit or, according to 
Schmitt’s (1975) definition, an ‘asset-liability’’(Cencini 2012: 55). 
618 See Cencini 2000. 
619 ‘Known as euro-currencies (though it would be preferable to use − as suggested by Triffin 
− the expression ‘xeno-currencies’), these duplicates are considered as positive assets on their 
own and become proper objects of trade’ (Cencini 2000: 13). 
620 ‘[S]ales and purchases of xeno-currencies pertain essentially to the category of speculative 
transactions. What has to be clearly understood is that speculation has reached such an 
enormous extent because the xeno-market has been increasingly fed by the process of 
duplication described above. Speculation is the effect and not the cause of speculative capital, 
and speculative capital is the direct result of currency duplication. As soon as currencies are 
transformed from means into objects of exchange their exchange rates vary according to their 
sales and purchases, and speculation arises from the possibility of capital gains resulting from 
these variations’ (Cencini 2000: 13). 
621 Moreover, the fluctuations (result of supply and demand) affect not just the currency 
traded as a ‘xeno-currency’, as Cencini next explains. ‘Any net purchase of money R in terms 
of money A affects both currencies, even if MR alone is a xeno-currency’ (Cencini 2000: 14). 
In this case-example, R is considered as the key-currency country and A, as the surplus 
country (non key-currency). 
622 ‘Resulting from a process of duplication, euro or xeno currencies are totally dissociated 
from any national output. They are duplicates of no value, and yet traded on the foreign 
exchange market as if they were real assets, and thus become the main cause of exchange rate 
erratic fluctuations. Indeed, money is a flow, a pure means of payment. Its transformation into 
an object of exchange is unnatural, and a clear symptom of the pathological state of the 
current system of international payments’ (Cencini 2012: 65). 
177 
explicitly623 refluxed to its original point of issue (R’s banking system) through the purchase 
of R’s financial securities624 by A’s investors, it thus remains available in A and at that, as a 
                                                
623 ‘If the system of international payments were founded on the circular use of an 
international currency − as suggested by Keynes in his plan for monetary reform presented at 
Bretton Woods −, no duplication would occur. In exchange for its net commercial imports a 
key-currency country would have to give up an equivalent amount of securities (shares or 
bonds), so that the instantaneous reflux of its currency would be explicitly recorded, thus 
avoiding the book-keeping duplication of financial claims taking place today. If this were the 
case, currencies would no longer be denatured, that is, transformed into objects of trade. 
Things being what they are, in the present system of international payments the process of 
duplication described by Rueff feeds a speculative capital market, and the transactions taking 
place on this market inevitably lead to fluctuations in exchange rates’ (Cencini 2000: 14). 
624 R being a key-currency country it pays for its net imports with a mere acknowledgement of 
debt (its own currency, MR), rather than through the sale of financial securities. In this way, 
‘it apparently can settle its trade deficit by transferring a sum of money… to its foreign 
creditors. Yet things do not work out this way. As confirmed by double-entry book-keeping 
and by what IMF experts have defined as the international investment position (IIP)’ (Cencini 
2012: 61), the key-currency nation’s external creditors receive, specifically, a bank deposit 
(R’s) claim rather than an amount of money R. Thus, it could be said that the key-currency 
nation (R) does ‘finance’ its net commercial imports through a net financial claim sale. It is 
true that though the exchange, even in this case, is seemingly equitably reciprocal in that A 
becomes bank-deposit owner of a deposit originating in nation R, it is not without evoking the 
calamitous effect of monetary duplication; the inherent flow nature of money will indeed 
ensure that money R infallibly returns to its point of issue, the banking system of R. As such, 
‘the sum entered on A’s banking system should be immediately replaced by an equivalent 
amount of financial claims. This is indeed what happens, since A’s banking system becomes 
the owner of a bank deposit formed in country R’ (Cencini 2000: 13). But this is one clear 
example whereby a system of international payments based on relative exchanges rates, 
which system particularly caters to the privilege of key-currencies, will ultimately evidence 
serious anomalies (e.g. monetary duplication phenomenon) given neither its infrastructure nor 
the principle (key-currency partiality) underlining it is, after all, mindful of the inherent flow 
nature of bank money. Cencini describes how our international payment system that is 
currently based on such a regime of relative exchange rates exactly facilitates the monetary 
duplication phenomenon and explains how the said phenomenon, in turn, fuels exchange rate 
instability. ‘[T]he duplication arises from the fact that the same claims on R’s bank deposits 
are simultaneously at the disposal of the debtor and the creditor countries. Since the national 
output defining the object of these claims is not itself doubled, only the claims circulating 
within country R have a real content, the others being mere duplicates. Now, while R’s 
banking system lends within country R the totality of its deposits, the banking system of 
country A is free to lend its duplicates on the foreign exchange market’ (Cencini 2000: 13). 
This means that these monetary duplicates will eventually find their way to the Forex market 
to be traded as ‘currency-goods’, no doubt driving speculation and thus fuelling erratic 
fluctuation of exchange rates. Moreover, as Cencini further points out, it is in such a system 
as that based on relative exchange rates that an asymmetry between non key-currency and 
key-currency nations is able to entail a monetary duplication that is clearly responsible for 
transforming bank money into a payment object when, inherently, bank money is a mere 
means of payment. ‘Since in a regime of relative exchange rates currencies are considered as 
real goods, it is not surprising that exchange rates are taken to define the prices of the 
currency-goods traded on the foreign exchange market. It is also easy to understand that, in 
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mere duplicate of the income still deposited with R’s banks, therefore, anomalously 
increasing the amount of capital in country A. Specifically, inflation consequently manifests 
in A on account of the presence of a duplicate, of an amount of money R (key-currency) 
deprived of any real content that increases pathologically, the amount of capital625 available in 
nation A. 
The forte of an international payment system based on absolute exchange rates is that it will 
assure the vehicular use of money through ‘the necessary equality between the balance of 
trade and that of financial transactions’ (Cencini 2000: 19). Specifically, in such a system, 
deficit countries (key-currency and non key-currency alike) would have no choice but to trade 
an equal amount of financial goods (e.g. securities) in exchange for their net imports. This 
necessary transactional condition, part and parcel of a system of international payments based 
on a regime of absolute626 exchange rates, is particularly important to ensure that the said 
                                                                                                                                                   
this case, currencies are actually transformed from means into objects of payment. It is 
through a duplication that this transformation becomes effective and that the regime of 
relative exchange rates has its full impact’ (Cencini 2000: 17−18). 
625 ‘If the residents of a country are paid in a foreign reserve currency for their net commercial 
exports … the sum of foreign currency obtained from abroad is first changed into an 
equivalent sum of national currency − with which exporters are paid − and then transferred to 
the country’s foreign reserve account at the domestic central bank, where it defines the net 
gain of the country as a whole’ (Cencini 2012: 59). It should be understood that, not at all, 
does inflation arise in country A (surplus country) on account of the money A (MA) that it 
creates against the sum of money R (MR) that it (A) enters on the asset-side of its (A’s) 
banking system each time a key-currency country (R) pays its net imports from A with its 
own domestic currency (R’s); rather, the equivalent amount of MA that is created as counter-
balancing effect to the sum of MR that is entered on the asset-side of its (A’s) banking 
system, is in fact necessary to avoid deflation that would otherwise settle in if this creation did 
not take place. The reason for this stems from the mercantilist gain that nations can realize 
through their net exports and, in the necessity to monetize it; thus, the creation of MA 
specifically represents the monetization of A’s external gain of mercantilist nature. So that 
though the money R entered on the asset-side of A’s banks is at the origin of a demand for 
money A which is created against it (MR), the actual creation is not itself at the origin of 
inflation; the supply of MA by the banks of A ‘being infinitely elastic’ (Cencini 2000: 16) it 
does not even affect the exchange rates. Moreover, this creation (of MA) is non-cumulative in 
time: it takes place, rather, through an initial emission (of MA) that forms a sort of revolving 
fund that can be used/reformed repeatedly, in successive periods, without any need for a new 
emission of MA; that is, unless the gain of mercantilist nature increased, in which case 
scenario a new emission would be necessary (equal to the difference between the new gain 
amount and the initial revolving fund amount). That all said, the inflation arising in surplus 
country A is due to the perpetual presence of a duplicate (an amount of MR deprived of any 
real substance) that increases, anomalously, the amount of capital available in country A; that 
is, since this capital is not being absorbed by A’s investors for the purchase of R’s financial 
securities, it thus remains pathologically available in A (amassing cumulatively in time). The 
manifestation of internationally originated inflation in surplus nations (result of key-currency 
countries, e.g. R, paying their net imports with a mere acknowledgement of debt, MR) is on 
account of this pathological increase of capital that is thus perpetually available in their 
respective nations. 
626 A regime of absolute exchange rates is naturally conducive to the circular or vehicular use 
of money, contrarily to a regime of relative exchange rates that, quite evidently, rather works 
against the vehicular and neutral use of money. Specifically, a system of international 
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countries’ individual domestic currencies are instantaneously refluxed to their original point 
of issue (respective national banking system), hence indeed ensuring that money is utilized 
but in a circular manner. In fact, bank-money627 will always return to its original point of 
issue, its very flow aspect628 will compel it to do so; this vehicular (flow) nature of bank-
money stems from double-entry bookkeeping. That said, the problem with a system of 
international payments based on relative exchange rates is that not only does this very 
regime’s (relative exchange) partiality to key-currency countries lead to the occurrence of 
monetary duplication that, in turn, fuels global exchange rate instability, the said partiality 
also leads, ultimately, to internationally originated inflation, as we have shown. 
Furthermore, on discussing the issue of exchange rate instability, it is also worth mentioning 
that monetary duplication is not the only occurrence that might lead to the fluctuation of 
exchange rates, in a system of international payments based on relative exchange rates, 
external debt servicing is yet another venue by which exchange rates are subject to 
destabilizing pressures. For example, when a deficit country (e.g. A) carries out629 its net 
                                                                                                                                                   
payments based on absolute exchange rates would not only guarantee reciprocally equitable 
real exchanges but more so, it would do so in a way that would complement the inherent flow 
nature of bank money, such as to avoid the monetary disorders (e.g., monetary duplication, 
exchange rate instability, external debt double charge) that otherwise manifest in a non-
system (such as we currently have) of international payments as well as in the respective 
national economies that it links. 
627 ‘The discovery of double-entry book-keeping marked the outset of modern economies as 
well as that of modern economics. From then on, the basis was laid for the emission of bank 
money, and for the birth of capitalism’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 261). And, moreover, on 
the vehicular/flow aspect of bank-money, the authors are specific on pointing out what 
exactly ensures it, that is, non other than adherence to double-entry bookkeeping. 
‘Compliance with double-entry book-keeping guarantees the vehicular use of bank money’ 
(Cencini and Citraro 2012: 266).  
628 To be clear, our meaning is not that money flows, but rather that, it is a flow, an 
instantaneous flow. As clarified by Cencini, ‘[m]oney cannot logically be exported, because, 
in its circulation, money can only act as a means of exchange and thus cannot become itself 
the object exchanged through its circular flow’ (Cencini 2012: 60). And, as he further points 
out, given that the flow aspect of money does not vary whether it is operating within a 
national (production economy) or international framework (exchange economy), this marks 
the principle by which the balance-of-payments of a nation must therefore naturally be in an 
equilibrium state. After all, it (balance-of-payments) ‘is construed according to the rules of 
double-entry book-keeping’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 272), from which the very flow nature 
of bank-money stems from. Cencini specifically explains. ‘Because of its necessary circular 
flow, money cannot finance any net purchase, either within a single banking system or 
between countries. This clearly means that purchases have to be matched by simultaneous 
sales carried out through the circular flow of money. At the international level, a country’s 
purchase of foreign real goods, services, and financial assets is necessarily balanced by its 
sales of domestic real goods, services, and financial assets’ (Cencini 2012: 60). 
629 ‘In order to pay for the interest on its external debt country A must earn an equivalent 
amount of country R’s bank deposits, which it does through its net sale of goods and services. 
Increased by the positive inflow of money R (or, more precisely, by the claims on R’s bank 
deposits), country A’s official reserves are then reduced by the outflow of money R (i.e. of the 
claims on R’s bank deposits) paid as interest to country R’ (Cencini 2000: 15). Now though 
money R is here considered as a key-currency, it should be understood that it could intend any 
foreign currency, reserve currency or, not. This is because it is the effect of a unilateral 
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interest payment in a foreign currency630 (key-currency or, not), the process might lead to a 
devaluation631 of its domestic currency; that is, if the pressure on exchange rates is not 
neutralized by a second payment as is imposed on the deficit nation as a whole and which 
implies a decrease in its official reserves. 
And regard external debt servicing, we have also shown that this payment transaction by a 
nation’s indebted inhabitants inevitably implicates the nation as a whole, which implication 
ends up doubling the net interest payment for the respective nation, given the current state632 
of our system of international payments. That is, operating within a framework of relative 
exchange rates, not only do payment transactions fail to complement the vehicular633 aspect of 
bank money and rather work against it634, but moreover, the payment system neglects to 
account for the explicit recognition of nations existing as their own entity635. The result being 
that the net interest payment exactly doubles in that its payment by the nation’s residents 
actually creates a monetary deficiency in foreign currency (unrequited exports: see Schmitt 
2012) which amount is ultimately covered by the nation as a set: the payment of the latter thus 
adding to that of its inhabitants. The multi-country payment reform that we advocate636 should 
                                                                                                                                                   
transfer, which transfer defines this very payment transaction occurring in a system based on 
relative exchange rates, that causes a net demand for the foreign currency (e.g. MR), in terms 
of MA (e.g. some deficit country A currency); the demand for MR to meet A’s net interest 
payment cannot be matched by an equivalent supply of MR by A’s banking system, the latter 
being in the impossibility to ever create a foreign currency (e.g. MR), the result thus enabling 
a net demand for money R, in terms of MA. 
630 Our meaning that is, having earned through its exports, an equal amount (equivalent to its 
net interest payment) of foreign bank deposits (e.g. R’s) it then relinquishes them (e.g., to R) 
in order to carry out its (A’s) net interest payment. 
631 ‘The banking system of country A has no means to create money R. Therefore, the demand 
for the amount of money R required to pay for interest on A’s external debt puts a pressure on 
money A’s exchange rate, which, if not neutralised, gives rise to a process of devaluation’ 
(Cencini 2000: 16). That is, if the pressure on exchange rates were not neutralized by a second 
payment (as it surely is) imposed on the deficit country as a set, which second payment 
decreases its official reserves: the anomalous double charge. 
632 ‘[T]he payment of net interest by a country’s indebted residents necessarily involves the 
country itself, whose payment − in the present system of international payments − adds up to 
that of its residents’ (Cencini 2012: 65). 
633 ‘At the international level, disorders are also due to the existence of a payments system at 
odds with the vehicular nature of money. As we already observed, Ricardo was the first 
economist to realize that − because of its circular flow − a national currency can never leave 
the banking system from which it originates’ (Cencini 2012: 64). 
634 That is, for example, as the occurrence of monetary duplication evidences. ‘By its own 
nature, money is simultaneously created and destroyed in an instant each time it is used as a 
means of payment. If, nevertheless, we do find amounts of domestic currencies outside their 
banking system, this is because − as clearly shown by Rueff (1963) − in the present system 
reserve currencies are duplicated: while entirely deposited in their banking system, they are 
also entered in the banking system of the creditor country’ (Cencini 2012: 64). 
635 ‘The double charge of net interest payments could be avoided only if the macroeconomic 
existence of countries were explicitly accounted for, and payments carried out respecting the 
flow nature of money’ (Cencini 2012: 65). 
636 That is, in the spirit of Schmitt et al. who have diligently followed in Keynes’s footsteps to 
lay the foundations for a viable reform plan that would transform our international payment 
system such as to disencumber it from its many and serious malfunctions. ‘Rejected by the 
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explicitly account for nations as macroeconomic entities, operating on behalf of their 
residents (more so, within the realm of their respective monetary sovereignties637) and, in 
conjunction with an international intermediary bank, such as to curtail indelibly the monetary 
disorders that currently fester within our actual system of international payments. It is fully 
understood that when the practical application of a system works in harmony638 with its 
proper theoretical development, anomalies are thus avoided. But unfortunately the reality is 
rather that the many deficiencies of our current ‘system’ of international payments definitely 
attest to the contrary. The global account ‘mysterious’ imbalances639, specifically the global 
current account deficit and, global capital account surplus that are both the result (as earlier 
demonstrated) of external debt servicing640 can also be explained on account of a lack of 
                                                                                                                                                   
American representative at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, Keynes’s plan has been 
revised and completed by Schmitt (1973), who clearly perceived the need to create both a 
bank acting as a central bank of national central banks, and a series of accounting entities − 
each operating autonomously in a given country − allowing for the countries to be explicitly 
and functionally involved in each payment carried out by their residents … such a reform 
would allow countries to benefit from their unlimited monetary sovereignty, while providing 
them with an international currency playing the role of a common standard and of an 
international means of payment’ (Cencini 2012: 65). 
637 ‘The passage from the present system of relative exchange rates, implied by the use of 
national currencies as international objects of exchange, to a system of absolute exchange 
rates, in which currencies are no longer traded, will guarantee costless the stability of 
exchange rates without forcing countries to abandon their monetary sovereignty’ (Cencini 
2012: 65−66). 
638 ‘When the working structure of the system conforms to its logical structure no pathology 
arises, which clearly shows how important analysis is in determining the causes of, as well as 
the remedies against, the pathological state of the economy’ (Cencini 2012: 48). 
639 ‘[T]he present ‘non-system’ fails to account for the macroeconomic aspect of international 
payments, which leads to the formation of a monetary deficit each time an LDC pays its net 
interest on debt. The decrease in LDCs’ official reserves necessary to restore equilibrium 
defines a dramatic loss of resources suffered by debtor countries, and accounts for the global 
discrepancies affecting the world current account and the world capital and financial account’ 
(Cencini and Citraro 2012: 283). See also ibid: 284 for further elaborate specifics. It should 
also be noted that though LDC intends least developed country, it has been shown that this 
specific ‘non-system’ deficiency affects, in this way, any deficit country at the time of 
external debt servicing.  
640 ‘[N]et interest payments are indeed the cause of both the world current account deficit and 
the world’s net capital inflow’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 263). Specifically, it is the fact that 
the second additional payment is not only superfluous but, that it is particularly 
macroeconomic that eventually unravels the enigma regard the discrepancy at the level of 
global accounts: the ‘missing surplus’ and, ‘missing capital outflow’ (see ibid.: 261). This 
indeed confirms ‘the existence of macroeconomic transactions’ (ibid.: 283). ‘At the 
microeconomic level the payment of interest is single, not double: country A’s residents pay 
their due only once, and R’s residents are not paid beyond their due. But the second, 
redundant payment is macroeconomic. It affects country A as a whole and benefits the 
macroeconomy of country R. The outflow corresponding to A’s second payment is thereby 
not entered into R’s current account. Only the microeconomic payment of interest is reported 
in R’s current account; the macroeconomic interest payment does not accrue to any particular 
residents of country R, and hence it fails to be reported in R’s balance of payments’ (Cencini 
and Citraro 2012: 284). This thus explains the ‘missing surplus’ and, the deficit of the global 
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respect for the inherent macroeconomic element641 of external payments, which lack is 
characteristic of a system of international payments based on relative exchange rates. On 
thinking about it, it is indeed interesting that discrepancies should arise within the global 
accounts (current and, capital and financial) given that after all, adherence to double-entry 
bookkeeping642 simply does not allow for ‘any discrepancy between debits and credits’ 
(Cencini and Citraro 2000: 279). But still, it is not surprising given that our actual external 
payment system is based on relative exchange rates, a regime that leaves much to be desired. 
Our current international payment system would operate much more efficiently were it 
instead based on a regime of absolute exchange rates combined with an international 
intermediary bank (central bank of domestic central banks) that would intervene as ‘monetary 
intermediary’643 on behalf of the countries themselves (as macroeconomic entities); as such it 
would be in a better position644 to curtail serious payment anomalies that otherwise inevitably 
manifest in a double charge of net interest (external debt servicing), not to mention the  
‘mysterious’ world account imbalances. 
The situation being what it currently is645, international payment transactions operate within a 
system that is based on relative exchange rates; in such a system though a country’s external 
deficit is paid within the period that the net imports arise, the actual reimbursement only takes 
place in a subsequent period and this is a true source of malfunction that leads to the double 
                                                                                                                                                   
current account when the two countries are considered in their ensemble, country ‘A’ 
intending some debtor country whilst country ‘R’ some creditor country. Now regarding the 
imbalance at the global capital and financial account level, the very ‘missing capital outflow’, 
let us note the following specifics regard the debtor country’s net interest payment that results 
in an internal savings for the creditor country. ‘[B]ecause of the pathological payment of net 
interest carried out by A, R pays for part of its purchases with the income of country A 
obtained free of cost. As this specific gain benefits the macroeconomy of R, no outflow of 
capital is entered into R’s balance of payments’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012: 285) that would 
match the ‘capital inflow in A’s balance of payments’ (ibid.: 284), which inflow accounts for 
the reduction in its (A’s) official reserves, the latter evidently making up for the foreign 
monetary deficiency that results from the net interest payment. 
641 Specifically, that is, the inherent macroeconomic element of international payments that 
should naturally account for nations existing as ‘macroeconomic entities’ (Cencini 2012: 58). 
642 As Cencini and Citraro remind us, ‘[a]t the global level this means that no discrepancy 
should exist either in the world current account or in the world capital and financial account’ 
(ibid.: 279). 
643 ‘Economists and experts alike are perfectly aware that the identity between overall exports 
and imports applies to countries. Yet the absence of an international central bank acting as a 
monetary intermediary for nations does not allow for countries being simultaneously credited 
and debited each time a payment is carried out on their behalf. Instead of being ‘coupled’ 
thanks to the mediation of money, a country’s sales and purchases are separated. In these 
circumstances a country’s overall exports and imports are no longer the terms of an identity. It 
is still claimed that they must be equal, but the autonomy of exports with respect to imports 
opens the way to a possible inequality, which leads to the world discrepancies affecting the 
global current account as well as the global financial and capital account’ (Cencini and 
Citraro 2012: 282). 
644 Our meaning is that it should be structured in such a way as to logically complement its 
conceptual/theoretical construct, that is, rather than work against it.  
645 Specifically, ‘that the system of international payments adopted since Bretton Woods has 
been based on a regime of relative exchange rates and that the change form disorder to order 
requires its replacement with a regime of absolute exchange rates’ (Cencini 2000: 17). 
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burden of external debts, both with respect to payment of net interests and, with respect to the 
formation, itself, of external debts. As we have shown, each time a deficit country (non key-
currency) pays for its net imports with a foreign loan, it ends up doubling its external debt. 
This is because, in the absence of monetary homogeneity as is the case in an international 
payment system based on relative exchange rates, the deficit country inevitably pays for its 
net imports twice; that is, it settles the said deficit (net imports) once at the level of foreign 
exporters, in money terms and once again in real terms, at the level of foreign investors (see 
Schmitt 2014).  
A system based on absolute exchange rates operating in conjunction with a third counter-
party world intermediary bank that issues its own currency standard646, could instead make all 
the beneficial difference. In such a system, a nation’s comprehensive imports and exports 
would remain ‘the terms of an identity’ (Cencini and Citraro 2012), the nation’s purchases 
and sales being properly linked through the intermediary intervention of an international 
standard instead of being intercepted in time. The lack of such an intermediary standard, 
today, leads to the double burden of countries’ external debts, not only in formation but as 
well regard the net interest payment. If a system of international payments were based on 
absolute exchange rates and complemented with a multilateral real-time gross settlement 
mechanism, it would immediately match647 a country’s net imports with equal exports and as 
such the country’s external debt would be nil, consequently ending the need for a payment of 
net interest648, let alone a double one, as is currently evidenced from the world account 
imbalances; moreover, the entirety649 of the deficit country’s domestic income would be 
spared. 
Having emphasized the multi faults of a system of international payments based on a regime 
of relative exchange rates, it should now be clearer as to what features we would hope to 
avoid or gain, in an alternate system such as one based on absolute exchange rates; that is, so 
as to enable the new reformed system to function in a more orderly fashion: devoid of 
pathologies that bear serious consequential effects on the economic and financial health of 
national economies. 
                                                
646 The idea behind an international currency standard is such as to bring in the element of 
monetary homogeneity that is required in external payments, but without the need for 
participant reforming countries having to renegade from their own respective monetary 
sovereignties; the international standard would be resorted to strictly to carry out external 
payments between the relevant reforming countries which countries would retain their 
respective distinct currencies for all their internal payments. 
647 In such a system, a reforming country would pay for its net imports with an equal part of 
its actual resources rather than an equal part of its future resources which factor, in our 
current defective system of international payments, enables the creditor country’s 
appropriation of a part of the deficit country’s internal resources (equal MR amount to the 
latter’s net imports), thus implying a definite loss of domestic income for the deficit nation. 
648 This is not to say that a reform of international payments would not honour interest 
payments that remain due; in fact, the multi-country reform that we advocate will account for 
their proper and gradual repayment but, the reform process will definitely prevent them from 
even arising at all. 
649 We have seen how, in a system based on relative exchange rates, a deficit country loses a 
part (equal MR amount of its net imports) of its domestic income when a net foreign 
borrowing is implied in the payment of its net imports. 
184 
Undeniably, we need to progress650 towards a system that would facilitate the orderly 
transactions of countries’ external payments by ensuring that its theoretical construct 
conceives of bank-money solely as an intermediary means of payment651 and that it allows for 
the concurrent652 supply and demand of currencies interacting within the said system653; 
precisely, the system based on absolute exchange rates, should be equipped with a real-time 
gross settlement mechanism that would streamline the immediate match of a country’s net 
imports with equal exports, which mechanism would be managed by a world intermediary 
bank that would issue an international currency, its own intermediary standard. 
Now, one of the most distinguishing features of a system based on absolute exchange rates is 
that it allows for the separation of bank-money flows654, that is, it is able to effectively keep 
the external currency flow (international money flow) apart from that of the internal currency 
flow (national money flow). Operating in such a way and through the particular function that 
the international intermediary currency would carry, the system would be able to properly 
internalize655 its external payments. That is, it would afford a reforming country the manner 
by which to integrate within its own economic circuit, the flux of its payments (creditor and 
debtor), in respect to the international economy656. 
Though the reasoning behind the internalization of external payments may not be readily 
evident, it might be better understood once the distinct role of the international standard is 
explained. Let us first remember the role of national money: it vehiculates real goods and 
services (commercial and, financial) amongst its country residents; it does this, very simply, 
‘by lending its form to physical output’ (Cencini 2000: 19). By the time money transgresses to 
an economy of exchange (international economy) from that of an economy of production 
(national economy), in order to exchange real goods (commercial/financial) internationally, 
these very goods ‘have already been monetised in their countries of production’ (ibid.: 19). 
Now keeping this in mind, it is easier to bring into focus the role657 that the international 
                                                
650 ‘The transition from relative to absolute exchange rates is therefore that from a system in 
which money is an object of payment to one in which money is a means of payment; from a 
system in which money is itself an asset to one in which real and financial assets are 
‘circulated’ by money. It is the circular use of money that, as in Keynes’s plan of reform, 
allows for the stability of exchange rates’ (Cencini 2000: 18). 
651 ‘[T]he time has come to abandon the ‘materialist’ conception of money and to work out a 
system of payments in which money is used only ‘vehicularly’. When this is done, the present 
regime of relative exchange rates will be replaced by a regime of absolute exchange rates in 
which each currency is exchanged against itself’ (Cencini 2000: 18). 
652 ‘It is obvious, in fact, that if every time money R is demanded by money A, money A is 
demanded by money R, no net demand can ever be exerted that may lead to a fluctuation of 
MA’s or MR’s exchange rate’ (Cencini 2000: 18−19). Money ‘R’ and money ‘A’ intended 
simply as the respective currencies of two example-countries. 
653 As Cencini clearly explains it, ‘each currency is simultaneously offered against and 
demanded’ (Cencini 2005: 325) by some chosen international standard, thus leaving ‘its 
exchange rate unaltered’ (ibid.: 325). 
654 ‘Absolute exchange rates define a regime in which the international monetary flow is kept 
separate from the flow of national currencies that takes place within each country’ (Cencini 
2000: 19). 
655 See Schmitt 1984: 136, as per earlier referenced. 
656 Our paraphrase of Schmitt’s French text, see Schmitt 1984: 137−138, as per our earlier 
reference. 
657 ‘[A] regime of absolute exchange rates is one in which, by taking the place of national 
currencies, the money chosen as the international means of payment lends its form to the 
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currency (intermediary standard) might, itself, have; it is none other than to lend ‘its form to 
the goods, services and financial claims exchanged between countries’ (ibid.: 19). Here then, 
is how, in a system based on absolute exchange rates, international exchanges 
(commercial/financial real goods and services) would actually transpire. By way of the 
intermediary standard (international currency)658, an amount of national (e.g. A’s) output 
(commercial or financial) is transported from its original currency shell (MA) to that of the 
shell of another country’s currency (e.g. MR) where there, it takes the place of that currency 
shell’s substance659 (real goods/services, commercial or financial), which substance 
exchanges its currency shell (MR) for that of MA’s. What is important to retain, is that in the 
end, it is not the shell of a country’s currency that is exchanged for another but rather, only its 
monetary substance is what is actually transferred, that is, from its original monetary shell 
(country currency) to that of another country currency’s monetary shell. In this way, a 
country’s very currency, specifically its monetary shell/form, never ventures from its country 
boundary, only its monetary substance is what is ever actually transported across and thus 
internationally exchanged; this is how in a regime of absolute exchange, a currency is, in the 
end, exchanged against its very self (instantaneously), albeit through an intermediary 
standard. 
In fact, it is only within such a regime of absolute exchange rates that bank-money could ever 
properly make use of the logical and, necessary distinction between its form (shell) and 
substance (real content). As Schmitt (2014) has pointed out in his proposal of the single-
country reform, understanding this important distinction, essentially establishes the raison 
d’être for a reform660 of international payments, in that the aim661, ultimately, is to ensure that 
the payment of a deficit country’s surplus imports is no longer paid both in substance and in 
form. 
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goods, services and financial claims exchanged between countries. Under this regime, each 
national currency is changed into the international money and not exchanged against it or 
against another national currency’ (Cencini 2000: 19−20). 
658 Cencini provides a clear description of an exchange, as it would exactly transpire within a 
system based on absolute exchange rates. ‘Through the intermediary of the international 
money, a part of present and future output of a country (say country A) is thus transferred 
from a (national) monetary form to another, where it replaces the goods and services (present 
or future) given in exchange by country R’ (Cencini 2000: 20). 
659 With regard to our reference to the monetary shell/form of a country’s currency (Cencini 
2000) see also Schmitt 2014; as well, see the latter with respect to the use of the expression 
‘monetary substance’. 
660 Be it single or, multi-country. 
661 ‘[W]e can easily understand the essential function of the reform. The goal is simply to 
avoid the surplus of expenditures over receipts of foreign currency being paid both by its 
substance and its form’ (Schmitt 2014: 64). 
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We begin our explanation of how such a system would work under the multi-country reform, 
with an illustration of a ‘delivery-versus-payment mechanism’662 which mechanism663 would 
form an integral part of the system. 
In our illustration, we attempt to evidence the circular flow of bank-money, specifically that 
of the respective country (reforming) currencies as they interact with the intermediary 
standard of the WIB (World Intermediary Bank), the NG. Our exemplary-diagram depicts a 
simplified illustration of how the payment transactions might actually occur between three 
specific countries664, represented here, only figuratively. 
If we examine diagram (7.1)665, two distinct circular paths can be discerned: they represent 
clockwise and counter-clockwise circuits666. We start our analysis from the left-hand side of 
                                                
662 See Rossi (2007a); see also Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003). ‘At 
this stage, the recent advances made by domestic banking systems in the management of 
settlement risks can provide the missing element to forge ahead Keynes’s plan. In short, it is 
possible to link together funds transfers and securities transfers at the international level to 
make sure that delivery of a financial asset occurs if, and only if, the corresponding final 
payment occurs, too (this is the delivery-versus-payment mechanism by means of which both 
actions take place at the same time; see Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 2003: 
492)’ (Rossi 2007a: 105). 
663 The settlement method that this procedural mechanism offers would assure the 
simultaneous co-ordination of payment (real goods: commercial/financial) with, or more 
precisely, versus delivery (real goods: commercial/financial); its protocol is specifically 
oriented towards avoiding that payment would not accompany delivery. 
664 The example-group of the multi-country reform that we advocate actually consists of 
seven countries: UK (England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland; could also include Crown 
dependencies e.g. Jersey, etcetera), Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland. In order to keep the explanation and representation simple (triangle versus 
hexagon), we have incorporated all four Scandinavian countries, simply, under Scandinavia 
with currency symbol (kr); in real-life application, each of their own country currency would 
be represented. As well, Switzerland and Liechtenstein being both on the Swiss franc (CHF), 
we have grouped these two countries together in our illustration. UK and its constituent 
countries are grouped under the pound sterling (£). The intermediary currency standard of the 
WIB, which we have chosen to call, NG, is represented by way of simple currency symbol (g) 
and operates at a higher hierarchic level than that of the national currencies, as an 
intermediary. Also for sake of simplification, our scenario description assumes: w £ = x CHF 
= y kr = z g. In the actual context of a multi-country reform, the currency value of the 
respective member countries, with respect to the intermediary standard, would be established 
at the onset though it could be re-adjusted in time, if deemed required by the World 
Intermediary Bank’s collective members (as per the similar intention under the single-country 
reform, see Schmitt 2014). 
665 Our diagram is an elaboration of Rossi’s own figure 7.1: ‘Figure 7.1 The two circuits of 
international money’ (see Rossi 2007a: 108). 
666 Though our explanation is much in keeping with Rossi’s (see Rossi 2007a) illustration-
style of the role that an international central bank might assume as well as how it might 
function, our exemplary illustration varies slightly, in that its focus is on evidencing how a 
reformed payment system could operate such as to be more compatible with the inherent 
circular aspect of bank-money; we highlight this feature and how the reform could work to 
complement it, through our explanation of how the ‘delivery-versus-payment mechanism’ 
(ibidem) might function in a multi-country reform.  
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our illustrative diagram so as to observe how, for example, Scandinavia’s currency667 would 
be used in a purely circular way, which way would guarantee its use as a mere means of 
payment in a system based on absolute exchange and operated multilaterally668. The case 
scenario we next describe is but a mere example of many others that might evolve within a 
multilateral real-time gross settlement system, based on absolute exchange. 
Let us suppose that, in the period under examination, one of the countries grouped under 
Scandinavia (see diagram 7.1) e.g. Iceland, has net imports from the UK. It (Iceland’s 
residents, State included) sells financial securities in order to finance its net commercial 
purchases from the UK. If it should be the case, that the latter country is not interested in 
purchasing Iceland’s financial securities, Iceland would have the option to sell them to 
another member country within the multi-country reform group (e.g. Switzerland), as would 
be enabled by the multilateral mechanism of a partial system of international payments, based 
on absolute exchange. In such a system, all the transactions that we describe would occur 
simultaneously and instantaneously. Ideally, Iceland’s net imports would be immediately 
matched by an equal export (sale) of financial assets to e.g., Switzerland, in the event that the 
UK was not interested in purchasing its (Iceland’s) financial (real) goods. In looking at our 
diagram 7.1, we can envision669 the simultaneous supply against and demand670 for the 
respective country currencies by the WIB’s intermediary currency standard (g) as it mediates 
the international exchange of real goods (commercial/financial) between the interacting 
countries. In our specific case, Iceland’s currency (kr) and that of Switzerland’s are 
simultaneously supplied against and demanded by the WIB’s intermediary standard (g) as 
evidenced by the clockwise and counter-clockwise circular paths (between Scandinavia and 
Switzerland) that evolve instantaneously and simultaneously just as it would in a real-time 
gross settlement system; moreover, we can observe or, imagine how Iceland’s currency (kr), 
is temporarily changed into the intermediary standard (shell/form of international 
homogeneous space) such that its (kr) substance/real content can then be transferred over to 
the currency shell of the Swiss franc (CHF) in exchange for the latter currency’s real content, 
following which exchange it (kr) is instantaneously returned to its original currency 
shell/form671, only with a different real content, to wit: Switzerland’s financial assets that 
have been exchanged for Iceland’s own financial securities in a sale/purchase transaction672. 
                                                
667 Again, it should be kept in mind that our reference to Scandinavia as an example-country 
is merely intended to simplify the illustration; the four Scandinavian countries, chosen as 
member-examples of the multi-country reform that we advocate, are thus incorporated under 
one single country in our diagram. 
668 As earlier pointed out, the multilateral dimension would, ideally, consist of a larger group 
of interacting countries; our representation here of only three countries is merely to simply 
our presentation and accompanying explanations.   
669 That is, in following the arrow directions to and from the WIB’s intermediary currency. 
670 We remind that the simultaneous supply and demand for the respective country currencies 
(reform members) would leave their individual exchange rates unaltered. This would certainly 
contribute towards restoring exchange rate stability, to some extent; as earlier pointed out, 
curtailing instability altogether would require a much grander impact that only an 
international payment reform encompassing all world countries could aim to achieve. 
671 Hence how, in the end, it (kr) is exchanged against its very self, such as currencies are 
exchanged in a system based on absolute exchange; it is also important to note that as soon as 
the sale/purchase transaction (between any two countries) is complete, the intermediary 
standard vanishes. 
672 For its part, the Swiss currency’s (CHF) real content has been exchanged for Iceland’s 
financial securities. 
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The transaction673 allows Iceland (its residents) to balance674 its commercial imports from the 
UK with financial sales to Switzerland and as such guarantees the identity between its 
(Iceland) purchases and sales.  
 
 
 
Diagram 7.1 The simultaneous supply against and demand for national currencies by an 
intermediary standard, in a delivery-versus-payment process based on absolute exchange and 
operating multilaterally. 
 
 
                                                
673 In other words, the sale/purchase transaction between Iceland and Switzerland enables 
Iceland to obtain the necessary credit with which to finance its net imports with the UK.  
674 An international payment system based on absolute exchange rates and complemented 
with a multilateral dimension, would enable any participating member country to balance at 
once its total purchases/imports (commercial/financial) with equal sales/exports 
(commercial/financial); this would be particularly enabled by the real-time gross settlement 
mechanism mediated by the WIB in conjunction with the International central bank Bureau 
(IB) of the respective reforming countries (multi-country reform). The instantaneous 
guarantee of the identity between a country’s exports and imports (EX and IM) essentially 
means that international exchanges will be defined by exchanges of real actual goods; that is, 
countries would exchange actual real goods (commercial/financial) for actual real goods 
(commercial/financial) of equivalent value. Countries of the multi-country reform (as those of 
the single-country reform, see Schmitt 2014), would no longer balance their purchases of 
actual real goods with sales of future real goods, thus curtailing the anomaly of our current 
international payment system whereby the payment of a country’s net imports with a foreign 
loan implies the payment of its net imports with a future real good: source of the double 
charge of external debts. In a new reformed system, the instantaneous exchange of real actual 
goods between the countries will effectively render any deficit country, non-deficit. That is, 
given its very deficit (net imports) will be immediately balanced by equal exports. 
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The objective behind a multi-country reform675 of international payments is that it would 
guarantee at once, the identity between EX and IM for each country adopting the reform; this 
would be achieved through the real-time gross settlement mechanism operated by the 
intermediary institution (e.g. WIB) in conjunction with the reforming countries. For example 
in our case scenario, Iceland would balance its purchase of commercial assets (net imports) 
from the UK with an equivalent sale of financial assets676 to Switzerland, thus instantaneously 
securing the identity between its imports and exports; as such it would no longer run a deficit 
and, matter-of-factly, it could not be considered a deficit677 country. For its part, the UK could 
balance its net sale of commercial assets to Iceland (surplus exports) with, for example, an 
equivalent purchase of financial assets from Switzerland. In which case678 and continuing in 
the same way, Switzerland would balance its purchase of financial assets from Iceland with 
an equivalent sale of financial assets to the UK.  
We have mentioned that the multi-country reform that we uphold consists of an international 
payment system (partial initially) that would be based on absolute exchange rates and, 
enhanced with a real-time gross settlement mechanism, operating multilaterally and according 
to a DVP protocol. We have particularly pointed out that the real-time gross settlement 
mechanism would be mediated by the WIB679; specifically, the daily functioning of the new 
                                                
675 Our intent is with respect to an international payment reform based on absolute exchange 
rates and complemented with a real-time gross settlement mechanism operating multilaterally 
according to a DVP (delivery-versus-payment) protocol. 
676 For example, bonds or shares (real financial goods) as issued by a country’s domestic 
economy, Iceland in this case. 
677 Now, the same result could have been achieved had Iceland instead sold its financial assets 
to the UK (should the latter have been interested in purchasing them) or, to some other 
country adopting the reform. 
678 In each case, the instantaneous respect of the identity between EX and IM as the reform 
would guarantee, means that each country balances at once (real-time gross settlement 
mechanism) its purchases/imports (commercial or financial) with equivalent sales/exports 
(commercial or financial). That is, in any one period, each country gives up actual real goods 
(commercial/financial) and in return, it receives actual commercial/financial goods of 
equivalent value; in this way the reform would preclude the onus relating to net imports 
(which imports are important to secure the sound development of both the deficit as well as 
that of the surplus country’s domestic economy) from falling entirely onto deficit countries 
(as it did pre-reform and more so, pathologically, if we account for the double charge). Both 
deficit and surplus countries would instead, equitably share the responsibility for their 
respective growth and development, in that the guarantee of the identity (between each 
country’s EX and IM) and precisely the manner in which the reform would attain it, would 
facilitate as well as foster foreign investment. The sustainability of surplus-oriented countries 
can’t but be safeguarded if their trade counterparts (importing countries) are also developing 
soundly and, in a sustainable way. See Schmitt 2014, as well Rossi 2012. ‘Indeed, as pointed 
out by Keynes (1942a/1980), the international rebalancing should be symmetrical rather than 
relying on deficit countries only: a substantial decrease of imports in the latter countries could 
potentially lead them as well as surplus countries into a (prolonged) recession or depression. 
Rather, the rebalancing mechanism should be so designed as to induce surplus countries (like 
Germany) to increase their commercial imports from deficit countries (such as Greece), which 
need to boost their exports’ (Rossi 2012: 235). 
679 By WIB (World Intermediary Bank), we intend some chosen international intermediary 
bank operating at a higher hierarchic level than that of the reforming countries’ respective 
national central banks. Alternatively, we could have chosen to call this intermediary bank, the 
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system would be based, as it is for national payment systems, on a mechanism of real-time 
gross settlement, with the distinction that at the international level it would be managed by a 
supranational bank (e.g., the WIB, in our study-module), that is, a central bank of national 
central banks. The payments made by the country’s residents (with respect to their foreign 
purchases) would be in the country’s domestic currency and would be addressed directly to its 
Domestic Bureau (DB), which bureau section of the SB680 would be responsible for paying its 
country exporters, also in domestic money. Now, whereas every payment681 made by the 
country’s residents would be in domestic currency682 and moreover addressed to the country’s 
DB, the International section of its country’s Sovereign Bureau683, in conjunction with the 
supranational bank (e.g. the WIB), would guarantee the external payments, in foreign 
currency. 
In the case scenario that we have, thus far, elaborated, the analysis of the suggested reform is 
more centered on the function of the new intermediary bank (e.g., WIB) as mediator of the 
countries’ external payment transactions, even if it is recognized that its role is carried out in 
association with the countries’ respective Sovereign Bureaus. Nevertheless, it is the daily 
operation of the new international payment system based on a real-time gross settlement 
mechanism, which mechanism the supranational bank effectively manages, that is essentially 
emphasized. For its part, the Sovereign Bureau (say of one member684 country, Iceland) 
merely acts as a monetary intermediary. In the period taken as reference, its residents’ 
purchase and sale transactions via the WIB’s real-time gross settlement mechanism is enough 
to guarantee the balance-of-payments identity. 
                                                                                                                                                   
EIB, to intend European Intermediary Bank; however we choose, for the time being, to refer 
to it as the WIB.  
680 The SB intends the country’s single Sovereign Bureau that is subdivided into two sections: 
the Domestic and International sections, represented by DB (Domestic Bureau) and IB 
(International Bureau) respectively. 
681 Our meaning is again with reference to its foreign purchases. 
682 Though the payment of Iceland’s residents is in domestic currency and directly addressed 
to the country’s Domestic Bureau, it is always of an amount equivalent to that of the sum 
ultimately paid by the country’s International Bureau, in NG; that is for example, if (at the 
reform onset) the Icelandic Krona (kr rather than ISK, in our study-module) had a currency 
value with respect to the intermediary standard (the NG) of 0.75 kr to 1 NG (1 kr = 1.333 
NGs) then, for a sum worth 1000 NGs, the Icelandic residents would have to pay 750 kroners 
(equivalent value to the sum paid by its IB, in NGs, to the WIB). Now if the (net) payment 
(Iceland’s) was, for example, destined for the UK and for a purchase amount of 500 pounds 
and, assuming the UK pound had a currency value of 0.50 £ to 1 NG (1 £ = 2.0 NGs), then the 
WIB would mediate an exchange of a value amount of 1000 NGs with the UK, for Iceland’s 
purchase (worth 500 pounds). In this example case scenario, 750 kr = 1000 NGs = 500 £; the 
payment/exchange is in NG value and in the form of real goods, financial/commercial (e.g. 
Iceland financial securities vs UK commercial goods) and intending amounts in billions, for 
example. 
683 That is, the International section of the country’s Sovereign Bureau: specifically, the 
International Bureau (IB), though not to be confounded as a separate Bureau of its own but 
rather as a separate section (International) of the country’s single Sovereign Bureau. Ideally, 
in the multi-country reform that we here represent, each of the member countries’ central 
bank will have a Sovereign Bureau (SB) that will be subdivided into two separate sections: 
specifically, the Domestic Bureau (DB) and the International Bureau (IB); both sections 
defining distinct parts (according to role and function) of one and the same Sovereign Bureau. 
684 That is, a participant member of the multi-country reform that we advocate.  
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Now if however, in the period under consideration, Iceland’s overall purchases 
(commercial/financial) by its residents were to be greater than its overall sales 
(commercial/financial), then its SB685 could take on a more active role, more akin to that of a 
financial intermediary, such that it could secure its country’s balance-of-payments identity, 
ultimately. We will next consider this special case that particularly highlights the intervening 
(financial) role of a reforming country’s Sovereign Bureau. 
But before we do, let us sum up the similarities of both case scenarios: the one that we just 
covered and, the one that we are about to elaborate. In both cases, the infrastructure of the 
multi-country reform is basically the same. In particular, in both cases, each member country 
would be expected to create its own Sovereign Bureau (SB); the payments of the country’s 
residents would always be addressed to its SB. The WIB would then carry out the payments 
between countries, on behalf of their respective SBs. In both case scenarios, the member 
country’s international payments would be mediated by its Sovereign Bureau (its IB), albeit, 
in association with the WIB. And, as previously stipulated, the payment system of the latter 
would be based on absolute exchange rates, operating with a real-time gross settlement 
mechanism of multilateral clearing686. 
We now turn our attention to the role of the Sovereign Bureau as financial intermediate. 
 
 
The Sovereign Bureau as financial intervener 
 
Before we begin our analysis, let us recapitulate the facts concerning both case scenarios. The 
conceptual construct of the multi-country reform is basically the same in both cases. It is 
rather the role emphasis that shifts, in that whereas in the first case it is centered more on the 
supranational bank, our second case study elaborates a more active role that could be taken on 
by the reforming countries’ respective Sovereign Bureaus687. Otherwise, the procedural and 
                                                
685 As always, its Sovereign Bureau considered as representative of the country itself, set of 
its residents. 
686 We refer the readers to a numerical example that straightforwardly exemplifies how the 
mechanics of such a system of international payments would work: see Cencini 2012a 
(21−24). Though, in his numerical illustration, Cencini uses the specific example of the ECB 
as the international/European settlement institution, which institution mediates the payment 
transactions between some country ‘A’ and other European countries ‘RE’ implementing the 
reform, we can easily see how his case-example would apply to our example-group of 
countries adopting the multi-country reform. For instance, we would substitute the ECB for 
the WIB and the euro for the WIB’s currency, the NG; as well, our chosen country currencies 
would be represented accordingly. See in particular tables 7 and 8 (pages 23−24). 
687 Though we have situated a reforming country’s Sovereign Bureau (SB) within its Central 
Bank, it should be noted that this is not an indispensable requirement of a multi-country 
reform; the reform could successfully operate whether or not, the SB is integrated within a 
country’s Central Bank. On first considering this point, it would seem natural to situate it 
there given that the international payment transactions of a country’s residents ultimately 
imply the country as a whole, as represented by its national Central Bank. However, we do 
acknowledge that there could be valid reasons not to incorporate the SB within a country’s 
Central Bank, for example, to stay clear of potential political conflicts on the role and 
relevance of a nation’s Central Bank. The matter would certainly have to be deliberated by an 
appointed committee of the group of reforming countries but whichever way it might be 
decided, the actual function of the reform should not be affected if, in all other respects, it is 
diligently implemented. 
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transactional protocol remains intact. The payments of the reforming countries’ residents 
would always have to be addressed, in domestic currency, to their respective Sovereign 
Bureaus, specifically to the latter’s Domestic section, referred to as the Domestic Bureau. It is 
this Bureau-section that would also be responsible for paying the country’s exporters, again in 
domestic money. The International section (the IB) of a country’s Sovereign Bureau would, 
for its part, guarantee the external mediation of payments (foreign currency) in conjunction 
with the supranational bank (WIB). The WIB would ultimately be responsible for actually 
carrying out the payments of real exchanges between the countries, on behalf of their 
respective International Bureaus; all would transpire through the WIB’s real-time gross 
settlement mechanism operating within a system based on absolute exchange rates. Now, the 
distinguishing aspect that separates the second case scenario from the first is that in the 
second case, which case we are now elaborating, the sale and purchase transactions of a 
country’s residents (e.g., Iceland) are not enough to guarantee the country’s overall balance-
of-payments identity. The country’s Sovereign Bureau, particularly its DB, would thus obtain 
as a net gain the amount688 of domestic currency spent by its residents for the payment of 
their imports, specifically their net imports. As far as the country’s International Bureau is 
concerned, it consequently incurs the responsibility, as representative of its country as a 
whole, to perform a sale of an equivalent amount of financial assets689 in order to comply with 
the balance-of-payments identity: it must essentially balance the country’s overall purchase of 
foreign resources with a sale of current domestic resources. The role of the country’s 
International Bureau, as such, becomes more involved690; it no longer acts merely as a 
monetary intermediary. 
We deliberate the analysis starting from the Sovereign Bureau691 of one of the countries 
implementing the multi-country reform. 
We again consider Iceland, one of the reforming countries of our example case-scenario. We 
suppose that in the period692 under examination, Iceland’s residents (State included) import 
more than they export (both commercially and financially). We consider the net gain in 
domestic currency (kr) that the Sovereign Bureau, in particular its Domestic section (the DB), 
will derive from the payment of net imports (equivalent NG value) by its country residents.  
                                                
688 The net gain amount received by the country’s Domestic Bureau is equivalent to that of the 
sum ultimately paid by the country’s International Bureau, in NGs (sale of financial assets 
that would secure the balance-of-payments identity and effectively pay for the country 
residents’ net imports with current domestic resources, e.g., a part of Iceland’s current 
domestic production, equivalent NG value of its net imports). 
689 That is, financial assets that have part of the nation’s current resources (domestic 
production) as their very object. 
690 As it does in Schmitt’s (2014) single-country reform, the Sovereign Bureau thus takes on 
an essential center role as well in the multi-country reform that we advocate (second case 
scenario); in so doing, it allows a country adapting the multi-country reformation to take one 
further step towards the internalization of its external payments, particularly given the fact 
that though the Sovereign Bureau is considered as a representative of the country itself (set of 
its residents), its very subsistence nevertheless falls under the same residential umbrella as 
that of its country residents. 
691 We recall that in the reformation that we present, when we refer to the Sovereign Bureau, 
we intend it as forming an integral part of a country’s Central Bank and specifically as one 
and only one Bureau, which Bureau is sub-divided according to individual tasks into two 
distinct sections: a Domestic and an International section, the DB and IB, respectively.  
692 Any length of period could be observed; we choose a period of one year. 
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Specifically, Iceland’s exporters would be paid (domestic currency) and the difference, the 
very net gain (in domestic currency; NG value of net imports) would be forwarded to the 
country’s Treasury by the Domestic Bureau, such that it could be invested in a new 
production. For its part, Iceland’s International Bureau would perform an equivalent sale of 
financial assets693 (NG value of net imports) to secure the country’s balance-of-payments 
identity. We will also consider including the reimbursement694 of previously incurred debts, in 
our analysis. 
Now it is conceivable that in the multi-country reform which we present, that the WIB could 
also intervene to help Iceland finance its net imports. This is certainly an additional role695 
                                                
693 It should be noted that the financial assets sold by the IB do not have as their object, the 
new production of its country’s Treasury, but rather, part of Iceland’s current domestic 
production; this was also the case in Schmitt’s single country reform (Schmitt 2014, part II). 
694 The reimbursement of previously incurred debts would increase the country’s expenditures 
and as such could be the cause of net imports (much will ultimately depend on the amount of 
the country’s total sales); as regard the exact reimbursement amounts (NG equivalent value) 
and due dates, they would remain those as contractually agreed upon by lenders and 
borrowers: they would not be amended in any way by the implementation of the reform, as 
adapted by the countries. 
695 Should the international settlement institution (e.g., the WIB) assume the responsibility of 
financial mediator/credit purveyor, in addition to its main role as monetary intermediate for 
the participant reforming countries, it might choose to enact from the onset, some cautious 
rules with respect to overall eligibility for countries seeking its financial assistance. For 
example, it might establish optimum quotas in regard to a trade-deficit country’s bond selling 
(with respect, specifically, to the WIB’s purchase of them) so as to ensure that the 
undertaking remained sustainable; as pointed out by Rossi, the chosen international settlement 
institution could ‘provide some limit (as a percentage of GDP) beyond which no country 
might finance its trade deficit through a sale of bonds’ (Rossi 2012: 235). It might also set 
specific eligibility standards in regard to a country’s solvency and/or the array of financial 
assets that could qualify for equitable payment. But it should be clear that none of the prudent 
measures that the WIB may consider undertaking, should it be asked to act as financial 
intermediary, form any basis of the reform itself; this is not to say that there could not be valid 
reasons (political or other) to limit the sale of financial assets but rather that this is not an 
economic problem to be taken on by the multi-country reform. And moreover, if the WIB 
should adhere to any precautionary measures, it should only be with respect to its own 
purchase of financial bonds, as issued by any deficit/reforming country. In regard the member 
countries’ residents (Sovereign Bureau included), they must be as free as possible to 
sell/purchase what they indeed wish to/are capable of, and on either or, both of the 
international commodity and financial markets. In this respect, we recall Schmitt’s intent with 
regard to his single-country reform proposal; it is as well what we intend with respect to the 
multi-country reform (in regard the member countries, their respective SBs included). ‘It is 
really important to note that surplus exports of ‘rich’ countries will in no way be affected by 
the reform. The purpose and intended result do not lie in suppressing net imports of countries 
that consider them advantageous. Symmetrically, there is no question of fighting against the 
net receipts in foreign currency of countries that are looking for them. What is ‘detestable’ is 
not the imbalance of international payments but the external debts that result from it. The 
research advocates the following: let countries be free to purchase and sell whatever goods 
they like in whatever proportion, within equilibrium or disequilibrium, but let them incur no 
foreign credit and no foreign debt as a result’ (Schmitt 2014: 96−97). On the other hand, 
should the WIB agree to act as a financial intervener if asked to perform this function, under 
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that it could itself take on, as financial intermediate. It would involve selling its own financial 
securities to residents of any country, Iceland included, which country might be interested in 
purchasing them. In turn, the WIB could buy financial assets from deficit countries (e.g., 
Iceland) that might have encountered difficulty696 selling their financial bonds through the 
WIB’s multilateral system. Not discounting that the WIB could indeed incorporate this vital 
function under its range of responsibilities so as to afford the reforming countries another 
avenue by which to secure its compliance with the balance-of-payments identity, there is 
nevertheless a distinct advantage to having a participant reforming country’s Sovereign 
Bureau in the picture. Let us further consider this, retrospectively. 
The fact that an international settlement institution (e.g., WIB) could potentially intervene as 
financial intermediary697 among a group of nations implementing a multi-country reform, 
does not add any new dimension to what has already been diligently put forward, world-wide, 
by serious proponents698 of a payment system reform as could be applied at a global/European 
level. What could, however, turn a multi-country payment system reform into a whole new 
ball game, would be to merge existing proposals with some of the unique features as Schmitt 
(2014) has advanced in his single-country reform project. In particular, if we prioritized the 
role that a co-resident Sovereign Bureau could play and the benefits that could be derived 
from it, for any of the reforming countries, each considered as a whole. It is not only about the 
fact of establishing a Sovereign Bureau within each of the reforming countries but, more 
precisely, about the co-resident699 element that it brings in: a definite step towards the 
                                                                                                                                                   
no circumstance should it ever be forced to purchase the financial bonds of any country, in 
any amount/type; this should remain its own prerogative. 
696 Rossi describes this situation and the role that an international settlement institution, the 
likes of the WIB (he refers to it as the ‘European settlement institution’), could take on in 
such instances ‘when (as is often the case) the residents in the trade-surplus country do not 
purchase those bonds that the (private or public sector’s) residents in the deficit country need 
to sell in order for them to finance their net imports. In this case, the European settlement 
institution must intervene and act also as a financial intermediary. Beyond issuing the number 
of money units that are necessary to pay finally the transaction between the two trading 
countries … the European settlement institution acts also as an international financial 
intermediary when it buys those bonds that residents in a trade-deficit country are not able to 
sell to residents in any trade-surplus country, who, by contrast, may be interested in buying 
those bonds that are sold (and perhaps issued) by the European settlement institution itself’ 
(Rossi 2012: 232−234). But as already mentioned, just how exactly the WIB might perform 
this function, that is, under what precautionary steps might it carry out the role if it agreed to 
do so, should fall under its own jurisdiction. 
697 That is, such as to assist any one of them in securing the necessary credit it might require 
for its balance-of-payments identity. 
698 A range of authors have written on the subject, we reference here only a mere few, 
particularly some of the authors that have written substantially on it: see in particular Schmitt 
(1973 and 1984), Rossi (2007 and 2012), Cencini (1995, 2001, 2005, and 2012a); see as well 
some of these same authors’ other related writings on the topic.  
699 As Schmitt has pointed out in his single-country reform, it would ‘guarantee that the 
external payments of the domestic economy are all carried out between residents. It is enough 
to this effect that the Bureau transforms every domestic payment addressed abroad (by 
considering it its own) into an external payment of which the Bureau is itself personally the 
only debtor’ (Schmitt 2014: 53). He next elaborates on the precise intent regard the co-
resident aspect of the Sovereign Bureau and how the latter would (in the single-country 
reform) take over the mediation of its country’s external payments ‘Domestic payments to the 
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internalization of a country’s external payments. A Sovereign Bureau700 would mediate the 
external payments of its co-residents in association with the WIB; it would distinctively set 
apart a country’s internal payments from that of its external payments and effectively ensure, 
in conjunction with the WIB, the vehicular use of its country currency. And, should the 
situation701 dictate a need for it, the Sovereign Bureau (its IB), acting as co-resident 
representative of its country (set of its residents), could perform a sale of financial assets to 
secure the country’s balance-of-payments identity. Admittedly, on considering it all, the 
multi-country reform emerges that much more involved and all-encompassing through the 
incorporation of a Sovereign Bureau that would, moreover, be co-resident. It opens the door 
to yet another co-coordinated effort as would be implicated, this time between the SB’s 
Domestic section (the DB) and the country’s Treasury (co-resident of the SB); after all, it is 
the Treasury that would receive (from the DB), as net gain, the amount of domestic currency 
that the country residents will have spent towards their net imports, which net gain amount it 
will invest in a new production. We next elaborate this (second) case scenario. 
In the situation whereby the sale and purchase transactions of a member-country’s residents, 
are not enough to guarantee the country’s overall balance-of-payments identity, then, by 
having a Sovereign Bureau in place, the latter (its DB) would thus receive, as a net gain, the 
amount (equivalent NG value) of domestic currency spent by its residents for their net 
imports. The Sovereign Bureau (its IB) would then undertake, as representative of the country 
itself, the task702 of securing the balance-of-payments identity, by selling abroad financial 
assets. Moreover, the essential aspect of it all is with regard the amount of domestic currency 
that the country’s Treasury would obtain from its Domestic Bureau, as net gain. This is where 
the multi-country703 reform could make an important difference704. The reason lies in the use 
that the reforming country, its Treasury, could make of this net gain once it receives it from 
the Sovereign Bureau. Particularly, in this regard, it should be noted that there would not be 
much point to the reform if a country’s (its Treasury) net gain were otherwise applied as 
‘straightforward purchasing power’705 towards the country’s current output; the financial 
                                                                                                                                                   
credit of the rest of the world are carried out between residents, because the Bureau is itself 
part of its country’s residents. The domestic payments of the Bureau do not prevent payments 
of foreign creditors to be carried out at their full value. Put simply, it is the Bureau that carries 
out and obtains the payment of the transactions occurring between its country and the rest of 
the world’ (ibid.: 53−54). In the multi-country reform, the Sovereign Bureau (its IB) would 
also mediate the external payments of its country residents (co-residents), nevertheless in 
conjunction with the WIB. 
700 We have in mind a Sovereign Bureau akin to the Bureau as intended by Schmitt in his 
elaboration of the single-country reform. See Schmitt 2014. 
701 Specifically the situation (our second case scenario) whereby, the sale and purchase 
transactions of a member country’s residents are not enough to secure the nation’s overall 
balance-of-payments identity. 
702 The task, that is, of selling abroad financial assets (equal amount to its country residents’ 
net imports, in equivalent NG value) on the country’s current production (assets having part 
of the nation’s current resources as their object) in order to balance the total purchase of 
foreign resources, in compliance with the balance-of-payments identity.  
703 As it was also the case for the single-country reform, see Schmitt 2014. 
704 To wit, much of the marvel would be found in the co-resident attribute that the SB would 
inherently carry. 
705 We recall Schmitt’s heeding as he considered this very point in his development of the 
single-country reform. ‘[I]t would be awkward if the income spent in domestic currency on 
the surplus import purchases of economy A were to be held as straightforward purchasing 
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assets that the Sovereign Bureau will undertake to sell abroad in order to secure the identity, 
(which financial assets have part of the country’s current output as their object) have not a 
purchasing power that is, after all, double.  
We begin by recalling that a country’s domestic production diminishes706 according to the 
value amount of its net imports and remember how Schmitt (2014) countered this negative 
effect in his single-country reform proposal; the same remedy could be applied to the group of 
countries adapting the multi-country reform. It is here that as co-resident representative of the 
country itself that the essence of the Sovereign Bureau’s dual role reveals itself, as evidenced 
by the inter-connected, though distinctly separate, functions of its Domestic and International 
sections. Its IB secures the balance-of-payments identity and in so doing, it guarantees the 
real payment of net imports: its real imports being fully covered by its real exports (sale of 
financial assets) of the period; moreover, as the real payment no longer involves the 
appropriation by the creditor country of part of the deficit/reforming country’s future output, 
the domestic income (same value of net imports) that pre-reform, was decisively lost to the 
double charge of external debts, is in fact salvaged by the reforming country. Now, given that 
the Sovereign Bureau (its IB) has guaranteed the real payment of net imports with an 
equivalent part of national resources, on its other hand it (specifically, its DB) thus 
legitimately earns the net gain received in domestic currency from its co-resident importers 
for the payment of their net imports. And, in the DB transferring the net gain to its Treasury 
(co-resident) in order that it is invested in a new production, the multi-country reformation 
can, as it did in Schmitt’s (2014) single-country reform, go one further step in its 
accomplishments: it can reduce its country’s unemployment707 by restoring the level of 
domestic production to what it initially was prior to the country’s net imports payment. 
Precisely then, the reforming country not only salvages the domestic income that, pre-reform, 
it lost to the double charge, it can even restore its domestic production to its initial level 
(specifically, to the level that it was prior to its net imports payment), through the net gain that 
is legitimately earned708 by its DB/Treasury. The increase in domestic production is 
                                                                                                                                                   
power by the government. In this truly inefficient case, country A’s national production 
would remain reduced by the value of the net purchases of foreign assets’ (Schmitt 2014: 91). 
The reference to country/economy A is with regard to some deficit country, A, in Schmitt’s 
example. 
706 ‘The reason is that the value … spent to cover the difference between expenditures and 
receipts is no longer available for the selling of a domestic product’ (Schmitt 2014: 98). 
707 ‘[T]his increase of its domestic production, being entirely due to the additional 
employment generated by the government’s action, decreases … the level of unemployment 
of the country’ (Schmitt 2014: 90). Schmitt’s reference to the government’s action implies its 
Treasury’s (or, its Budget’s, as Schmitt referred to it, in his 2014 presentation of the single-
country reform) investment of the net gain in a new production. ‘This reduction of under-
employment will add to the advantage already obtained through the cancellation of external 
debts’ (Schmitt 2014: 90). 
708 ‘[C]oncerning surplus imports economists consider in general as ‘normal’ that the incomes 
form and spent in domestic money disappear following their expenditure. This is wrong and 
something the reform will make impossible. These incomes will be earned, intact, by the 
sovereign Bureau’ (ibid.: 98). Though Schmitt’s reference in regard to ‘the reform’ is with 
respect to his single-country reform project, the investment of the net gain as earned by a 
country implementing the multi-country reform, can equally achieve the same results: a 
country’s domestic income will remain intact (restored to its initial level). It is the Treasury’s 
investment in a new production (non-consumption goods), additionally to that of its country 
co-residents, that will be responsible for this; it will effectively ‘restore the balance between 
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particularly achieved by its Treasury’s investment of the net gain/profit into a new production 
(in addition to that of its country’s residents). However, needless to point out, the new 
production should be that of non-consumption goods709 if we remember that the investment of 
a profit (net gain) into a new production means that the resulting output is already outright 
purchased710 at the very moment that new wages are paid out. With this in mind, the country 
could invest the net profit towards any infrastructure that the country might be in need of, for 
example, road/water works, even in the construction of public schools and/or any other 
government owned institutional buildings (hospitals) or, public works. The country could thus 
enhance its overall standard of living whilst reducing its level of unemployment. 
Now, we have mentioned that in fully paying its net imports with real exports, through a sale 
(equivalent NG amount of net imports) of financial assets711 as undertaken by its Sovereign 
Bureau (IB), the deficit/reforming country not only eradicates the double charge712 of its 
external debt, it actually reduces it to zero, in the period taken as reference. As such, the 
country is effectively rendered non-deficit; its deficit (net imports) having been paid in full 
and, in the same period in which the net imports originated. The question that should next be 
considered is what will the multi-country reform do with regard to a country’s previously713 
incurred external debts, which debts remain due and rightly require to be paid to external 
creditors. In revisiting Schmitt’s (2014) single-country reform proposal in this respect, it is 
soon realized that the same procedure can be applied such that these external debts that have 
materialized in the past, can be gradually re-paid. In fact, what will simply happen is that their 
re-imbursement amounts714 will form part of the country’s expenditures, increasing them 
accordingly and as such, potentially be the cause of net imports, depending on the said 
                                                                                                                                                   
real and monetary income’ (ibid.: 98). Moreover, the country-residents’ transactional 
exchanges will transpire as though their external purchases were national purchases; this 
because, the residents’ international purchases will, after all, always be paid to a co-resident: 
the DB of its country’s Sovereign Bureau. ‘Domestic payments to the credit of the rest of the 
world are carried out between residents, because the Bureau is itself part of its country’s 
residents’ (ibid.: 53).  
709 ‘[I]t is necessary that the profit spent by the Bureau does not produce any goods for 
consumption or investment, which are themselves part of the goods to be sold. The reason is 
that this product is already purchased at the moment the profit of the Bureau pays for new 
employment. Unlike all other productions, the expenditure of the Bureau’s or the 
government’s profit is an expenditure that is active both on the production and on the sale of 
goods: at the very instant this profit is transformed into new incomes, it is precisely an income 
already spent for the final purchase of the corresponding output’ (ibid.: 98). 
710 ‘In other words, the holder of this very special profit becomes the final owner of newly and 
additionally produced goods’ (ibid.: 98). 
711 Financial assets, that is, that specifically has a part of the country’s current resources, as 
their object. 
712 We recall that pre-reform, the deficit country paid its net imports twice: once in real terms 
and once again in money terms; the multi-country reform enables a country to pay its net 
imports, once only, in real terms: specifically, with a part of its actual domestic resources. 
713 As it is the case with regard to Schmitt’s single country reform, we intend the same with 
respect to the multi-country reform: ‘[t]he reform will radically alter the payment of previous 
debts’ (Schmitt 2014: 45). 
714 The exact amounts and date of reimbursements would remain those contractually agreed 
upon by the lenders and borrowers; the reform would not modify anything in this regard. 
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country’s total sales. We next consider a simple numerical example715, to illustrate how it 
would work. 
We consider again Iceland as our example deficit-country. We suppose that, in the period 
taken as reference, our said deficit country imports for 13 units (always billions) and exports 
for 10 units, in domestic money; initially, expenditures exclude previous debts which debts 
amount to 2 units (domestic money) for the period in question. Next, we include the 
reimbursement, exactly 2 units (national money) in debts outstanding, to the imports amount: 
expenditures thus amount to a total of 15 (domestic money, in billions) units. Now, assuming 
that the total amount of the country’s sales, for the said period, does not alter the net imports 
amount, the latter would therefore equal 5 units. Country importers would thus pay, in the 
period, to the Domestic section of their Sovereign Bureau, a total amount of 15 (billions) units 
in domestic currency; the DB would then pay its country exporters the sum of 10 units out of 
this 15 units sum and forward the difference, 5 (billion) units to its Treasury, as net gain716. 
As previously mentioned the gain/profit is net given, for its part, the Sovereign Bureau’s 
International section would undertake a sale of financial assets for a same sum amount, 
exactly 5 (billions) units (NG currency) such as to secure the country’s balance-of-payments 
identity717 (sale of current domestic resources to balance the purchase of foreign 
resources/total expenditures), for the said period. 
 
 
Some comparative notes 
  
In closing this chapter, we think it opportune to highlight some of the main differences and 
similarities between the two types of reform that the countries could adopt: single-country 
versus multi-country. Primarily, it is worth pointing out that both open the door for a 
substantial role to be played out by a country’s Sovereign Bureau718. This is even the case in 
                                                
715 Our example is based on one as illustrated by Schmitt in his single-country reformation 
project (see Schmitt 2014: 45−46, also 81−82), but that could easily be implemented, as well, 
by a group of countries adapting the multi-country reform. 
716 The intent of the reform (multi/single country) is that this net gain amount (e.g. 5 units, 
billions, in domestic income) would be earned as pure profit by the country’s Treasury who 
would invest it in a new production of non-consumption goods, with a view to restore the 
nation’s initial level (previous to the net imports payment) of domestic production whilst 
reducing its unemployment. 
717 Once again the intent of the multi-country reform with respect to the member countries’ 
respective deficits (net imports) would be that of the single-country reform. We next capture 
Schmitt’s reflection on this essential point. ‘The progress achieved by the reform is of an 
unexpected importance. We will come back to it. It is first necessary to understand that the 
difference between today’s situation and the reform is not at all to make it possible for 
countries’ deficits to create a positive difference between the imports of goods from the rest 
of the world and imports that are reciprocal. In our example, even though country A runs a 
deficit, R’s imports are equal to and not less than A’s imports. R’s imports are always equal to 
A’s imports, even when country A runs a deficit’ (Schmitt 2014: 82). The reference to ‘A’ 
(country) and ‘R’ imply some deficit country A and the rest of the world as represented by, R. 
718 In both types of payment reformation, whether single-country or multi-country, it would 
be expected that the countries implementing the reform (single/multi) would create a 
Sovereign Bureau, that would act as a representative of the country itself (set of its residents), 
and which Bureau would mediate the payments of its national residents (State included), both 
internally and externally; in the case of the multi-country reform, it would particularly 
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the multi-country reform where the additional feature of an international settlement institution 
having the faculty of issuing its own currency standard, takes nonetheless center stage in 
operating an international payment system of multilateral clearing. As regard levels of 
complexity, the multi-country reform could be viewed as more engaging and politically 
sensitive by the mere fact that the reform would encompass a potentially expanding group of 
countries that would implicate their respective governments in the decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, the multi-country reform option does have the striking advantage of facilitating 
growth (economic/financial) amongst the interacting group of reforming countries and, most 
likely, even increasingly over time. The single-country reform, for its part, is certainly not 
without its own merits; brilliantly engineered, it offers countries the option of single-handedly 
reforming their respective system of external payments such as to counter the double charge 
of external debts that they currently suffer; it is clearly an individual and at the ready option 
for any country decisively wanting to better their current predicament, both from an economic 
and financial stand point, in that it is entirely up to the said country, itself, to undertake the 
initiative.  
Moreover, the end result for both reforms, whether single-country or multi-country, is the 
same. In both, not only is the pre-reform double charge of external debts eradicated, even 
more, zero external debt is achieved; as well, the domestic income remains available within 
the reforming country. Now, when individually compared, we can sum up the following. The 
reform adopted by a group of countries allows for the creation of a partial system of 
international payments, based on absolute exchange rates and with a real-time gross 
settlement mechanism managed by an international/European settlement institution (e.g., the 
WIB). Within such a system, countries’ net imports would be immediately matched by equal 
exports, their respective domestic income would remain intact (internally available) and the 
countries would respectively incur an external debt equal to zero. In the single-country 
reform, no system of international payments, per se, can be created (no individual country 
alone could ever create such a system); it is thus necessary to enable any individually 
reforming country to obtain free of cost the foreign currency that is required to convey its 
external purchases, through a loan that must not increase its external debt. The end effect 
must always be the same, regardless of the reform undertaken (single or multi-country): zero 
external debts; the only difference being that this end result can only be obtained (in the 
single-country reform) through a mechanism that allows the reforming/deficit country to gain 
access, for e.g., to 1 MR (foreign currency, money R, in billion dollars), in each period, 
without any increase in its external debt. 
 
 
More on reformation options 
 
Next, in the spirit719 of reform, we examine schematic blueprints of reformation options that 
could be implemented by any one group of countries decisively committed to enhancing its 
member countries’ current system of external payments. We begin with diagram 7.2720, which 
                                                                                                                                                   
mediate the residents’ external payments in association with a chosen international settlement 
institution, e.g., the WIB. 
719 Our schemata are specific adaptations (with slight variations) from Cencini (2001, p. 22: 
‘Figure 1’) whereby he illustrates what a global reformation undertaking could intend. 
720 Our diagram 7.2 is adapted from Cencini (2001, p. 22: ‘Figure 1’); it is particularly an 
adaptation-excerpt of Cencini’s ‘Figure 1’ in which we illustrate the partial system of 
international payments that our chosen group of seven countries could implement in 
association with the WIB (our e.g. of an international settlement institution). We remind that 
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provides a hierarchical layout of a partial system of international payments as could be 
adopted by our chosen exemplary group of nations. At the helm, we find the WIB (World 
Intermediary Bank): the Central Bank721 of the NG (New Group: our chosen group of seven), 
which group’s individual Central Banks722 are represented at the middle level (the individual 
Central Banks of each of the four Scandinavian countries have been grouped together under 
NCBs, for simplification); the bottom level depicts an array of secondary723 banks 
(represented as COB in keeping with Cencini 2001) operational within each of the currency 
areas that we represent (UK £, Scandinavia kr, Switzerland/Leichtenstein CHF)724. The 
WIB’s own currency standard is denoted by ‘g’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 7.2: Adapted from Cencini (2001, p. 22: ‘Figure 1’)     
  A partial system of international payments as could be mediated by the WIB       
                                                                                                                                                   
the nations of our chosen group of seven intend: the UK (primarily England, Wales, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland); Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden; Liechtenstein and Switzerland.  
721 It provides a homogeneous monetary zone for our chosen group of seven ‘through the 
emission of a monetary standard used as vehicular currency by member countries in all of 
their reciprocal payments’ (Cencini 2001: 22); moreover, it (the WIB) affords ‘a mechanism 
for the financial settlement of transactions by operating a system of clearing in collaboration 
with national central banks’ (ibid.: 22). That is, in our case study we specifically intend the 
national Sovereign Bureaus (SBs) situated within and forming an integral part of the 
reforming countries’ respective NCBs. 
722 ‘They act as clearing agents of commercial banks and guarantee national monetary 
homogeneity’ (Cencini 2001: 22). 
723 Each carry out payment transactions in their own national money given that the reform 
intends, for member countries, the upholding of their respective monetary sovereignties.   
724 DM in our diagram 7.2 intends, as it does in Cencini’s ‘Figure 1’, ‘the domestic money 
used in each country’ (Cencini 2001: 22−23). 
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In diagram 7.3 we illustrate (along the lines of Cencini’s 2001 elaboration) a more 
comprehensive system of international payments725. In this particularly more intricate schema, 
we have, in variation to Cencini’s ‘pyramidal structure’ (ibidem), incorporated the ECB 
alongside other NCBs, as though the current Euro zone nation members had opted to unite 
under a United States of Europe726, its own sovereign country. In its previously assigned 
slot727, we have instead inserted a new European central bank, which bank we denote by EIB 
(European Intermediary Bank)728 and which substitutes our earlier denomination of WIB 
(World Intermediary Bank); the new global/world Central Bank of Central Banks is 
represented at the very top of the diagram: the ICB (International Central Bank)729.  Although 
our hierarchal schema mainly brings together three distinct world areas730 (Europe, The 
Americas, and Asian countries)731, we envision that it could, in time, encompass more distinct 
regional monetary unions or, many more countries coming in under the umbrella of any of the 
three monetary areas as depicted in our diagram 7.3732 (second horizontal line from the top). 
Now, as to why we might have incorporated the current members of the Euro zone under a 
single sovereign country of its own, our reasoning is unadorned. It is simply that in regard the 
European political arena’s current state of affairs, specifically that of the Euro zone, there 
appears to be no intention of ever733 turning back to embrace, once more, one’s (any Member 
States) forsaken monetary sovereignty, despite the strain of financial, economic and political 
hardship that some734 have encountered since the onset of EMU’s monetary ‘union’. It seems 
                                                
725 Our diagram 7.3 is adapted from Cencini (2001, p. 22: ‘Figure 1’); it is a globally oriented 
schema that groups a larger number of countries under a more comprehensive system of 
international payments. As a variant to Cencini’s ‘Figure 1’ we have incorporated the ECB 
alongside other NCBs (on the second horizontal line from that of the very bottom one which 
features the COBs), as though the current country members of the Euro zone were united 
under a single sovereign nation, the United States of Europe. 
726 We suppose the Euro as the unique country currency that could be adapted by the United 
States of Europe were they (Member States) to primarily undergo a reform of payments that 
would truly render their newly formed country a single currency country, referred to as the 
United States of Europe (USE). 
727 That is, as depicted by Cencini (2001) in his ‘pyramidal structure of the new system’ 
(Figure 1: p. 22). 
728 We have kept the name, NG, for the currency standard of the EIB (European Intermediary 
Bank). 
729 In keeping with the designation/layout of Cencini’s (2001) ‘Figure 1’. Also, in our 
diagram 7.3, again in keeping with Cencini (2001), we refer to IM as intending the 
international money/currency of the ICB; as well, DM intends ‘domestic money’ and COB, 
the countries’ ‘commercial banks’ (ibid.: 22).  
730 Specifically: three regional monetary unions representing Europe, the Americas and Asia 
with their own respective regional currency standards, that of the NG and, as in Cencini’s 
(2001) case, the Dollar and the Yen; the NG being issued by the EIB and the Dollar and the 
Yen, being issued by the AMCB (American Central Bank) and the ASCB (Asian Central 
Bank), respectively. 
731 Except for a few minor variations, we have kept our schematic layout, overall, much in 
line with that of Cencini’s ‘Figure 1’. Our diagram 7.3 is a very slight variation of it. 
732 Or even under the schematic umbrella as exactly depicted by Cencini’s (2001) ‘Figure 1’. 
733 Our meaning: least of all in the foreseeable future. 
734 We refer to some in the sense, that is, of more so than other Member States; for the most 
part, the effect of the monetary ‘union’ has not been overly positive and, for some Member 
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more likely, realistically, that the Euro zone Member States will eventually succumb to 
uniting under a single sovereign country (e.g., the United States of Europe). On this subject, 
we caution however, on the risks of such an endeavour735. Let us next consider this further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 7.3: Adapted from Cencini (2001, p. 22: ‘Figure 1’)          
  A more comprehensive system of international payments      
 
 
One risk that readily comes to mind is the issue of free mobility of capital736 that could (as it 
happens in a unique currency region) very likely fuel already competing economic interests. 
Another is the disadvantage of a single monetary policy, as evident from the ongoing saga of 
financial turmoil within Euro land, that is simply not conducive to a vastly divergent737 group 
                                                                                                                                                   
States on more than one level, e.g., Greece and other peripheral countries the likes of Spain, 
Portugal, Italy. 
735 That is, the endeavour of Euro zone Member States eventually uniting under a single 
sovereign country; hence, the reason we have red-circled its insertion position (within our 
diagram 7.3), as simply one other national Central Bank, the ECB, situated alongside other 
NCBs and, under the EIB umbrella in the hierarchical set up. 
736 ‘Indeed, free capital mobility in a single currency area means that capital moves from the 
less interesting member countries (with respect to the return on investment) to the more 
interesting countries in that area. Obviously, both short-term (speculative) investment and 
long-term (foreign direct) investment are directed into those economies where the yield is 
highest among the countries of the currency area, a return on investment that is positively 
correlated with the rate of real growth. If so, then economic divergence may increase among 
member countries, giving rise to higher rates of unemployment in those member countries … 
that offer no interesting rate of return on investment compared to some other countries of the 
same currency area’ (Rossi 2007: 101). 
737 ‘[T]he experience of European monetary unification proves that levelling the playing field 
is a pre-condition rather than an outcome of monetary integration. The process of 
convergence at the world level appears insurmountable, economically and above all 
politically. Furthermore, one monetary policy applied to vastly heterogeneous countries is 
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of Member States, whether considered from an economical, financial, political or, cultural 
perspective; it is not surprising that, more often than not, it is the stead-fast self-interest of 
each that eventually despairingly pulls them apart rather than unite them on a progressive 
common front. Were the Member States instead opt to recover their respective monetary 
sovereignties, it would enable their individual governments to stir the country’s economic and 
monetary policies (e.g., regard interest rates) according to their specific requirements and, 
country make-up; the Member States would have a better chance at evolving more 
progressively, in all aspects, if their very country profile was particularly kept abreast in 
national policy making. That said, the return to their respective monetary sovereignties would, 
without doubt, have a more certain and sustainable chance to succeed were it accompanied 
with some form (single/multi-country) of external payment system reform. Otherwise, as we 
have elaborated in this paper, the Member States’ vulnerability to the double charge of 
external debts, with respect to both its formation and the net interest payment, would continue 
to take its toll. 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
inefficient and amplifies divergences between strong and weak countries’ (Alessandrini and 
Fratianni 2008: 25). 
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8       Day’s end 
 
 
 
 
Looking back and onwards 
 
It is true that life in general is very much a process of evolution. A template that was formed 
from past individual experiences738 marks even the way that we view and assess things on a 
day-to-day basis. If we consider Keynes, just for example, his progressive efforts739 in 
monetary policy stemmed from his apprehension regard a serious lack of global institutional 
regulation that dated prior to the Great Depression. And yet again, there is the other situation 
of critical exchange rate instability that was a driving force behind the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
and the eventual creation of the European Monetary Union. The fact is, not all of our 
consequential responses to our past leads to a better alternative. But fortunately the template 
that colours our very outlook on life has, itself, the faculty to evolve over time, much in 
accordance with our ongoing experiences, be they positive740 or, negative. One individual that 
would likely attest to this is Dini741. A brilliant and fascinating mind in the fields of civil and 
                                                
738 ‘It is often said that man judges the facts that occur in non-human environments 
nevertheless according to his own experiences’ (Schmitt 2014: 92). 
739 ‘Keynes’ work is a response to the institutional weaknesses at international level that have 
characterized the first era of globalization, and his work is foremost aimed at international 
institution-building. Keynes monetary thought was elaborated in the 1920s, preceding the 
depression, and was chiefly devoted to understanding the nature of bank money (which 
proved to be very different than metallic money) and of modern banking activity. Keynes’ 
main legacy lays in his analysis of the adequacy of the institutional arrangements underlying 
both the national and international system of exchanges. The Keynes Plan is an attempt to 
ground the international system of trade in a sound monetary institutional framework’ 
(Piffaretti 2009: 52). 
740 After more than forty years of working on the issue of the external debt problem, not only 
did Bernard Schmitt’s research experience and perseverance lead to a solution for the 
eradication of the double charge, it ultimately evolved to zero external debt for the 
deficit/reforming country: more than he’d even gambled for. ‘By abolishing the sovereign 
debt, the Bureau will also enforce the cancellation of any external debt formed by net imports’ 
(Schmitt 2014: 64). A result to which he, himself, admits ‘an excellent conclusion, although a 
little unexpected’ (ibidem). 
741 Enrico Dini is a civil engineer by trade; he is probably better known as ‘The Man Who 
Prints Houses’ (see 3Dprinting.com The Story of Enrico Dini – The Man Who Prints Houses 
by Robert Dehue, July 9, 2013) though he currently is the man who, amongst other genial and 
most interesting projects, prints houses for fish, precisely ‘artificial lifelike coral reefs from 
sand’ (see http://www.isplora.com/news/print-houses). He is currently Chairman of Monolite 
UK Ltd, having founded the company in 2007. The London based company invented a new 
robotic technology for application in the construction building industry, which revolutionary 
process was branded as D-Shape. ‘His D-Shape machinery is capable of creating, from 
sandstone, full-sized buildings without the need for human intervention. The 3D printing 
process Dini’s machine uses requires nothing more than sand and an inorganic binder to 
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robotics engineering, Dini ceaselessly strives to think in uninhibited ways that allow his 
intellect to attain the pinnacle of creativity and perfection. As a youngster, the love of his life 
was building sandcastles by the sea. Today, he is the man behind a revolutionary new kind of 
architecture that has the potential to create buildings out of sandstone using an innovative 
technological process and a 3D printer (D-Shape). Interestingly enough though not 
surprisingly, he likes to describe his D-Shape printing machinery not as a machine742 but 
rather as a tool743 with which to create architecture. At a particular event presentation744, he 
candidly recounted not only how a basic idea745 had become a vision but also how one fateful 
incidence746 had seriously set him back on his heels; steadfastly resolved in his quest to 
                                                                                                                                                   
function, and Dini believes D-Shape has arrived at a methodology sure to upset the 
architectural design and building construction trades’ (see 
http://www.3dprinterworld.com/article/descent-into-genius-enrico-dini); (see also 
http://w3.bwk.tue.nl/fileadmin/bwk/ade/workshops/17.2.pdf). 
742 The machine (D-Shape 3D printer) runs in conjunction with an algorithmic software tool; 
it effectively prints algorithms. 
743 The following are some excerpts of an interview with him that was published on the 12th of 
January, 2015: ‘… a new tool to make a new architecture … the genius is not to produce a 3D 
printer but what to do with it … the advantages of 3D printing are endless, the only limit 
really, is the imagination’ (Audi Stories of Greatness: Enrico Dini challenges the limits of 3D 
printing; see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNCk4huhbUE). Although he’d originally 
designed his 3D printer to specifically build houses, he came to realize that its current 
construct best suited as an instrumental tool with which to create a vast array of any kind of 
architectural designs, particularly that of ‘archinature’ (environmentally friendly man-made 
marine creatures) to use his coined expression; one experience led to another and he thus 
became actively involved, amongst other interesting and ongoing ventures, in worldwide 
projects concerned with coastal ecology. 
744 His talk was held at Bocconi University in Milan, at a TEDxBocconiU events ‘Large Scale 
3D printing: Enrico Dini at TEDxBocconiU’. It was published on the 21st of May 2013 (see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L65QKBDQ6mc). 
745 He once had a Zcorp 3D printer that was developed by the Zcorp Corporation in 
Burlington Massachusetts based on a principle originating at the MIT in Boston; it was with 
this 3D printer that he once printed out a scaled down model of a house, simply in jest. In 
doing so, however, he got the idea that a house could be built in an unconventional way, that 
it could actually be printed out, using a 3D printer; he thus set out to build the 3D printer that 
he would require in order to attempt to do this. 
746 The story begins with the collapse of a Radiolaria-like shell that he’d created, but for Dini 
it turned out to be ‘the story of an inventive process’ that ‘produced a completely different 
outcome’ and as he particularly points out ‘the outcome of an inventive process that is still 
moving on’. (See ibid for ‘Large Scale 3D printing: Enrico Dini at TEDxBocconiU’; 
published 21st May, 2013). Though Dini had initially set out to invent a machine that would 
print houses he came to realize in the aftermath of this set-back (shell creation collapse) that 
his invention had inadvertently evolved into the creation of a 3D printing tool that had the 
potential to redefine architecture altogether, to take it to a whole new level, not only in 
methodology but also in applications. In positive retrospect, he decided it was a definite 
‘signal of a different way to think of architecture’ (see ibid); he elaborates on his very 
experience ‘not being able to make a fantastic machine but being able to make very rough 
objects I found a solution to use my machine as is and not as I be willing it to be: archinature. 
Shaping in demolition and also shaping in addition, in growth’ (ibidem). ‘It opened the way to 
use this 3D printing immediately in a certain environment, the sea for instance. So you see 
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revolutionize the world of architecture he set out to positively transform the experience into a 
new undertaking: he opened the door to the realm of archinature747. Whenever recounting the 
varied missions that he has in the making, Dini speaks with a captivating and most contagious 
enthusiasm; his storyline is simply enthralling, a true breath of fresh air. 
It would be invigorating, certainly encouraging, if we could sense a same enthusiasm applied 
to turning the European project (EU/EMU), as it stands today, towards a newly found and 
sound direction. Though the original thrust behind its development may have been to sow the 
seeds for a strong and prosperous European unification with which to hit the ground running, 
the project seems to have since fallen into a stagnant pond. Perhaps the best and sure way out 
of its quandary would be to attempt to escape it, in small steps. 
Let us consider, for starters, the European Monetary Union. The ECB has already in place the 
entire basic institutional infrastructure that could serve well, albeit provided some custom 
alterations were implemented, should the Member States be willing to embrace the multi-
country reform. In this case scenario, the Member States would be the very group of countries 
implementing a partial system of international payments with the ECB at the helm and, with 
the understood proviso that the said countries would regain their respective monetary 
sovereignties. This is the only way that the Euro Zone Member States could properly be set 
up as a truly functional and authentic monetary union. Otherwise, in the absence of a third 
counter-party international settlement institution (which the ECB currently falls short of) to 
mediate all of the external payments of its respective Member States, the latter remain without 
a true monetary union or, unique currency, for that matter. Moreover, they have not yet fully 
embraced, at least not concertedly, the idea of forming together a new sovereign country, e.g., 
the United States of Europe, which country could effectively issue its own national currency. 
And until they do so, which seems likely that they just might (even if only in the long run) 
given the current state of affairs, the Member States will remain in limbo, having neither a 
unique currency as would befit an authentic monetary union or, a national currency that they 
could call their own, were they united together within a newly formed sovereign country. 
Now, with all due respect to the Founding fathers who ardently fought for the establishment 
of a European Monetary Union (EMU) complemented with its ‘unique’ currency, the idea of 
Member States regaining their respective monetary sovereignties, at this stage of the game, 
would probably feel like they’ve been dealt a wallop. After all, it wasn’t in the cards. Fair 
enough, but just the same, this is where Dini’s positive approach could make all the 
difference. If instead of muddling along in a state of perpetual denial, the Member States were 
to bite the bullet and simply embrace the spirit of reform748, be it single or multi-country, they 
could very well be pleasantly surprised; free from an otherwise precarious situation with no 
end in sight, they could turn over a new leaf and in the event of adopting a multi-country 
reform, the ECB could even apply its existing infrastructure (with some custom 
modifications) and the whole paraphernalia of its working mechanism towards a newly found 
raison d’être as a true international settlement institution. It would be, undoubtedly, a fine 
                                                                                                                                                   
that I started supposing to invent a printer and then I invent a new concept of the architecture; 
I suppose going to print houses and I print houses just for a fish’ (ibid).  
747 Dini explains how ‘our sense of esthetics is something that is related to an evolution 
process’ as he describes his artistic creatures as ‘petrified algorithms, digital manufacturing 
based on computational designs’; he provides an example of what can be created out of this 
concept: ‘a digital model of a coral reef’. (See ibid for ‘Large Scale 3D printing: Enrico Dini 
at TEDxBocconiU’; published 21st May 2013). 
748 That is to say, presumably with a return of their respective monetary sovereignties in the 
cards. 
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way for the ECB to re-invent itself. In an analogy to Dini’s own experience749, the genius 
doesn’t have to be all about the original threads that went into the creation of a currency 
‘union’, nor in what it might have initially been designed for, but rather, in what it can best 
deliver at day’s end.  
That all said, if the Member States think that regaining their respective monetary 
sovereignties750 is too risky or, simply frightening, then the choice of uniting into a single 
sovereign country could be contemplated as another alternative; though certainly not without 
considering, in depth, its unique consequences. Then again, if neither undertaking is thought 
to be worthy of having a shot at, then perhaps the only thing left to do is for them to wait it 
out and let nature take its course. Of course, that would be like putting the cart before the 
horse. 
 As for the non-Euro zone European states, their individual prospects are a little easier from 
the start; by the mere fact that their respective monetary sovereignties are already existent, 
they are definitely ahead of the game: it is just a matter of weighing out the best way to play 
it. Once again, if the bigger picture of joining other non-Euro751 countries in implementing a 
partial system of international payments (multi-country reform) seems too daunting, then 
these countries (non-Euro) would really have nothing to lose to solitarily adopt the single-
country reform, even as an initial752 step. On considering it, the creation of a Sovereign 
Bureau within each of their respective countries, in either case scenario (single or multi-
country reform option) is a necessary requirement of the reformation, be it single or, multi-
country. Thus this initial step, part and parcel of either payment system reform, will most 
certainly have not been carried out in vain. If, in time, they aspired to a more comprehensive 
undertaking, then a reform implicating a group of countries in a partial system of international 
payments could always be considered at that point; the Sovereign Bureau in each of their 
respective countries would already be in place. There would remain only the task of 
consorting amongst them on the setting up of an international settlement institution (the likes 
of the WIB or, the EIB, for example) that would mediate the reforming countries’ external 
payments, in association with the individual country Sovereign Bureaus. In fact, it may be 
that if a group of non-Euro zone countries consorted on adopting a partial system of 
international payments, this could be the fateful catalyst to get the ball rolling with regard the 
Euro zone Member States, eventually, succumbing to the trend. 
On considering the laboring of the Founding fathers of the European project and the energy 
spent in their idealistic endeavours, and moreover, in fairness to all that are currently 
implicated, it becomes clear that the ailing situation warrants not only an acknowledgement of 
shortfalls but also a sincere desire to reach an equitable solution. After all, learning from our 
mistakes and being able to move on, is far more important than the fact that we might of 
stumbled along the way.  
This paper presents a compilation of the works of some of the most prominent authors who 
have written intensively on our subject. Still and all, at day’s end, we nevertheless face a work 
                                                
749 ‘[T]he genius is not to produce a 3D printer but what to do with it’. See Audi Stories of 
Greatness: Enrico Dini challenges the limits of 3D printing; published on the 12th of January 
2015. 
750 That is, along with adapting some form of external payment reform (single/multi-country). 
751 Assuming, that is, that joining the existent EMU (European Monetary Union) is not 
considered a viable proposition. 
752 In time, as they regain sound economic and financial growth from having, in the least, 
protected themselves from the double burden of external debt, they may feel better ready to 
consider a more encompassing form of reform such as the multi-country reformation would 
entail. 
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in progress. It is one thing to be in the know of our quagmire, yet quite another to be able to 
muster up the courage to do something about it. Will our nations be up to it? Affaire à 
suivre… 
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